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Abstract
This thesis seeks to understand the variety of factors that influenced the 
fairly widespread defection of much of the Spanish paramilitary 
constabulary, the Civil Guard, during the military rebellion that sparked the 
1936-1939 Civil War. The significance of this phenomenon for the initial 
stages of the uprising has been recognised in the literature, but the 
explanations presented for it have been often either overly deterministic or 
focus too much on structural aspects, at the expense of social and historical 
factors. Indeed, most academic studies have conflated the issue of the Civil 
Guard with that of the “military problem”, that is, the ubiquitous presence 
of the military in the political evolution of modem Spain, which often 
allowed the Spanish armed forces to interfere and eventually assume the 
control of the governing of the nation.
This study, while noting the importance of the links between the Civil 
Guard and the military, gives equal if not greater importance to the fact that 
the former is primarily a policing body, and thus a variety of other 
dynamics have to be considered when attempting to understand the 
attitudes and actions of the corps. Indeed, while much of the military was 
detached from the daily workings of society, civil guards were on the front 
line of social conflict, and this unavoidably affected attitudes within the 
corps towards the viability of the Republic, and the legitimacy of its left- 
wing governments. Furthermore, the Civil Guard was not immune to the 
political passions of the day. Indeed, the antagonism between the Left and 
the Civil Guard reached a new intensity in the wake of the October 1934 
Revolution, leading to a further deterioration when the leftist Popular Front 
coalition won the February 1936 elections. The polarization that infected 
Spanish politics during this period, as well as the increasing levels of social 
unrest and political violence, were key factors in influencing civil guards’ 
loyalties once the military rebellion began in July 1936.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Civil Guard, Spain’s paramilitary constabulary and largest police force until recent 
times, played an influential role in many of the pivotal events of the Second Republic 
(1931-1939), a fact recognized by both historians and contemporary protagonists of 
otherwise diverse views. For example, many have noted that the reluctance of the 
Director-General of the Civil Guard, Lieutenant General Jose Sanjujro, to maintain the 
monarchy through force after the Republican victory in the April 1931 elections was 
instrumental in the peaceful change of regime.1 Indeed, the uncertainty of gaining the 
support of the Civil Guard for any potential coup against the Republic would prove a 
deterrent for many would-be military conspirators for the next five years.2 Their 
concerns over the attitudes of the Civil Guard were well-founded. When the Army 
rebelled in July 1936, several scholars have noted that the division of Spain in those first 
few days roughly corresponded to the split of loyalties among the Civil Guard in favor of
1 Amongst those witnesses to the events of 12-14 April 1931 who noted the importance of Sanjuijo’s 
desertion of the monarchy: Miguel Maura, Asi cayo Alfonso XIII (Mexico City, 1962), pp. 165-166; Conde 
de Romanones, “Historia de cuatro dias”, originally published in 1940, reproduced in Notas de una vida 
(Madrid & Barcelona, 1999), pp. 511-512; Alvaro Alcala Galiano, La caida de un trono (Madrid, 1933), 
pp. 191-192; Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco (Barcelona, 
1976), pp. 450-452, and Mi vida junto a Franco (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), pp. 97-98. Historians 
have accepted largely their verdicts: Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1990), p. 86n2; 
Stanley Payne, Politics and the Military in Modem Spain (Stanford, CA, 1967), pp. 264-265; Joaquin 
Arraras, Historia de la segunda Republica espahola, Vol. I (Madrid, 1970), p. 28; Guillermo Cabanellas,
La guerra de los mil dias, Vol. I (Buenos Aires, 1975), pp. 178-179; Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography 
(London, 1995), pp. 69-71; Eduardo Gonzalez Calleja, El mausery el sufragio (Madrid, 1999), pp. 611- 
617. Ricardo de la Cierva, formerly the official state historian under the Franco regime, talks of Sanjuijo’s 
“three blows” against the monarchy, which earned the General “the number one position in the list of 
gravediggers of the monarchy”: Historia ilustrada de la guerra civil espahola, Vol. I (Barcelona, 1977), 
pp. 105-110. Rafael Borras Betriu mirrors La Cierva’s “three blows”, in which he calls Sanjurjo’s adhesion 
to the Revolutionary Committee on the morning of April 14th “the first of the four momentos estelares” 
which led to the proclamation of the Second Republic: Cambio de regimen: Caida de la Monarquiay 
proclamacion de la Republica (Barcelona, 2001), p. 248.
2 Preston, Franco, pp. 70, 111 -118.
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either the government or the insurgents.3 Indeed, one historian even suggests that this 
fact was partially responsible for turning a coup d’etat into a civil war.4
The actions of the Civil Guard affected the evolution of the Republic in other ways as 
well. Much like the Roman Catholic Church, the Civil Guard was an institution of great 
symbolic importance in Spanish society, and this image was not simply discarded with 
the proclamation of the Republic. The Civil Guard’s role as the daily defender of the 
state and the social order under the monarchy, and its veneer of uncompromising military 
discipline, had shaped popular perceptions of that very state and society. For those of 
more humble origins, the Civil Guard was the living symbol of an unjust, occasionally 
brutal, social order. Given that the Civil Guard was a representative of the central state, 
this perception was thus transferred towards the state itself, a state whose laws and 
representatives were viewed in a still largely rural society as foreign impositions, as 
opposed to being the will of the “people” (usually understood in local terms). It was the 
principal task of the new Republican government to reformulate this relationship between 
state and society. The repeated heavy-handedness of civil guards in dealing with protests 
and disorders throughout the Republican period contributed to the alienation of sectors of 
the working-classes from the new regime. Because of and in addition to this, the 
employment of the corps by the governments of the Republic was an immediate and 
continual source of friction between the pro-republican groups, especially those of the 
Left. They felt that the continued utilization of the Civil Guard was at best an
3 Preston, Franco, p. 148; Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective (London,
1986), p. 75; Joan Villaroya i Font, “La Guardia Civil: La crisis del Estado, 1923-1939”, Historia 16, Vol. 
19, No. 218 (1994), pp. 44-46; Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 
2002), pp. 79 and 79n4.
4 Alejandro Vargas Gonzalez, “La Guardia Civil ante el alzamiento”, Historia 16, No. 308 (2001), p. 75.
anachronism, at worst a betrayal of the ideals of the Republic. Within a month of the 
new regime’s proclamation, the controversy over the employment of the Civil Guard 
provoked the first governmental crisis of the Republic, and instances of civil guard 
brutality or violent clashes with the public over the next five years only served to 
heighten these tensions.
Despite the importance of the Civil Guard, the corps remains on the margin of the 
existing historical literature of the Second Republic and Civil War. There exists few 
scholarly works dedicated to the force and its personnel during the Second Republic -  or 
any other period for that matter -  and of those that do exist, the majority are produced by 
members of the corps, or by their colleagues in the military or police.5 While these 
official (and sympathetic) histories provide us with much useful information, they also 
leave many issues untouched, particularly those that may reflect poorly on the prestige 
and honour of the Civil Guard. Indeed, these works conform to a long historiographical 
tradition that seeks to defend the military nature of the Civil Guard against its critics.6
5 Of those works that give detailed attention to either the Second Republic as a whole, or focus on certain 
periods of this era, see Francisco Aguado Sanchez, La Guardia Civil en la revolucion roja de octubre de 
1934 (Madrid, 1972); Fernando Rivas G6mez, El Frente Popular: antecedentes de una alzamiento 
(Madrid, 1976); and the relevant sections in Francisco Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, 7 
vols. (Madrid, 1983-1985), this last title is broadly considered the official history of the corps. Lt. Col. 
(later General) Aguado Sdnchez was the founder and one-time director of the Centre for Historical Studies 
within the General Directorate of the Civil Guard, in which Lieutenant (later Captain) Rivas G6mez also 
worked. Established in the late 1960s, the Centre has produced a series of works dedicated to the history of 
the corps, the most important of these being the journal Revista de Estudios Historicos de la Guardia Civil 
(1968-1988), in which several articles (by Aguado Sdnchez and Rivas G6mez, amongst others) on the 
Second Republic and Civil War appeared. The near-monopoly enjoyed by the Civil Guard over its own 
history is not a phenomenon restricted to Spain. The lack of independent research about the gendarmerie- 
style police forces appears to be a common phenomenon throughout Europe: Clive Emsley, Gendarmes 
and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford, 1999), pp. 4-5; Jean-Noel Luc (ed.), La Gendarmerie, 
Etat et Societe au XIXe Siecle (Paris, 2002). For a general discussion of the historiography of the Civil 
Guard, see Gerald Blaney, Jr., “La historiografia sobre la Guardia Civil. Critica y propuestas de 
investigation”, Politicoy Sociedad, vol. 42, No. 3 (2005), pp. 31-44.
6 The first histories of the corps appeared in the wake of the bienio progresista (1854-1856), during which 
the organization, if not the very existence, of the Civil Guard was threatened. These histories defended the
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Since the Civil Guard’s foundation in 1844, its military nature has been a continual 
source of controversy. Nonetheless, there has been little change in the organization or 
nature of the corps from that first established by its founder, the Duque de Ahumada. For 
the Civil Guard and its admirers, this continuity demonstrates the wisdom of Ahumada’s 
vision, and hence the lack of any need to alter the military nature of the corps.7 In their 
view, it was the Civil Guard’s military discipline and relative protection from undue 
political interference (read civilian control) that, in their opinion, made it the impartial 
enforcer of laws and minimized, if not eliminated, the widespread corruption that 
characterized Spanish civil institutions. This, they would argue, made civil guards8 more 
efficient and reliable than their counterparts in non-militarized, civilian forces (local or 
centralized), and thus indispensable to any and all governments.
A second claim frequently put forward by civil guard historians is that of the political 
neutrality of the corps. This supposed political neutrality was a by-product of the Civil 
Guard’s military discipline, a neutrality that made it the loyal servant of all governments, 
no matter what their political ideology. Those political groups that were critical or
military nature of the corps, and place it within centuries-old traditions of Spanish policing. Indeed, to 
underline this continuity, considerable space is dedicated within these works to past police forces: Antonio 
de Quevedo y Donis and Jose Sidro Surga, La Guardia Civil: Historia de esta institucion (Madrid, 1858), 
Crispin Ximenez de Sandoval, Las instituciones de seguridadpublica en Espahay sus dominios de 
Ultramar (Madrid, 1858), and Jos6 Diaz Valderrama, Historia, servicios notables, socorros, comentarios 
de la cartilla, y  rejlexiones sobre el cuerpo de la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 1858). The arguments and 
structure of these first works are faithfully replicated in all subsequent general histories of the Civil Guard, 
including the seven volume Historia de la Guardia Civil by Aguado Sanchez.
7 As one of the corps’ more famous Director-Generals, Lt. General Jos6 Sanjurjo, stated, “Experience has 
shown that the fundamental principles governing the training of individual members of the Corps are so 
sound that they have never been altered. There could be no better proof of the wisdom which has 
prescribed them.” Jose Sanjuijo, “The Spanish Civil Guard”, part II, The Police Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4 
(1931), p. 542.
8 When referring to the Civil Guard as an institution, capital letters will be used (“Civil Guard”). When 
referring to the personnel of the corps, lower case letters will be employed (“civil guard” or “civil guards”).
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hostile to the Civil Guard whilst in opposition (read the Left), the defenders of the corps 
assert, soon realized the apparent error of their position upon coming to power and 
recognized the benefits of the corps’ services, and thus converted into admirers of the 
Benemerita and its traditions.9 The underlying logic behind this argument is that those 
groups that argued for the demilitarization of the corps did so not for any reasons of 
improving its structure or efficiency, but rather to utilize (or weaken) the Civil Guard for 
their own partisan political agenda.
Furthermore, the Civil Guard is often portrayed in the official historiography, somewhat 
misleadingly, as the modem manifestation of a long tradition of paramilitary policing 
bodies, that reaches back to the Middle Ages. By doing so, they attempt to bolster further 
the legitimacy of the nature and structure of the corps by presenting these as intimately 
linked with Spanish civilization. Thus, they would argue that the success of the 
Ahumadine model was precisely due to its near-perfect conformity with immutable 
Spanish values and the fundamental needs of Spanish society.10 Those that sought to
9 The Civil Guard was known as “La Benemerita " (The Meritorious) amongst its admirers, a title officially 
conceded to the corps by Alfonso XIII in 1929. This title, curiously, was also used in reference to the 
Carabinieri in Italy. An example the Civil Guard’s view of the love-hate relationship between the Left and 
the Civil Guard, in which the former are presented as naive and the source of the tension between the two, 
see Miguel Lopez Corral, “Los gobiemos de izquierdas y la Guardia Civil”, Guardia Civil, No. 521 (1987), 
pp. 41-52.
10 The emphasis on the national, that is, domestic, origins of the Civil Guard was not a phenomenom 
particular to the Spanish corps. The Piedmontese Carabinieri Reali, the precursor to the Italian force by the 
same name, did not officially recognize the French origins of the gendarmerie model, instead claimed a 
direct link with the Carabini force created in 1791 to combat bandits and brigands: Emsley, Gendarmes and 
the State, p. 183. Traditional historians of the English police also sought to emphasize the historic, national 
roots of the “New Police”: Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History (London, 
1996), pp. 248-249. The leading historian of the current generation of Civil Guard historians, Captain 
Miguel Lopez Corral, recognizes the more modem origin of the Civil Guard, though he otherwise 
maintains the same arguments in favour of the military nature of the Civil Guard as his predecessors: La 
Guardia Civil: Nacimientoy Consolidacion, 1844-1874 (Madrid, 1995).
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undermine or deny this harmonious relationship between the Civil Guard and Spanish 
traditions were misguided or, using Francoist parlance, part of “anti-Spain”.
In terms of the Republican period, the indispensability and neutrality of the Civil Guard 
is contrasted to the volatility of the republican regime, and the partisanship of its (leftist) 
governments. As one civil guard historian asserted, “Spain was not prepared for a 
democratic regime (regimen de convivencia) . . .  Almost all Spaniards agree that the 
public disorder [of the period] was an underlying cancer that ended up destroying the 
Republic.”11 Official Civil Guard historiography has emphasized the irresponsibility, if 
not the threat posed by the Left in the form of the October 1934 Revolution, the descent 
into violence and chaos under the Popular Front government and its “persecution” of the 
Civil Guard -  whose personnel were only doing their duty and, and according to them, 
served the Republic loyally. This line of argument thus provides the necessary 
justification for the military rebellion of July 1936 and excuses, if not glorifies, the 
blatant breach of discipline of Ihose civil guards who joined it in order to “save Spain”.
As the official literature extols the supposed political neutrality of the corps, it employs a 
curious logic that characterizes those civil guards who defended the elected Popular Front 
government during the Civil War as, at best, misguided or indecisive, or, at worst, 
politically motivated. Consequently, there is no recognition that those civil guards who 
joined the rebellion might have been politically motivated as well, or indeed that there 
was any perceivable sympathy for the Right amongst the members of the corps 
throughout the Republic. Indeed, in marked contrast to the descriptions of the Left in
11 Fernando Rivas Gomez, ‘La Guardia Civil del siglo XX’, in Jose Sanz Munoz (ed.), La Guardia Civil 
Espanola (Madrid, 1994), p. 246. This view can also be found in Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia 
Civil, Vol. V, p. 136.
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Civil Guard histories, there is little criticism to be found of the role of the political Right 
in the breakdown of the Republic and its contribution to social tensions and political 
violence.12
Those works written by scholars not professionally linked to the Civil Guard, the 
National Police Corps or the military take a markedly negative view of the Spanish 
policing tradition.13 In their opinion, the military nature of the Civil Guard, its links with 
the Army, and its predominance within the Spanish policing apparatus, was a product of 
the efforts of ancien regime forces to control, if not halt the democratization and 
modernization of Spanish politics and society. This view was first set out in great detail 
by Diego Lopez Garrido in his seminal work, La Guardia Civil y  los origines del Estado 
centralista, whose themes were expanded upon in Manuel Ballbe, Orden publico y
12 These views can also be found in the most recent monograph on the Civil Guard during the Republican 
period: Julio de Anton, Policiay Guardia Civil en la Espaha republicana (Madrid, 2001). While providing 
some useful material, Ant6n, a Superintendent in the National Police Corps, demonstrates a near-obsession 
with the Masonic affiliations of many republicans, a favorite theme of the Franco dictatorship, and 
maintains the fiction that civil guards only acted according to their duty. For a discussion of the dominant 
pro-Francoist view within the Civil Guard of the Civil War period, see Gerald Blaney, Jr., “Unsung Heroes 
of the Republic? The Civil Guard, the Second Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1936’, in Morten Heiberg 
& Mogens Pelt (eds.), New perspectives on the Spanish Civil War after the end of the Cold War 
(forthcoming). Nonetheless, there are examples of Civil Guard historians who do not subscribe to the 
official interpretation, or at least question it: Gonzalo Jar Couselo, “La Guardia Civil en Navarra (18-07- 
1936)”, Principe de Viana, no. 192 (1991), pp. 281-323; Jesus Nufiez Calvo, “Bemabe Lopez Calle: el 
guardia civil, anarquista y maquis”, Diario de Cadiz (14 December 2004); Jose Luis Cervero, Los rojos de 
la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 2006). Somewhat more timidly, Miguel Lopez Corral admits that those who 
joined the 1936 military rebellion did break discipline, though without condemning their actions: “La 
Guardia Civil en la Guerra (1936-1939), Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil, no. 10 (1994), pp. 143-155. The 
Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil is published by the General Directorate of the Civil Guard, and this 
particular issue was dedicated to the history of the corps, in commemoration of its 150th anniversary.
L6pez Corral’s article was reproduced, virtually in its entirety, in the official magazine of the Civil Guard: 
Miguel L6pez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en la guerra, 1936-1939”, Guardia Civil, Part I: No. 530 (1988), 
pp.41-48; Part II: No. 531 (1988), pp.41-48.
13 Enrique Martinez Ruiz is the most notable exception here. Possibly for this reason, his La creacion de la 
Guardia Civil (Madrid, 1976) has exercised a certain influence amongst civil guard historians, evident in 
such works as Miguel Lopez Corral’s La Guardia Civil. Nacimientoy consolidacion.
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militarismo en la Espana constitucional, 1812-1983,14 Given the longer time frame of 
Ballbe’s book, which covers the Second Republic, it has become the primary reference 
for works that deal with the Civil Guard in this period.15 Ballbe, like Lopez Garrido, 
views the Civil Guard through the prism of the debate over the “military problem” (el 
problema militar), in which the military, through its near independence from the civilian 
authorities as well as its usurpation of the latter’s prerogatives, assumed the role of 
arbiter of Spanish politics, to the detriment of the democratic development of modem 
Spain.
One of the principal mechanisms for doing this was through the military’s control over 
issues of public order which, according to this school of thought, had two main 
consequences for the Civil Guard. Firstly, in terms of the corps’ relationship to the 
general public, the “militarization” of public order necessarily imported rigid militaristic 
attitudes into the regulation of social tensions and conflict. As a result of their military 
training and structure, which was meant to separate them from the communities in which 
they were stationed, civil guards were more aggressive, if not brutal in their dealings with 
the public, for they saw the latter not as citizens with rights that were to be served and
14 Diego Lopez Garrido, La Guardia Civily los origins del Estado centralista (first edition: Barcelona, 
1983; revised second edition, Madrid, 2004); Manuel Ballbe, Orden publico y  militarismo en la Espana 
constitucional, 1812-1983 (Madrid, 1983 & 1985). Lopez Garrido wrote a second book dealing with 
policing in Spain, much of which deals with the Civil Guard: El aparato policial en Espana (Barcelona,
1987). While his first book principally deals with the mid-nineteenth century, the focus of the second, 
beyond a summary of material from his first work, is largely on the 1960s and 1970s.
15 Among those works which largely follow the theses of Ballbe are Stanley G. Payne, Spain’s First 
Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936 (Madison, WI, 1993); Mario Lopez Martinez, Orden publico 
y luchas agrarias en Andalucia (Madrid, 1995); Julian Casanova De la calle al frente. El 
anarcosindicalismo en Espaha, 1931-1939 (Barcelona, 1997); Eduardo Gonz&lez Calleja, “El Estado ante 
la violencia”, in Santos Julia, ed., Violenciapolitico en la Espaha del siglo X X (Madrid, 2000), pp. 365- 
406; Graham, The Spanish Republic at War; Carlos Gil Andres, La Republica en la Plaza: Los sucesos de 
Arnedo de 1932 (Logrofio, 2002); Chris Ealham, Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937 
(London, 2005).
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protected, but rather a potential threat that had to be controlled. This in turn served only 
to radicalize opposition movements, increase social tensions and violence, and thus 
destabilizing the political process and undermining civilian authority.
Secondly, in relation to the civilian authorities, the Civil Guard’s institutional, 
jurisdictional and personal links with the military gave it a potentially dangerous degree 
of autonomy from the civilian control, all the more so when the lines between military 
and civilian competencies were blurred by the presence of military officers in civilian 
positions. This not only meant that there existed a lack of accountability for the actions 
of civil guards, which made them all the more likely to resort to force in their dealings 
with the public, but also signified that in a contest between civilian and military authority, 
such as that which occurred in July 1936, civil guards would side with the latter. The 
failure of the Second Republic to rectify this situation, it is argued, contributed largely to 
its breakdown and collapse into civil war. Indeed, Ballbe goes on to claim that not only 
did the Republicans fail to fully break with the practices of the past, their supposedly 
“authoritarian” approach to dissent and public order issues only served to perpetuate, if 
not exacerbate those problems inherited from the monarchy.16
The Civil Guard’s military nature and its close links with the army undeniably had an 
impact on its personnel and institutional cultures. Nonetheless, the near-singular focus on 
this aspect has led scholars to overlook a series of equally important factors that also 
influenced civil guard attitudes and behaviour, factors which were crucial to
16 Ballbe, Orden publico y  militarismo, pp. ii-iii, 317-396. Ballb^’s chapter on the Second Republic is titled 
‘The contradictions of the Second Republic and the configuration of an authoritarian democracy’.
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understanding not only the difficulty of “republicanizing” the Civil Guard but also the 
dynamics and motivations behind the decisions of many civil guards to join the 
Alzamiento National. Writing in the shadow of four decades of military dictatorship and 
the threat from ultra sectors in the military and the security forces to the democratic 
transition after Franco’s death (such the attempted coup of February 1981, in which civil 
guards played a prominent role), it was only natural that scholars focussed their attention 
on the role of a militarized Civil Guard on the political development of modem Spain. 
The desire to understand the roots of the military dictatorship and how best to reform the 
Spanish state -  in which the supposed failures of the Second Republic were foremost in 
mind -  were the primary concerns underlining much of the initial academic research on 
the Civil Guard after the death of Franco. Nonetheless, once the danger to the democratic 
transition had passed so did academic interest in bodies such as the Civil Guard. This has 
largely translated into stagnation as far as research into the corps during the Republic and 
Civil War period, as witnessed by the continued heavy reliance on texts such as Ballbe by 
more recent works on the period.
This doctoral thesis hopes to build upon our existing knowledge, and employ a variety of 
different approaches to the history of the Civil Guard during the Republic. The objective 
is to put the actions and attitudes of its personnel in their full context, identifying both 
underlying and immediate factors that ultimately led to the defection of many civil guards 
to the military rebels in the summer of 1936. The vast majority of past studies have 
attempted to explain the behaviour of civil guards either by referring to their military 
training, regulations and other official measures meant to shape civil guards in a
14
particular mould, or by government policies and strategies regarding policing and public 
order. Such an approach largely relegates civil guards to passive actors, and does not 
give sufficient consideration to other factors that influenced their conduct and viewpoints. 
Perhaps as a consequence of this, virtually no independent academic work on the period, 
even those that deal explicitly with the issues of public order during the Republic, makes 
any reference to sources such as the professional press of the Civil Guard -  or those 
articles written by members of the corps in the military press -  which would have been 
crucial in ascertaining its personnel’s attitudes about a variety of issues and events.17
In order to understand the mindset of a civil guard, it is important first to understand the 
environment that he finds himself in, the pressures and preoccupations that colour his 
views of that same environment. Chapter Two will examine not only the military aspect 
of a civil guard’s professional and social life, but also his interaction with the general 
public. Unlike the regular soldier who lived within the confines of garrison life, the civil 
guard, like any other policeman, had to patrol the communities under his jurisdiction, 
which involved a much higher level of interaction with the general public and a greater 
intimacy with the social and political problems of the day. Another difference between 
the civil guard and his army counterpart is that civil guards lived in isolated posts, greatly 
outnumbered by the populations that they served. The often tense relationship that 
existed between civil guards and the (predominantly) rural communities that they served 
was as important in determining civil guard attitudes and actions as their military 
background. This dynamic was all the more evident in times of significant social unrest,
17 The only exception to this is Gil Andres, La Republica en la Plaza, yet the author only consults the 
December 1931 and January 1932 issues of the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil, and then only in 
respect to the issue of reforming the regulations of the Civil Guard and the events at Amedo.
and affected how civil guards viewed opposition groups and working class organizations. 
In sum, while civil guards shared their military counterparts’ reverence for the concepts 
of authority and order, these were not abstract notions for the men of the Benemerita, but 
could be matters of life and death.
Indeed, the daily experience of a civil guard also coloured his perception of the political 
situation and the regime that he served. Like other social groups, civil guards viewed a 
political ideology or form of government in terms of how these responded to their own 
interests and concerns. From the perspective of a civil guard, who was situated in the 
front line of any social conflict, this would mean the ability for a regime to maintain 
order. Chapter Three will examine how the Civil Guard viewed the social and political 
crises facing Spain from the “Disaster of 1898” to the fall of the Monarchy in April 1931. 
With the authority of the constitutional monarchy collapsing in the years after the First 
World War, alongside the attendant rise in social and political conflict which stoked fears 
of a Bolshevik takeover (in which civil guards would certainly have been among the first 
targets for the revolutionaries), civil guards gravitated towards a military solution in 
1923. When the failure of the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera brought about a 
similar situation, civil guards then looked (somewhat more reluctantly) to the republican 
opposition as a possible answer to Spain’s problems.
Despite the apparent similarities between the situations in 1923 and 1931, there were 
significant differences. In contrast to the unswerving support enjoyed by the corps under 
the dictatorship (and the monarchy in general), as well as the ideological proximity
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between many civil guards and the values of the old regime, there existed a certain 
suspicion, if not hostility, between the Benemerita and their new republican masters.
Yet, there was not an insuperable divide between the two parties as there was some 
common ground between the goals of the Provisional Government of the Republic and 
the Civil Guard, which could have evolved into a more positive relationship. That 
ultimately this was not the case has led many scholars to focus on the supposed failure of 
the Republicans to exert effective civilian control over the Civil Guard and the other 
security forces, as well as establish a “republican” alternative to the militarized approach 
to public order issues.
While this interpretation is partially true, it overlooks a series of other factors, as well as 
making a series of debatable assumptions, amongst these the tendency to view the 
relationship between the Civil Guard and the Republican authorities as static, and thus the 
widespread defection to the military rebels in 1936 as virtually a foregone conclusion. It 
is important to stress the evolutionary nature of this relationship, as well as to highlight 
the different priorities and strategies of the various administrations and how this impacted 
on attempts to “republicanize” the Civil Guard. Often scholars underestimate the extent 
and nature of those reforms passed during the Republican-Socialist governments of 1931- 
1933, and how the Centre-Right administrations of 1933-1935 undermined these
|  Q
significant reforms of the Civil Guard and the public order apparatus. The debate over
18 Ballbe sees no change between the Republican-Socialist governments and those of the Radical-CEDA 
period: Orden publico y  militarismo, p. 363. This should come as little surprise as Ballb6 sees the 
Republican period as a continuation of the policies of the Monarchy, a line of continuity that stretches from 
the Republic to the Franco regime (pp. 397-402). Turrado Vidal also notes what he sees as a significant 
continuity between the two Republican periods: La policia en la historia, p. 189. For a challenge to these 
interpretations, see Gerald Blaney, Jr., “Keeping Order in Republican Spain, 1931-1936”, in G. Blaney, 
Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 1918-1940 (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 31-68.
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the direction and meaning of the Republic, and the breakdown of the unity seemingly 
enjoyed at the birth of the regime, also necessarily made the “republicanization” of the 
corps all the more difficult. Furthermore, care should be taken when talking about a 
rebellion against “the Republic” in 1936 for, unlike the civilian militias of the Carlists 
and the Falange who had a particular political agenda, it will be seen that many civil 
guards felt that they were rebelling against a particular government, the Popular Front 
government, and thus ultimately defending the Republic.19
Chapters Four to Six will chart this progression from guarded support for the Republic 
within the Civil Guard to widespread rebellion. Chapter Four will deal with the first 
period of Centre-Left rule, in which the seeds of the mutual hostility between the Civil 
Guard and the Left seen in 1936 were planted. Again, this was not necessarily a product 
of the conservative outlook of most civil guards, or their military nature, though these 
aspects were undoubtedly important. The proclamation of the Second Republic provoked 
a variety of reactions within the Civil Guard. Many civil guards were not against change 
per se, but rather disorderly change. Indeed, underlying the issues of ideology, the use of 
force and civilian control, was a concern over levels of social and political violence 
which were the fundamental preoccupations of most civil guards. From the perspective 
of a civil guard, high levels of unrest, and the radical rhetoric that usually accompanies it, 
signified a potential danger to his physical well-being, and to that of his family who 
resided with him in the casa-cuartel. It also resulted in more mundane annoyances such
19 A reflection of the political ambiguity of the 1936 rebellion can be seen in General Franco’s manifesto 
broadcast on 18 July 1936, in which he avoided any explicit reference to either defending the Republic or 
restoring the monarchy, lying the blame for the situation in Spain on the government of the Popular Front. 
Preston, Franco, pp. 140-141.
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as longer hours and frequent mobilisations that took him across the country and away 
from his family, who were left vulnerable in his absence. Civil guards looked to the 
reigning government to manage, if not resolve, those conflicts that gave rise to these 
waves of unrest. When the government seemed unable or unwilling to deal with disorder, 
civil guards would take what they felt were the necessary measures to impose order, 
including preventative brutality. When this apparent failure on the part of the 
government seemed endemic, or due to a supposed revolutionary agenda, then frustration 
turned into alienation, and possibly even rebellion.
The first murmurs of rebellion were already evident in January 1932, when the ongoing 
social unrest evident in much of Spain -  unrest that was supposed to diminish, if not 
disappear with the establishment of the Republic -  converged with a shift in the political 
composition of the government from a broad Right-Centre-Left coalition to a more left- 
wing one. The controversies surrounding events such as those of Castilblanco, Amedo 
and Casas Viejas served only to enlarge the growing chasm between the Left and the 
Civil Guard, leading the latter increasingly to see the former as contributing to the 
disorder, and thus not fit to govern. At the same time, the corps enjoyed the unstinting 
support of conservative sectors, who viewed the Civil Guard as the defender of progress 
and civilization from the dark passions of the easily-manipulated infantile masses, and 
whose criticisms of the Left Republican-Socialist government echoed those of many civil 
guards. This allowed civil guards to dismiss those criticisms of the corps coming from 
the Left as partisan, and also gave a certain popular legitimacy to the view of a growing
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number of civil guards that the policies of the ruling political coalition, particularly the 
Socialists, were the cause of the ongoing unrest.
The rhetoric of the Centre-Right, whose main representative, the Radical Republican 
Party, had left the Republican-Socialist coalition in December 1931, did much to foster 
the image of the Left Republican-Socialist governments as overly partisan. Being the 
largest and oldest of the Republican parties, the Radicals’ rhetoric lent a further air of 
legitimacy to the criticisms of semi- and non-republican sectors, including those within 
the Civil Guard. The targeting of the Socialists by the Radicals only increased the latent 
suspicion these groups harboured towards the working class movement. Furthermore, the 
sheer opportunism of the leader of the Radicals, Alejandro Lerroux, had led him to resort 
to the time-honoured tradition of courting disaffected elements within the military and the 
police. It also led the Radicals into an alliance with the authoritarian Right, as represented 
by the CEDA party. This became more pronounced once the Radicals were in power, as 
Lerroux and his followers sought to ingratiate themselves with these elements in order to 
break the organizational strength of the Left and maintain themselves in power 
indefinitely.
Chapter Five will examine the period of Centre-Right rule, in which the policies of the 
Radical-CEDA governments not only undermined the reforms of the previous 
administrations, but also did much to polarize the political atmosphere. Regarding the 
Civil Guard, these policies of “rectification” and provocation did much to reinforce old 
suspicions of the Left, particularly after the events of October 1934. The October
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Revolution was seen amongst leftist circles as an effort to defend the Republic from those 
who wished to destroy it, and the repression that followed it evidence of the true colours 
of the Centre-Right government. From the perspective of the Civil Guard, they had 
defended the Republic from the Bolshevik pretensions of the Socialists and their allies, a 
defence that cost the force many dead and wounded. Indeed, the enforced social peace 
that followed the repression, and the praise the corps received from the government, was 
contrasted favourably to the disorder of the period of Centre-Left rule during which the 
Civil Guard was constantly “attacked” by leftist groups for simply doing their duty (as 
they saw it), attacks that only intensified in the wake of the post-revolutionary repression.
Indeed, the period of Centre-Right rule did much to set the ground for the events of the 
spring and summer of 1936 when the Centre-Left returned to power in the form of a 
Popular Front coalition. Chapter Six will examine the process whereby the internal 
discipline of the Civil Guard broke down, to the point at which rebellion seemed the only 
option to save Spain, and themselves, from the Communist revolution that they believed 
was imminent. While it is clear now to all but the most partisan of historians that this 
Bolshevik threat was more a phantom menace than a reality in the making, at the time it 
seemed all too possible to many civil guards. False rumours of revolutionary 
preparations, coupled with the radical rhetoric of the working class organizations and the 
rising tide of strikes, land occupations and street violence made the ominous warnings of 
the politicians of the Right ring true in the ears of many civil guards. From the point of 
view of many civil guards, the Popular Front government was unable or, worse yet, 
unwilling to take the “necessary measures” to deal with the situation. Instead, the
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government appeared to prefer “persecuting” those same civil guards who protected the 
Republic in 1934, and its policies were undermining the authority and morale of the 
benemerita, whose personnel constituted the dam that held back the revolutionary flood. 
As such, just as in 1934, civil guards would be the first casualties if this dam were ever to 
break, and so they were ever vigilant for cracks.
Yet, we should not view this as simply the hysteria of a reactionary paramilitary police 
force. The polarisation that had infected Spanish politics by 1936 had almost inevitably 
spread to the whole police apparatus, with officers of both leftist and rightist convictions 
believing that the government was too weak to deal with the feared fascist or communist 
danger, and beginning to organize their efforts for the defence of their respective causes. 
Yet, it should be remembered that these politically active civil guards were a minority. 
Nonetheless, the sympathies of the majority of civil guards leaned towards the military 
conspirators. This was not simply a case of a civil-military divide, but rather the product 
of a variety of factors.
Nonetheless, when the deluge broke, the responses of many civil guards were more like 
reactions to events than the carrying out of well-laid plans. While the murder of Calvo 
Sotelo at the hands of a squad of Assault Guards led by a left-wing Civil Guard officer 
had served as a clarion call to those who feared that the Popular Front government had 
lost control of the situation, there was considerable hesitation amongst a significant 
number of civil guards when the planned military rebellion was initiated on 17-18 July 
1936, particularly in those areas where the uprising did not enjoy widespread popular
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support. This was in part due to the ingrained reticence to break discipline, for almost all 
provincial and divisional commanders were loyal to the government, as was the Director 
General himself. This fact is significant for it demonstrates that those who did rebel did 
so not only against the Popular Front, but also against the authority of their own 
commanding officers and the expressed orders of their Director General.
This most exceptional breakdown in discipline thus reflected a general sense of 
desperation and fear amongst many civil guards, sensations that would only increase in 
intensity as events unfurled. A distinction must be made between those who participated 
in the conspiracy in its early stages, those that joined the rebellion outright, and those that 
defected later. In this sense, figures on percentages of loyal and rebel civil guards often 
obscure as much as they reveal. Chapter Seven will attempt to put these figures in their 
proper context, understanding the variety of motivations behind those that did join the 
military rebels, and taking into consideration the chronology of these acts. For example, 
for those civil guards that attempted to suppress their distaste for the Popular Front 
government and ignore right-wing propaganda about an imminent Communist coup, the 
temptation to join the rebellion became irresistible once the revolution did break out in 
those areas still under nominal government control. Moreover, government orders to 
distribute arms to the working class organizations and to lead their militias against the 
civil guards’ comrades in arms would have confirmed the suspicion in many of these civil 
guards that the government was at the mercy of the revolutionaries. Indeed, the very 
order to arm those same organizations that had displayed such hostility towards the corps
23
was seen as the equivalent of asking them to assist in their own suicides and the massacre 
of their families.
In conclusion, this thesis will attempt to put the actions and attitudes of civil guards 
during the Republican period in their proper context. It is hoped that that will present a 
more nuanced view of the Civil Guard, and consequently, on the corps’ relationship with 
the Republican regime.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Civil Guard was bom in a century of conflict and instability. While the War of 
Independence against France (1808-1814) should have produced a broad sentiment of 
national unity, the reality was the exact opposite. Tellingly, when the French intervened 
once again in the Spanish political process less than 10 years later, putting an end to the 
“Liberal Triennium” (1820-1823) and restoring to King Fernando VII his absolutist 
prerogatives, the lack of popular resistance to this foreign intrusion into domestic affairs 
was notable. The divisions within the royalist camp and also amongst the liberals only 
fractionalized political loyalties further, resulting in civil war (1833-1840) and a string of 
uprisings. Indeed, despite their eventual victory over the reactionary wing of the royalists 
in the First Carlist War (as this civil war is commonly known), Spanish liberals were as 
divided as ever, and the popular appeal of their doctrine was weak outside urban areas.
In a predominantly rural country, as Spain was until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, this meant that the mobilizing power of the liberal state would remain tenuous, 
which in turn encouraged the increasing intervention of the military in civilian affairs. 
Local and regional sentiment remained strong, and often resisted the encroachment of the 
central state into their affairs. The weakness of the state in much of the country and the 
social upheaval produced by invasion, war and the shift from a seigniorial to a capitalist 
economy gave rise to banditry, peasant unrest and a pervasive sense of insecurity in much 
of the country.
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When the conservative branch of Spanish liberalism, the Moderates, took power in 
December 1843, they set out to resolve these problems through the establishment of 
strong central institutions and a strict control of the political and governing process. One 
of the key institutions needed to achieve these goals was a national police force. Given 
the nature of the political situation in Spain, this police force would have had to be a 
centralized one. The Moderates were not the first group to realize this, as previous 
governments had attempted to establish policing bodies, but these rose and fell as quickly 
as the administrations that proposed them.1 In the absence of effective local or national 
policing bodies, the maintenance of law and order was entrusted to civilian militias and 
the military. The former, as elsewhere in Europe, proved to be politically unreliable, 
were poorly trained, transitory in nature and often as corrupt and arbitrary as the old 
policing bodies of the ancien regime? On the other hand, some within the military were 
beginning to feel uneasy about the constant use of troops for policing duties. The 
Minister of War, General Mazarredo, expressed these concerns in letter to the Interior 
Minister on 31 December 1843, in which he noted the negative effects these types of 
duties were having on the discipline of the Army, which was not organized or trained for 
such duties, and the need for a regular force under the auspices of the Ministry of the 
Interior to deal with public order issues and banditry.
1 For a discussion of the various attempts to establish a national police apparatus from 1808 to 1844, see 
Martin Turrado Vidal, La policia en la historia contemporanea de Espana, 1766-1986 (Madrid, 1995), pp. 
45-124.
2 As one militiaman explained to the English traveller George Borrow, “If we meet any person who is 
obnoxious to us, we fall upon him, and with a knife or bayonet generally leave him wallowing in his blood 
on the pavement; no one but a national would be permitted to do that.” Quoted in Raymond Carr, Spain, 
1808-1975 (Oxford, 1982), p. 159.
3 Diego Lopez Garrido, El aparato policial en Espana (Barcelona, 1987), p. 42. For similar concerns and 
issues elsewhere in Europe over the use of militias and regular troops for policing duties, see David H.
Bay ley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis (New Brunswick, NJ, 1985), pp. 42- 
43.
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The inadequacy of both the National Militia and the military as police forces was 
recognized in the preamble of the Royal Decree of 28 March 1844, the first of the two 
principal founding documents of the Civil Guard. This decree set out the need for a 
disciplined national force at the disposal of the central government, which despite its 
civilian function, would be staffed by men seconded from the military. As in many other 
countries, soldiers were seen as ideal candidates for service in the police, particularly in 
gendarmerie forces as these were stationed in rural communities, for they were seen as 
possessing the necessary discipline to fulfil their duties and would be less corruptible.
This was a logical conclusion in an era of nation-construction, when the state was 
expanding both in terms of competencies and personnel. However, the sense of a 
common identity and loyalty to the nation-state, as opposed to a more local focus, was 
weak amongst the general population, the same population from which recruits would be 
needed for an ever-increasing bureaucracy. In order to guard further against the pull of 
local influence, it was also stated that civil guards would receive a relatively high salary. 
As such, the decree gave high importance to the selection and pay of personnel, for unless 
men of impeccable character were recruited and duly recompensed for their service, “the 
hope placed in this institution that it will reflect the benefits seen in other nations will not 
be realized”.4
The man approached to organise the new force was Field Marshal Francisco Javier Giron 
y Ezpeleta, the Second Duke of Ahumada, who was Inspector-General of the Army at the
4 The full text of this decree can be found in Enrique Martinez Ruiz, Creadon de la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 
1976), pp. 383-388.
27
time. Ahumada was known for his organisational skills, and had some familial 
experience with the task of organising police forces as his father, General Pedro Agustin 
Giron, had put forward a project for the creation of a gendarmerie-type force, the Legion 
de sahaguardias nacionales, over twenty years earlier.5 As Inspector-General of the 
Army, Ahumada was charged with resolving those issues affecting the discipline of the 
military, which had been undermined by seven years of civil war against the Carlists 
(whose officers were absorbed into the regular army as part of the agreement that ended 
the 1833-1840 civil war) and then three years of rule by General Baldomero Espartero 
(1840-1843), who represented the opposing liberal camp (the so-called Progressives) and 
had forcefully assumed the Regency of the Spanish Crown, only to be dislodged from 
power in turn by apronunciamiento. During his tour of Catalonia, the Levante and 
Andalusia -  the heartlands of Carlist and Progressive sentiment -  Ahumada was 
distressed with the attitudes of the local civilian officials, who did not to recognize his, 
nor the central government’s authority, and the negative effect this was having on the 
military garrisons stationed in these areas.6 As such, he was opposed to the idea that the 
provincial governors would be entrusted with the selection of officers for the new corps, 
as stipulated in the 28 March decree, and demanded that he himself would be awarded 
this key competency. Moreover, he believed the March decree had a series of other 
organizational shortcomings, amongst these the lack of a general inspectorate to ensure 
the discipline and efficiency of the new corps.
5 For a discussion of the failed proposal of 1820, and an overview of its contents, see Miguel Gistau 
Ferrando, La Guardia Civil: Historia de esta institucion (Madrid, 1907), pp. 110-114. In his memoirs, 
Gir6n cited the French Gendarmerie as the inspiration for the proposed Legion de salvaguardias 
nacionales: Ballbe, Or den publico y  militarismo, p. 141.
6 Excerpts of his letters during his inspection of these areas are provided in Carlos Seco Serrano, “Narvaez 
y el Duque de Ahumada: Acotaciones a un espistolario”, Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil (henceforth CGC), 
No. 1 (1989), pp. 333-35.
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After his colleague and friend General Ramon Narvaez, the “big sword” (espadon) of the 
Moderates, assumed direct leadership of the government, Ahumada could be certain that 
his recommendations would receive proper consideration. He was not disappointed, and 
on 13 May 1844 a second decree was promulgated that superseded that of 28 March. The 
May decree increased the role of the Ministry of War in the corps -  placing it in charge of 
personnel, discipline, pay and organization -  while leaving the force at the orders of the 
Interior Minister and the provincial governors as regards their regular duties.7 This dual 
dependency, common to almost all gendarmerie forces, meant that the Civil Guard was 
governed by two sets of regulations, drawn up by the Ministries of War and the Interior 
respectively. Nonetheless, the Interior Minister and his representatives would in practice 
be the junior partners in the running of the corps, even more so when the Civil Guard was 
officially integrated in to the military in 1878.8 Moreover, instead of each province 
simultaneously raising their own companies of civil guards, the corps would spread out in 
concentric circles radiating from Madrid, thus ensuring their obedience to the central 
government and a controlled, gradual build-up of its personnel and presence. Indeed, the 
various academies of the Civil Guard as well as those schools set up for the sons and 
daughters of its personnel were all located in the environs of the nation’s capital.
While it is true that Ahumada did push the Civil Guard in a more centralized and 
militarized direction, the significance of this for the political development of Spain has 
been exaggerated by academics searching for the historical roots of the Franco
7 The full text of the 13 May 1844 decree can be found in Martinez Ruiz, Creation, pp. 388-395.
8 Miguel L6pez Corral, “El Gobemador Civil y la Guardia Civil”, in El Gobernador Civil en la politicay en 
la Administration de la Espana contemporanea (Madrid, 1997), pp. 413-420.
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dictatorship. In doing so, the development of policing both inside and outside of Spain is 
often presented in an overly simplistic and deterministic fashion, overemphasizing the 
differences and overlooking a series of similarities with its European neighbours.9 In 
general, Spain is portrayed as having deviated from the “classic” models of liberalism, as 
represented by the British experience and from that of the first phase of the French 
Revolution. The dominant characteristics of these two examples, as seen by scholars 
such as Lopez Garrido and Ballbe, were their decentralized and clear civilian nature.
This “classic” model of policing, tied to the local communities, was thus at the service of 
the general public, not at odds with it.10
In fact, if anything, Spain followed the same basic trajectory as that of France. The 
processes of militarization then marginalization of the French militia forces (the National 
Guard) and the centralization and militarization of the Gendarmerie National were both 
underway by 1792. These measures have not been viewed historically as departures from 
the ideals of the French Revolution, but rather as necessary for the protection and 
ultimate survival of these same ideals from the forces of reaction. The fact that it was a
9 The traditional view of the “failure” or “weakness” of Spanish liberalism in general has been modified or 
challenged by a number of scholars. See, for example, see Isabel Burdiel, “Myths of failure, myths of 
success: new perspectives on nineteenth-century liberalism”, Journal of Modern History (1988), pp.892- 
912; Id., “The liberal revolution, 1808-1843”, in Jos6 Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (eds.), Spanish 
History since 1808 (London, 2000), pp. 17-32; Adrian Shubert, A Social History of Modern Spain (London, 
1996), pp. 1-7; Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox, Espana: 1808-1996. El desafio de la Modernidad 
(Madrid, 1997), pp. 11-13 and passim.
10 Lopez Garrido, for example, views the National Militia as the representative of local, municipal power 
and the “shock force” (fuerza de choque) of liberalism, and sees first the centralization of the state 
administration by the Moderates and then the militarization of the Civil Guard as victories of counter­
revolutionary (that is, non-liberal) forces: Guardia Civily los orlgenes, pp. 47-51, 73-114, 168-183. Ballbe 
titles his section on the founding of the Civil Guard as “The creation of the Civil Guard and its distancing 
from the classic liberal model”. Ballbe faults the Progressives, as he does Spanish liberalism in general, for 
“not rejecting political militarism” and failing to establish a civilian and professional police apparatus, like 
that of England. He characterizes the “English model” as the “classical liberal conception of the police”, 
and then goes on to compare the English “bobby” with the Spanish Civil Guard, describing the former in 
the most favourable terms and presenting the latter as little more than an militarized force of occupation: 
Orden publico y  militarismo, pp. ii-iv, 141-154.
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military officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, who took charge of this process, codified it and 
spread it across the continent, while making compromises with the more moderate 
sections of the old elite, has not been seen as a defeat of France’s liberal revolution. 
Instead, it was Napoleon’s defeat and exile that brought about attempts to restore the 
status quo ante of the ancien regime. In fact, the political fluctuations of France in the 
nineteenth century did not translate into any major modifications of the organization and 
nature of the French gendarmerie, which retained its centralized and militarized form. As 
regards the Spanish case, while the May 1844 decree has been portrayed as a deviation 
from the traditional model of the French gendarmerie, in fact those changes made by 
Ahumada reflected not only his own thinking about the needs of the new corps, but also 
the then-current regulations and structure of its French counterpart.11 Indeed, the 
effectiveness of the French gendarmerie had impressed many contemporary statesmen.
As such, gendarmerie forces were created across Europe, from the Low Countries to 
Denmark, across the various German and Italian states and also in Russia, all sharing the 
military nature and same basic structure of the French corps.12
Moreover, the English experience was neither as consensual nor as purely civilian as 
traditional portrayed. The establishment of the “New Police” was met by great resistance 
and suspicion of significant sectors of the English population. While status quo elements 
of English society eventually came to appreciate the utility of modem police forces, 
particularly for their usefulness in suppressing disorder, opposition movements and the
11 Miguel Martinez Garcia, “La Gendarmeria francesa y la fundacidn de la Guardia Civil”, CGC, No. 16 
(1996), pp.187-205. For the evolution of events in France, see Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford, 1999), pp. 41-46, 59-60, 90-91.
12 For details of the emergence of gendarmerie forces in various European states, see Emsley, Gendarmes 
and the State.
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working classes maintained a certain level of dislike and apprehension of the “Bobby”, 
giving him nicknames such as “Crusher”, “Blue Devil” and “Blue Locust”. In fact, until 
the “New Police” model had spread to the rest of England, the London Metropolitan 
Police acted as a “national riot squad”.13 Moreover, the “professional civilian police” of 
Britain admired by Spanish scholars (as well as traditional English police historians) was 
as much an ideal as a reality, as English constables, like their counterparts on the 
continent, had notable military elements to them, particularly in regards to their training 
and the universal emphasis on discipline and hierarchy.14 As one scholar of the English 
police noted, “A policeman’s training, like a soldier’s, is intended to sever many of his 
ties with his previous civilian life.”15 In his training and duties, the British officer on the 
beat differed little from the Continental gendarme on patrol. Indeed, one can reasonably 
argue that the title “New Police” (by which English statesmen attempted to differentiate 
the new police forces from both the traditional policing bodies that preceded them and the 
centralized “French” model of policing) was as much of a misnomer as the name “Civil” 
Guard.16
Nor did the militarization of the Civil Guard in 1844 signify a hijacking of the liberal 
agenda by ancien regime elements and the Army. As elsewhere, compromise with more 
moderate sectors of the traditional elite largely allowed Spanish liberals to implement
13 Emsley, Policing in its Context, 1750-1870 (London, 1983), pp. 59-75,148-155; id., The English Police: 
A Political and Social History (London, 1996), pp. 24-42, 59-84.
14 Emsley, The English Police, pp. 26, 56-59, 254-257; id., “A Typology of Nineteenth-Century Police”, 
Crime, histoire etsocietes, Vol. 3 No. 1 (1999), p. 36; id., Gendarmes and the State, pp. 6-7, 7nl8.
15 Ben Whitaker, The Police in Society (London, 1979), p. 227.
16 While English policemen would maintain that they were a force apart when compared to their continental 
colleagues, they still broadly considered the latter -  including the various gendarmeries -  as members of the 
same family of police. Indeed, the English Police Journal, which was dedicated to a whole range of police 
and criminological issues, ran a series of articles on the various European police forces (including the 
Spanish Civil Guard) outlining their training and structure in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
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their reforms, constructing the fundamental institutions of a liberal state.17 The creation 
of the Civil Guard, despite its military nature, should be considered part of this liberal 
agenda, as it was much more a product of liberalism than it was of any feudal ideology. 
As noted above, given the general situation is Spain, the construction of strong 
centralized state institutions was necessary in order to transform the deeply-entrenched 
social, cultural, economic and political structures of the ancien regime. A simple 
expansion or change in the ruling classes would not be sufficient to effect this 
transformation, as the statesmen of the future Second Republic would discover, for those 
elements attached to the old order frequently resisted this process. The apparent success 
of the centralized “French model”, including that of its police, only increased the 
attractiveness of this route to “modernity” in Spain as elsewhere in Europe. The 
“English” model of local governance and the federalist option of the United States were 
seen as anomalies by many European liberals and of limited practical relevance to the 
problems with which they had to contend.18 The political instability faced by most 
European states in the nineteenth century (and the first half of the twentieth), instability 
on a scale not known in Great Britain, necessarily had an impact on the structure and 
nature of the police as well as of other state institutions.19 Indeed, the fact that the
17 Arturo Cajal Valero, El Gobernador civily el Estado centralizado del siglo XIX (Madrid, 1999), pp. 106- 
107.
18 Cajal Valero, El Gobernador civil, pp. 26-39; Carr, Spain, 1808-1975, p. 236. The roots of the 
centralized state, of course, go back farther than the French Revolution and the Napoleonic system. The 
origins of much liberal thought can be traced back to the Enlightenment: Carr, ibid., pp. 61-62. This 
includes ideas about the role and structure of the police and the law, concepts that preceded the 18th 
century, but found theirfullest expression in the “enlightened despotism” of that century: Marc Raeff, “The 
Well-Ordered Police and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: 
An Attempt at a Comparative Approach”, American Historical Review, Vol. 80, No. 5 (1975), pp. 1221- 
1243; Brian Chapman, Police State (London, 1970), pp. 15-27.
19 For the impact of political instability and revolutionary outbursts on the development and structures of 
police forces, see Hsi-huey Liang, The rise of the modern police and the European state system from 
Metternich to the Second World War (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 25, 34-35; Emsley, The English Police, pp. 6- 
7,248-261. For a discussion of the policing policies of various European countries in the twenty years after
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“English” model of policing was largely confined to the component parts of the island of 
Great Britain (that is, those areas where the legitimacy of the British political order was 
not under serious threat) is in itself a demonstration of the particular circumstances that 
produced a more decentralized and less militarized police force.20 This reality was 
begrudgingly acknowledged even by the greatest admirers of English liberalism in 
nineteenth-century Spain, the Republicans. Despite the commitment of a significant 
sector of the republican movement to the ideals of a federal state as well as their 
opposition to institutions such as the Civil Guard, when they found themselves in charge 
of a state that was on the verge of collapse, they doubled the personnel allotment of the 
Civil Guard.21
As mentioned previously, the lack of popular support for the liberal order and the 
centrifugal political and social forces inside Spain meant that recruitment of civil guards 
was a selective process. As they would be stationed in small posts scattered across the 
countryside, discipline and good character were of primary importance. Initially 
applications were accepted from decommissioned soldiers and militiamen of at least five 
years of service, of certain physical standards, with a letter of good conduct and character 
by either their former commanding officer (for ex-soldiers) or the mayor or priest of their
the First World War, see Gerald Blaney, Jr. (ed.) Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity, Change and Crisis, 
1918-40 (London, 2006).
20 The first modem police force created by English statesmen was not the Metropolitan Police, but rather 
the Peace Preservation Force of Ireland, later the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), which was more like the 
French Gendarmerie than the future “Bobbies”. Sir Robert Peel, the principal figure behind the creation of 
the Metropolitan Police, was a key figure in the establishment of the Irish force, which came into being in 
1822. The RIC became the point of reference for the police forces of the British Empire. For Peel and the 
Irish police, see Clive Emsley, Policing in its Context, 1750-1870 (London, 1983), p. 60; id., Gendarmes 
and the State, pp. 246-250.
21 Miguel L6pez Corral, La Guardia Civil: Nacimientoy Consolidacion, 1844-1874 (Madrid, 1995), pp. 
367-374.
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hometown, and the ability to read and write. These original high standards set for recruits 
(as well as the reluctance of the heads of the regular military to lose their best men to the 
Civil Guard) made it difficult fill the necessary personnel requirements, and temporary 
compromises on certain requirements (such as literacy) were conceded in order to recruit 
enough men. By the time of the Republic, while the physical, moral and educative 
requirements were still in force, recruitment was limited to those with military 
experience, whose father served in the Civil Guard or those young men who studied at 
the College of Young Guards.23
Recruitment was only the preliminary way of establishing and maintaining the desired 
type of force. The whole edifice of the Civil Guard was constructed in a manner to 
imbue certain values amongst its personnel and ensure that they fulfilled their various 
duties. This first step in this procedure was the training of candidates. Aspirants to the 
corps were trained initially in either the special academies or by the local command of the 
area in which they lived or were to serve. Special emphasis was given to topics such as 
military subjects, Spanish history, and those items most related to the particular service of 
a civil guard, such as the various laws that he would have to enforce. After passing their 
initial exams, civil guards would then spend a probationary period under the direct 
supervision of their commanding officer and more seasoned colleagues. This not only 
allowed for further opportunities to shape new personnel and instruct the latter in the
22 Martinez Ruiz, Creation de la Guardia Civil, pp. 56-62. For the difficulties surrounding the educational 
levels of the first generation of recruits, see Fernando Rivas Gomez, “La ensenaza en la Guardia Civil (Part 
I)”, REHGC, No. 13 (1974), pp. 134-145.
23 Sanjurjo, “The Spanish Civil Guard”, pp. 373-377.
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practicalities of his job, but also to weed out those recruits who turned out to be unsuited 
for the demands and pressures of being a civil guard.24
This process of moulding civil guards was continual. This was partially done through the 
rigid hierarchy and discipline of the corps, but was also carried out through attempts to 
foster a social class of virtuous men dedicated to the protection of the state and society. 
The desire to guarantee the discipline of its personnel meant that interaction with the 
public, outside that necessary for the carrying out of one’s duties, was discouraged. As 
such, men could not serve in the town of their birth or that of their spouse, and were 
housed in barracks. This marriage between the personal and profession was evident in 
the term given to these buildings: casa-cuartel, literally “home-barracks”. The desire to 
create the ideal civil guard went beyond those socializing measures of the current 
generation of men, but extended into future generations. Life in the casa-cuartel 
familiarized with, and instilled in, the children of civil guards the values and lifestyle of 
the corps, and thus had a self-reproducing quality as sons often went on to follow in the 
footsteps of their fathers 26 For those sons or daughters who lost their father in the line of 
duty, orphanages and schools were set up not only to look after their needs, but also to 
keep them within the fold. In order to encourage and benefit from this gravitation 
towards service in the Civil Guard, the College of Young Guards was established in 1853
24 For a general discussion of the training and education of civil guards, see Rivas Gomez, “La ensenaza en 
la Guardia Civil”, REHGC, Part I: No. 13 (1974), pp. 134-176, Part II: No. 14 (1974), pp. 117-157.
25 This practice was common amongst all European gendarmeries, and was known as the “principle of 
ahistoricalness” in the Austrian Empire: Emsley, Gendarmes and the State; Liang, The rise o f modern 
police, pp. 27-28.
26 In examining thirty years of entrants (1953-1984) into the Special Academy of the Civil Guard, Diego 
L6pez Garrido discovered that an average of 63.28% had fathers who served in the corps. For this and 
other figures about the relatively high self-reproduction within the Civil Guard, see El aparto policial en 
Espana (Barcelona, 1987), pp. 136-147.
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in order to prepare sons of civil guards for their future life in the corps, and its alumni 
were given preference in the recruitment and placement. The primacy of a solid moral 
education, seen as essential for a civil guard, was evident in the regulations of the 
College. As the first article under the section “Obligations of Young Guards” states:
“The primary obligation of the Young Guard is blind obedience and profound respect for 
his superiors. Subordination and exactness in everything is the basis of a career whose 
motto can be summed up in three words: self-denial, virtue and honour.”27
These values echo those of the Cartilla of the Civil Guard. Considered the Bible of the 
corps, it served as the basis for virtually all subsequent manuals and literature produced 
for and by the Civil Guard 28 Produced in pocket-sized form so it could be kept on a civil 
guard’s person at all times, its contents were expected to be memorized. In addition to 
containing the Civil and Military Regulations of the corps and the various duties and 
obligations of a civil guard, the Cartilla provided instruction in proper behaviour and 
etiquette. Indeed, the first nineteen articles of the Cartilla itself deal with issues of 
personal conduct, demonstrating the priority given to moral issues such as duty and self- 
sacrifice, reflecting in turn concerns over the discipline of civil guards once they were 
faced with local pressures or potentially dangerous situations. Alongside the Cartilla 
itself, members of the corps were flooded with manuals (issued officially by the corps or 
by individuals), and a series of professional journals that disseminated everything from 
recent legislation and policing techniques to Spanish history (including the heroic deeds
27 Article 84, Guardias Jovenes. Reglamento de 1864 (Madrid, 1993 reprint)
28 For example, the practical application of the moral instructions of the Cartilla to everyday life was 
demonstrated in a collection of short stories in Sen£n D’Aco (pseud, for Eduardo Gonzalez de Escanddn), 
El Guardia Civil: Episodios de su viday servicio. Coleccion de cuentos minusculos en correlacion con los 
articulos de la Cartilla del Cuerpo (Ciudad Real, 1899).
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of past and present civil guards), as well as being forums for the public expression of 
issues relating to the daily issues and preoccupations of civil guards. Furthermore, a 
series of general histories of the Civil Guard were published in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth. While providing actual 
historical data, they also served an important function of fostering a common identity that 
reached back across generations, as well as establishing an historical lineage of the corps 
and underlining its ever-present role in Spanish society. Despite the variety of topics 
covered in these journals, manuals and histories, they all contain common themes 
centring on (military) discipline, duty to the nation and moral rectitude.
These efforts to bolster the morale and convictions of civil guards are a reflection of the 
difficult life that came with service in the corps. The work was tough, the hours long, 
and a civil guard was expected to make his rounds no matter what the weather. Unlike 
other manual labourers, civil guards were largely deprived of those activities that partially 
alleviated the hardships of their existence. A civil guard was required to monitor village 
fetes, not participate in them. The puritanical moral code of the corps prohibited the 
playing of card games, and meant that an evening of intoxicating release from the daily 
grind of his existence could result in disciplinary action. The first three articles of the 
first chapter of the Cartilla exhort a civil guard to be a paragon of virtue. Article 6 in the 
section dedicated to station commandants (jefes de puesto) instructs them that they 
“prevent their subordinates from giving themselves over to diversions inappropriate to the 
gravity and restraint of the corps”. Article 7 demands that commandants prohibit their
29 Rivas G6mez, “La ensefiaza”, I, p. 153; L6pez Garrido, La Guardia Civil, pp. 156-158. The use of 
professional journals to transmit necessary information as well as strengthening group sentiment was 
common practice among all police forces, whether they were militarized or civilian-controlled.
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charges from engaging in “any kind of card games”, while Article 8 exhorts them to 
make sure that their men do not engage in vulgar conversation. The civil guard was 
never considered to be completely off-duty and he was always held accountable for his 
actions.
These drawbacks were not compensated for in terms of salary. While a civil guard might 
expect a relatively high rate of pay in the first decades of the corps’ existence, the 
increasing budgetary demands of an expanding Civil Guard could not be met by a 
chronically under-funded Spanish state. As one Interior Minister reported in 1904, the 
rates of pay for civil guards had not changed since 1871 despite rises in the costs of 
living.30 This state of affairs had changed little by 1930.31 The lack of funds available 
also affected the living conditions of civil guards, as many casa-cuarteles were reported 
to be in disrepair, with some considered unhygienic and a threat to the health of their 
inhabitants.32
The restrictive and rigid social life imposed on a civil guard also had its potential 
negative aspects as regards his living quarters, despite official efforts to encourage 
camaraderie. Regulations dictated that relations between officers and their charges
30 AHN, Serie A, Legajo 39A, Letter of the Interior Minister (Allendesalazar) to the Finance Minister, 12 
December 1904.
31 “Leyendo la prensa: De El Debate”, RTGC, No. 243 (May 1930), p. 201; “Miscelanea: Los haberes”, 
RTGC, No. 247 (September 1930), p. 467; “Miscelanea: el problema economico”, RTGC, No. 249 
(November 1930), p. 477.
32 “Miscelanea: El acuartelamiento”, RTGC, No. 244 (June 1930), pp. 262-263; “El acuartelamiento”, 
RTGC, No. 245 (July 1930), pp. 283-284.
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should not be familiar or relaxed, but formal and courteous.33 Given the strong emphasis 
on discipline and submission to one’s superior officers, one can imagine that recourse 
against abusive commandants was limited. As for those commandants who did not cross 
the line into outright abuse, but were nonetheless overly officious, there was little a civil 
guard could do but grin and bear it. As they all lived in the same accommodation, this 
meant that there was no escaping the bane of a problematic commanding officer. An 
apparently frequent bone of contention was the wives of one’s fellow civil guards, as 
marital conflicts or poor relations between a spouse and one’s colleagues could cause 
considerable tension within the close confines of a casa-cuartel.34
Yet, service in the Civil Guard brought some benefits with it. For Army officers stuck in 
the reserve lists, it offered them an active command. After the pacification of the 
Spanish Protectorate in Morocco in 1927, a notable number of Infantry officers from the 
Army of Africa applied for transfer into the Civil Guard. As one such officer, Enrique 
Serra Algarra, who later went on to fight in the Blue Division in the Soviet Union and 
rose to the rank of lieutenant general, explained why he and others wanted to transfer to 
the Civil Guard:
We went to Africa to defend Spain and fight against the Moor, but when the war
ended we found garrison life very boring. As we enjoyed action and war, we
33 Miguel Cid Rey (captain of the CG), La Guardia Civil dentro de la moral. Conducta de sus individuos en 
el orden civil y  militar (Guadalajara, 1903), pp. 47-61; Pedro Martinez Mainer (captain of the CG), El 
consultor del guardia civil (Avila, 1920), pp. 276-278.
34 “Del orden interior”, RTGC, No. 74 (February 1916), pp. 87-95; Cid Rey, Guardia Civil dentro de la 
moral, pp. 63-71. Nonetheless, the valuable functions performed by the wives of civil guards were 
recognized: “Las esposas de los guardias”, RTGC, No. 165 (November 1923).
35 Charles J. Esdaile, Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939 (Malden, MA, 
2000), p. 93.
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asked to be transferred to the Civil Guard because it promised plenty of action in 
the persecution of criminals.
Yet the majority of civil guards came from the lower classes, especially the peasantry, as 
these also constituted the primary group for recruits for the Army given their inability to 
buy an exemption from military service.37 For those men who came from areas of high 
unemployment or underemployment, service in the Civil Guard proved an attractive 
alternative after completing their military service, especially for those who developed a 
taste for the soldier’s life.38 The Civil Guard provided them and their families with 
certain benefits that would be largely out of reach for many poor peasants and landless 
labourers: secure housing, steady year-round pay, decent clothing (in the form of their 
uniforms). As one officer commented on this trade between freedom and the disciplined 
life inside the corps: “How did almost all of you live prior to enlisting into the Civil 
Guard? [...] Here you have a house, pay, camaraderie, protection. Did you have this 
when you were dependent on some local patron? Did you dress as well as you do 
now?”39 For the civil guard who joined the force without basic schooling, he was taught 
arithmetic, how to read and write, as well as other useful skills for a future career once his 
enlistment period ended, or he retired from the corps.40 If he served enough years within 
the Civil Guard, he could also expect a modest pension, as well as other forms of social
36 Quoted in Josd Luis Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 2006), p. 30.
37 Martinez Ruiz, La creacion de la Guardia Civil, pp. 59-60.
38 Gabriel Ferreras Estrada, Memorias del sargento Ferreras (Leon, 2002), pp. 12, 51-52.
39 Cid Rey, La Guardia Civil dentro de la moral, pp. 18-21.
40 Cid Rey, ibid., p. 21.
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security.41 A basic form of personal insurance was also extended to the families of civil 
guards, whose children received schooling, especially for those sons and daughters whose 
father had lost their lives in the line of duty, and special funds were set up to assist 
orphans and widows of killed personnel. All in all, service in the Civil Guard, for all its 
privations and hardships, offered a certain degree of social mobility to its personnel and 
their families. It was this linkage between the austere and disciplined life and self- 
improvement that coloured in no small part (though not exclusively) the perceptions of 
many civil guards in terms of the liberal social order, labour conflicts and the 
glorification of military values.
The establishment of a Civil Guard station in a village brought the presence of the central 
state and its values into the daily life of rural communities in a way largely unknown 
previously. The role of the Civil Guard was not simply the elimination of banditry and 
the maintenance of public order, but was also to be the spearhead of a process of “internal 
colonization”.42 The “Benemerita” was supposed to bring progress, civilization and the 
concept of the nation-state to what were seen as rural backwaters, whose intense localism 
was viewed as obstacles to the prosperity and advancement of the nation. This elitist 
view of the countryside and its inhabitants was not peculiar to Spain 43 and the preference
41 Enrique Martinez Ruiz, “Fondos, pensiones y retiros en los origenes de la Guardia Civil”, REHGC, No. 
29 (1983), pp. 159-197; Francisco Martinez Quesada, “La economia del guardia civil a traves de su historia 
(part III)”, REHGC, No. 15 (1975), pp. 55-85.
42 Clive Emsley, “Peasants, gendarmes and state formation”, in Mary Fulbrook (ed.), National Histories 
and European History (London, 1993), pp. 87-88.
43 For similar views in France, see Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural 
France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA, 1976), particularly Chapters 1 and 2. As noted above, this urban disdain 
for the ways and peoples of the rural world, and the need for a top-down reform of society were not the 
peculiar prejudices of 19th century liberals, but was evident in much of the thinking of the 18th century 
philosophes and underpinned the policies of the “enlightened” absolutism of the reformist monarchs of that 
period.
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of sectors of the peasantry for retrograde or primitive political movements such as 
Carlism and anarchism only served to confirm for urban liberals the need to transform the 
manners and mentalities of the vast majority of the Spanish population. While the 
coercive element of this process has been adequately researched and described by 
numerous scholars, particularly in relation to the repressive function of the Civil Guard, 
there also existed a softer, more subtle side to this attempted transformation. The proper 
and courteous manner of the well-groomed civil guard (sometimes more the expression 
of an ideal than the reality) was meant to serve as an example to the rural population, 
while the implicit connection between this country-boy-done-good and the state was 
evident in the national flag that hung over his barracks. Moreover, in a countryside that 
was largely devoid of local emergency services, civil guards were charged with providing 
assistance in cases of floods, fires or other calamities.44
This aspect of public service, though conceived of in paternalistic terms, was a key 
element not only in the identity of a civil guard, but also in how he viewed his role in 
society. While most popular representations of the Civil Guard reflect the repressive 
aspects of its function, the image the Civil Guard often portrays of itself within in its own 
media is that of the “Good Samaritan”, or that of the heroic lawman apprehending 
criminals, while histories and professional journals of the corps frequently produced 
statistics accounting for those humanitarian services carried out in any given year. The 
fact that official figures show that humanitarian duties only accounted for a small portion 
of services carried out by civil guards, the emphasis on such duties underlines their
44 For a discussion of the humanitarian aspects of the duty of the Civil Guard, see Gonzalo Jar Couselo, “La 
fiincion social de la Guardia Civil”, Cuadernos de Trabajo Social, no. 7 (1994), pp. 179-192.
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importance for the self-image of the corps. Furthermore, as shall be demonstrated below, 
civil guards also saw their role in the maintenance of order and law enforcement not as an 
inherently repressive, but rather as yet another humanitarian deed in the service of 
society. Nonetheless, recourse to violence often was a characteristic of a civil guard’s 
behaviour, though certainly not exclusive to the corps, for reasons to be outlined below.
Whatever the intentions of liberal reformers were, this intervention by the central state 
was not always well received at the local level, and the men of the Civil Guard thus 
became caught in middle of this tension between localism and centralism. While most 
scholarly attention has focussed on the military nature of the corps and those regulations 
that attempted to minimize the social ties between civil guards and the communities in 
which they were stationed, the fact of the matter is that in the closed world of rural Spain 
there was always going to be a certain isolation and alienation between civil guards and 
the local population. Coming from outside of the town, civil guards, like any other 
person (including those from neighbouring towns), were looked upon was virtual 
foreigners. If we keep in mind that the Spanish word pueblo means both “village/town” 
and “people”, and thus “my town” and “my people” are interchangeable expressions, we 
begin to get a sense of the dynamics involved in peasant-Civil Guard relations. Simply 
put, the local civil guards were not “sons of the village” nor were they members of the 
“people”.45 This identification of the Civil Guard with foreignness was not restricted to 
the relatively isolated rural hamlets of southern Spain. In Asturian mining towns, which
45 Julian A. Pitt-Rivers, The People of the Sierra (Chicago, 1961), pp. 6-12,130-131. For a discussion of 
close-nit social relations of rural villages, see Pitt-Rivers, op cit., especially Chapters 1 and 2; Gamel 
Woolsey, Death’s Other Kingdom: A Spanish Village in 1936 (London, 2004); Gerald Brenan, South From 
Granada (London, 1957); Carmelo Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte de los Caballeros: A Sociological Study of a 
Spanish Town (Oxford, 1966).
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attracted men from all over Spain, civil guards were associated with the one “foreign” 
nationality that was despised by all the others: the Galicians. Whether this was because 
of the relatively large numbers of gallegos amongst the ranks of the Civil Guard, or a 
simple conflation of the two most hated “outsiders” is not clear, but the identification was 
significant as hostility towards Galicians amongst the miners superseded that of ideology 
or that of any other regional rivalry.46
The communal ties within rural villages and towns often superseded the bonds of 
ideology or those of deep animosity towards a particular institution. For example, the 
American poet Gamel Woolsey noted that such considerations held firm even in the 
heated revolutionary atmosphere of the first weeks of the 1936-1939 Civil War. When a 
group of anarchists from Malaga city came to her small village to arrest a retired civil 
guard who evidently had a reputation for brutality, the local villagers vigorously opposed 
them because this particular civil guard was a local man, and thus a “son of the village”. 
The villagers did not recognize the right of the committees in Malaga to judge one of 
their own, be he a civil guard or not. It was only the threat of force by the heavily-armed 
“outsider” anarchists that the villagers gave way and let them take the retired civil guard
47away.
Long traditions of local rule and a practical, personal view of conflict resolution clashed 
with the jurist conception of law as legislated by “foreigners” in Madrid and enforced by
46 Adrian Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners o f Asturias, 1860-1934 (Urbana & 
Chicago, IL, 1987), pp. 71-72.
47 Woolsey, Death’s Other Kingdom, pp. 81-82. A similar phenomenon has been observed in relation to 
anti-clerical vandalism, particular regarding symbols of local patron saints.
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the local civil guard, who, despite their peasant origins, were also “outsiders”. This 
could manifest itself over matters such as personal feuds to more light-hearted affairs 
such as a rowdy and noisy public remonstrance against individuals who fell foul of local 
standards of morality or fairness. Since these types of demonstrations of popular 
disapproval were considered lawless disturbances by the state authorities, it was the duty 
of the Civil Guard to dissolve them. Nonetheless, such unpopular restrictions on non­
political expressions of public opinion were not always forcefully suppressed, and 
sometimes allowed to continue if they proved impossible to contain.49
Perhaps this clash of civilizations is best exemplified by the attempt to stamp out rural 
banditry. The “social” or “peasants’” bandit, whose arrest or elimination was one of the 
principal tasks of the Civil Guard, was often protected by the local populations for as 
long as he did not commit some sort of act that offended local sensibilities, and 
frequently was glorified for his struggle against some sort of injustice or the 
“illegitimate” laws of the “outsiders”. Yet, if the “social” bandit did cross the line and 
commit a crime or crimes that were recognized as such by the local villagers, the latter 
would then have no problem with co-operating with the Civil Guard to bring about his 
capture.50 The divergence of views between the local peasantry and the Civil Guard
48 For rural concepts of “justice” and the “law”, see Pitt-Rivers, People o f the Sierra, Chapters 11-13; 
Lison-Tolosana, Belmonte de los Caballeros, Chapters 9 & 10. This, of course, was not a peculiarly 
Spanish phenomenon. For a description of peasant resistance to the “intrusions of the alien law and its 
representatives into his world” in France, see Weber, Peasants into Frenchman, Chapter 5, and, more 
generally, Emlsey, “Peasants, gendarmes and state formation”, pp. 81-83.
49 These public chastisements were known as cencerrada in Andalucia, and had their equivalents in the 
French charivari, the Italian scampanate and the German Katzenmusik. In these countries, as in Spain, 
such demonstrations increasing attracted the disapproval of the authorities: Pitt-Rivers, People o f the 
Sierra, pp. 169-177; Emsley, Gendarmes and the State, pp. 252-253;
50 For a discussion of the “social bandit” and the conventions and conditions surrounding his support by 
rural communities, see Pitt-Rivers, People o f the Sierra, pp. 178-185; Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: 
Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20^ Centuries (Manchester, 1971), Chapter 2.
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intensified as capitalist conceptions of property overturned long-held local customs 
regarding the use of common lands and resources. This increasingly became the case as 
social banditry evolved into anarchism and merged with already existing forms of 
popular protest. The conflict of interests between the Civil Guard as the representative of 
the state and the protector of the socio-economic status quo and the exasperations and 
aspirations of the rural poor could, and did, explode into violent confrontations.
While the Civil Guard came to be closely linked with the interests of the large 
landowners and local notables, particularly as social unrest mounted, a perfect state of 
harmony did not exist between the two parties. The fact that the Civil Guard lay outside 
of the direct control of the municipal authorities, all of whom would have been men of 
substance who largely viewed the interests of the community and their own personal 
interests as being one in the same, meant that conflicts of interest could and did arise. 
Since the Civil Guard was an agent of the central state, a central state that claimed 
(though never achieved) a monopoly of armed force, the authorities in Madrid ultimately 
decided where Civil Guard stations would be located, and could also call away the local 
detachment of civil guards to deal with disturbances outside the district in which they 
served. Moreover, given the relative thinness of Civil Guard personnel on the ground, in 
times of high and widespread social tension, local landowners felt inadequately protected 
from the ire of their social inferiors. As a result, local notables and large landowners 
pressed for the creation of locally-based and locally-controlled rural guards. This clear 
challenge to the presumed monopoly of rural policing by the Civil Guard was fiercely 
resisted by members of the corps, as the proposed Provincial or Rural Guards would not
47
only serve to marginalize further civil guards within rural communities, but also become 
a potential competitor for resources.51
Nonetheless, local notables recognized the utility of the Civil Guard and would seek to 
co-opt local forces through the granting of a variety of benefits and subsidies, such as 
health care, religious sacraments, provisions and furniture. These demonstrations of 
gratitude towards the Civil Guard, often broadcasted publicly, were frequently recorded 
in the professional journals of the corps as well as in its Official Bulletins. Moreover, 
local corporations, large landowners and industrialists managed to circumvent their lack 
of direct control over the corps by petitioning the government to send a detachment of 
civil guards during a village fete, the harvest or a labour dispute and promising to cover 
the costs of mobilization and maintenance of the force.52
This connivance between the central government and the local notables could cause 
considerable consternation amongst civil guards, who could be left feeling themselves 
pressured from all sides as they were charged with enforcing the laws of the state, only to 
be undermined or punished by the same state for carrying out their sworn duty. One such 
instance where this could occur was over the issue of banditry. Similar to the common 
folk, local notables supported and protected those bandits that were co-opted into their 
service, and in such cases they hindered the local Civil Guard in its efforts to bring
51 Miguel Gistau (Captain of the CG), Historia de la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 1907), pp. 205-207; “Leyendo 
la prensa: La Guardia provincial”, RTGC, No. 246 (August 1930), p. 366; “Guardia Civil: Servicio Rural”, 
LCM(13 February 1931); “Guardia Civil: Guarderia rural”, LCM(4 March 1931); “Guardia Civil: Los 
guardias rurales”, LCM (6 March 1931).
2 See also Michael M. Seidman, Workers against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona during the Popular 
Fronts (Berkeley, CA, 1991), pp. 24, 31-32; Gonzalez Calleja, La razon de lafuerza, pp. 44,44n60. This 
practice would continue during the Second Republic, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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“their” bandit to justice. In one particular case, the collusion between two gangs of 
bandits and the local notables in the Estepa district of the province of Sevilla caused 
national outrage when it was exposed in detail by a local citizen, with the help of the 
local civil guard commander exasperated after several frustrating years of service in the 
area. The central state intervened and sent in hundreds of civil guards to round-up the 
main protagonists, and seventy-nine men were arrested. Nonetheless, powerful friends of 
the imprisoned men pulled the necessary strings and all of the accused were released 
without trial. In what must have been seen as an undermining of the very principles that 
the corps stood for, the Civil Guard officer -  and a local judge who assisted in 
coordinating the inquiry -  were transferred out of the district shortly thereafter. The local 
author who had made the details public was chased out of town.53
Another one of the principal duties of the Civil Guard was the persecution of deserters 
from military service. While this task was traditionally one of the causes of conflict 
between civil guards and the rural poor, it became a potential source of tension with the 
proprietor classes once these could no longer purchase an exemption from military 
service. One article in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil tells of an anecdotal, 
though very likely true, story of a village where a wealthy family of landowners cajoled 
and bribed government officials to establish a Civil Guard station in their town. Upon 
achieving their objective, this family saw itself as the effective “owners” of this 
detachment of civil guards, and thus acted as if the latter were no more than their
53 Hank Driessen, “The ‘noble bandit’ and the bandits of the nobles: Brigandage and local community in 
Nineteenth-Century Andalusia”, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1983), pp. 109-110. Pitt- 
Rivers notes that if a man enjoyed good relations with local authorities he “need fear no outside 
interference”: People of the Sierra, pp. 16-17.
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employees. One day, one of the sons of this family, claiming physical illness, gained a 
temporary release from his obligatory military service. Once his official period of release 
had ended, and it was clear that he was healthy, this son still failed to return to his 
garrison. The local Civil Guard received the order to oblige him either to return to his 
garrison or to admit himself into the nearest military hospital. After choosing the second 
option, and being of perfect health, he was quickly released from the hospital and then 
dispatched to Spanish Morocco. No sooner had this son been sent off to Africa, the local 
detachment of Civil Guard received a notice threatening eviction from their housing as 
soon as the current contract expired.54
While civil guards may have experienced some friction or resentment towards local 
notables, on the whole relations between the two groups were harmonious, for whatever 
conflict of interests may have arisen, their common fear of the lower classes was greater. 
From the civil guard’s perspective a local notable may be corrupt or insufficiently 
patriotic-minded, but the latter nevertheless belonged to the “respectable” classes who 
appreciated the services and sacrifices of the Benemerita.55 In contrast, civil guards 
existed in a near-permanent state of tension, if not conflict, with the lower classes. Due 
to their dire living conditions and lack of legal recourses for addressing grievances, it was 
this social group that produced the bandits and lawbreakers, and whose members were 
the source of most instances of public disturbances. Indeed, as an outsider whose
54 Mariano Moral Garcia (Corporal of the CG), “El problema del acuartelamiento: El caciquismo rural”, 
RTGC, No. 154 (December 1922), p. 449.
55 This division of the public into groups appears to be common amongst police forces, regardless of their 
nature. In his study of the attitudes amongst several police forces in America, the sociologist William A. 
Westley noted that “Policemen seem to distinguish and define these groups on the basis of their supposed 
attitude towards the police, their values (what will make them respect the police), their political power, and 
their relationship to the ends of the police.” William A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological 
Study of Law, Custom and Morality (Cambridge, MA, 1970), pp. 96-105.
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authority was never fully accepted, who enforced alien and unpopular laws, as well as 
being the nearest, most tangible symbol of the state, civil guards were always going to be 
the foci for the hostility of the lower classes. This reality was never absent from the 
consciousness of civil guards, as demonstrated by the frequent accounts of comrades 
wounded or killed in the line of the duty that were recorded in their press and literature.
It is also evident in the practice of patrolling in twos. While the institution of the “/a 
pareja” was seen by some sectors as a more effective mechanism for intimidating 
troublemakers,56 in fact it was principally a measure of self-defence for the guards.57
The level of tension at any given time or place was an important determinant of the use of 
force by civil guards. Traditionally, scholars have attributed the employment of violence 
by civil guards almost exclusively to the military nature of the corps and the lack of 
accountability of its personnel. While items such as Article 2, Chapter 5 of the Military 
Regulations of the corps state that the civil guard, like a solider, is nothing more than the 
executor of the orders he receives from his superiors, and thus free of any responsibility 
for carrying out his duty, it is not necessarily true that these same regulations encouraged 
the use of force, even if they were open to abuse. The focus on certain parts of the 
Cartilla has often meant the disregarding of numerous other articles in the same manual 
that advise, if not admonish civil guards to gain the respect and trust of the populations 
they serve. More specifically in relation to the use of force, Article 4, Chapter 1 of the 
Cartilla notes the negative effects of violence on the public estimation of the corps, while
56 As one anarchist activist remarked, “There are two guards. One beats you, and the other has the gun. If 
you make a move, he shoots you.” Quoted in Jerome R. Mintz, The Anarchists o f Casas Viejas 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1994), p. 112.
57 The system of patrolling in pairs was not peculiar to the Spanish Civil Guard, but was also practiced by 
other gendarmeries in Italy, France and elsewhere: Emsley, Gendarmes and the State, pp. 20, 243nl3, 249.
58 See, for example, Ballbe, Orden publico, pp. 148-154.
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Article 18 of the same counsels that “your primary weapons should be persuasion and 
moral authority”, and that a civil guard should only resort to his force as a last option, or 
in self-defence. These sentiments are also echoed in the literature and press of the 
corps.59 Nonetheless, some manuals were more “understanding” about the need to use 
force. One such manual noted that “the means of forces that guards employ always have 
to be those necessary to reduce [the subject] to obedience”. While counseling that 
personnel use tact and politeness (in accordance to the subject’s social class), if the 
person or persons resist or insult a guard, the latter is advised “to hit them with your 
firearms until they are reduced to silence and obedience”.60 While in practice civil guards 
demonstrated that they were not adverse to employing various forms of violence and 
intimidation, interpretations that seek to explain this primarily (or exclusively in the case 
of Ballbe) through the military nature or the corps’ regulations do not, and cannot account 
adequately for broad variations in the degrees of violence used by civil guards.
The root determinant of the willingness to resort to violence among civil guards lies in 
the general social and political situation, as well as that of the locality in which they are 
stationed. Civil guards viewed the population in which they had to police with a mixture 
of sympathy, condescension and fear. Coming from the humbler rungs of society 
themselves, civil guards were aware of the grievances of the peasantry and urban working 
classes. One article appearing in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil criticized the 
authorities for treating strikes as “revolutionary events [...] not understanding that a
59 Cid Rey, La Guardia Civil dentro de la moral, pp. 76-78; Colonel Jos6 Osuna Pineda, “Educacidn Moral: 
Sanas Doctrinas”, RTGC, No. 260 (October 1931), p. 443; Sergeant Manuel Martin Rubio, “La 
conservation del orden publico”, RTGC, No. 279 (May 1933), pp.175-176.
60 Martinez Mainer, Consultor del Guardia Civil, pp. 64-65.
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strike is the means by which the worker attempts to defend his rights and improve his 
working conditions”. This only becomes a question of public order, it continued, when 
“coercion is used [by the strikers], attacks are made on property, or when the security 
forces {la fuerzas publicas) are attacked or their instructions disobeyed”.61 As agents of 
law and order, civil guards were also aware of how these grievances might propel the 
poorer and more desperate sectors of society into violent conflict with the existing order, 
and in such outbursts, civil guards were always going to be one of the principal targets of 
popular ire.
As such, civil guards saw their authority intimately linked with their personal security. 
Given their relative physical and social isolation, and hence vulnerability, civil guards 
had a heightened sensitivity to anything that might weaken their authority. The use of 
force, or the threat of it, was seen as a practical, if not necessary measure in enforcing the 
law and maintain his position of authority. This perception reflected, to an extent, 
popular conceptions of the need to assert one’s authority when challenged, even amongst 
those same peasants who resented the authority of the local Civil Guard.62 Yet, this was 
not just a by-product of the Civil Guard’s nature, nor that of Spanish culture, but rather a 
consequence of the civil guard’s situation as a policeman. In one study of the use of 
force amongst several American police departments in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
maintenance of respect for a police officer’s authority was a key justification for the use
61 “La Guardia Civil en las cuestiones de orden publico”, RTGC, No. 15 (March 1911), pp. 161-167, quoted 
in Eduardo Gonzalez Calleja, La razon de la fuerza: Orden publico, subversion y  violencia politico en la 
Espana de la Restauracion, 1875-1917 (Madrid, 1998), p. 50n64.
62 Pitt-Rivers, People o f the Sierra, pp. 156-157.
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of violence, and the perceived levels of respect a social group had for the police was a 
primary determinant of a policeman’s conduct when dealing with them.63
While legislation protecting the “honour” of the military was an issue of social prestige 
for Army officers, for civil guards such legislation had a more practical significance.
This is evident in the content of court rulings on delitos de insulto a fuerza armada 
concerning civil guards: throwing stones at them, striking them, threatening them with a 
firearm or a knife, dynamiting a casa-cuartel, and so on. One particular ruling 
particularly reflects this concern by civil guards over their vulnerability. This ruling 
judged the phrases “Out with the Civil Guard” and “Have at them, they are few in 
number” to be insultos a fuerza armada. A look at those rulings in which military 
judges decided that a particular action was not a delito de insulto a fuerza armada may 
perhaps give us cause to re-evaluate how open-ended such interpretations were in 
practice. Among those rulings listed in the Guia del Instructor, the following were 
judged not to be crimes against the authority of a civil guard: a civilian who 
unintentionally hits a civil guard when resisting being deputized by a civil guard; verbal 
insults against a Civil Guard corporal after the latter struck the former; when a civilian 
gets into a fist fight with a Civil Guard corporal after a heated discussion of a particular 
matter (that is, not related to the law).64 Indeed, in one notable ruling, a group of 
defendants were absolved from any wrongdoing when a contingent of civil guards 
appeared to be over-stepping their authority and conniving with local authorities to falsify
63 Westley, Violence and the Police, pp. 118-143, especially pp. 138-139, and more generally, pp. 92-108.
64 Captain Manuel Garcia Mercadillo, Guia del Instructor (Madrid, 1935), pp. 68-71. All the rulings cited 
were during the Restoration Monarchy, that is, prior to 1923.
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the results of a local election in Navarcles, to which they were greeted with stones and 
howls of protest by the townsfolk.65
These preoccupations over personal safety had their impact on the institutional mentality 
of the corps and influenced their views on society, which placed a premium on concepts 
such as authority (conceived of in hierarchical terms) and order. These two concepts, 
authority and order, were seen as the foundations of civilization and progress, and were 
meant as necessary checks on individualist egoism. As one Civil Guard instructor 
explained
All relations, be they public, private or familial, need to be established, regulated 
by someone. It is necessary, moreover, that this someone, with greater skill, with 
more knowledge, with greater power, establish these relations so that they are 
respected by all, either voluntarily or through coercive means. From here is bom 
the concept of authority that, as we see, can be accepted or imposed. [...] Men, 
while biologically equal, are not so socially. [...] It is evident, then, that there is a 
difference (between men) that tends to elevate some and humble (rebajar) others. 
The greater the level of social complexity, the greater the levels of differentiation. 
History confirms these assertions, and continues to do so each day as the division 
of labour becomes ever more minute.
Authority, given the imperfection of mankind, is useful and necessary in 
social practices [...] Man needs a guide that puts him on the right road, a protector 
that helps him and defends him, a teacher that instructs and counsels him. These
65 Castor Calvino Sabucedo, Defensa hecha ante del Consejo de Guerra de I os paisanos ... en la causa por 
el supuesto delito de insulto a la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 1904).
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are precisely those social goals that the various classes of authority dedicate 
themselves to. Honour, respect, the obedience that one gives to the authorities is 
nothing more than the consequence of the gratitude of the citizenry for the 
protection, knowledge and counsel that they receive.66
In this article we can see the components of the institutional mentality of the Civil Guard 
and the basic mindset of its personnel vis-a-vis society at large. On the more personal 
level, it demonstrates recognition of how the discipline of the corps had led to the social 
betterment of its personnel, and thus the hierarchy, paternalism and military values of the 
corps were seen in a positive light. This recognition was not the product of simple 
indoctrination, for indoctrination is only effective if it has some sort of resonance with the 
personal experiences of its intended audience. Instead it reflected the benefits gained 
discipline and from what was known as a “good moral education”, of which religion 
played an integral part.67 Those elements of society that did not possess these qualities 
were seen to suffer from their deficiencies. This included, for example, their colleagues 
in the Security Corps (Cuerpo de Seguridad), whose well-known short-comings were 
seen as products of “the total absence of subordination and discipline”.68
66 Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Cursillo de etica. Capftulo III: La Autoridad”, RTGC, No. 250 
(December 1930), pp. 515-516. This piece was part of a series of articles titled “Short courses on ethics” 
was published in the RTGC by Captain Rodrigo Zaragoza, who was an instructor at the College for Young 
Guards as well as at the corps’ own Special Academy. See also Major Jos£ Pastor, “Vulgarizaciones: 
Delitos contra la Autoridad”, RTGC, No. 247 (September 1930), pp. 394-395. For earlier examples of this 
mindset, L6pez Garrido, La Guardia Civilylos origines, pp.157-158. Lopez Garrido attributes these 
attitudes directly (and apparently exclusively) to the authoritarian internal nature of the corps itself.
67 Cid Rey, La Guardia Civil dentro de la moral, pp. 23-26; “Que es moral”, RTGC, No. 76 (April 1916), 
pp. 19-20.
68 “Algo que importa: El Cuerpo de Seguridad”, RTGC, No. 76 (April 1916), pp. 78-80. The Security 
Corps was part of the Interior Ministry police {la policla gubernativa). The uniformed Cuerpo de 
Seguridad (Security Corps), patrolled the streets and dealt with public order in the provincial capitals and 
the large towns, and the plain-clothed Cuerpo de Vigilancia (Surveillance Corps) primarily investigated 
crimes, including political ones.
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In terms of his role in society, the civil guard saw himself as the “defender of order”, a 
necessary component in the proper workings of society. He was necessary in the same 
manner as religion was to the good of mankind, and thus those of his colleagues who had 
been killed in the line of duty were portrayed as “martyrs”. The Civil Guard saw itself as 
an instrument of civilization, part of a brotherhood of gendarmeries that existed in other 
“advanced” societies.69 As pointed out in the article above, civilized society was both 
“accepted or imposed”. The Civil Guard was the guardian of that society, which 
sometime required the use of force if it were to survive. Civil guards believed that when 
performing coercive duties they were doing so for the common good, to maintain order, 
for without order there could be no progress. Those members of society that recognized 
the utility and sacrifices of the Benemerita were seen as part of the “respectable” and 
“civilized” classes, and this normally meant the middle and upper classes, though could 
include the lower classes as well. Those sectors of society that attacked the Civil Guard 
or attempted to undermine its authority were seen as criminals, deviants and/or 
foreigners.
69 This identification with other gendarmes corps is evident in the title of one article about the organisation 
of the Italian Carabinieri, in which the latter are referred to as the “Italian Civil Guard”, RTGC, No. 26 
(February 1912), pp. 118-128. See also comments in El Mentor del Guardia Civil (weekly journal), No. 1 
(1 August 1855), pp. 2-4. The image of the efficacy and utility of the Civil Guard was underlined by the 
petition of various Latin American governments to send missions of the benemerita to help organize and 
train their own police forces. “La Policia de Colombia copiada de nuestra Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 129 
(November 1920), p. 8; “Nueva mission a America”, RTGC, No. 143 (January 1922), p. 20; “El coronel 
peruano C6sar Landazuri: Estudiando a la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 145 (March 1922), pp. 81-83 [note: 
the pagination of the issues of the RTGC run continuously for each year, and this article, despite 
appearances, was the front page story for its particular issue, demonstrating its importance]; “Las misiones 
de la Guardia Civil en la America latina”, RTGC, No. 191 (January 1926), pp. 25-26.
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It is important to note here that while the Civil Guard generally viewed the lower classes 
as the “dangerous classes”, they still differentiated the average “honourable” worker from 
those who sought to “exploit” his hardships for their own political goals, these often 
being characterized as either, at best, misguided, or, at worst, barbaric. The fact that 
anarchism was the dominant ideology amongst the landless labourers, and also amongst 
many of the urban working classes, made this characterization of the working-class 
movement seemingly all the more justifiable. Anarchism in its negation of state authority 
and its doctrine of “propaganda by the deed” was, in ways that socialism was not, the 
antithesis of all that civil guards held to be the building blocks of a society. As one 
conference held by the corps on the phenomenon of anarchism concluded, anarchism was 
a barbaric foreign doctrine, and anarchists “harmful beasts” (bestias daninas), whose 
destructive influence had to be eliminated from Spanish society. Indeed, the anarchist 
was considered by the attendees of this conference to be worse than the common 
criminal, for unlike the latter, the anarchist believes his actions are justified and moral, 
and thus lacking the foundation for redemption.70
“Those who have ideas” (Jos que tienen ideas) were seen as the root of most social 
indiscipline and an implicit threat not only to society at large, but more importantly for 
civil guards they poisoned relations between them and the working classes. As the lower 
classes were viewed generally by civil guards as impulsive, less civilized and almost 
infantile, the efforts of those “agitator” who sought to mobilize the working classes 
against the system constituted a danger to their own physical safety. This concern could
70 First Lieutenant Emiliano L6pez Montijano, “Sobre anarquismo (De las conferencias de oficiales en el 
14° Tercio)”, RTGC, No. 83 (November 1916), pp. 44-53.
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take on the characteristics of paranoia, as seen in the Civil Guard’s reaction to the alleged 
Black Hand conspiracy of the 1880s. As the anarchist movement grew in western 
Andalucia, rumours began to spread about a plot to murder landowners and those that 
supported them and destroy their crops and property. While civil guards were active in 
the forging of evidence to prove this conspiracy’s existence, it is very likely that they 
believed the threat to be real, as witnessed by references to the Black Hand in 1915 when 
they feared another plot was in the making in the area.71 As anarchists, like the social 
bandits of earlier times, enjoyed the support of the rural workers and could fairly easily 
disappear in their midst, in times of mounting social unrest, civil guards would adopt 
brutal and often arbitrary tactics in their attempts to marginalize and eliminate the 
movement. The violence employed by both civil guards and anarchists could, and did 
evolve into a vicious circle, which only made civil guards more determined to assert their 
authority through forceful means. As one historian noted, “living as they did among their 
enemies, [civil guards] became unusually ready to shoot.”72
Some scholars have explained phenomena like the hysteria surrounding the Black Hand 
and its subsequent repression through reference to a militarized public order apparatus
TXdominated by a Civil Guard outside the control of the civilian authorities. But these 
types of incidents, and particularly the role the Civil Guard played in them is somewhat 
more complex. First of all, this particular incident occurred in a time of general 
international concern over the emergence and growth of anarchist movements, as well as
71 Mintz, Anarchists o f Casas Viejas, pp. 23-24,24nl0,106-110; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 62-64.
72 Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 157-157.
73 Ballbe, Orden publico y  militarismo, pp. 233-239.
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their violent activities.74 Secondly, while the magnitude of the Black Hand membership 
was certainly exaggerated by the Civil Guard and other authorities, the existence of such 
an organization had some basis in reality.75 Given the international atmosphere, the 
increasing mobilization of the working class, and the local atmosphere for those civil 
guards caught in the middle of mounting social conflict in western Andalucia, the danger 
represented by the Black Hand conspiracy seemed all too real and had to be dealt with by 
all means necessary. The working class and peasant movements that emerged in the 
second half of the nineteenth century not only challenged those values that civil guards 
were trained to defend, but represented a broader, better-organized and thus greater 
danger to what were previously uncoordinated and precisely-defined outbursts of popular 
protest. As thus, they implicitly further undermined the authority of civil guards, and 
hence heightened their existing sense of insecurity and vulnerability. The resort to 
measures such as the manufacture of evidence and other dubious tactics was not restricted 
to a supposedly uncontrollable and unaccountable Civil Guard, but employed by other 
police forces which felt that the general public did not appreciate the scale of the threat 
presented by anarchism and other subversive movements.76 The justification or 
romanticizing of anarchists by some sectors of the public and press, just as with the 
bandits of a previous generation, would have struck civil guards as an insult to the very
74 Gonzalez Calleja, La razon de la fuerza, p. 233. The Italian police was also exercised by the emergence 
of secret societies and working class movements, and occasionally created suitably threatening conspiracies 
to provoke the government to take the “appropriate” action: Richard O. Collin, “The Blunt Instruments: 
Italy and the Police”, in John Roach and Jurgen Thomaneck (eds.), Police and Public Order in Europe 
(London, 1985), pp. 188-189.
75 Gonzalez Calleja, La razon de la fuerza, pp. 232-241.
76 The Parisian police, for example, believing that they needed to awake the French public and its 
politicians to the nature of the anarchist movement enabled, if not set up the anarchist bombing of the 
Chamber of Deputies in 1893: Chapman, Police State, pp. 87-88.
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real sacrifices and sufferings they and their colleagues had to endure in order to protect 
society from such dangerous elements.
This perception of anarchists as savages that needed to be dealt with severely, as well as a 
general suspicion of most working class movements, was not necessarily the product of 
the military nature and training of the Civil Guard. These perceptions were shaped and 
justified by general attitudes of the day towards dissent and working class mobilization, 
as well as by the dominant academic and pseudo-scientific theories of the era. The 
emergence of the discipline of criminal anthropology did much to mould public opinion, 
and that of those charged with dealing with social order and crime. By the middle of the 
nineteenth century scientific theory purporting to explain criminality were already 
circulating in Spain. One such theorist was the Catalan phrenologist Mariano Cubi, who 
mixed the lack of culture and moral education of the masses with certain physical 
characteristics of individuals. These types of theories eventually merged with the new 
science of psychiatry, and theories about “temporary insanity”, “moral insanity” (locura 
moral), and “degeneration”. This last concept came to enjoy common currency, as did 
the idea of a struggle between “rational society” and the “degenerate offenders” who 
were “foreigners to reason and from society”. These theories evolved into the concept of 
“atavism” popularized by the Italian criminal anthropologist Cesare Lombroso, whose
77works were translated and read across Europe, including in Spain. Such ideas fit into 
liberal concepts of the rational man and the ability to achieve social harmony through the 
application of reason and science to the art of government. In consequence, those that
77 Pedro Trinidad Fem&ndez, La defensa de la sociedad: Carcel y  delicuencia en Espana, siglos XVJII-XX 
(Madrid, 1991), pp. 248-263.
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existed on the margins of society or resisted society’s laws were seen as somehow 
lacking in some faculty or another.
Moving beyond the terrain of common criminality to that of political crimes, Lombroso 
and his followers characterized anarchist militants as bom criminals or insane, or both.
In contrast to reformist minded socialists who sought the orderly transformation of 
society, anarchists with their tactic of “propaganda of the deed” attempted to achieve 
their ideal society through violence and acts of robbery. This perception of anarchism as 
primitive, backwards and degenerate held great currency amongst many scholars and was 
transmitted to the general public through books, newspapers and popular journals. Such 
interpretations were picked up on in police journals,78 and as seen in the above reference 
to anarchists as “harmful beasts”, the Civil Guard as well.
The distinction between the “noble” yet impressionable and impulsive worker, and the 
“deviant agitator” seen in many Civil Guard commentaries was also prevalent in the 
emerging discipline of social psychology, which gave a scholarly veneer to fears over the 
breakdown of traditional methods of social control and the mobilization of the lower 
classes. The ideas of the “maddened crowd” and “collective crimes” were already being 
propagated and discussed widely by the turn of the twentieth century. The most 
influential thinker in this field was the Frenchman Gustave Le Bon. Le Bon, who like 
Lombroso had many followers in Spain, noted with concern the growing impact of the 
uncultured, infantile masses in the political life of various states, whose movements he
78 See, for example, the quotation from La policia espanola about anarchists in Trinidad Femdndez, La 
defensa de sociedad, p. 261.
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feared would drag their respective nations backwards and threaten the progress of 
government by reason, a scenario that the extension of suffrage made increasingly 
possible.79 Mixed with concepts of Social Darwinism and prescribing measures to 
control the “dangerous masses”, the “savages of Europe”, it fit in nicely with the ideology 
of military discipline and hierarchy imbued in civil guards, as well as their concerns over 
the mobilization of “social inferiors” by demagogues who sought to subvert the natural 
social order and undermine the principle of authority.80 Proposals to reduce the incidence 
of “collective crimes” and reinforce the fabric of the social order centred around the 
necessity of a “good moral education” and the rehabilitation of past criminals through
O 1
work societies and programs, proposals that not only appeared in Civil Guard journals, 
but also conformed with the fundamental values of the corps.82
This general concern amongst the “civilized” classes about the irrational, uneducated 
savages in their midst often led to a cultural blurring of civilian and military. Much like 
with the centralization of the state and the establishment of militarized police forces, the 
extent of this blurring depended upon the perceived fragility of the political and social 
order. One of the principal frontiers where this blurring occurred was in relation to the 
police and public order. For scholars such as Ballbe, this blurring was exactly the
79 Trinidad Fernandez, ibid., pp. 263-282. For more general treatment of the influence of the theories of 
scholars like Lombroso and Le Bon, see Serge Moscovici, The Age of the Crowd: A Historical Treatise on 
Mass Psychology (CUP, 1985) and Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici (eds.), Changing Conceptions 
of Crowd Mind and Behavior (New York, 1986).
80 See, for example, Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Cursillo de 6tica. Capitulo V: El orden social”, 
RTGC, No. 252 (February 1931), pp. 125-126.
81 “La criminalidad y su repression. Conferencia pronunciada en la Academia de Jurisprudencia el dia de 3 
de Mayo de 1916 por D. Augusto del Cacho”, RTGC, NO. 83 (November 1916), pp. 57-67.
82 Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Cursillo de &ica. Capitulo IV: Deber y Obligation, Moral y 
Derecho, Honor”, RTGC, No. 251 (January 1931), pp. 23-24; Captain P.C.M., “Criminalidad”, RTGC, Part 
I: No. 250 (December 1930), p. 526, Part II: No. 251 (January 1931), pp. 24-25.
63
problem in Spain, and the roots of the “military problem” lay in the lack of a 
“professional civilian police” which led to a “distortion of the traditional functions of the 
Army by resorting to military officers for the maintenance of the interior security of the 
state”, which in turn encouraged politically-minded officers to intervene in the political 
process.83 Yet, the employment of the military in public disturbances was fairly common 
through Europe, often at the behest of the civilian authorities.84 Moreover, in Spain as 
elsewhere, military intervention was often in conjunction with, or at the encouragement 
of civilian groups, as opposed to being done in the name of the military itself. Yet, 
militarism was not simply about the influence of professional soldiers in policy-making 
and politics in general, but also an issue of “how far the categories, mentalities, and
Of
modes of operation of the military have percolated into society at large”. From the 
soldier-kings and boy scouts before the First World War to the paramilitary political 
groups that followed it, we can see just how easily the distinction between purely civilian 
and purely military can be lost. Considering such cultural currents and policing practices, 
combined with a seemingly constant stream of social unrest and “indiscipline”, it seems 
almost logical that civil guards would, like certain civilian sectors, begin to gravitate to 
more militaristic solutions to society’s problems.
Surrounded by corruption, localism, disrespect for the law, etc., it is little wonder that 
civil guards began to see themselves as the only force for order, morality and patriotism 
in Spanish society, much like their colleagues in the regular military. Under normal
83 Ballbe, Orden publico y  militarismo, pp. ii-iv.
84 For France and Germany, see Anja Johansen, “State bureaucrats and local influence on the use of 
military troops for the maintenance of public order in France and Prussia, 1889-1914”, Crime, History & 
Societies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2001), pp. 53-73.
85 Volker R. Berghahn, Europe in the Era of Two World Wars: From Militarism and Genocide to Civil 
Society, 1900-1950 (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, 2006), pp. 73-75.
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circumstances, such sentiments of frustration and indignation would produce nothing 
more than grumbling conversation amongst colleagues or complaints in the corps’ own 
press. Yet, when coupled with periods of rising social unrest and frequent acts of 
political violence, these sentiments could take on a much more dangerous form. Civil 
guards often found themselves literally caught in the crossfire over tensions between the 
central government and local interests and within local communities themselves. As 
agents of the state, civil guards looked to the state to resolve these issues, restoring order 
and thus removing the potential and real danger posed to members of the corps. With the 
vast majority of civil guards stationed in small, relatively isolated outposts, treated as 
interfering outsiders by a largely hostile population that greatly outnumbered them, it 
should be of little surprise that civil guards were very sensitive to levels of social and 
political conflict. As will be discussed in the next chapter, when the state appeared to be 
unable to control the situation, civil guards began to take matters into their own hands in 
defence not only of those ideals held to be most dear to the corps, but also of their own 
personal safety. This could take the form of increased brutality against perceived and real 
enemies. In a period where the very foundations of the state appeared to be crumbling, it 
also could translate into disaffection and acts of indiscipline.
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CHAPTER THREE
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the foundations of the Restoration Monarchy 
began to crack. The Restoration system was constructed in the wake of the political and 
social chaos that marked the period commonly known as the Revolutionary Sexennium 
(1868-1874), which also included the short-lived First Republic (1873-1874). The 
Sexennium itself was a product of the lack of a political consensus amongst social and 
political elites, mixed with growing popular discontent against the restrictive political and 
economic system erected under the conservative governments of Isabel II. The coalition 
of forces that brought down the Bourbon monarchy soon split into factions, and that 
which originally was designed to be a simple change of dynasty accompanied by a 
limited opening of the political process converted into numerous revolts at home and in 
Cuba, the abdication of the replacement monarch, Amadeo I, and the proclamation of the 
First Republic. The disastrous experience of the Sexennium, particularly under the 
Republic, was etched in the minds of a generation of politicians, who then restored the 
Bourbons to the Spanish throne and forged a system of power sharing, the turno pacifico, 
that was intended to prevent a similar breakdown.
This consensus amongst the elites, and the apathy of the bulk of the Spanish population 
was eroded by the “Disaster of 1898”, which marked the starting point of the gradual 
breakdown of the Liberal Monarchy. The humiliating military defeat at the hands of the 
Americans as well as the loss of the final remnants of Spain’s once-great global empire 
generated an avalanche of criticism of the political status quo, which found resonance
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amongst nearly all quarters of Spanish society. “Regenerationism”, as this movement 
came to be called, denounced the shortcomings of the Liberal Monarchy, blaming it for 
Spain’s backwardness and descent into third-rate status. On a more fundamental level, 
the process of industrialization and urbanization made the maintenance of the strict 
control of the political process signified by the turno system ever more problematic. 
Moreover, faced with these challenges, the two dynastic parties, the Liberals and the 
Conservatives, began to break into factions, further undermining the functioning of the 
turno system. The polemics and dynamics produced by the First World War only served 
to heighten the impact and intensity of these undercurrents, despite the fact that Spain 
remained neutral throughout the conflict. Indeed, by 1917 these forces for change had 
not only permeated civil society but also the military and security forces, which formed a 
kind of guild organizations known as juntas in defense of their professional interests and 
employed the rhetoric of regenerationalism.1
All this had an impact on attitudes within the Civil Guard. The Spanish-American War 
had driven a wedge between the military and civilian politicians, as each party laying 
blame for Spain’s humiliating defeat at each other’s doorstep. The belief amongst the 
military that society -  and politicians in particular -  did not fully appreciate their 
sacrifices in defending the national interests of Spain filtered into the Civil Guard, for not 
only did many of the latter’s officers come from the army and was imbued with the same
1 For the incipient unionism amongst the Interior Ministry police, see Eduardo Gonzalez Calleja, La razon 
de la fuerza: Orden publico, subersion y  violencia politico en la Espaha de la Restaracion, 1875-1917 
(Madrid, 1998), pp. 521-522. For attitudes amongst the military, see Carolyn P. Boyd, Praetorian Politics 
in Liberal Spain (Chapel Hill, 1979); Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Spain (Stanford, 1967), 
Chapter 8. For a general overview of the period see Francisco J. Romero Salvado, Spain 1914-1918 
(London, 1999).
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patriotic values, but the Benemerita itself had units in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines, units that were repatriated and integrated into the peninsular force. Indeed, 
in the wake of the Cu-Cut incident in 1905, when a group of military officers ransacked a 
Catalan newspaper that criticized the military, rumours spread that disgruntled officers 
may assault parliament. The upper hierarchy of the Civil Guard made it be known that 
they would not be willing to fire on their comrades in arms.
As social and political conflict mounted during the First World War, disaffection with the 
Restoration system grew. Echoing regenerationalist critiques of the political system, a 
series of articles published in the corps’ own journal noted the decadence of the 
Restoration Monarchy, criticizing the defects of caciquismo and the “partisanship” of the 
political class in the face of national crisis. “The political situation in Spain,” it 
complained, “is relatively close to chaos.”3 While the Civil Guard was among the most 
disciplined of the various military and security forces, it was not immune to the political 
currents running through all sectors of Spanish society. Thus, as various military units 
attempted to imitate the relative successes of the working class unions and formed juntas, 
elements of the Barcelona Civil Guard garrisons established contacts with the leading 
juntero of the city, Colonel Benito Marquez.4 The fact that this nascent form of 
indiscipline emerged in Barcelona, the most conflictive city in Spain, was no coincidence, 
nor was the fact that the city was the scene of the greatest incidents of Civil Guard
2 Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1975 (Oxford, 1982), p. 561n3; Payne, Politics and the Military, p. 95; 
Romero Salvado, Spain 1914-1918, pp. 56-57.
3 “Etica social”, RTGC, No. 152 (October 1922), pp.344-345; “Etica social (II)”, RTGC, No.153 
(November 1922); “Etica social (M)”, RTGC, No. 154 (December 1922), pp.450-451; “El problema del 
acuartelamiento: El caciquismo rural”, RTGC, No. 154 (December 1922), pp.448-449.
4 Francisco Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, Vol. IV (Madrid, 1984), p. 116.
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brutality. The link between high levels of social and political violence, a weak and 
ineffective government, and discontent within the Civil Guard were revealed by 
statements in the corps’ own press. After a particularly tumultuous year, the Civil Guard 
expressed its exasperation with the government. In language laced with the threat of a 
pronunciamiento, it was announced in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil “This has 
to stop”, followed by a long, detailed list of “aggressions” against the Civil Guard in 
1919. “The government and the country should pay attention to this”, it explained, for 
“owe cannot nor should not consent to this environment of murder and cowardice by the 
masses against the Benemerita institution of the Civil Guard.”5
The issue of a regime’s legitimacy was intimately linked to the authority, and hence 
personal well-being, of civil guards. Since civil guards were charged with protecting the 
ruling regime, as well as being the primary force for maintaining public order, its 
personnel were primary targets for opposition to the status quo, organized or 
spontaneous. As the legitimacy of a regime crumbles, the physical threat to those who 
attempt to maintain it increases in tandem. While the monarchy most closely matched the 
value system of many within the Civil Guard, its legitimacy (or at least that of its form 
under the Restoration system) rested ultimately on its conformity with the needs and will 
of the nation. For civil guards, the litmus test for this conformity was its ability to 
maintain order, to preserve “social harmony”. When the first organised challenge to the 
Restoration system emerged in 1917, it largely focussed on reforming the current system 
by opening up the political process to new groups so that the government would more 
accurately reflect the will of the nation and allow for a reduction in tensions, and
5 “Las agresiones a la Guardia Civil en el ano 1919”, RTGC, No. 119 (January 1920). Italics mine.
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presumably violence. This consensual solution, as opposed to a revolutionary one, had 
some resonance in the Civil Guard.6
Yet, it was the fear of a revolutionary outcome that most exercised the minds of many 
civil guards. Not only was such a state of affairs repugnant to a group of men imbued 
with a strong sense of the moral value of discipline, it also carried with it the threat of 
physical violence against those whose duty it was to maintain order. Revolution was 
ideologically an anathema for most civil guards for it meant the weakening of those 
societal controls that separate civilized man from barbarians, controls that they viewed 
vital for their authority and hence safety. Thus, any radical deviation from the 
established order would be viewed as suspect.
In was in this context that republicanism was viewed by the Civil Guard. The 
tumultuous, disastrous experience of the First Republic was etched into the historical 
memory of the Civil Guard.7 The failure of the First Republic was not seen in the context 
of a regime that emerged in a period of already high tension and conflict, but rather in 
terms of republicanism’s unsuitability for the character of Spanish civilization. As one 
article in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil explained, despite the good intentions 
of those “respectable elements” which supported the First Republic during the last
6 “Ladera” (anonymous Civil Guard officer), Fechas de sangre: dos semanas de anarquia en Espana. 
Historia, comentarios y  sucesos culminantes de la rebelion de 1909y  de la huelga general revolucionaria 
de 1917 (Madrid, 1917), pp. 326-328.
7 This view was shared by their military colleagues. For the negative connotations of republicanism 
amongst the military, see Fernando Fem&ndez Bastarreche, “The Spanish Military from the Age of 
Disasters to the Civil War”, in Rafael Baflon & Thomas M. Barker (eds.), Armed Forces and Society in 
Spain: Past and Present (New York, 1988), pp. 239-240; Carlos Seco Serrano, Militarismoy civilismo en 
la Espana contemporanea (Madrid, 1984), p. 397. The equation of republicanism with anarchy evidently 
enjoyed popular currency throughout Spanish society until the mid-1920s: Stanley G. Payne, Spain’s First 
Democracy: The Second Spanish Republic, 1931-1936 (Madison, WI, 1993), p. 23.
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monarchical crisis, a political ideology based on “systems” as opposed to the “true social 
order” was bound to descend into revolution.8 Spain’s natural, hierarchical social order, 
they felt, was consecrated by both religion and natural law. Any government or regime 
must act in accordance with these if society is to progress; those that ignore them court 
disaster.9 For the Civil Guard, as for much of the Spanish Right, republicanism became 
synonymous with disorder and anarchy. Thus, while the governments of the Restoration 
Monarchy struggled to contain the increasing unrest of the period, the Civil Guard press 
reminded its readers of the “horrors” of the First Republic and celebrated the corps’ 
historical role in suppressing Republican coup d’etats.10 The fact that these articles were 
published in reaction to a largely anarcho-syndicalist uprising is particularly telling for 
they show the tendency to conflate republicanism with all forms of revolutionary activity.
Republicanism’s association with weak government and anarchy seemed all the more 
dangerous to civil guards in the atmosphere generated after the collapse of the monarchy 
in Russia and the triumph of the Bolsheviks. The Russian Communists had managed to 
take advantage of the collapse of a tottering monarchy and wretch power from the 
Republican Provisional Government that attempted to replace it. In the revolutionary 
euphoria that swept across Europe, police and governments everywhere -  including 
traditionally tolerant countries such as Switzerland -  were on the look out for Bolshevik 
subterfuge as the Communists set up the Third International and called for the world
8 “Del tiempo viejo: La republica en Espana”, RTGC, No. 114 (1919), p. 291.
9 “i,Qu6 es “moral”?”, RTGC, no. 76 (April 1916), p. 19; Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Cursillo de 
6tica. Capitulo II: El Estado”, RTGC, No. 249 (November 1930), pp. 475-476; “Capitulo HI: La 
Autoridad”, RTGC, No. 250 (December 1930), pp. 515-516; “Capitulo V: El orden social”, RTGC, No. 252 
(February 1931), pp. 125-126.
10 “Los sucesos de Zaragoza” & “Las sublevaciones en el Ejercito”, RTGC, No. 121 (1920), pp. 1-2 & 8-12 
respectively; “Los sucesos de Zaragoza: Una pdgina historica de la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 120 (1920), 
pp. 24-27.
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revolution.11 Parallels between Russia and Spain were not the fantasies of just 
conservative and reactionary elements. Republicans such as Marcelino Domingo called 
Spain the “Russia of the West”, and anarchists and sectors of the Socialists also felt that 
the time was ripe to follow the Bolshevik example and so joined the Third International.12 
Fears amongst the Civil Guard during previous periods of social unrest, subversive 
movements and working-class mobilisation -  such as during the Black Hand conspiracy 
of the 1880s -  reappeared with the near-paranoia over Bolshevik agents, fuelled by an 
increase in violence and revolutionary rhetoric. The Deputy Inspector of the Barcelona 
Civil Guard, amid rumours that Lenin himself had arrived in Barcelona, reported to the 
Director General of the corps, Lt. Gen. Juan Zubia y Bethencourt, of the “grave” situation 
in that city as anarcho-syndicalist militants at the orders of foreign revolutionaries had
mobilized 80,000 workers and were planning a revolutionary grab for power. The
1 ^colonel requested the declaration of martial law to pre-empt the alleged plot.
It was this perception of the inadequacy of normal means of control and the eroding 
legitimacy of a regime that seemed to be in terminal decline as governments rose and fell 
in rapid succession that drove civil guards, alongside other groups, towards more radical 
positions. As mentioned before, while social unrest and violence plagued all of Spain
11 For the attempts of various European governments and their police forces to monitor and control the 
activities of Communists and their suspected sympathizers in the years immediately following the 
Bolshevik seizure of power, see Hsi-huey Liang, The rise of the modern police and the European state 
system from Metternich to the Second World War (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 213-236.
12 For the impact of the Communist revolution in Russia and the attempted revolutions elsewhere on the 
political climate in Spain, see Gerald Meaker, The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923 (Stanford, 
1974); Eduardo Gonzalez Callleja, El mausery el sufragio. Orden publico, subversion y  violencia politico 
en la crisis de la Restauracion, 1917-1931 (Madrid, 1999), Chapter 1; Romero Salvado, Spain 1914-1918, 
pp. 150-153, 179-185.
13 Colonel Deputy Inspector of the 21st Regiment to the Director General of the Civil Guard (5 January 
1919), AHN, Ministerio de la Gobemaci6n, Serie A, Legajo 17®, Exp. 1, 543 and 1229.
72
throughout this period, the situation was particularly acute in Barcelona. As a result, civil 
guards stationed there lost faith in the ability of civilian statesmen to resolve Spain’s 
problems, and assumed an attitude of insubordination and began to take matters into their 
own hands. A month before General Primo de Rivera’s military pronunciamiento in 
September 1923 suspended the constitutional legality and put an end to the Restoration 
system, the Civil Governor of Barcelona protested that the commander of the provincial 
contingent of the Civil Guard repeatedly ignored him, and only reluctantly obeyed his 
orders.14 When Primo finally did “pronounce” against the government, the Civil Guard 
of both Barcelona and nearby Zaragoza refused to intervene against the rebels, while the 
remainder of the corps maintained a position of extremely dubious loyalty to the
, 15regime.
That the Civil Guard did not come to the aid of a weak government is not surprising in a 
Europe where communist insurrections were still a reality. The Restoration Monarchy 
had failed to meet its principal responsibility as a State, which is to maintain order, and 
thus lost its legitimacy. Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, who was an instructor at both 
the School for Young Guards and the Special Academy for officers, outlined this theory 
of legitimacy in his “short ethics courses”, published several years later in the Revista
14 Civil Governor (Barcelona) to the Interior Minister (No. 902, 19 August 1923), AHN, Ministerio de la 
Gobemacion, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 6, Barcelona.
15 Colonel Guardia Civil 3° y 21° Tercios to the Interior Minister (No. 444, 13 September 1923), AHN, 
Ministerio de la Gobemacion, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 6, Barcelona; Maria Teresa Gonzalez Calbet, La 
dictadura de Primo de Rivera (Madrid, 1987), pp. 70-71; Gonzalez Calleja, El mausery el sufragio, pp. 
266-267. According to General L6pez de Ochoa, the commanders of the Barcelona garrison of the Civil 
Guard had pledged their adhesion to “the movement” prior to the acutal pronunciamiento: Eduardo L6pez 
de Ochoa, De la dictadura a la republica, (Madrid, 1930), p. 27. The official history of the Civil Guard, La 
Guardia Civil Espanola, published by the National Directorate of the Civil Guard in 1994, makes no 
mention of the events surrounding Primo de Rivera’s pronunciamiento. Somewhat more surprisingly, the 
October 1923 issue of the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil also fails to mention the events of the 
previous month; in fact, when reading this issue one would hardly have known that Primo’s coup happened 
at all.
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Tecnica de la Guardia Civil. He explained that order is maintained by authority (the 
State). Without order, a society falls into anarchy and the natural social order is 
destroyed, making the progress of mankind impossible. Thus, when a society enters a 
period of social crisis, it is faced with two options: dictatorship or revolution. While 
dictatorships (like that of Primo de Rivera) are meant to be a temporary “heroic” measure 
to re-establish the social order, “if in the critical moment there is not a force of order able 
to take power... inevitably revolution will come.” In such a disastrous situation,
“society throws itself down the road of violence, destroying all that is right and moral”,
“it being submerged forever in insanity and degeneration, destroying the civilization that 
humanity had been working towards for centuries.”16 The implicit reference to the events 
in Russia could not have been clearer.
The failure of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship to construct a new political order that 
would permanently resolve Spain’s political, economic and social problems meant that 
civil guards would come to face in 1930-1931 a situation similar to that of 1917-1923. 
King Alfonso XIII had found that his support for the dictator and (implicitly) Primo de 
Rivera’s policies had alienated military officers and politicians alike.17 Thus, as the 
monarchy entered yet another crisis, Alfonso XIII found himself in an even weaker 
position than in 1917. The interim government of General Berenguer set up in the wake
16 Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Capitulo II: El Estado”, pp. 475-476; “Capitulo III: La Autoridad”, pp. 515-516; 
“Capitulo V: El orden social”, pp. 125-126. See also the anonymous articles “Delitos contra la Autoridad” 
in RTGC, Nos. 247 & 248 (September & October 1930), pp.394-395 & 453-454. Such attitudes are still 
hold weight today. The semi-official history by Aguado Sanchez (who was the former director of the 
Center for Historical Studies within the National Directorate) takes a very apologetic view of the 1923 
coup, while failing to mention its illegality (or the positions taken within the Civil Guard): Historia de la 
Guardia Civil, IV, pp.192-193. Julio de Ant6n, a Police Commissioner of the National Police, takes a 
similar view in his Historia de la Policia Espahola (Madrid, 2000), p. 233.
17 Payne, Politics and the Military, pp. 256-263; Gabriel Cardona, El poder militar en la Espaha 
contempordnea hasta la guerra civil (Madrid, 1983), pp. 103-112.
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of Primo de Rivera’s resignation lacked sufficient support to carry out its function. 
Ultimately, the solution of this crisis depended on the ability of pro-monarchist elements 
to patch together a coalition willing to restore the pre-1923 constitutional order in some 
form or another, or for the republican opposition to mount a successful challenge to 
overthrow the tottering monarchy. While the number of active monarchists disposed to 
save the regime appeared to shrink by the day, the republican opposition seemed to grow 
ever broader, including ex-monarchists, the Socialists and republicans themselves. As 
unrest mounted and the political situation appeared uncertain, civil guards looked to 
which group, the monarchist or the republicans, would prove the stronger in this contest 
for power and, most importantly, prevent a complete breakdown of authority and thus 
avert a lapse into revolution.
While the monarchy was weakened, it was not yet defeated, and the pro-republican 
opposition realized that in order to take power themselves they would have to undermine 
the regime’s instruments of self-defence. Amongst the most important of these was the 
Civil Guard. Well-founded concerns remained over the possible resistance of the Civil 
Guard to the establishment of a republican regime. Civilian conspirators feared for the 
success of a rebellion only supported by a small group of army officers and their largely 
conscripted troops, given the discipline and often better training of the Benemerita.
Julian Bestiero, President of the Socialist Party (PSOE), told Antonio Bartolome y Mas of 
the National Revolutionary Junta in September 1930 that his party would not act against 
the regime “without the previous guarantee from enough of the military forces that they
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would keep the Civil Guard in their quarters.”18 As the leader of the Revolutionary 
Committee, Niceto Alcala Zamora, noted, “with the view of those who are sure of victory 
and wish to govern in the near future, it was preferred to make it known to this institution 
that it should not go against the national will and that it would retain its position of 
guaranteeing the new legal order.”19
In order to gain the support, or at least the neutrality of the Civil Guard, the republicans 
would need to present themselves as a credible alternative government, that is, one that 
would provide a solution to the chronic unrest and instability of the monarchy. Indeed, in 
an effort to project an image of a “conservative” Republic of “order”, Alcala Zamora and 
Miguel Maura -  both ex-monarchists and Catholics -  were given leading roles in the 
Revolutionary Committee.20 Alcala Zamora presented an image of a “Republic of order” 
in a speech given in Valencia (13 April 1930), stating that the republicans wished to 
establish a “Republic that was viable, able to govern and conservative in nature.” He 
went on to exclaim that “I will not assume the role of a Kerensky, and implant a 
convulsive and epileptic Republic.”21 At the same time republicans portrayed the regime 
as having lost its legitimacy and thus rebelling against it was completely justified, 
perhaps even a duty. The National Revolutionary Junta drew up a manifesto in 
September 1930 and distributed it around Civil Guard barracks in anticipation of the
18 Quoted in Gonzalez Calleja, El mausery el sufragio, p. 530.
19 Niceto Alcala Zamora, Mis memorias (Barcelona, 1998), p. 165.
20 Ben-Ami, Origins o f the Second Republic, pp. 86-87; Carr, Spain 1808-1975, p. 595; Gonzdlez Calleja, 
El mausery el sufragio, p. 530.
21 Quoted in Joaquin Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica, Vol. I (Madrid, 1970), p. 40.
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planned uprising against the monarchy. In this manifesto, the illegality of the present 
government was stressed as well as calls for unity with the cause of “the people”.22
For the monarchy, given the political unreliability of the military and the poor state of the 
Interior Ministry police, the continued discipline amongst the Civil Guard was 
paramount. As a consequence of this dependence on the Civil Guard, the monarchy 
could not be a passive bystander to the republicans’ efforts to undermine the loyalty of 
the corps. The intelligence services were conscious of the propaganda efforts of the 
republicans amongst the armed forces.24 The government was also aware of the growing 
cooperation amongst the anti-monarchist opposition and their plans to bring down the 
regime, and in September 1930 the Interior Minister instructed the Director General of 
Security, General Emilio Mola, to draw up plans for concentrating the forces of the Civil 
Guard in the various provincial capital and other strategic points in the event of an 
attempted uprising.25 A detailed blueprint, drawn up with the advice of the Civil 
Governors of each province, was in place by November 26
While the Berenguer government was able to suppress the disjointed republican 
rebellions of December 1930 fairly easily, it was not complacent about the potential 
threats to the monarchy and began its own propaganda offensive amongst the Civil
22 Gonzalez Calleja, El mausery el sufragio, p. 530.
23 One of the first priorities of the Berenguer government was to rectify the deficiencies of the Interior 
Ministry police, and Berenguer requested the newly-appointed Director General of Security, General 
Emilio Mola, to draw up a comprehensive reform within the space of three months: Emilio Mola Vidal, 
Obras Completas (Valladolid, 1940), pp. 233-234.
24 Mola, Obras Completas, pp. 349 & 631; Shlomo Ben Ami, The Origins o f the Second Republic in Spain 
(Oxford, 1978), p. 88
25 Damaso Berenguer, De la Dictadura a la Republica (Madrid, 1975), pp. 209-210.
26 Mola, Obras Completas, p. 481; Gonzalez Calleja, El mausery el sufragio, pp. 547-8 & 547nl45.
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Guard. The King’s “special predilection” and “his interest and attraction” for the Civil 
Guard was plastered across the front page of the January issue of the force’s journal.27 
Two initiatives were announced days later. Firstly, the government declared a series of 
improvements in the pay of the Civil Guard.28 Secondly, on the Saint’s Day of Alfonso 
XIII, it was announced that the King would award General Jose Sanjuijo, the commander 
of the Civil Guard, the Gran Cruz de Carlos III -  one of the Spanish military’s highest 
honours. If the symbolism of this act was not already obvious, it was decided that the 
King would personally present the medal to Sanjurjo in the main royal residence in 
Madrid on the anniversary of the Civil Guard’s creation. All press accounts noted the 
extraordinary character of this move 29 In addition to this, the Cross of San Fernando was 
awarded posthumously to the Civil Guard sergeant who was killed in the suppression of 
the December revolt. As noted in the article announcing this, Sergeant Gallego would be 
the first Civil Guard to receive this medal, as it is normally only awarded to those soldiers 
displaying extraordinary conduct in the defense of the regime in battleground-type 
situations.30
In contrast to the King’s admiration of the corps, the military press played on the 
traditional suspicion of many within the Civil Guard about the revolutionary intentions of
27 “Dfas de S.M. el Rey Don Alfonso XIII”, RTGC, no. 251 (January 1931), pp. 1-3. Also, the fact that the 
regime felt the need to censor the corps’ journal in January is particularly telling.
28 “Guardia Civil: Importante mejora”, LCM (22 January 1931); “Ante el secreto del ano”, RTGC, no. 251 
(January 1931), p.3; “Guardia Civil: Aumento de los premios de constancia”, LCM (5 February 1931). 
These financial inducements were made in conjunction with a general salary increase for the armed forces, 
declared that same month: Payne, Politics and Military, p. 260.
29 “El anniversario de la creacidn de la Guardia Civil”, Ejercito y  Armada (30 March 1931); “87 aniversario 
de la fiindacidn de la Guardia Civil”, LCM(29 March 1931); “Su Majestad el Rey impone en palacio al 
general Sanjuijo la gran cruz de Carlos HI”, ABC (29 March 1931).
30 “Guardia Civil: Se propone al sargento muerto en Jaca para la cruz de San Fernando”, LCM (14 February 
1931).
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the Left. The “three principal decrees of the ‘conservative’ Republic” that the failed 
revolt had attempted to establish were published in La Correspondencia Militar. The 
third of these decrees was the abolition of the Civil Guard and the establishment of a 
radical, left-wing “People’s National Guard”31 The government was aided in its efforts to 
win the hearts and minds of the Civil Guard by monarchist supporters. Prominent 
monarchists such as the Conde de' Guadalhorce, as well as those intimately tied to the 
fallen dictatorship, like former Finance Minister Jose Calvo Sotelo and the general’s own 
son, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, began a publicity campaign to halt the “growing 
republicanism” within the armed forces.32 In a January 1931 article, Jose Antonio 
described what he called “the miracle of the Civil Guard”: in a society which seems 
inherently lacking a sense of communal or civic duty, the Benemerita stands out for its 
discipline and sacrifice for the greater good.33
After the failed republican pronunciamiento of December 1930 the government 
demonstrated once again the importance it placed on the services of the Civil Guard, and 
its concern over the discipline of the Benemerita. In the middle of January 1931 a second 
Mobile Unit was created within the Civil Guard as a rapid-reaction force to deal with any 
further attempted uprisings. As was pointed out in an article in La Correspondencia
i i .
Militar discussing the establishment of the 29 Regiment, “This measure ... should 
produce a deep sense of satisfaction amongst all of us, because it reveals once more the 
confidence the government... has placed in the forces of the [Civil Guard], which it
31 “Documentos interesantes de la fracasada revolucidn”, LCM (18 January 1931).
32 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, pp. 219-220.
33 Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, “El milagro de la Guardia Civil”, originally printed in La Provincia (Las 
Palmas de Gran Canaria) on 7 January 1931, reproduced in the Revista Profesional de la Guardia Civil -  
the post-Civil War successor to the RTGC-no. 8 (August 1943), pp. 7-8.
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considers the firmest supporter (sosten) of order and tranquillity.” Yet, not just anyone 
could enlist in this crack unit. Alongside meeting the physical requirements, the 
authorities needed to be certain that “convinced that [candidates] are not contaminated by 
any advanced political idea.”34
The Republicans were not discouraged after their failed attempt in December 1930 to 
topple the regime through force, and more overtures were made to the Civil Guard from 
the pages of the republican newsletter La Gaceta de la Revolution, associated with the 
Radical Republican Party of Alejandro Lerroux. Seeking the “benevolent neutrality” of 
the Civil Guard in the event of another republican uprising, they attempted to assure the 
corps that its future would be secure under a Republican government and that it would 
attend to the Civil Guard’s economic grievances. Yet, this time, with the carrot came the 
stick: if, when the time comes, the Civil Guard opposed the will of “the people”, “the 
people will hate it, and the Republic, in their name, will issue a thunderous decree of 
dissolution.” In another article, the republicans asked their followers to take note of the 
name or ID number of any agent of the police who attacked them, who would then find 
himself relieved of his employment once the Republic was installed.35
The republicans did achieve a more concrete gain when contact was established with 
General Sanjurjo by Lerroux. Lieutenant General Jose Sanjurjo Sacanell was one of the 
most prestigious Army officers of his time, his actions in the Moroccan Wars earning him
34 “Guardia Civil: El 29 Tercio”, LCM(23 enero 1931); “Guardia Civil: El ingreso en los Tercios moviles”, 
LCM (29 January 1931).
35 “Los partidos republicanos a la Guardia Civil”, La Gaceta de la Revolution, No. 5 (28 January 1931); “A 
los soldados”, La Gaceta de la Revolution, No. 7 (12 February 1931).
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seven promotions, numerous medals (he was the only officer to have been awarded the 
Cross of San Fernando twice, the Spanish military’s highest honour), and a noble title, the 
Marques del Rif. His family was traditionally associated with the cause of the Carlist 
pretenders, though General Sanjurjo himself never fully identified with their cause.36 
Sanjurjo was like many officers of his generation: while holding no clearly defined 
political ideas beyond a vague nationalism, Sanjurjo believed in the Army’s right to 
intervene in politics whenever enough of its officers felt that a government was running 
counter to the “national will”.37 Indeed, as the General commented to his friend Pedro 
Sainz Rodriguez, “the State is like a limited company; if the management is good then 
that’s fine; if management is bad, then change it”.38 Given Sanjurjo’s stature amongst 
his fellow officers and his command of the Civil Guard, his sympathies were a constant 
preoccupation for monarchists and republicans alike.
The course of Sanjurjo’s interventions in politics was characterized by pragmatism and 
reversal of positions. Sanjurjo’s first political activity came with his brief flirtation with 
the Juntas de Defensa Militar, only then to become an antijuntero?9 As Military 
Governor of Zaragoza, Sanjurjo pledged his support for Primo de Rivera’s 
pronunciamiento in September 1923, playing an active role in the destruction of the
36 Though the surname Sanjuijo is Galician in origin, the Sanjurjo family planted its roots in Navarra, one 
of the historic strongholds of Carlism. His grandfather and paternal great-uncle both fought under the first 
pretender, Carlos V, during in the First Carlist War, with the latter, Josd Antonio Sanjurjo, became the 
personal secretary to the pretender. Sanjurjo’s father and maternal uncle followed the banner of Carlos VII 
in the Second Carlist War, the latter relative eventually becoming the aide-de-camp of the pretender. 
Enrique Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, El general Sanjurjo: Heroe y  victima (Madrid, 2004), pp. 25-29.
37 For interventionist attitudes among the Spanish military, see Payne, Politics and the Military’, Cardona, 
El poder militar, Raymond Carr, “Spain: Rule by Generals”, in Michael Howard (ed.), Soldiers and 
Governments (London, 1959), pp. 135-148.
38 Quoted in Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 2002), 
p.247.
39 Boyd, Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain, p.l43n4
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constitutional monarchy.40 As the popularity of the dictator began to wane and plots 
against his rule began to surface, Primo de Rivera placed his trusted friend Sanjurjo in the 
crucial post of Director-General of the Civil Guard in December 1928.41 Yet, when 
Sanjurjo realized the extent of the alienation from Primo de Rivera amongst many within 
the Army, as well as a tumultuous drop in public support for the dictator, Sanjurjo 
counselled his comrade to resign 42 Sanjurjo’s importance was recognized by the anti- 
primorriverista General Berenguer, who left Sanjurjo in the post of Director-General 
while he attempted to construct the delicate bridge back to constitutional legality.43 Yet, 
given Sanjurjo’s personal ties to Primo de Rivera, whose efforts were now denigrated by 
a king and government anxious to disassociate themselves from the dictator, and 
Sanjurjo’s pragmatic, if not opportunistic approach to politics, his unconditional support 
of the monarchy was not assured.
Some have claimed that Sanjurjo’s actions during the first few months of 1931 were 
influenced by a feeling of resentment towards the king for the latter’s “abandonment” of 
Primo de Rivera, leading some to insinuate that the General’s own “abandonment” of 
Alfonso XIII after the April elections was some sort of payback 44 Whatever Sanjurjo’s 
personal relations with the Royal household, there does not appear to be any evidence
40 Cardona, Elpoder militar, p. 79. According to General Eduardo L6pez de Ochoa, the “various 
indiscretions” of Sanjurjo obliged Primo to move the date for his pronunciamiento forward: De la dicatura 
a la Republica, p. 27.
41 Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, El general Sanjurjo, pp. 73-75.
42 Cardona, El poder militar, p. 101.
43 Emilio Esteban-Infantes, General Sanjurjo. Un laureado en el penal del Dueso (Barcelona, 1957), p. 
114.
44 Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversacionesprivadas con Franco (Barcelona, 1976), pp. 555- 
556; Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida junto a Franco (Barcelona, 1977), p. 89; Marques de 
Hoyos, Mi testimonio (Madrid, 1962), p. 171; Esteban-Infantes, a close friend of Sanjuijo and his aide-de- 
camp, noted that the General was upset with the treatment that Primo de Rivera received after his 
resignation and had a difficult relation with the King, but stresses that Sanjuijo’s actions were not 
influenced by personal considerations: General Sanjurjo, pp. 113 & 125-126.
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that Sanjurjo entertained any serious thoughts about the possibility of regime change until 
the fall of the Berenguer government in February 1931. Indeed, not only did he 
congratulate his men for defending the regime during the rebellion of December 1930,45 
but also he was instrumental in the economic concessions granted by the government to 
the corps in January 1931.46 Given the frequent complaints made by the Civil Guard in 
their own journal over pay, Sanjurjo’s efforts cannot be seen as anything else than an 
attempt to bolster the morale of his men and endear them to the faltering regime.
Yet, the collapse of the Berenguer government and the difficulty in putting together a 
coalition to replace it were the most instrumental factors in conditioning Sanjuijo’s 
attitudes towards the political crisis facing the monarchy. The weakness of the King’s 
position, and the growing popularity of the republicans, convinced Sanjurjo of the 
advisability of agreeing to the invitations of Lerroux’s representatives to meet with the 
Radical leader.47 Lerroux, always keen to exploit discontentment within the military, 
asked Pedro Rico of Republican Action in mid-January 1931 to arrange a meeting with 
the highest-ranking general possible. Through a mutual friend, Rico was put in contact 
with Colonel Ubaldo Aspiazu, a close confidant of Sanjurjo and later the intermediary 
between Sanjurjo and the republicans during the critical days of 13-14 April 1931. 
Aspiazu set up a meeting between Lerroux and the General in February. Though 
Sanjurjo made it clear that he would not join any conspiracy, he (and by extension the 
Civil Guard) would not oppose a change of regime “if the entire people should want a
45 Sanjuijo’s message to the Civil Guard (General Order of 17 December 1930) is reprinted in Esteban- 
Infantes, General Sanjurjo, pp. 116-117.
46 “Guardia Civil: Importante mejora”, LCM(22 January 1931); “Ante el secreto del ano”, RTGC, no. 251 
(January 1931), p.3; “Guardia Civil: Aumento de los premios de constancia”, LCM(5 February 1931).
47 Esteban-Infantes, General Sanjurjo, pp.113 & 126-127.
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Republic”. Strangely, Lerroux, stated in his memoirs that Sanjurjo refused his advances 
(though he claimed it was well known that the general was sympathetic to the republican 
cause), which, incidentally, is the same story Sanjurjo told General Mola, whose 
intelligence network found out about the meeting.49 Stranger still is the fact that outside 
Lerroux’s inner circle within the Radical Party (and the monarchy’s surveillance 
services), no other republican leader appeared to be aware of this significant 
development. According to Rico, Lerroux wanted to keep this important contact all to 
himself so as to prevent him from being sidelined, which would not be surprising given 
the distaste many of the other republican leaders felt towards him.50
Sanjurjo’s position was similar to that of his men. In spite of their role in suppressing the 
December 1930 revolt and the propaganda efforts of the government, the Civil Guard 
began its own propaganda campaign in January 1931 in order to demonstrate the corps’ 
political neutrality. Even before Sanjurjo met with Lerroux, the Civil Guard announced 
its “profound apoliticism” in the decidedly pro-monarchist La Correspondencia Militar. 
The Civil Guard claimed that it too was a “victim” of the political system, which forced 
the corps to perform political tasks that were outside their duties -  like persecute 
republicans -  which only tarnished the force’s good reputation. As such, the “fully 
justified ... instinctive antagonism” felt by the republicans towards the Civil Guard meant
48 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic, 1931- 
1936 (Brighton, 2000), pp. 134-135; Questionnaire by Josd Maria Carretera for Sanjurjo, Archivo Sanjurjo, 
quoted in Sacanell Ruiz de Apodaca, El general Sanjurjo, pp. 80-81.
49 Alejandro Lerroux, Lapequeha historia de Espaha, 1930-1936 (Barcelona, 1985), p. 65; Mola, Obras 
Completas, p. 631.
50 Townson, Crisis o f Democracy in Spain, p. 135.
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that, as proof of its integrity and to avoid any accusation of partiality, the corps must 
remain completely aloof from the electoral process.51
This did not signify necessarily absolute neutrality, or a willingness to join any 
republican conspiracy against the monarchy. The republicans allegedly made some 
inroads with the Civil Guard. General Mola received an anonymous letter in May 1930 
warning of anti-monarchist sentiment in large parts of the armed forces, including the 
Civil Guard.52 Civil Guard historian Aguado Sanchez echoes this, claiming that by 
summer 1930 the Republican Military Association had many sympathizers amongst Civil
c * i
Guard officers. Yet, given the ingrained suspicion towards republicanism amongst 
many civil guards, Alcala Zamora noted that despite their propaganda efforts, the 
republicans had very few adherents amongst the Benemerita,54 Indeed, despite the 
regime’s concerns over attitudes within the Civil Guard towards the political struggle, it 
appears that, on the whole, there was little to worry about. An article published in the 
Civil Guard section of La Correspondencia Militar in March 1931 demonstrate the 
veracity of Alcala Zamora’s negative assessment. This article discussed the republican 
propaganda pamphlets that were distributed in the various barracks of the Civil Guard in 
an attempt to gain their support for the failed December 1930 rebellion, and dismissed the 
republicans’ promises of better working conditions and pay, as well as job security under 
a republic as “siren songs”. The Civil Guard would not be fooled by these “tricks” and 
“lies”, as the “captured documents” from the December rebellion clearly demonstrated
51 “Guardia Civil: Sinceridad electoral”, LCM(24 January 1931).
52 Mola, Obras Completas, p. 349.
53 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, p. 219.
54 Alcala Zamora, Memorias, p. 165.
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that the republicans planned to dissolve the corps and initiate a social revolution. Aware 
of the “true” intentions of the republicans, and true to their duty as civil guards, “there 
does not exist, nor ever will, the most remote fear that these forces will be contaminated 
by the burst of insanity which characterized the defeated movement [of December]”.55 
Moreover, another article instructed the government to not “rest on its laurels” and take 
advantage of the “period of tranquillity” following the failed rebellion to equip the Civil 
Guard properly so that the latter would be better placed to defend the regime against the 
next attempted insurrection.56
Nonetheless, if a period of tranquillity followed the abortive insurrections of December 
1930, it did not last. By the end of March 1931 pro-republican elements had begun to 
step-up their campaign once again. The trial of the Republican leaders over the 
December uprisings began on 20 March, and ended not with the condemnation and 
marginalisation of the republicans, but their acquittal and vindication. Indeed, events had 
gained a momentum that seemed impossible for the Aznar government to contain, despite 
its conciliatory gestures. On the 24-25 March student protests at the Complutense 
University in Madrid descended into a virtual battle with the Civil Guard and police. 
These protests spread to other universities across Spain and further undermined public 
confidence in the regime.57 Given the apparently continual deterioration of the 
monarchist position, the increasing unrest, and with the municipal elections less than two 
weeks away, the government began to bolster its security apparatus in anticipation of 
trouble. From 29 March a series of changes in the commands of the Civil Guard and
55 “Guardia Civil: Cantos de sirena”, LCM(18 March 1931).
56 “Guardia Civil: Perfodo de tranquilidad”, LCM (24 March 1931).
57 Ben-Ami, Origins of the Second Republic, pp. 216-217.
Interior Military police were announced. These included new Chiefs of Police in Madrid 
and Barcelona (the former going to a colonel of the Civil Guard, Jose Aranguren Roldan, 
who would later play a key role in July 1936 as the commander of the Civil Guard in 
Catalonia); a new Deputy Director-General of the Civil Guard was (General Benito Pardo 
Gonzalez, who was previously Regimental Inspector of the Civil Guard in Barcelona), as 
were two new Inspectors within the National Directorate (General Agustin Marzo 
Balaguer, who was previously Chief of Police in Madrid, and General Manuel Gomez 
Garcia, who was elevated to the rank of Brigadier General so he could occupy this post); 
Colonel Jose Osuna Pineda was assigned sub-inspector of the Mobile Unit based in 
Madrid (the 27° Tercio); and new provincial commanders of the Civil Guard were named 
for La Coruna, Teruel, Navarra, Huelva, Castellon, Valencia and the Balearic Islands. 
Also, the Director General of the Carabineros (the militarized frontier and customs 
police) was recalled from leave.58
In the face of the growing vociferousness of the republicans, pro-monarchist forces 
mobilized their own propaganda campaign, which frequently targeted the Civil Guard. 
Some monarchists showed their support for the regime through donations to the Civil 
Guard.59 The readers of the monarchist dailies ABC and El Debate started up a public 
subscription for the mother of the Civil Guard sergeant that was killed during the 
confrontation with republican students in Madrid.60 Indeed, ABC printed a full-page 
picture of the grieving mother on its front page, with the caption “Civil Guards have
58 “Nuevo jefe superior de Polida de Madrid” & “Reales decretos de varios ministerios”, ABC (29 March 
1931); “Firma del Rey”, Ejercito y  Armada & ABC (2 April 1931); “El Director General de Carabineros”, 
ABC (2 April 1931).
59 Ben Ami, Origins o f the Second Republic, p. 212.
60 ABC (28 March 1931)
mothers too”.61 The monarchist military press joined the chorus. A front-page article 
addressed to the Civil Guard and the other security forces in La Correspondencia Militar 
claimed that the confrontation between the corps and the University of Madrid students 
was provoked by “foreigners” and “communists”, the enemies of order who “hate 
authority and all those who possess the smallest vestige of it.” What was needed, it 
continued, was “to form a united front against anarchy and disorder. This is the duty and 
in the interest of all who wear a uniform; the security and the prestige of the state 
demands it.”62 As later articles would demonstrate, for the editors of La 
Correspondencia Militar (and, one would suppose, for its readers), the monarchy was the
fkXbest defence against disorder, a republic being synonymous with it.
Despite the propaganda of pro-monarchist sectors and the prominent ceremony held on 
28 March, hosted by the King in honour of Sanjurjo, and by extension the Civil Guard, 
events were undermining the monarchist position. As the political momentum appeared 
to be favouring the republican cause, it demanded a level of pragmatism from the Civil 
Guard. The various Civil Guard commentaries on the clashes with student in Madrid, for 
example, were not dedicated to denouncing the protests as the work of subversive 
elements, but rather complained about the negative press the Benemerita was receiving 
by its handling of the events.64 This sensitivity to public criticism, while not new, was 
significant when placed in its political context, that is the conviction amongst the Civil 
Guard that a change in regime was a distinct possibility. Indeed, two days before the
61 ABC (27 March 1931)
62 “La autoridad y el companerismo”, LCM (7 April 1931)
63 “jA las umas!”, LCM( 12 April 1931)
64 “Guardia Civil: Despuds de los sucesos”, LCM(28 March 1931); “Guardia Civil: La ley, en quiebra”, 
LCM (2 April 1931).
municipal elections were to take place, an article appeared in the staunchly monarchist La 
Correspondencia Militar in which the Civil Guard expressed its gratitude for the support 
it had received from pro-monarchist elements, including the honours rendered to the Civil 
Guard sergeant that was killed in the university clashes, it also announced that the corps 
would not intervene in the political process. Instead, it would simply do its duty and 
would not “demonstrate the least bit of sympathy for any particular group”.65
The election results on 12 April were worse than even the pessimistic Aznar Government 
expected. In spite of expecting a less-than ideal result, the scale of the success of the 
Republican-Socialist coalition came as a surprise and left the government unsure as to 
how to handle the situation. The Conde de Romanones, who was the Secretary of State, 
noted that upon arriving in Madrid that afternoon, “I was immediately aware that the 
battle was lost.”66 To take stock of the situation, all of the members of the government 
(except for the Ministers of War, Navy and Finance) met in the Ministry of the Interior at 
around 5:30 p.m. General Sanjurjo also went to the ministry, the only non-minister to do 
so. All of the members of the government were despondent and unsure as to what action 
they should take. In his account of this meeting, Romanones states that amongst the 
gloomy ministers gathered in the Interior Ministry, “the most important vote of all those 
we encountered there was his, above all for the post he held.” At this point, several of 
them turned to Sanjurjo to gauge his reaction to the events. To the general, the “national 
will” he spoke of to Lerroux two months earlier had made itself known: with the military 
divided, the republicans victorious, and the government in disarray, now was the time for
65 “Guardia Civil: El fruto de un sacrificio”, LCM (10 April 1931).
66 Conde de Romanones, Notas de una vida (Madrid & Barcelona, 1999), p. 499.
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pragmatism, not force. Thus, when asked by those present whether the regime could still 
count on the Civil Guard, Sanjurjo responded that “until last night you could have”.67 
After Sanjurjo told those gathered there that they could not count on the Civil Guard to 
defend the regime, Romanones claimed that “with this, the last hope of the regime fizzled 
away.”68
Yet, while Sanjurjo’s position came as something of a shock, the General’s reluctance to 
overturn forcibly the election results was in line with the view of the majority of those 
gathered at the ministry. Except for Juan de la Cierva, no one had considered the armed 
defence of the monarchy to be a serious option 69 As Hoyos notes, “no one suggested 
that they replace [Sanjurjo] as Director General of the Civil Guard with someone else 
who would show himself disposed to carrying out blindly the orders of the 
Government.”70 Indeed, as Romanones himself said the next day, “the Mauser [the rifle
# 71
used by the Civil Guard] is an inadequate answer to the manifestation of suffrage.” 
Lacking a clear plan of how do deal with the situation, but not wanting to give the 
appearance of a crisis, they decided to wait events out and not to meet again until 14 
April, their next regularly scheduled meeting. By doing so, events developed outside of 
their control and a compromise solution that could have preserved the monarchy became 
increasingly unlikely. . ■ ■
67 Sanjurjo’s exact words differ slightly in the various accounts of those present, yet all essentially agree on 
their meaning. See Conde de Romanones, “Historia de cuatro dias”, originally published in 1940, 
reproduced in Not as de una vida, pp. 499-500 & 511-512; Gabriel Maura Gamazo, Recuerdos de mi vida 
(Madrid, 1934), pp. 206-207; Hoyos, Mi testimonio, pp. 122-129; Alvaro Alcala Galiano, La caida de un 
trono (Madrid, 1933), pp.191-192.
68 Conde de Romanones, “Recuerdos de las ultimas horas”, El Sol, 4 June 1931.
69 Ben Ami, Origins of the Second Republic, pp. 239-240 & 245-248.
70 Hoyos, Mi testimonio, p. 129.
71 Quoted in Ben Ami, Origins o f the Second Republic, p. 242.
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Despite the plans of those gathered at the Interior Ministry, not all members of the 
government felt that events should be left to chance. When the Minister of War, General 
Damaso Berenguer, learned of the election results later that evening, and the reactions of 
those ministers gathered at the Interior Ministry, as well as that of Sanjurjo, he quickly 
realized that things could quickly get out of hand if the government did not take control 
of the situation. Fearing that the election results would expose the divisions in the 
military, especially if they provoked a pro-republican pronunciamiento, he sent out a 
telegram at 1:15 a.m. on the morning of 13 April. In this telegram Berenguer instructed 
the Captain Generals to maintain discipline amongst the troops under their command to 
avoid any unnecessary violence as the country followed “the logical course that the 
supreme national will imposes on it.”72
Berenguer was not the only one who felt that a solution to the looming crisis could not 
wait until the fourteenth. Throughout the thirteenth, the various ministers shuffled back 
and forth attempting to formulate a way of salvaging the monarchy. In the meantime, 
General Sanjurjo, very likely aware of Berenguer’s telegram and unwilling to wait for the 
government to decide on a course of action, re-opened contact with Lerroux.74 While the
72 Berenguer, De la Dictadura a la Republica, pp. 316-320. In his meetings with various ministers, 
Berenguer showed each of them his telegram. All of them approved it: Romanones, Notas de una vida, p. 
513.
73 Ben Ami, Origins of the Second Republic, pp. 240-242.
74 General Franco relates the story of Natalio Rivas, who claimed to have personally seen Sanjuijo himself 
in Lerroux’s building on the thirteenth: Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones, pp. 88-89, 121. Rivas 
(or Franco himself) was probably embellishing somewhat as it seems highly unlikely that Sanjuijo would 
personally go to meet with Lerroux, given the likelihood that he would have been spotted. Indeed, the fact 
that such an important development as the Director-General of the Civil Guard meeting with a member of 
Revolutionary Committee before the fate of the king had been decided would have picked up on and 
announced in the press.
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exact result of this contact is unclear, especially as Lerroux appears to have kept this 
development a secret from the rest of the nascent Provisional Government, even sources 
which seek to downplay Sanjurjo’s involvement with the republicans before the official 
transfer of power admit Sanjurjo was in contact with the republicans from the thirteenth 
via his intermediary Colonel Aspiazu.75 It seems that Sanjurjo had had some 
encouragement to approach the Radical leader. There have been claims that some 
prominent monarchists, either members of the government or with close ties to it, advised 
Sanjurjo that morning that he, in the interest of maintaining order, place the services of 
the Civil Guard at the disposal of the republicans in the event they take power. Alcala 
Galiano claims to have been told by “an illustrious historian and ex-minister of the 
Crown” that on the morning of the 13th, the leader of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista 
Francisco Cambo, the Treasury Minister Juan Ventosa and the Minister of Labour 
Gabriel Maura (who was probably Alcala Galiano’s source), pessimistic about the fate of 
the monarchy, made such an suggestion to Sanjuijo.76
The historian Ricardo de la Cierva alleges that at 9:00 p.m. that evening, presumably as a 
result of Sanjurjo’s negotiations with Lerroux, the General circulated a telegram to the 
regional commanders of the Civil Guard informing them that they “give the proper orders 
to the forces under your command so that they do not oppose the just expression of the
75 Esteban-Infantes, General Sanjurjo, p. 129; Hoyos, Mi testimonio, p. 188.
76 Alcala Galiano claims to have been told by “an illustrious historian and ex-minister of the Crown” 
[Gabriel Maura?] that on the morning of the 13th Francisco Cambo, Minister of the Treasury Juan Ventosa 
and Minister of Labor Gabriel Maura, pessimistic about the fate of the monarchy, made such an intimation 
to Sanjurjo: La calda de un trono, p. 198nl. The British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir G. Grahame, informed 
the Home Office that a “reliable authority” had told him something along the same lines: F0371/15771 No. 
152, Grahame to Henderson (16 April 1931).
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republican triumph that could arise from the Army and the people.”77 The existence of
•  70
this telegram has been questioned, but if true would have only signified that Sanjurjo 
shared the same concerns as Berenguer: that in the absence of clear orders, a clash 
between monarchist and republican garrisons could erupt and lead to violence, perhaps 
even a civil war. In any event, the initiative was passing to the Revolutionary Committee 
as crowds of their supporters began taking control of the streets, demonstrating in favour 
of the Republic. Encouraged by the relative passivity of the government, which in the 
past would have already declared martial law and sent the Civil Guard and Army into the 
streets, to the republicans and the population at large the days of the monarchy seemed
70numbered and rumours of an abdication spread.
As dawn broke on the fourteenth, the Second Republic was proclaimed in the Basque 
town of Eibar, with similar declarations occurring across Spain. Later that morning, after 
meeting with several ministers of the government, the King accepted that all was lost and 
agreed to leave the country with the hope that an interim government could be formed
77 Ricardo de la Cierva, Historia ilustrada de la guerra civil espanola, Vol. I (Barcelona, 1977), p. 107.
78 De la Cierva appears to be the only person to have known of this telegram’s existence, his knowledge of 
it deriving from the testimony of a Socialist employee in the Palacio de Comunicaciones, Gabriel Mario de 
Coca. Aguado Sanchez, rather convincingly, challenges De la Cierva’s evidence on technical grounds: 
Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, p. 230. Rivas G6mez disputes the significance De la Cierva attaches to 
the supposed telegram (as well as its veracity), arguing that “Sanjuijo would have done nothing more than 
second that which was ordered by the Minister of War in [his earlier] telegram [to the Captain Generals]”: 
Fernando Rivas G6mez, “La Guardia Civil en la caida de un rey”, REHGC, No. 16 (1975), pp. 130-131. It 
would seem the strongest argument against the existence of such a telegram is the fact that none of the main 
protagonists, neither monarchist nor republican, nor any of the major newspapers mention it; which, given 
its significance, would be very difficult to explain.
79 The republicans and their supporters were astounded by the inaction of the government in the face of 
what normally would have been considered revolutionary or seditious demonstrations, as several Civil 
Governors characterized them in their telegrams to the Interior Ministry: AHN, Civil Governor [Navarra] to 
the Interior Minister and the Director General of Security (No. 594, 12 April 1931), Civil Governor 
[Huelva] to the Interior Minister and Director General of Security (No. 627, 13 April 1931), Ministerio de 
Gobemacion, Serie A, Legajo 16A, No. 16. For a description of the popular mood during the evening of 
the 13th, see El Socialista & El Sol (14 April 1931).
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and then oversee a plebiscite on the future of the monarchy.80 As the King was to be 
escorted in his journey into exile by a contingent of Civil Guards, Under-Secretary of the 
Interior, Mariano Marfil was asked to make the necessary arrangements; this meant 
informing Sanjurjo of the King’s decision.81 Shortly thereafter, Sanjurjo placed himself 
at the orders of the Revolutionary Committee.
There is much debate about just when Sanjurjo passed over to the Republicans. His own 
version, published in both the military and Civil Guard press, minimized his contacts 
with the Committee by noting that he did not officially (that is, publicly) meet with the 
Republicans until the King had abdicated, that is late in the afternoon. Nonetheless, 
Sanjurjo’s account unintentionally admits that he effectively placed himself at their 
orders in the morning'. “[Sanjurjo’s] position was to respect the people’s sovereignty and 
the national will because he understood that the Army was a part of the nation. Yet he 
felt that until the [Revolutionary Committee] effectively assumes power, he could not put 
himself in contact with them out of loyalty and discipline [to the King] ... but he 
authorised the emissary to communicate his position to Alcala Zamora and [Miguel] 
Maura”.82 Other accounts corroborate that Sanjurjo adhered to the Committee prior to 
the Alcala Zamora-Romanones meeting, that is, before 1 p.m. Alcala Zamora in a public
speech reprinted in El Sol states that the Committee received the adhesion of the Civil
0-1
Guard by 12 noon. Romanones and Gregorio Maranon, both witnesses to the Alcala
80 Ben Ami, Origins o f the Second Republic, p. 243.
81 Miguel Maura, Asi cayo Alfonso XIII, p. 164. Maura mistakenly claims that Sanjurjo knew of the King’s 
resolution to leave the country by 9:00 a.m.
82 The official account, doubtlessly approved by Sanjurjo himself as they are all word-for-word 
reproductions of each other, can be found in several sources: “La neutralidad de la Guardia Civil”, LCM 
(16 April 1931); “Lealtad de la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 255 (1931), pp.242-243; El Sol (15 April 1931).
83 El Sol (12 May 1931).
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Zamora-Romanones meeting mention Alcala Zamora informing Romanones that he had 
already received the adhesion of General Sanjurjo.84 Miguel Maura has Sanjuijo himself 
appearing at his residence at 11:00-l 1:15 a.m. to place himself at the orders of the 
Committee, though this was unlikely.85 Sanjuijo’s close friend and aide-de-camp Esteban 
Infantes is evasive about the General’s contacts with the Revolutionary Committee before 
the transmission of powers was agreed between Alcala Zamora and Romanones, but 
insists that Sanjurjo did not formally adhere to the Provisional Government until this 
occurred.86
From that moment on, Sanjurjo became increasingly active in aiding the peaceful change 
of regime. When summoned to the War Ministry around noon, Berenguer informed 
Sanjuijo (as well as Generals Millan Astray and Cavalcanti) of the plans to set up an 
interim government.87 Sanjurjo, perhaps fearing that any attempts to salvage the 
monarchy would only exacerbate the situation in the streets and in the barracks, 
responded that there was no other alternative but for the Alfonso to abandon the throne. 
Yet, as with the issue of Sanjurjo’s contacts with the Revolutionary Committee, there is 
some disagreement about the impact, if not content of Sanjurjo’s comment. Francisco 
Franco Salgado-Araujo, recording his cousin’s attempts to shift blame for his own
84 Romanones, Notas de una vida, p. 517 & Marafidn, quoted in Rafael Borr&s Betriu, Cambio de regimen: 
Caida de la Monarquia y  proclamacion de la Republica (Barcelona, 2001), p. 260 (originally found in 
Maranon’s Obras Completas, Vol. IV, Madrid, 1968, p.493).
85 Maura, Asl cqyo Alfonso XIII, pp. 164-165. It appears that Maura, writing from memory years after the 
events, had confused the order of events: Sanjuijo did come to his residence, but not until after the transfer 
of powers was known. If Sanjurjo would have personally appeared at Maura’s flat at the time Maura 
claims, it would have been impossible for him to have escaped the notice of the many reporters and 
bystanders gathered outside. Given that not a single newspaper mentions what would have been a major 
development in the course of events, it is likely that Maura was thinking of the message Sanjuijo sent via 
his intermediaries.
86 Esteban Infantes, General Sanjurjo, p. 131; La sublevacion del general Sanjurjo (Madrid, 1933), pp. 
136-137
87 Berenguer, De la dictadura, p. 337.
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inaction during the crisis, claims that General Franco adopted his position of passive 
acceptance of the proclamation of the Republic after discovering from General Millan 
Astray -  who was present at the War Ministry with Sanjurjo -  that Sanjurjo said that he 
could not count on the Civil Guard to defend the king, and thus Alfonso had to leave 
Spain. Director-General of Security Mola’s rather less personally-motivated version 
has Millan Astray informing Berenguer that Franco (“a person in Zaragoza whose 
opinion had to be taken into account”) felt that in the circumstances “there already was no 
other solution other than the king giving up the throne”.89 Socialist sources claimed that 
Sanjurjo threatened to resign if Alfonso did not abdicate.90
By the time Romanones arrived at the residence of Alcala Zamora to discuss the forming 
of an interim government at around 1:00 p.m., the initiative had clearly passed to the 
Republicans. The Aznar Government’s lack of resolve only reinforced popular 
perceptions that a change of regime was nigh. Thus, not only had Sanjurjo 
communicated his support of the Provisional Government, but many Civil Governors 
across Spain had also begun to place themselves at the orders of Alcala Zamora 91 Faced 
with such a situation, and amidst fears that events could soon evolve beyond the control 
of the Provisional Government itself if the king did not immediately leave Spain, 
Romanones abandoned this final attempt to salvage the throne and yielded to Alcala 
Zamora’s demand that the king leave Spain “before the sun set”.92
88 Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida junto a Franco, pp. 97-98; Mis conversaciones privadas, pp. 450-452.
89 Mola, Obras completas, p. 867.
90 El Socialista (15 April 1931).
91 Maranon, quoted in Borras Betriu, El cambio del regimen, p. 260 (originally found in Maranon’s Obras 
Completas, Vol. IV, Madrid, 1968, p. 493).
92 Descriptions of the Alcala Zamora-Romanones meeting can be found in Alcald Zamora, Mis memorias, 
p. 192; Romanones, Notas de una vida, p. 517; Marafion, Obras Completas, IV, pp. 492-493.
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Once the news of Romanones’ capitulation became known, Sanjurjo’s emissary Aspiazu, 
who was waiting at Miguel Maura’s residence, informed the General of the events and of 
the new government’s request that he come to Maura’s house to discuss the necessary 
measures to maintain order during the Provisional Government’s assumption of power. 
Now that the required formalities had been taken care of, Sanjuijo agreed.93 After 
meeting with Maura at around 4:30-5:00 p.m., Sanjuijo went to the National Directorate 
of the Civil Guard to meet with his immediate subordinates and begin transmitting the 
proper orders to the regional commanders.94 When the Provisional Government arrived 
at the Puerta del Sol to take possession of the Interior Ministry and officially declare the 
Republic, the civil guards stationed inside the building presented their arms to the new 
government, at which point the Socialist leader Francisco Largo Caballero commented to 
Alcala Zamora: “The Republic is a fact (La Republica es un hecho)”.95
To what extent were Sanjurjo’s claims of his inability to rely on the Civil Guard true? 
Histories produced by the Civil Guard historians dispute the claim that Sanjuijo 
abandoned the King. They follow the official line set out (veiy likely by Sanjurjo 
himself) back in 1931, which was that arguing that Sanjurjo was not a minister and could 
not determine government policy. Sanjurjo could not and did not refuse to cany out a 
direct order to employ the Civil Guard. It was the defeatism of the government and its 
passivity in the face of the growing crisis that led to the fall of the monarchy. Once
93 El Sol (15 April & 7 June 1931); “La neutralidad de la Guardia Civil”, LCM (16 April 1931); “Lealtad de 
la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, pp.242-243.
94 Esteban Infantes, La sublevacion de Sanjurjo, pp. 136-137; Cesar Gonzalez-Ruano & Emilio Rodriguez 
Tarduchy, Sanjurjo: Una vida espanola del novecientos (Madrid, 1933), pp. 172-173.
95 Quoted in Borras Betriu, El cambio de regimen, pp. 288-289.
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powers had passed to the Republican regime and the now-established government called 
upon his services, Sanjurjo simply acted as his duty demanded.96
Furthermore, as the Civil Guard historian Rivas Gomez notes, by accepting the 
interpretation that Sanjurjo was to blame -  which he clearly does not believe, stating the 
general was made a “scapegoat” by Romanones -  one would be accepting implicitly that 
“by extension, all of the Civil Guard” turned their back on the monarchy.97 For members 
of the Benemerita, who pride themselves as the determined defenders of the Spanish 
State, such an interpretation was clearly unacceptable. They doubt the veracity of 
Sanjuijo’s “supposed” comment on the night of the 12th that he could not count on the 
Civil Guard to follow orders to defend the regime. As Rivas Gomez argues, Sanjuijo 
could not have made such a claim for, as he himself just learned of the election results, he 
would not have had time to consult with the regional commanders to gauge their 
reactions to the situation. Therefore, such a statement would be completely speculative, 
and in Rivas Gomez’s opinion, untrue.98 Indeed, these authors challenge all claims made 
that the Civil Guard did anything but follow orders during those three days. Yet, by 
proposing that Romanones was only seeking to shift blame from himself to Sanjurjo, 
Rivas Gomez appears to believe that the Count was at least exaggerating Sanjurjo’s
96 The official account, doubtlessly approved by Sanjurjo himself as they are all word-for-word 
reproductions of each other, can be found in several sources: “El general Sanjuijo, respetuoso con la 
voluntad nacional, se pone al servicio de la Republica”, El Sol (15 April 1931); “La neutralidad de la 
Guardia Civil”, LCM(16 April 1931); “Lealtad de la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 255 (May 1931), pp. 242- 
243.
97 Fernando Rivas Gomez, “La Guardia Civil del siglo XX”, in Jose Sanz Munoz (ed.), La Guardia Civil 
Espanola (Madrid, 1994), p.209. Rivas G6mez first put his version of events -  which seek to exculpate 
both Sanjurjo and the Civil Guard from any hint of wrongdoing -  in his article “La Guardia Civil en la 
cafda de un rey”, (1975), pp. 111-167. His account has since become the official interpretation of events. 
See Francisco Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, Vol. IV (Madrid, 1984), pp. 225-244.
98 Rivas G6mez, “La Guardia Civil del siglo XX”, p.209. Rivas Gomez bases his interpretations largely on 
the account given by Esteban-Infantes: Esteban-Infantes, General Sanjurjo, pp.125-126.
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comments that night, or at worst, making the whole thing up. By singling out 
Romanones, Rivas Gomez unfortunately overlooks the fact that all those present at the 
Interior Ministry that night record Sanjuijo as saying the same thing (though differing in 
the exact wording).
Moreover, Sanjurjo’s statement about the attitude of his men should not have been a 
surprise for, as we have seen, the unwillingness of the Civil Guard to contest a republican 
victory had been announced in the La Correspondencia Militar, the last of such 
announcement being only two days before the elections." Nonetheless, a cursory glance 
at newspaper accounts of events across Spain between the thirteenth and fourteenth show 
that most civil guards were willing to break up demonstrations when receiving clear 
orders to do so. The telegrams of at least two provincial governors also report that the 
Civil Guard units under their jurisdiction were willing to maintain order.100 This was 
echoed in the memoirs of the Director-General of Security, General Mola, who stated that 
among the various police forces in Madrid, only the Civil Guard gave the impression of 
being disposed to obey orders.101 Indeed, as one republican demonstration made its way 
through the streets of Madrid they were confronted by a contingent of Civil Guards in the
1 A 'l
Plaza de Cibeles who dispersed them, as ordered by Mola.
99 “Guardia Civil: El fruto de un sacrificio”, LCM(10 April 1931).
100 AHN, Civil Governor [Navarra] to the Interior Minister and the Director General of Security (No. 594,
12 April 1931), Civil Governor [Huelva] to the Interior Minister and Director General of Security (No. 627,
13 April 1931), Ministerio de Gobemacion, Serie A, Legajo 16A, No. 16.
101 Mola, Obras Completas, pp. 857-859.
102 Mola, Obras Completas, p. 856; “Represion sangrienta en las calles de Madrid”, El Socialista (14 April 
1931). According to sources within the Socialist party, Sanjuijo punished the officer who was in charge 
during the confrontation at Cibeles: Gonzdlez Calleja, El mausery el sufragio, p. 614n352.
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It is evident from the accounts of both Mola and Sanjurjo’s aide-de-camp Esteban
Infantes that clear orders were not forthcoming from the government. By the evening of
the thirteenth, this lack of direction, coupled with rumours of an abdication, led to an
increasing reluctance on the part of many civil guards to disperse the masses of pro-
1
republican supporters filling the main public areas of Madrid. Gregorio Maranon 
reported that as he was returning to his home that evening, he noted that “in the faces and 
actions of several of the guards, and in the words of an officer that I talked to briefly, one 
could perceive a tortured indecision. The representatives of authority began to doubt 
themselves and whom they were meant to serve.”104
This sense of uncertainty only increased as the Republic began to be proclaimed from 
various town halls on the morning of the fourteenth. In Eibar, the first town to make such 
a proclamation, the local Civil Guard contingent remained in their barracks as the jubilant 
crowds celebrated. This was not necessarily a welcomed event, for as one of the newly- 
elected republican councillors, Juan de los Toyos, reported to his colleagues in San 
Sebastian, “the Civil Guard does not view favourably [their proclamation of a Republic], 
but rather with long faces. If fact, they seem as if they wished to drive us off.”105 This 
growing reluctance to intervene was also evident in Madrid. When the Under-Secretary 
of the Interior, Mariano Marfil, told the commanding officer of the Civil Guard stationed 
around the Ministry of the Interior that the King wished his men to disperse the pro­
republican crowds gathered there, the officer responded
103 Berenguer, De la dictadura, pp. 332-333; Borras, Cambio de regimen, p. 227.
104 Maranon quotation in Borras, Cambio de regimen, p. 228.
105 Mola, Obras Completas, p. 863; Arraras, Historia de la segunda Republica, I, p. 24. De los Toyos 
quotation in Borras, Cambio de regimen, p. 234.
100
Tell His Majesty that, on his orders, I would go out into the Puerta de Sol on my 
own and let the crowds tear me to pieces, but I cannot order those under my 
command to do so because they will not obey.106
At around three in the afternoon a republican crowds descended on the Palacio de 
Comunicaciones and raised the tricolour flag. The civil guards charged with defending 
this important building did not intervene.107
Newspaper accounts of the day demonstrate a variety of reactions by civil guards to the 
events, and such confusion was natural as Sanjuijo did not begin to transmit orders about 
the change of regime until after six in the afternoon.108 Nonetheless, reactions varied 
amongst the Civil Guard to the change of regime. Some guards began to fraternise with 
the republican crowds. In Ubeda (Jaen) the captain of the local Civil Guard led a group 
of republicans as they entered the town hall and proclaimed the Republic there.109 
Elsewhere, there were civil guards who were rather less enthusiastic about the change in 
regime. In the town of Treviana (Logrono), the newly-elected Republican councillors 
approached the commanding officer of the local Civil Guard post to complain about the 
provocative actions of local monarchists. Sergeant Hernandez Ramirez responded with 
his belief that “all republicans are swine (canallas) and that his only regret was not 
opening fire on them on the day of the elections.” Upon receiving the news the following
106 Maura, Asi cayo Alfonso XIII, pp. 162-163. Unsurprisingly, Civil Guard historians dispute the veracity 
of this exchange: Rivas G6mez, “La Guardia Civil en la caida de un rey”, pp. 134-136; Aguado Sanchez, 
Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, pp. 233-234.
107 Berenguer, De la dictadura, p. 338, Arraras, Historia de la segunda Republica, I, p. 30.
108 Gonzalez-Ruano and Rodriguez Tarduchy, Sanjurjo, pp. 172-173; Esteban-Infantes, General Sanjurjo, 
p. 136.
109 Ahora (15 April 1931)
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day, 15 April, that the Republic had been proclaimed throughout Spain, the republicans 
of Treviana still encountered hostility from the local Civil Guard. In contradiction to the 
official position of the corps’ loyalty to the new regime, Sergeant Hernandez Ramirez 
probably more accurately reflected the view of many civil guards when he told his new 
civilian superiors that “with the coming of the Republic, he became a republican by 
force.”110
Civil guards greeted the coming of the Republic in a variety of ways: some with 
resignation, some with a sense of trepidation, some with varying degrees of enthusiasm 
and others with varying degrees of hostility. That some sort of political change was on 
the cards was widely perceived. As one article announced, the establishment of the 
Republic “[was] not, nor could have been a surprise for those who followed attentively 
the country’s political situation”.111 What seemed to concern civil guards most was that 
if a change of regime was to be effected, it be done in as smooth a manner as possible so 
as to minimize the weakening of governmental authority. It was exactly this concern, the 
preservation of authority, that most exercised the thoughts of many civil guards as they 
feared that the loosening of the established norms of control would unleash those dark 
forces that led to the establishment of communism in Russia.
Yet, the strategic abandonment of an unpopular and illegitimate monarchy in order to halt 
the further radicalization of the situation and a conversion to republicanism are two
110 Both quotations from Carlos Gil Andres, La Republica en la Plaza: Los sucesos de Arnedo de 1932 
(Arnedo, 2002), pp.237-238.
111 “Guardia Civil: El cambio de regimen”, LCM (17 April 1931).
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different things. One of the principal tasks of the new regime was to “republicanise” both 
the mentalities and methods of the Benemerita. This was no easy undertaking for, 
besides having to change ingrained institutional cultures, the disagreements amongst the 
component members of original Republican-Socialist coalition rendered difficult a clear 
definition of what “republicanism” and the “Republic”. Added to this was a historic 
antagonism between Republicans and Socialists, one the one side, and the Civil Guard on 
the other -  not to mention the hostility of many amongst the working classes towards the 
corps -  and the continuation, if not escalation of social unrest into the Republican period. 
As shall be seen in the following chapters, these combination of factors would prove fatal 
to the Republican project, however broadly defined.
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CHAPTER FOUR
On 15 April 1931 in Barcelona the newly-elected Radical councillor Jordi Vinaixa 
travelled to the Civil Guard barracks located on the Ramblas, went up to its balcony and 
raised the Republican flag. After doing so, he proclaimed that the Civil Guard, in 
allowing the tricolour fly over their quarters, were now a “Republican Guard”.1 This 
symbolic act represented the hope that the Civil Guard, in accepting the legitimacy of the 
Republic, was now at the service of the people’s will and no longer its oppressor. This 
transformation seemed to be accepted by the Barcelona Civil Guard themselves. The 
commander of the 4th Company of the 21st Regiment, Captain Emilio Escobar, sent a 
telegram to the Catalan leader Francesc Macia, describing a large public ceremony 
whereby the Catalan flag was raised alongside the Republican one above their barracks. 
He goes on to describe the sense of fraternity between the crowds gathered for the 
ceremony and the Benemerita, congratulating Macia for his nomination as President of 
the Catalan Generalitat, and declared the unshakable loyalty of the Civil Guard to the 
new Catalan authorities.2 Yet, despite the optimistic atmosphere of the first days of the 
new regime, a tempestuous current ran under the bridge from monarchy to Republic, 
which would soon carry away much of this initial goodwill. The proclamation of the 
Second Republic was simply the first step in “republicanising” Spanish society, and the 
institutions that governed it. Amongst the latter, the Civil Guard -  despite its official 
acceptance of the Republican regime -  would prove amongst the more difficult to 
Republicanise. The attempted process of “republicanisation” would be a complex one in
1 El Debate (16 April 1931).
2 “En Barcelona: La adhesion de la Guardia Civil”, Ejercito y  Armada (17 April 1931).
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which aspects both pertaining to the corps as well as those extraneous to the Civil Guard 
would all have their impact.
One of the obstacles facing this proposed republicanisation was an underlying sensation 
that the corps was incompatible with the new political order. The primarily repressive 
role of the Civil Guard under the monarchy, and its ubiquitous presence meant that the 
corps had become for many the living embodiment of an oppressive regime and unjust 
social order. As a result, the popular image of the Civil Guard amongst the Republicans 
and the working class organizations was that of being the “enemies of the people”, or in 
the words of the left-wing Socialist, Julio Alvarez del Vayo, the Civil Guard was “the 
most hated figure in Spain”.3 The Civil Guard, and the police in general, were not 
viewed by substantial sectors of the population as the neutral enforcers of the nation’s 
laws, but as the brutal agents of the social and economic elite. The Republican 
authorities were well aware of this popular hostility towards the Benemerita, and the 
negative image that could result from its use by the new regime. This included the more 
conservative members of the Provisional Government, such as the former monarchist and 
now Prime Minister Niceto Alcala-Zamora, who asked the Interior Minister and fellow 
conservative Republican, Miguel Maura, either to abolish the Civil Guard or to reform it 
“in such a manner as to make it appear that we have dissolved it”.4 Even the military 
authorities, who counted amongst the staunchest defenders of the Benemerita, could on 
occasion feel the need to cater to public hostility towards the corps.5 What was clear was
3 Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom’s Battle (London & Toronto, 1940), pp. 311-312.
4 Miguel Maura, Asi cayo Alfonso XIII (Barcelona, 1966), p. 206.
5 General Rodriguez del Barrio, the National Inspector of the Army and soon to be conspirator against the 
Republic, did not call for the formation of the local garrison of the Civil Guard during a review of the
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that the change in regime could not, on its own, erase deeply felt anti-police attitudes 
amongst sectors of the population and the Republican coalition now in government.
There existed considerable disagreement within the Republican-Socialist coalition over 
what should be done with the Civil Guard. For some, the corps was at best an 
anachronism, a relic left over from the monarchy, and at worst a complete contradiction 
to the principles of the new democratic regime. While recognizing the hostility of 
elements of the general population and his colleagues towards the corps, Interior Minister 
Maura, decided after reviewing the regulations of the Civil Guard that no reform of these 
was necessary. Furthermore, aware that the new regime needed the services of the Civil 
Guard, Maura was concerned that any attempt to reform the corps would undermine the 
morale, if not loyalty of the force.6 Maura’s refusal to alter “a single comma of the 
famous ordinances” of the Civil Guard reflected more than the rumblings of a recalcitrant 
ex-monarchist. Simply put, the Provisional Government could not dissolve the Civil 
Guard for fear of the backlash this would cause within the military, and also because of 
the lack of an alternative professional police force to take over its functions. The Interior 
Ministry had its own police forces, the Security Corps and the Surveillance Corps. 
Numerically weaker than the Civil Guard, the Interior Ministry police were also notorious 
for their ineffectiveness in dealing with major disturbances.7 To have abolished the Civil
armed forces stationed in Malaga in early July. While the civil provincial governor protested at this 
omission, Azana suspected that the General had decided to do this in order to avoid any hostile response 
from the public: Manuel Azana, Diarios Completos: Monarquia, Republica y  Guerra Civil (Barcelona, 
2000), p. 152.
6 Maura, Asi ccryo, p. 206.
7 On the policia gubernativa and issues surrounding the reform of the security forces, see Maura, Asi cay o, 
pp. 265-275; Niceto Alcala Zamora, Memorias (Barcelona, 1998)pp. 220-221; Diego Martinez Barrio, 
Memorias (Madrid, 1983), p. 109; Azafia, Diarios Completos, p. 185; Emilio Mola, Obras Completas 
(Valladolid, 1940), pp. 233-234.
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Guard would have left the new regime virtually defenceless in the face of attacks from 
both the Left and the Right. As Diego Martinez Barrio, a moderate and Republican of 
long standing, noted, most Republicans had to “subordinate profound convictions about
Q
the necessity to transform the institute” to the exigencies of the time.
Yet, these “profound convictions” were not so easily suppressed and were the cause of 
the first major rift within the Provisional Government before the Republic was even a 
month old. On 10 May 1931, a scuffle that had broken out at the inauguration of the 
newly-formed “Circulo Monarquico Independiente ” in Madrid -  most likely due to the 
provocative actions of its members -  quickly evolved into angry Republican crowds 
attacking those places most associated with the old regime. The involvement of the Civil 
Guard in the protection of some of these buildings, as well as the fact that the Director- 
General of Security, Carlos Blanco Perez (a crony of Alcala Zamora with no ties to the 
Republican cause),9 had granted the monarchist group permission to organize, had 
mobilized Republican supporters into mounting a popular show of force against 
monarchist (or presumed monarchist) elements. Blanco was not only a personal friend of 
Alcala-Zamora but had served as Director-General of Security on two previous occasions 
under the monarchy. In light of the recent anti-Republican comments of the Primate of 
the Catholic Church in Spain, Cardinal Segura, religious buildings were attacked and 
soon churches across Madrid were being sacked and set on fire. Also targeted were those 
conservative elements within the government and the state that were seen as obstacles to
8 Martinez Barrio, Memorias, p. 105.
9 Santos Martinez Saura, Memorias de un secretario de Azana (Barcelona, 1999), pp.84-86, 93-94; Maura, 
Asi cayo, pp. 241-242. See Blanco’s greeting to the men of the Interior Ministry police in the BODGS of 
20 April 1931, reproduced in Jose Caamafio Boumacell, La policia a traves del tiempo, 1908-1958 
(Madrid, 1999), p.163.
the (leftist) Republican agenda, namely the Civil Guard and Maura himself, with 
demands for the dissolution of the former and the dismissal of the latter.
Maura, a devout Catholic, was alarmed by the prospect of the Republic descending into 
mob rule and quickly resolved to send out the Civil Guard to suppress the protests. 
Maura’s desire to deploy the Civil Guard, one of the most potent symbols of the 
monarchy, against a pro-Republican demonstration was too much for the other members 
of the government to countenance, and the Interior Minister soon found himself 
confronted by virtually all of his colleagues. Indeed, even the monarchist Blanco thought 
such an action inflammatory, and was the first one to alert the cabinet to Maura’s plans. 
The Minister of War and left-wing Republican Manuel Azana led the opposition against 
Maura, threatening to resign if the Civil Guard was used against the demonstrators. 
Meanwhile, a group of members of the Ateneo (of which Azana was the President) 
arrived at the Interior Ministry. From the balcony at the front of the Ministry building, 
their spokesman read out a statement in favor of the abolition of the Civil Guard and the 
dismissal of Maura. Incensed at the blatant meddling of the other ministers in his duties, 
as well as the personal affront to his authority, Maura offered his resignation. The 
impasse was finally resolved the following day as the disturbances spread to several other 
cities, with martial law being declared in Madrid and Maura was granted full authority to 
deal with issues of public order. Nonetheless, the use of the Civil Guard by the 
Republican government was seen as so controversial, that it was deemed less problematic 
to send regular troops into the streets to restore order.10
10 Maura, Asi cayo, pp. 240-264; Martinez Barrio, Memorias, 36-38; Alcala Zamora, Memorias, pp. 217- 
222; Stanley G. Payne, Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936 (Madison, WI, 1993),
108
The rapidity with which a relatively small disturbance spread nationwide was not lost on 
the members of the Provisional Government, nor was the potential for the exploitation of 
such unrest missed by the enemies of the regime. Consequently, the usefulness of the 
Civil Guard soon became clear to many of Maura’s colleagues. Alcala-Zamora, who had 
been the first minister to try and prevent Maura from sending out the Civil Guard, made a 
public speech blaming the events of 10-11 May on extremist elements out to discredit the 
Republic, while praising the discipline of the Civil Guard and its loyalty to the new 
regime.11
Indeed, the same Azana who so strongly opposed the use of the Civil Guard in May 1931 
would later find himself defending the force in parliament. Cipriano de Rivas Cherif, 
Azana’s brother-in-law and close friend, noted that while many requested the dissolution 
of the Civil Guard, the Minister of War felt that this was a long-term objective, to be 
arrived at very gradually: that is to say, only once a suitable replacement was set up. 
Azana felt that while the Republic did not necessarily enjoy the M l loyalty of the corps, 
as long as its discipline was intact, there was little reason to push through a measure that 
was bound to provoke a strongly hostile reaction amongst the military at a time when the 
War Minister was attempting to introduce wide-ranging reforms.12
pp. 44-45. Juan-Simeon Vidarte claims that Azafia himself offered the balconies of the Interior Ministry to 
his Ateneo colleagues for them to read their proclamation: Las Cortes Constituyentes de 1931-1933 
(Barcelona, 1976), p. 35.
11 El Sol (12 May 1931); Alcala-Zamora, Memorias, pp. 220-222.
12 Cipriano de Rivas Cherif, Retrato de un desconocido. Vida de Manuel Azafia (Barcelona, 1981), p. 196.
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As periodic incidents of unrest continued on into the summer of 1931, the government’s 
reliance on the Civil Guard became all the more evident. By the end of May Maura 
already was receiving complaints from the civil governors about the need for more Civil 
Guards properly to monitor and maintain order in their provinces.13 Moreover, once civil 
governors managed to get reinforcements for their provinces, they were reluctant to 
release them from service. When the Civil Governor of Barcelona requested the return of 
the 29th Regiment (a rapid-response mobile unit normally stationed in the Catalan 
capital), Maura sent out a telegram on 24 August to those Civil Governors in whose 
provinces these men had been deployed. In response, the Civil Governor of Valencia 
claimed that not only could he not release those reinforcements stationed in his province, 
but he requested that even more men be sent.14 The plight of the Barcelona Civil 
Governor was shared by several of his colleagues, as they pleaded with the Interior 
Minister for the return of their Civil Guard personnel.15 This situation continued 
throughout the year, as the Interior Minister repeatedly had to ask provincial governors to 
release those reinforcements that were no longer necessary, often with the same result.16
Although not in possession of the two Ministries that deal with the Civil Guard, nor in 
control of any of the provincial governorships, the Socialists also had to contend with the
13 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 15, Civil Governor [C&diz] to Interior Minister 
(No. 1913,27 May 1931); Civil Governor [C&diz] to Interior Minister (No. 1172,16 June 1931).
14 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 19, Civil Governor [Valencia] to Interior 
Minister (No. 899, 25 August 1931). See also the responses of the Civil Governors of Oviedo (Legajo 39A, 
No. 18,25 August 1931) and Zaragoza (Legajo 39A, No. 19,25 August 1931), both of who stated that they 
could not afford to release those reinforcements stationed in their respective provinces.
15 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 19, Civil Governor [Zamora] to Interior Minister 
(No. 318,08 September 1931); Civil Governor [Valladolid] to Interior Minister (No. 77, 2 October 1931).
16 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 15, Interior Minister to Civil Governor [Cadiz], 
(No. 376, 16 December 1931), Civil Governor [Cadiz] to Interior Minister (No. 845,23 December 1931), 
Interior Minister to Civil Governor [Cadiz], (No. 646,24 December 1931); Legajo 39A, No. 14, Interior 
Minister to Civil Governor [Alicante], (No. 374,16 December 1931).
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issue of the Civil Guard, particularly in the light of the views of their constituency, which 
consisted in large part of workers and peasants who were had direct experience of the 
Civil Guard’s more repressive dimension. Like their Republican colleagues, there existed 
differences of opinion amongst the Socialist leadership about the Civil Guard, and despite 
the hostility of many of them towards the corps, moderation initially characterized many 
of those views expressed. Juan-Simeon Vidarte, a member of Prieto’s centrist grouping 
within the Socialist Party and later an outspoken critic of Republican policies regarding 
police reform and public order, explained:
We Socialists did not want to abolish those institutions charged with defending 
the social order -  as was the anarchists’ position -  but rather reform some of the 
more anachronistic regulations ... that were unacceptable under a democratic 
regime for the repression of emotional and momentary protests of wide sectors of 
public opinion.17
While there was some internal debate amongst the Socialists as to their specific role in a 
Republican administration, the overall strategy was that of bolstering the new regime.18 
To this end, they eschewed any radical proposals that might undermine the moderate 
reformist image that the Provisional Government was attempting to portray, or 
antagonize still powerful sectors such as the military. This meant swallowing, like their 
Republican allies, their deep-seated hostility towards the Civil Guard. As Vidarte 
explains, while the dissolution of the Civil Guard was part of the Socialists’ agenda, the
17 Vidarte, Las Cortes Constituyentes, p. 292.
18 For a discussion of the moderation of, and divisions amongst, the Socialists, see Paul Preston, The 
Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic (henceforth 
CSCW), (London, 1994), Chapter 3.
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exigencies of the situation and pressure from their coalition partners obliged them to drop 
this pledge from their platform.19 At the Extraordinary Congress of the PSOE in July 
1931, a representative from Jaca (Huesca) presented a motion for the disarming the Civil 
Guard. The hapless delegate was unable to complete his petition due to the disapproving 
response his proposal caused amongst his colleagues.20 Taking this sentiment even 
farther was Julian Besteiro, one of the most prominent, though conservative leaders 
amongst the PSOE. Echoing Maura’s position, Besteiro remarked to the Minister of War, 
Manuel Azana, that the Civil Guard “is an admirable machine. One needs not to abolish 
it but make it work in our favour.”21
Nonetheless, while opinions such as Besteiro’s were not the mainstream view within the 
PSOE, during the first year of the Republic the majority of Socialist representatives 
limited their demands to the Interior Ministry to the transfer of problematic Civil Guard 
officers. Indeed, such transfers constituted the primary strategy employed by the 
Provisional Government as it would not only defuse local tensions, but was also felt to be 
less antagonistic to Civil Guard sensibilities than a policy of the widespread purging its 
ranks. This measure was often necessary wherever there existed a history of hostility 
between Civil Guards and local Republican and Socialist representatives, a fact 
recognized even by Director-General Sanjuijo, who commented to Azana that his men 
might have difficulty accepting orders from those whom they previously viewed as the
19 Vidarte, Las Cortes Constituyentes, pp. 292-293.
20 El Partido Socialista ante las Constituyentes (Madrid, 1931), p. 56. The Socialists efforts to moderate 
their agenda and the expectations of their growing constituency, and the difficulties they encountered in 
doing so, see Paul Preston, CSCW, Chapter 3.
21 Azafia, Diarios Completos, p. 425.
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enemy.22 As a result, waves of large-scale transfers of NCOs (sergeants and corporals) 
and guards were carried out by the National Directorate during the spring and summer of 
1931 23
Yet, even this moderate position could sometimes lead to disagreements, especially when 
doctrine clashed with pragmatism. In one interesting case, the Socialist parliamentary 
deputies for the province of Badajoz (all members of the PSOE’s right and centre 
groupings, including the besteiristas Manuel Muino and Narciso Vazquez and the 
prietistas Julian Zugazagoitia and Juan Simeon Vidarte) wrote to the Interior Minister 
requesting the wholesale transfer of all Civil Guard personnel in their province. 
Interestingly, this was before the election of the deputy for Badajoz who was the most 
militantly critical of the Civil Guard, Margarita Nelken, who did not enter the Cortes until 
after a by-election on 4 October 1931. Only days after the letter sent by the deputies, a 
series of telegrams from municipal authorities (many of these Socialists) and local 
Socialist organizations in and around the town of Alburquerque petitioned the Interior 
Minister to prevent the transfer of the District Commandant of the Civil Guard, with 
whom they enjoyed a positive relationship 24 Yet, as the year wore on and frustrations 
and passion rose, the debate within the PSOE about the limits of their moderate stance 
towards the Civil Guard became more heated, particularly as rural workers flooded into 
the Socialists’ union, the UGT, bringing the explosive situation in the countryside to the
22 Azana, Diarios Completos, pp. 201-202.
23 “Disposiciones generales de la Guardia Civil”, LCM (20 May 1931,17 June 1931, 18 July 1931)
24 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 14, Agrupacion Socialista [Badajoz] to Interior 
Minister (No. 1299, 24 July 1931); Workers’ Centre, Barrio Pilar Ferrera [Alburquerque, Badajoz] to 
Interior Minister and Socialist Parliamentary Deputy Celestino Garcia (No. 1416,27 July 1931); Gregorio 
Zamora, et al, [Montijo, Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 1432,28 July 1931); Mayor of Alburquerque 
[Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 1492, 29 July 1931); Mayor Sendras [San Vicente de Alcdntara, 
Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 1517, 30 July 1931).
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forefront of the Socialists’ attention, as well as provoking confrontation with Civil 
Guards at the local level.
While the exigencies of being in power caused a certain tension with the beliefs and 
experiences of republicans and Socialists in regards to the Benemerita, the change of 
regime produced a similar conflict amongst the Civil Guard. While some Civil Guards 
greeted the proclamation of the Republic with a strong sense of dread or distaste, there 
were a few who saw the reforming agenda of the new regime as a better response to the 
chronic conflict that characterized labour relations in Spain. The British journalist Henry 
Buckley recounted one startling display of hostility to the old order. Travelling in a third- 
class railway carriage in the autumn of 1931, Buckley had encountered a Civil Guard 
sergeant who had startled him by exclaiming that “People can say what they like about 
the monks and nuns but I tell you this that unless you bum down all their buildings and 
thus destroy their lairs Spain will never get anywhere”. Buckley recounts his surprise as 
this remark, “given its source”, noting that this civil guard “was one in a thousand in his 
class”.25
The majority view within the Civil Guard was rather less iconoclastic. Instead, most 
Civil Guards greeted the relatively peaceful change of regime with mixture of relief and a 
sense of foreboding. This perspective was best explained in a front-page editorial 
statement made in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil:
25 Henry Buckley, Life and Death o f the Spanish Republic (London, 1940), p. 78. Nonetheless, the 
religious devotion of the ordinary civil guard should not be exaggerated. In his memoirs, Civil Guard 
Sergeant Gabriel Ferreras noted that his colleagues did not share his religious fervor, one of them sneering 
that he could not believe that in the twentieth century “that there could be such fanatic individuals”: Gabriel 
Ferreras Estrada, Memorias del sargento Ferreras (Le6n, 2002), p. 59.
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Save for various isolated incidents ... this transcendental political change 
occurred with minimal disturbance, a clear sign of the civic-mindedness and 
understanding (comprension) of the different social classes, and contradicts the 
suspicion that the Spanish people will fall into some insane mimicry of Soviet 
nihilism. Nonetheless, we believe it indispensable as a prudent measure that the 
authorities and those people of order, aided at all times by the lavish protection 
provided by the Civil Guard, watch closely any revolutionary attempt -  
presumably in the form of attacks of the communist disease -  which left 
unobserved will try to submerge the nation in endless chaos. Democracy and 
liberty, fair enough, but justice as well. If the country has rejected aristocratic 
absolutism, it has not been to fall under another form of absolutism, one even 
more intransigent and tyrannical, an absolutism that disgusts the conscience of all 
human beings.
The Civil Guard, wisely led by General Sanjuijo, maintains at every 
moment and will maintain forever a position of absolute neutrality in regards to 
political matters, respectful of the will of the people and serving loyally the ruling 
regime (el Poder constituido).’
The second article of the same issue, titled “The Loyalty of the Civil Guard”, also an 
editorial, picks up on the issue of the purported political neutrality of the corps. It praised 
the efforts of General Sanjurjo during the transfer of powers, attributing to him (and by 
extension, the Civil Guard) most of the credit for the smooth transition from monarchy to
26 “La Republica Espanola”, RTGC, No. 255 (May 1931), p. 241. As the Revista Tecnica uses a system of 
continual page numbering, that is, carrying over the page number from one issue to another, starting anew 
at the beginning of each year, page 241 constitutes the first page of the May 1931 issue of RTGC.
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Republic. While this was somewhat of an exaggeration, the article was meant to convey 
the fundamental importance of the Civil Guard to the new regime, as well as warning 
against those who sought to undermine the Republic for their own partisan agendas:
One can consider our Republic as an unshakeable political block (un bloque 
estatal inconmovible), under whose shadow all of the different political sectors -  
from the conservative to the socialist -  will be able to discuss their various 
programs in a noble and civilized parliamentary debate. No one should dare try to 
disturb the material and spiritual peace that has been gained with the regime that 
was brought about with the acquiescence of all, for they have no right to do so and 
would deserve the most staggering (fulminante) and harsh punishment.27
Several sentiments are evident in these two articles. The first of these is the fear that the 
Provisional Government will suffer the same fate as its Russian counterpart in 1917. The 
concern was that the change of regime would result in an erosion of state authority, thus 
creating an opportunity for a Bolshevik-style conquest of power. The need to protect the 
Republic from such a danger was in the interests of all and, given the election results, 
represented the national will. For most Civil Guards, Communists and anarchists were 
the main danger, not monarchists. The Civil Guard saw itself as the primary pillar 
supporting the Spanish state and the first line of defence against any Communist uprising 
or social revolution, a view shared by their colleagues in the military and conservative 
sectors of civilian society who never stinted in their support of the corps. As such, those 
who did not appreciate the necessity and sacrifices of the Civil Guard and who criticised
27 “Lealtad de la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 255 (May 1931), pp. 242-243. For further praise of General 
Sanjuijo’s actions on 14 April, see “Guardia Civil: El mayor acierto del general Sanjurjo”, LCM (16 April 
1931).
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the Benemerita were seen as marginal, irresponsible or subversive elements. Unlike their 
new Republican masters, the Civil Guard did not look upon these conservative groups as 
a threat, but rather sectors of opinion that had to be accommodated within the new 
political order. As many monarchists flocked to the various Republican parties, 
particularly the Radicals, it appeared to many Civil Guards that this accommodation was 
possible as well as desirable. Indeed, the very example of the Civil Guard’s own 
Director-General, not to mention the presence of two former monarchists in the 
government itself, seemed to prove the point. One can even say that how the new regime 
treated the more flexible and moderate sectors of the previous political order was seen by 
many Civil Guards as a litmus test of sorts as to the future of the corps itself under the 
Republic. This meant that the marriage of convenience between the Civil Guard on the 
one hand, and the (Left) Republicans and Socialists on the other, was susceptible to 
considerable strain.
The underlying conflict of perspectives between the Left Republicans and the Socialists, 
and the Civil Guard and their political allies in the Republican Centre and Centre-Right, 
could and did erupt into full blown confrontations as both sides struggled to define the 
political character of the Republic, as was first seen during the events of 10-11 May.
This tension manifested itself in a variety of ways and occasions, and at times within the 
two blocks themselves, and continued throughout the life of the regime. For a regime 
anxious to establish the mle of law, and thus ensure that Civil Guards respected the new 
legal order, policies such as the establishment of a committee to judge and punish 
“responsibilities” for the crimes of the dictatorship could prove counterproductive,
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particularly due to the vagueness of the very definition of “responsibility” and the 
inconsistent manner in which responsibility was determined. Given the threats made by 
the Republicans before the April elections, as well as the limited efforts to purge the 
security forces, it was feared amongst the corps that virtually any Civil Guard could be 
brought up and jailed on charges simply for following orders. The perception that the 
“responsibilities” issue was not one of punishing those who enabled and bolstered an 
illegal dictatorship, but was rather a vengeful and arbitrary tool of political persecution, 
was sustained by the fact that no one from the Socialist UGT, including its leader, who 
was now a government minister, was going to be investigated for their collaboration with 
Primo de Rivera.
The Republican authorities further confused the issue by justifying one act of military 
rebellion (that of December 1930), glorifying the “martyrs” Galan and Garcia Hernandez, 
while condemning another (that of September 1923). That this was guided by political 
considerations over that of legal ones was evidenced by the government’s treatment of 
General Sanjurjo, who not only openly adhered to the pronunciamiento of Primo de 
Rivera, but he was also a well-known friend and supporter of the dictator. Sanjurjo was 
not only idolised within the Civil Guard, but also he was seen by most of his subordinates 
as the symbol of the national will, of the non-partisan nature of the new regime -  and thus 
his treatment was symbolic of the fate of the Benemerita itself. Diego Martinez Barrio 
reported to Azana that, according to his sources, “the Civil Guard will not consent to 
Sanjurjo being touched”.28 While Azana dismissed this intelligence, perhaps too lightly, 
given the several crucial services that Sanjurjo provided for the Provisional Government,
28 Azana, Diarios Completos, p. 253.
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amongst these mollifying the concerns within the military and the Civil Guard about the 
character of the new regime, it was decided not to bring him in for a statement.29 Despite 
such concessions to the sensibilities of the Civil Guard and the military, a sense of 
distrust towards the more leftist elements within the administration, particularly the War 
Minister, continued unabated. Azana’s practice of conferring with lesser ranking officers 
with Republican sympathies on military matters gave rise to a rumoured “black cabinet” 
of advisors.30 While Azana himself had always attempted to avoid unnecessarily 
antagonizing the military, the Republicans’ politicization of matters of discipline and 
duty, which would -  rightly or wrongly -  take on a more pronounced character after 
October 1934, would come back to haunt them later.
Whatever tensions existed between the Civil Guard and middle class Republicans and the 
Socialist leadership (several of whom came from the middle classes as well), it was the 
relationship between the Benemerita and the labouring classes that proved the most 
difficult to manage. As the two articles discussed above demonstrate, there was 
considerable anxiety that the change of regime would open the floodgates to social 
revolution. For the Civil Guard, given the delicate situation that prevailed while the 
Provisional Government attempted to consolidate the new regime, compromise, patience 
and public order were of crucial importance during this potentially dangerous phase in the 
nation’s history. This meant that public acts of dissent, such as strikes and protests, had 
to be closely monitored and kept strictly within the framework set out by the government.
29 Azafia, Diarios Completos, pp. 259, 262-263; Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, pp. 69-70.
30 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London, 1993), pp. 78-79; Paul Preston, “TTie Prisoner in the 
Guilded Cage: Manuel Azafia”, Comrades: Portraits from the Spanish Civil War (London, 1999), pp. 201- 
204.
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The lack of an authentic democratic tradition in Spain meant that under the monarchy 
opposition to a government often meant opposition to the regime itself, and Civil Guards 
at times had a difficult time distinguishing between loyal and disloyal oppositions, and 
the lines between economic and political protests were often blurred. The fact that many 
Republican politicians themselves suffered from the same difficulty only underlines the 
point, for one or two elections did not convert Spain automatically into a democratic 
society. As such, seemingly illiberal measures were seen as temporarily necessary while 
the regime consolidated itself, which in turn would enact a process of Republicanising 
society. This process would entail the eventual disappearance of those movements, such 
as the anarcho-syndicalists, which were seen as products of the exclusive and repressive 
nature of the monarchy. This also meant that the civil rights of the extreme Left (as well 
as the Right) could be infringed upon when these came into conflict with the interests of 
the regime. As Azafia replied to his critics during the parliamentary debate over the Law 
for the Defense of the Republic, which -  rightly or wrongly -  sought to criminalize 
opposition to the regime, “I am not a liberal”.31
As has been mentioned before, the Civil Guard viewed the working classes with a 
mixture of sympathy, condescension and fear. There were some promising signs that the 
relationship between the two groups could improve. Far from being cut off from the rest 
of society, as political and cultural ideas infiltrated the civilian population, they would 
also find some resonance within the Civil Guard. Just as the political atmosphere after 
1914 led to Civil Guards adopting the rhetoric of regeneration, so the coming of the 
Republic saw an increasing identification amongst the Benemerita with the working
31 Manuel Portela Valladares, Memorias: Dentro del drama espahol (Madrid, 1988), pp. 126-127.
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classes, even if this was at times only rhetorical. As one article published in the Revista 
Tecnica de la Guardia Civil explained in reaction to a petition to dissolve the Civil Guard 
and arm the “people”,
Foolish and absurd is the premise behind such a concept, as the corps, far from 
representing the plutocracy or the nobility, has its roots in the proletariat which 
feeds it with its red blood [tiene su raiz en elproletariado que lo nutre con su 
sangre roja] and devotes itself to the defence of the law that serves all. The Civil 
Guard, father of a very modest family, is an honourable worker who offers his 
labour to the sovereign people ... to guarantee its rights. A thousand examples 
testify to the impartiality of the meritorious Institute, which denounces and 
persecutes, when there is cause to do so, the powerful in favour of the humble.32
Indeed, another article in the same journal noted that the humble Civil Guard was also 
poorly paid for his labour, echoing a certain resentment towards the attention given to 
other workers, while no one spoke up for the “worker for peace” (<obrero de lapaz)\
It ought to be recognized that the Civil Guards’ services are not rewarded as they 
should be, in that their derisory salaries have not been raised. When all other 
types of workers gain an improvement in their pay, many times through violent 
means, with strikes and threats, no one has raised their voice in favour of the 
obrero de la paz, who endangers his life and that of his family a hundred times in 
service to the nation.’33
32 J. Ortiz Tallo, “Tribuna Libre: Disolver la Guardia Civil y armar al pueblo”, RTGC, No. 259 (September 
1931), p. 434.
33 “Leyendo la Prensa”, RTGC, No. 261 (November 1931), p. 550. The author of this article, which was 
presumably published in a newspaper, is listed as “Friend”. Given the manner in that the author discusses
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In regards to the organized working class movements themselves, many Civil Guards 
judged these as much, if not more, on their tactics as they did their ideology. As such, 
there was some distinction between the more reformist and moderate sectors of the 
working class movement, and those that preached social revolution and endorsed 
violence, and thus represented a physical danger to those civil guards that had to confront 
them. The Civil Guard felt that now that the working classes could voice their grievances 
through their representatives in a free and democratically-elected parliament, there was 
no justification for such radical measures. Consequently, given that parliament had been 
freely and democratically elected, such radical elements could be more easily 
characterized as being against the will of the nation. The majority of the country rejected 
violent acts and supports the Civil Guard, one article explained, and not just the middle 
classes, but also
the majority of the proletariat, affiliated to the UGT, that admirable Socialist party 
that has given so many examples of common sense and sound judgement. The 
Socialists have shown themselves to be a formidable force for government, 
perfectly disciplined and united, rejecting violence and by such has condemned 
the actions of those eternal scroungers who live off disorder (eternos vividores del 
desorden).34
the grievances of the Civil Guard, we can assume that he was a civil guard himself, who disguised his 
identity to avoid punishment for indiscipline. At any rate, the article’s reprinting in the official journal of 
the Civil Guard demonstrates, at least, that such views reflected those of the corps.
34 R.N., “Guardia Civil: El mejor elogio”, LCM (30 May 1931); “Guardia Civil: En defensa propia”, LCM 
(28 July 1931).
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Civil Guards maintained a distinction between the common worker and those 
organizations that were dedicated to protecting his interests. The more extremist 
elements, such as the anarcho-synidcalists and the communists, were not seen as 
representing the sentiments of certain sectors of working-class opinion, but rather as the 
exploiters of the frustrations and lack of education of the ordinary worker. From the 
Civil Guard’s perspective, the policies of more radical elements were against the interest 
of the average “honest” worker, who would then suffer the repressive force of the state, 
while the “professional agitator” would flee the confrontation that they created, only to 
foment disorder elsewhere. Moreover, since these “deviants” or “criminal elements” 
were confronted -  and foiled -  in their objectives by the Civil Guard, they incessantly 
criticized the Benemerita and demanded its dissolution. Since there existed little concern 
that the CNT could actually achieve its political goals, the fear was that the anarcho- 
syndicalists would radicalize the working classes, and the communists would then benefit 
from this.
Outside its more syndicalist factions, the CNT leadership “regarded the Republic with 
considerable suspicion and barely restrained impatience”, and rejected its labour 
arbitration mechanisms, particularly as these were in the hands of their bitter rivals, the 
Socialists, just as they were under the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. They also 
represented, and encouraged, a considerable sector of working-class opinion, which 
expected significant change almost immediately. From the very proclamation of the
35 Preston, Coming o f the SCW, p. 75; Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, 
1931-1939 (London, 2005); Carlos Gil Andres, Echarse a la calle: Amotinados, huelguistasy 
revolucionarios (La Rioja, 1890-1936), (Zaragoza, 2000), pp. 179-192, passim.; Chris Ealham, Class, 
Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937 (London, 2005), pp. 54-101.
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Republic, the CNT demonstrated its refusal to compromise with the security forces.
While the other elements of the Spanish Left suppressed their deeply held dislike for 
institutions such as the Civil Guard for the sake of consolidating the new regime, the 
CNT, feeling no particular allegiance to the Republic, felt no need to hide their hostility 
towards the police. Two days after the establishment of the Republic, the anarchist daily 
Solidaridad Obrera provided an example of their position vis-a-vis the police: ‘Yesterday 
the ex-monarchic forces were nowhere to be seen in the city. The streets were clean of 
those bad elements, just like garbage. Everyone was praising this preventative 
measure...because everyone, absolutely everyone, hates these monarchic forces...Let it 
be that the “monos”, civiles [Civil Guard] and “poli” [police] never return, never!’36 The 
Civil Guard was singled out with particular vitriol by the CNT and its fellow-travellers. 
The pamphlets prepared for the attempted insurrection by radical military officers and 
anarcho-syndicalists in Sevilla in the end of June 1931, invited everyone, “Armed forces, 
civilians and soldiers” to join the revolution, yet “we exclude from this call the murders 
of the people, the Civil Guard”.37
As was to be expected, the Civil Guard had little sympathy for the CNT, and consistently 
called for strong measures to be taken to deal with the subversive organization, a course 
of action that the Republican authorities themselves were inclined increasingly to follow. 
Nonetheless, despite the Civil Guard’s antipathy to the tenets of libertarianism and a long 
history of violent confrontation with the CNT, some words of praise could be offered for 
more moderate sectors within the movement. After the moderate syndicalist leader Joan
36 Solidaridad Obrera, 16 April 1931.
37 A copy of the revolutionaries’ manifesto was read out in full in parliament: Diario de Sessiones de las 
Cortes Constituyentes (20 July 1931), p. 58.
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Peiro published an article calling for a halt to the violent tactics of his coreligionists, he 
became the surprising recipient of praise from the Civil Guard (which probably did him 
and his cause little good in CNT circles). The Civil Guard article, which characterized 
anarchist tactics as the products of “primitive mentalities”, not only applauded Peiro’s 
statement but also explained that the corps’ use of force was a reaction to the violence 
that they themselves were subjected to. In other words, if the CNT would abandon its 
strategy of “revolutionary gymnastics”, the Civil Guard would act with greater restraint.38 
Whether this would have been the case or not, taken in conjunction with the positive 
comments made about the Socialists, it at least signified the potential for some sort of 
improvement in the relationship between the Civil Guard and the working class 
organizations. Indeed, the improvement of this relationship would be one of the keys to 
democratizing and Republicanising the Civil Guard (and the working classes themselves). 
In this regard, the statesmen of the new regime needed to demonstrate to the corps that 
their strategy of consultation and compromise was a better solution to the instability and 
unrest that had periodically gripped Spain. This in turn, depended on the government’s 
ability to “republicanise” the culture of protest and those manifestations of labour unrest 
inherited from the monarchy.
Nonetheless, this relationship was not defined solely by the central government or the 
representatives of the various parties in Madrid. In fact, dynamics of the locality in 
which Civil Guards served had their effect as well. There were municipalities and 
districts in which the local authorities and the contingent of Civil Guards enjoyed a fairly 
positive relationship. There were examples of local workers’ associations or Republicans
38 “Guardia Civil: Por una vez, de acuerdo”, LCM (29 July 1931).
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seeking to prevent the transfer of a Civil Guard officer with whom they had a good 
working relationship.39 More surprisingly was the request from one Socialist society in 
Arjona (Jaen) for the sending of more Civil Guards to protect striking workers from the 
local patronos.40 These examples aside, more often than not, particularly in areas with 
long traditions of social conflict, the relationship between the local Civil Guards and 
working classes was tense and full of mutual recriminations. Furthermore, the particular 
political parties or workers’ organizations that dominated a given locality, such as those 
with a strong anarcho-syndicalist presence, necessarily influenced the dynamics of the 
situation. The traditional alliance between the local proprietor class and the Civil Guard 
was strengthened not only by their shared fear of the working class unrest, but sometimes 
by the government itself. Given the budgetary problems of the central government, and 
the extra costs of redeploying Civil Guard personnel, offers by local proprietors to cover 
these additional expenses in exchange for a concentration of forces in their district were 
often accepted by the Interior Minister.41 The situation was further complicated by the 
fact that the political struggles between Left-Centre-Right would often erupt over issues
39 “Manifestaci6n popular contra el traslado de un capitdn de la Guardia Civil”, LCM (17 July 1931); 
“Guardia Civil: Un caso tipico”, LCM (21 July 1931); AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, 
No. 15, Alcalde de Cabra [Cdrdoba] to Interior Minister (No. 1536, 23 May 1931), Los Presidentes de 
Partido Republicano Radical Socialista y Centro Obrero de Fratemidad de Cabra [Cordoba] to Interior 
Minister (No. 1543, 23 May 1931), Rafael Serrano, Jefe del Centro Telef6nico de Cabra [Cordoba] to 
Interior Minister (No. 1606, 24 May 1931); Ibid., No. 18, Eduardo Caso, Alcalde de Villaviciosa [Oviedo] 
to Interior Minister (No. 31,01 October 1931). See also footnote 23 above.
40 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 16, Sociedad Obrera Socialista de Arjona [Jaen] 
to Interior Minister (No. 954,18 October 1931).
41 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 16, Civil Governor [Jaen] to Interior Minister 
(No. 1439,22 April 1931; No. 906, 15 May 1931; No. 176,2 June 1931; No. 240, 3 June 1931; No. 385, 5 
June 1931; No. 956, 13 June 1931; No. 1147, 16 June 1931; No. 1108,20 June 1931; No. 81, 2 July 1931; 
No. 83, 2 July 1931); Ibid., Legajo 39A, No. 16, Civil Governor [Lerida] to Interior Minister (No. 1991, 28 
May 1931); Interior Minister to Civil Governor [Lerida], (No. 386, 12 June 1931); Ibid., Legajo 16A, No. 
16, Civil Governor [Navarra] to Interior Minister (No. 1512, 23 May 1931; No. 1284, 23 July 1931; No. 
1404,27 July 1931; No. 450, 13 August 1931; No. 451,13 August 1931; No. 559, 17 August 1931; No. 
1004, 27 August 1931; No. 959, 22 September 1931; No. 1066,24 September 1931; No. 1291,27 
November 1931).
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over the actions and or transfer of the local Civil Guard. Since Republicans, though some 
only Republicans in name, could come out in defense of the local Civil Guard, this gave a 
sense of justification and popular support to the corps, as seen in the various declarations 
in their own press. Moreover, in those areas where there existed considerable popular 
anti-Republican sentiment, such attitudes could permeate the local Civil Guards units.
For example, in the traditionalist and devoutly Catholic province of Navarra, Maura 
confided to Azana, all of the Civil Guard sympathized with the Carlists, and thus should 
be transferred to posts elsewhere in the peninsula.42
While the various politicians and representatives in Madrid did not always determine the 
relationship between Civil Guards and the working classes, that is not to say that they had 
no impact. Indeed, since the Civil Guard was a centralized institution that relied 
ultimately on the decisions made in Madrid, the position of the government was of 
considerable importance. This often left the government in a difficult position, as it had to 
maintain a delicate balance between meeting the expectations of both the Civil Guard and 
the working classes. In terms of the former, alongside their concerns about the viability 
of Republicanism in Spain, the Civil Guard had long feared that the coming of a Republic 
represented a threat to their livelihood, as was seen by its cautious neutrality in the 
months before the April 1931 election. In terms of the latter, significant sectors of the 
population had expected that the new Republic would dissolve the corps, an impression 
that the Republicans often encouraged in their speeches before assuming power. The 
threat to the existence of the Civil Guard was linked intimately with the authority of the 
corps, which was seen by Civil Guards themselves as crucial not only to carry out the
42 Azana, Diarios completes, p. 226.
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unpopular task of enforcing the nation’s laws, but also to the personal safety of its 
personnel. As such, Civil Guards expected and demanded that the Provisional 
Government defend the prestige of the Benemerita against its detractors, and demonstrate 
its appreciation for the corps’ sacrifices and hardships.
Concern amongst the Civil Guard about the issues mentioned above manifested itself 
almost immediately. During the May Day celebrations in Barcelona, the local garrison 
of Civil Guard was accosted and insulted by the more aggressive elements amongst the 
revellers. Incensed at their treatment, they sent a letter to the Catalan Generalitat 
complaining about the rough and disrespectful treatment that they suffered, and then 
threatened that they “would no longer tolerate being the victim of insults and 
aggressions” of “certain elements”, namely “communists” and “anarchists”.43 This act of 
incipient insubordination received the backing of the military press, and evidently 
considerable public sympathy 44 More importantly, the Captain-General of Catalonia, 
General Eduardo Lopez de Ochoa, commented to the press that he was shown a very 
similar note during an earlier visit to the garrison in which he told the officers of his 
agreement with their complaints. He noted, however, that he did not authorize the 
publication of the note, nor should a military institution like the Civil Guard have done 
such a thing. Nonetheless, Lopez de Ochoa stated that he did not feel that the issue
43 “La Guardia Civil de Barcelona presenta una nota al Gobiemo de la Generalidad”, Ejercito y  Armada (6 
May 1931). Macia claimed that he never received any such letter: “Desde Barcelona: El senor Macia dice 
que no ha recibido el escrito que se atribuyd a la Guardia Civil”, LCM (8 May 1931).
44 “La misidn de la Guardia Civil”, LCM (8 May 1931); “Adhesiones a la Guardia Civil: En el 21° Tercio 
se han recibido mas de tres mil taijetas”, LCM (10 May 1931). Both of these articles appeared on the front 
page of La Correspondencia Militar.
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deserved any official reprimand.45 Given the fact that Lopez de Ochoa was a liberal and 
a Republican, his sympathy with the grievances of the Barcelona Civil Guard should have 
been a cause of some concern to the government, particularly Interior Minister Maura 
who met with the general soon after the letter’s publication. The Interior Minister 
ordered an investigation of the incident,46 but the events of 10-11 May would soon erase 
any desire to make an example of the Barcelona Civil Guard.
Members of the Corps were aware of the heated ministerial confrontation over the use of 
the Civil Guard during the events of 10-11 May, alongside the Ateneo declaration from 
the Interior Ministry balcony and the hostile mood amongst the crowds. Not surprisingly, 
these incidents, in conjunction with those surrounding the May Days in Barcelona, 
created a sense of unease amongst the Civil Guard. Apprehensive about recent 
developments, Maura called a meeting of various high-ranking officers of the corps and 
Director-General Sanjurjo in an effort to alleviate any discontent, and to gauge the mood 
within the Civil Guard after the events of the previous two weeks. Sanjurjo assured the 
Interior Minister of his own loyalty and that of his men, though one of the colonels 
present was less enthusiastic in his support. While stating that he understood the root 
causes for the outbursts of 10-11 May and was certain that the government would take 
action to prevent such incidents from occurring again, he let it be known that much of his
45 “El capitan general de Catalufia y la Guardia Civil”, El Sol (5 May 1931); “El capitan general de 
Catalufia revista las fuerzas de la Guardia Civil”, LCM (6 May 1931); “Noticias political: El documento de 
la Guardia Civil”, Ejercito y  Armada (9 May 1931); “El escrito de la Guardia Civil: Manifestaciones de 
capit&n general de Catalufia”, LCM (9 May 1931).
46 “Noticias politicas: Manifestaciones del Sr. Maura”, Ejercito y  Armada (08 May 1931).
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confidence in the government was based on his confidence in Maura himself.47 The fact 
that the minister was also singled out by the protesters probably helped in this 
identification between the interests of the Civil Guard, the public order and the minister 
himself
The views of this particular colonel were echoed throughout the Civil Guard press. In 
one article, the Civil Guard author both defended the prestige of the corps while 
demonstrating a comprehension of the sources of popular hostility towards it. The article 
argued that the discipline of the corps demanded that it follow the orders of its superiors 
under the monarchy, and thus were passive actors in the abuses of the previous regime. 
While understanding that this has damaged the reputation of the Civil Guard, the 
implication was that now that the source of these abuses had disappeared (i.e. the 
monarchy), so had the basis of hostility towards the force. The article recognised that the 
corps’ function in urban areas is largely repressive, and thus the author believed that 
those crowds in Barcelona and Madrid that were calling for the dissolution of the Civil 
Guard were unaware of the variety of humanitarian functions that it carried out in the 
countryside. As such, it was reasoned, urban dwellers had a distorted view of the 
functions and duties of the corps.
Indeed, the continued reliance of the Republican authorities on the Civil Guard caused a 
certain concern amongst the latter since their employment in controlling urban
47 Maura, Asi cayo, pp. 272-273. Maura gives the date of 16 May 1931 for this meeting, which Aguado 
Sanchez calls into question as Sanjuijo was in Spanish Morocco at that time, not returning to Madrid until 
12 June: Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, pp. 254-255.
48 “Los pueblos piden Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 256, (June 1931), p. 290
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disturbances was simply adding fuel to the fire. It was argued in a series of articles that 
the Civil Guard should only be used sparingly in such situations, allowing the Interior 
Ministry police to do their duty and handle public order in the cities and large towns.49 
Also, another article counselled Civil Guards to act with restraint, recognizing that it was 
not only the nature of their duty that provoked public hostility towards them.50 Given 
that the regime’s reliance on the Benemerita was likely to continue into the foreseeable 
future, there also were calls for non-lethal modem means for crowd dispersal so as to 
reduce casualties amongst protesters, and hence their hostility towards the Civil Guard.51 
The constant redeployments, which left their normal rural districts (and their families that 
lived in them) undefended, and the consequent long hours also led to requests for 
increases in personnel from an overwhelmed and overstretched Civil Guard.52
The Civil Guard felt that in return for the hardships suffered in service to the Republic, its 
politicians should adequately defend the corps prestige and properly recompense its 
personnel. One way that the government could demonstrate its gratitude, Civil Guards 
suggested, would be a pay raise.53 Another was public recognition of the sacrifices Civil 
Guards made defending the regime. As one article claimed, “if this meritorious force did
49 “Guardia Civil: Discretion en su empleo”, LCM(3 July 1931); “Guardia Civil: Asi no se puede seguir”, 
LCM (7 July 1931).
50 “Education Moral: Sanas Doctrinas”, RTGC, No. 260 (October 1931), p. 443.
51 “Guardia Civil: La falta de medios”, LCM (29 May 1931); “Lo que se impone”, RTGC, No. 258 (August 
1931), p. 376.
52 N.R., “Guardia Civil: Aumentos necesarios”, LCM(10 June 1931); “Guardia Civil: Se impone el 
aumento de plantillas”, LCM (12 June 1931), “Guardia Civil: La utilidad indiscutible del Instituto”, LCM 
(10 July 1931).
53 “Guardia Civil: El haber de la tropa”, LCM (2 August 1931); “Guardia Civil: Hay que vivir alerta”, LCM 
(4 August 1931); “Guardia Civil: Las pensiones de cruces”, LCM(7 August 1931); “Guardia Civil: Las 
pensiones de viudedad y orfandad”, LCM (08 August 1931); “Guardia Civil: Ante el proximo presupuesto”, 
LCM(27 August 1931); “Guardia Civil: Ecos de actualidad”, LCM(30 August 1931); “Manifestaciones del 
general Sanjuijo”, LCM (30 August 1931).
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not exist, the Republic would have already disappeared.”54 The Civil Guard certainly felt 
justified in making such assertions, as similar statements about the utility and necessity of 
the corps were repeated in the civilian press.55 There was an understanding that during 
the period of consolidation of the Republic, challenges to the new political order by 
extremist elements would occur and almost necessarily result in violent confrontations 
between Civil Guards and sectors of the general population, such as those that occurred in 
Montemolin (Badajoz) and Santa Olalla (Toledo) in June 1931. Yet, the corps demanded 
alongside any innocent civilian casualties, those Civil Guards that were wounded or 
killed in the course of duty should also be publicly recognized and honoured. In 
Montemolin, a lone civil guard had been a “victim of duty” after attempting to defend the 
local post office from a group of protesters. He was chased through the streets with 
“savage ferocity” after a scuffle and killed in the main square.56 Not only should these 
sacrifices be publicly recognized, a front-article article printed in La Correspondencia 
Militar pointed out, but physical attacks on the Civil Guard should be punished severely 
and the authority of the corps protected.57
Nonetheless, instances of public hostility towards the corps continued to manifest 
themselves, to the discomfort of a government intent on maintaining the confidence and 
loyalty of its most numerous police force. A group of bystanders, reputedly angry 
participants from the recently repressed telephone worker strike, began to hoot and howl
54 “Servicios: La Comandancia de Toledo”, RTGC, No. 260 (October 1931), p. 456.
55 “En honor y defensa de la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, No. 256 (June 1931), p. 291; “En honor de la Guardia 
Civil”, RTGC, No. 257 (July 1931), p. 342; “Leyendo la Prensa”, RTGC, No. 261 (November 1931), p.
550.
56 “Guardia Civil: Olvidos injustos”, LCM (27 June 1931); “Servicios: Vicitmas del deber. En Montemolin 
(Badajoz)”, RTGC, No. 257 (July 1931), p. 335.
57 This article featured an excerpt from the daily newspaper El Castellano, which made exactly the same 
comments: “El honor de la Guardia Civil”, La Correspondencia Militar (10 July 1931).
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as the contingent of Civil Guard passed during the official parade during the opening of 
the Cortes on 14 July 1931, in full view of the government. Other attendees, including 
some parliamentary deputies, attempted to drown out the hissing and booing with 
applause for the corps.58 This incident did not go unnoticed by the Civil Guard itself. A 
series of articles in reaction to the events appeared in the military daily La 
Correspondencia Militar. The first of which explained that such displays of public 
hostility damaged morale, and that the sacrifices and hardships suffered in the months 
since the proclamation of the Republic should bring praise and a sense of gratitude.
Those who applauded the corps “know how to thank and appreciate” the services 
provided by the Benemerita. They were characterized as “the true people” (el verdadero 
pueblo). Their detractors, the “so-called representatives of the people” were informed 
that their devious plans would never bear fruition whilst the “sons of Ahumada” were 
there to protect the public, warning them that they “shall not pass” (esos no pasaran).59
What also did not go unnoticed was the fact that such public displays of aggression 
towards the Civil Guard at an official event would not have been tolerated under previous 
regime, and the permissiveness of the new Republic for such outbursts was seen as 
disrespecting the sacrifices made by the Benemerita in defending it. Echoing the letter of 
the Barcelona garrison back in May, one article explained that the Civil Guard was 
“caught between two fires” in that their mission was staunchly to defend public order, but
58 “La apertura de las Cortes Constituyentes”, LCM (15 July 1931), Azana, Diarios Completos, p. 169.
59 “Guardia Civil: La reaction se impone”, LCM(16 July 1931), front page. An article that appeared a few 
days before the opening of parliament discussed the high volume of extraordinary services that the Civil 
Guard had to carry out in the month of May, noting that “certain extremist elements” were deliberately 
provoking disorder as part of a predetermined plan: “Guardia Civil: Servicios prestados en el mes de 
Mayo”, LCM (8 July 1931).
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that this brought with it criticism and attacks from those who sought to disturb the peace. 
It was asserted that the Civil Guard will not “permit those series of attacks that are 
constantly launched against it by “riffraff’ (la canalla), in what could be interpreted as a 
veiled criticism of the government, it was stated that they should not have to tolerate such 
public hostility.60 Another article appearing a few days later noted a planned Communist 
demonstration scheduled for 1 August, in which the dissolution of the Civil Guard was 
going to be demanded. The author of the article asked “for how long” this situation was 
going to be tolerated, stating that the time had come to impose respect for public order. 
Indeed, perhaps thinking of the about-face many Republicans made upon gaining power, 
it informed its critics -  “these false apostles” -  that there just may come a day in which 
they will seek the protection of the Benemerita from “the fury of their deceived 
coreligionists, who have yet to see their true face”.61 This exasperation with the near­
constant wave of disturbances, carried out largely by the CNT, and the concern about the 
damage they were committing to the Republic’s image, was shared by the government 
itself. Even the leader of the Socialist Left, Francisco Largo Caballero, was demanding 
that Interior Minister Maura take harsh measures to bring the anarcho-syndicalists to 
heel.62
60 El Duende Rural (pseudo.), “Guardia Civil: Entre dos fiiegos”, LCM(20 July 1931). A later article 
claimed that accusations by extremist elements against civil guards simply for doing their duty only served 
to weaken their authority amongst the local population, even when these accusations are proven false: 
“Guardia Civil: Acusaciones falsas”, LCM(18 August 1931).
61 “Guardia Civil: ^Hasta cuando?”, LCM (23 July 1931). For more articles expressing both their 
exasperation at the continual disorder, as well as calls for the government to take a harder line, see also, 
“Guardia Civil: En defensa propia”, LCM(28 July 1931); “Guardia Civil: Por una vez, de acuerdo”, LCM 
(29 July 1931); “Guardia Civil: Hay que impeder las insidias”, LCM(13 August 1931).
62 Preston, Coming of the SCW, pp. 88-89.
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That this desire for order on the part of the Civil Guard was related primarily to personal 
safety, as opposed to a lack of identification with the ideals of the Republic, was most 
clearly seen in relation to the issue of public violence, and more specifically, the 
proliferation of arms. The most important way in which Civil Guards demanded that the 
government recognize the sacrifices and dangers suffered by the corps in this period of 
transition and consolidation was the strict control of firearms. Demands for energetic 
measures to prevent the proliferation of arms emerged alongside the first bursts of public 
disorder in the wake of the change of regime. As one article explained, while the issue of 
arms control was important for everyone, “for the corps it is of extraordinary importance” 
as the very nature of the Civil Guard’s duty means that “it has to live in constant struggle 
with evildoers”. Weapons in the hands of “the ignorant” or “the wicked” compromised 
the “most sacrosanct of all human rights” of civil guards: the right to life. The apparent 
increase in the proliferation of weapons was seen as a by-product of the loosening of 
controls brought about by the change of regime, and the possession of arms only 
encouraged social conflict as it undermined the one of the most important weapons in a 
Civil Guard’s arsenal: the monopoly of firepower. Given the massive imbalance of 
numbers between a local post of four Civil Guards and crowds that can number in the 
dozens, if not the hundreds, this was of capital concern for the corps.64 It was incumbent 
on the government to tackle what was “the greatest danger that faces Spain at the 
moment”, and several articles held out the example of the disarming of the Moroccan 
tribes during the process of pacification in this colony as proof of the effectiveness of
63 “Guardia Civil: La recogida de armas”, LCM (21 May 1931).
64 “Guardia Civil: La dotation de los puestos”, LCM (22 June 1931); R.M., “Guardia Civil: Revision de 
licencias de uso de armas”, LCM (14 July 1931).
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such a strategy.65 Much in the same way that many workers were becoming frustrated 
with the sometimes ineffective application of its labour reforms, Civil Guards complained 
that the government did not actively enforce its own laws against the illegal possession of 
arms 66 When the government did take action and defend itself and all of society from 
those “professionals of disorder” that were arming themselves to “carry out their 
disastrous and anti-Spanish work”, they received praise from the Civil Guard.67 
Likewise, extraordinary legislation such as the Law for the Defence of the Republic was 
also welcomed by the corps.68
It was felt amongst the Civil Guard that the “national will” still stood behind the 
Republic, and that most of the disorder resulted from extremist minorities (which were 
almost always characterized as “primitive” and “barbaric”). Given the superior firepower 
of the state, the violent tactics of the revolutionaries will always fail. As one article 
explained, “today a revolution can only be made through the ballot box, when the people 
make their unanimous desire for change to be known”.69 Indeed, despite the many 
confrontations over the previous months and displays of hostility from the working 
classes, the Civil Guard press still maintained that the majority of workers were pacific in 
their disposition, being a potential force for strong government that rejected the actions of
H(\the violent minority of “degenerate hordes”. Implicit in such opinions was the belief
65 “Guardia Civil: Insistimos”, LCM (30 July 1931); “Guardia Civil: Las armas clandestinas”, LCM (16 
August 1931). Foreign examples were also cited in support of the effectiveness of a general policy of 
disarming the population: “Guardia Civil: El ejemplo de fiiera”, LCM(21 August 1931).
66 “Guardia Civil: Medida poco eficaz”, LCM (23 August 1931), front page; “Guardia Civil: Mirando al 
porvenir”, LCM (1 August 1931).
67 P.N., “Guardia Civil: Acierto gubermental”, LCM (28 August 1931).
68 “Ley de defensa de la Republica”, RTGC, No. 261 (November 1931), pp. 518-519.
69 “Guardia Civil: Fracaso de la violencia”, LCM(6 September 1931).
70 “Guardia Civil: Siguen las agresiones”, LCM (9 September 1931).
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that the disorder that Spain was suffering was largely due not to the nature of the regime 
itself, but rather to an apparent reluctance of the government to clamp down on these 
extremist elements. Despite the efforts by Ministers to deal with the disorder, the general 
impression amongst the Civil Guard was that the government was not doing enough. The 
Civil Guard decried a “crisis of the principle of authority”, but importantly did not link 
this to the Republic itself. Instead, the apparent constant disorder and confrontations that 
Spain was suffering through was due to the rapidity of the change of regime, but also due 
to the inexperience of the new rulers.71 The price of the perceived shortcomings or 
incompetence of their political masters was the blood of Civil Guards, an impression 
reinforced in the military and conservative press.72 Ominously for the Provisional 
Government, praise for the efforts of General Sanjurjo began to appear in the military and 
Civil Guard press. As one front page article exclaimed, Sanjuijo was “the type of man 
that Spain needs to consolidate itself while it sets off on its new direction”.73 As another 
front page article pointed out, Sanjurjo had already proven himself a capable leader. He 
managed to disarm and pacify the Rif tribesmen, it was argued, and Sanjurjo and the 
Civil Guard could do the same in Spain itself, if he was given the adequate authority to 
do so.74
71 “Guardia Civil: Crisis del principio de autoridad”, LCM (2 September 1931).
72 “Sucesos en Prat de Llobregat. La Guardia Civil es agredida”, LCM (2 August 1931), title in large print; 
“^Hasta cuando? El benemerito Institute) es nuevamente vejado por sus enemigos”, LCM (19 August 1931), 
front page; “Lo de todos los dias. Desarman a la pareja de la Guardia Civil y hieren a un guardia”, LCM 
(20 August 1931); “Lo de todos los dias. Agresion a fuerzas de la Guardia Civil y de Seguridad”, LCM (28 
August 1931), front page; “^Hasta cuando? Cuatrocientos hombres armados contra siete Guardia civiles”, 
LCM (6 September 1931).
73 “Guardia Civil: El hombre del dia”, LCM(4 July 1931); “El General Sanjuijo”, RTGC, No. 258 (August 
1931), p. 347.
74 “Guardia Civil: Medida poco eficaz”, LCM(23 August 1931); “Guardia Civil: Ecos de actualidad”, LCM 
(30 August 1931).
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In the view of the Civil Guard, instead of staving off the revolutionary danger, the 
Ministers in the current government appeared to be no more than inadequate commanders 
in the ongoing battle between civilization and barbarism. Shortly before the April 1931 
elections, concern was expressed about democratic politics and the dangers of 
demagoguery.75 While the relative orderly transfer of powers after the April elections 
had alleviated partially such concerns, the disorder that followed the initial calm had 
allowed such fears to resurface. In the last instalment of his “Short Ethics Courses”, 
Captain Rodrigo Zaragoza of the Civil Guard Special Academy once again gave voice to 
such opinions. In his discussion of popular sovereignty, Rodrigo Zaragoza contrasts the 
negative extremes to a “balanced democracy”. One extreme would be that of a 
“dictatorship of the majority” that ignores or persecutes less numerous social groups. In 
what can only be seen as a not-so-thinly-veiled criticism of the government, he goes on to 
describe the other extreme:
An even worse effect is produced when the government directs almost all of its 
efforts to protect the needy or unruly classes, neglecting the true social 
equilibrium. In this case demagoguery subverts the social order and puts political 
society itself at risk. The populism that inspires these methods turns into a more 
vulgar form (populacheria) that attempts to flatter the violent minorities who 
inflict through their actions a true affront to civilization.76
75 Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Cursillo de etica. Capitulo V: El orden social”, RTGC, No. 252 
(1931), pp. 125-126
76 Captain Manuel Rodrigo Zaragoza, “Cursillo de &ica. Capitulo X y ultimo: El Pueblo”, RTGC, No. 261 
(November 1931), pp. 534-535
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As they had done in other times of unrest and apparent government weakness, Civil 
Guards became increasingly likely to resort to force in the face of potential physical 
danger. During one incident in Barcelona in early September, a fire-flght broke out 
between Civil Guards and a group of protesters. While the account given states that it 
was impossible to determine who opened fire first, the contingent of Civil Guards were 
soon able to dominate the situation. Yet, the article accurately notes the sense of fear 
amongst the Civil Guards: “Panic soon overcame the Civil Guards, and as they have done 
in so many other occasions, they began to open fire crazily, attempting to kill the ghost of 
their own terror.”77
The Socialist leader Largo Caballero also noticed a change in the attitudes and actions of 
the Civil Guard, and how this linked to the political situation. He remarked to Azana that 
“during the dictatorship the Civil Guard conducted itself in a proper manner with the 
workers and peasantry, without mistreating anyone as they frequently did beforehand”, 
yet “since the coming of the Republic, the Civil Guard has returned to its brutal ways.”78 
An article appearing in La Correspondencia Militar noted a significant incident in Bilbao 
whereby an altercation between Basque nationalists and Republicans was resolved 
without force by the Civil Guard. This event was significant as the intervention of the 
Benemerita was greeted with applause by those present, for “one can count on the fingers 
of one hand the number of times since the change of regime that the presence of the Civil 
Guard was not received with demonstrations of hostility”. The article ended hoping that
77 “Guardia Civil: Si es una injuria al benemerito Instituto, la rechazamos indignadamente”, LCM (8 
September 1931). As can be gathered from the title of the article, the Civil Guard rejected the negative 
aspects of this account, made in an unidentified civilian newspaper characterized as being part of the corps’ 
critics.
78 Azafia, Diarios Completos, p. 425.
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the day would soon come whereby such expressions of antagonism towards the corps
*7Qwould no longer occur.
Despite such wishful thinking, there was little in the last few months of 1931 that could 
alleviate the rising sense of insecurity felt by many in the Civil Guard. As a reflection of 
this insecurity, as well as frustration and anger, Civil Guards began to become more 
aggressive towards those elements that they perceived to be fomenting disorder and 
undermining the corps’ authority. In Motril (Granada) and Olvera (Jaen) Civil Guards 
attempted to provoke clashes with local Socialist organizations.80 The Mayor of 
Manzanilla (Huelva) was publicly insulted and threatened by the local Civil Guard 
Commandant.81 A similar incident occurred in Olvera (Cadiz) when a Civil Guard 
lieutenant, acting on orders of the provincial governor, arrested the deputy mayor and 
most of the town council after they sided with an apparently tumultuous strike. Pistol in 
hand, the lieutenant publicly insulted his prisoners as they passed through the streets. In
Bollullos Par del Condado (Huelva), the local Civil Guard Commandant harassed not 
only a Socialist councillor, but also an arbitration committee that was attempting to 
resolve a labour dispute.83
79 “Guardia Civil: Ya era hora”, LCM(15 September 1931).
80 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 15, Miguel Sanchez, President of Maritime 
Union and Mayor of Motril [Granada] to Interior Minister (No. 1063,24 September 1931); Ibid., No. 16, 
Socialist Councillors of Olvera [Jaen] to Interior Minister (No. 390, 8 October 1931).
81 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 15, Sr. Madroftal, Mayor of Manzanilla [Huelva] 
to Interior Minister (No. 275, 06 October 1931).
82 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 15, Mayor of Olvera [Cadiz] to Interior Minister 
(No. 471, 9 October 1931). In the version published in the RTGC, the offending municipal officials were 
said to have participated in a revolutionary strike, during which the Civil Guard were fired upon: 
“Servicios”, RTGC, No. 261 (November 1931), p. 548.
83 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 15, Arbitration Comite (Comit6 paritario) in 
Bollillos Par del Condado [Huelva] to the Interior Minister (No. 891,21 September 1931).
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As tensions rose in the countryside, so did opportunities for violent confrontation. 
Amongst the more serious of these occurred in Palacios Rubios (Salamanca) in late 
September 1931. After an illegal rally in the town of Penaranada de Bracamonte, also in 
the province of Salamanca, groups of unruly strikers began disturbing the peace and 
began attacking local bakeries. According to official reports, when a contingent of seven 
Civil Guards arrived on the scene, they were greeting with shouts of “death to the Civil 
Guard”, and then had rocks thrown at them. Reportedly shots from the crowd rang out, to 
which the Civil Guards fired a warning volley into the air. The crowd responded with 
more stones and attempted to disarm the guardias. In response, the Civil Guards opened 
fire upon the crowd, killing two and wounding four.84 This event had profound 
repercussions. Whatever the official version of events, this clash was seen amongst 
working class organizations as an aggressive act by the Benemerita against desperate 
workers seeking social justice. As such, a number of telegrams from various parts of 
Spain arrived at the Interior Ministry protesting the “villainous aggression” committed by 
the Civil Guard against “our defenceless comrades”.85
As can be seen, Civil Guards were not the only ones that were adopting a more 
aggressive manner. While the Socialist leadership attempted to use their influence within 
the Union General de Trabajadores to calm the anger of their members, fearing that too 
many strikes might undermine the Republic, the continued presence of three Socialists in
84 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 18, Civil Governor [Salamanca] to Interior 
Minister (Nos. 1212 & 1226,28 September 1931); Civil Guard District Commandant, Penaranda de 
Bracamonte [Salamanca] to Director General of the Civil Guard and the Interior Minister (No. 1219,28 
September 1931).
85 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 16, La Directiva Sindicato Obreros Mineros, 
Linares [Jaen] to Interior Minister (No. 159,4 October 1931); Ibid., No. 16, Diego Serrano & Guillermo 
Bravo, Torre del Mar [Malaga] to Interior Minister (No. 206, 5 October 1931); Ibid., No. 18, Sr. Alvares, 
Secretario Secci6n Mineros de Barruelo [Palencia] to Interior Minister (No. 162,4 October 1931).
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the government meant that expectations amongst the rank and file remained high. This in 
turn only led to increasing frustration, particularly among the landless labourers who 
constituted the bulk of the membership of the UGT’s Federation Nacional de 
Trabajadores de la Tierra. They were exasperated by the extent to which the legislation 
and directives coming from Madrid were proving difficult to enforce at the local level
o r
due the resistance of local agrarian economic elites. During an ongoing acrimonious 
labour dispute in Gilena (in the eastern part of the province of Sevilla, near Estepa), the 
Civil Guard had detained a group of aggressive strikers and was transporting them back 
to town. When passing the local Workers’ Centre, the guardias were set upon, and a 
corporal was killed and two guardias were wounded. Reinforcements arrived on the 
scene and dissolved the hostile crowd, resulting in three workers killed and five 
wounded.87 In Jimena (Jaen), a strike was called by Socialist-affiliated workers in protest 
at being blacklisted by the local proprietor classes. This group of some 300 workers 
stood their ground when the Civil Guard arrived to disperse the crowd, and began hurling 
insults at the force and throwing stones. According to the account of the provincial Civil 
Guard commander, after hearing shots fired, the guardias opened fire themselves, 
wounding three protestors. After initially fleeing, the strikers regrouped in even greater 
numbers and attempted to overpower the relatively small number of guardias. The latter 
were obliged to retreat to the safety of their casa-cuartel. The resulting tensions required
OQ
the provincial governor to send reinforcements repeatedly over the next several days.
86 For the growing pressures within the Socialist Party and its organizations, see Preston, CSCW, pp. 91-94.
87 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 18, Civil Governor [Sevilla] to Interior Minister 
(Nos. 425 & 428, 9 October 1931).
88 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 16, Civil Guard Provincial Commander [Jaen] to 
Interior Minister (No. 360,9 December 1931; No. 398, 10 December 1931); Civil Governor [Ja6n] to 
Interior Minister (No. 348, 9 December 1931; No. 388, 10 December 1931; No. 415, 11 December 1931; 
No. 522,14 December 1931).
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Not surprisingly, workers’ groups saw themselves as the victims as opposed to the 
aggressors, and complained to the Interior Minister for the “inhumane repression” carried
O Q
out by the Civil Guard and the heavy-handed actions of the governor.
These violent clashes were duly reported in Civil Guard press, which in turn called for 
greater vigour on the part of the government. It was felt, with little sense of exaggeration, 
that while Civil Guards were shedding blood defending the Republic and Spain from “an 
orgy of violence and criminality”, the corps’ press stated that “no government worthy of 
being called such” should tolerate the wave of “social indiscipline” provoked by the CNT 
and the Communists.90 The general sensation amongst the corps was that things were 
getting worse, as seen by the greater amount of space dedicated to public disorder in the 
Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil. Moreover, this impression was reinforced by the 
right-wing civilian press, which consistently praised the Civil Guard for its efforts and 
echoed its concerns about the social and political situation. These articles were reprinted 
in the Civil Guard press.91 The view expressed by the Civil Guard’s internal press and 
journals was that constant disorder had characterized Spain since April 1931 and was the 
result of extremist elements attempting to exploit the weakness of the state, rather than 
working class frustration at the intransigence of the economic elite towards the 
Republican reforms. While understandable, given the front-line position of the rank-and-
89 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 16, Vicente Velasco, Presidente del Congreso 
local Federaci6n Obrero, Linares [Jaen] to Interior Minister (No. 671,19 December 1931); Ibid., La 
Directiva de Sindicato minero “El Invencible”, Linares [Jaen] to Interior Minister (No. 990, 28 December 
1931).
90 “Servicios”, RTGC, No. 260 (October 1931), p. 456; “Impresiones y comentarios: La esterilidad de la 
rebeldia contra la Republica”, RTGC, No. 261 (November 1931), pp. 512-513; “Servicios”, RTGC, No. 261 
(November 1931), pp. 548-549; “El orden publico”, RTGC, No. 262 (December 1931), p. 557; “Servicios”, 
RTGC, No. 262 (December 1931), pp. 565-567.
91 “Leyendo la prensa”, RTGC, No. 261 (November 1931); p. 550; “Leyendo la prensa”, RTGC, No. 262 
(December 1931), pp. 567-568; “Secci6n no oficial”, BOGC (20 December 1931).
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file Civil Guards in the social battles taking place in parts of the southern countryside, 
this was an alarmist, not to say inflammatory, interpretation of events.
Likewise, the working class press, especially that of the FNTT, also reported on these 
confrontations, and similarly called for greater government intervention. Inevitably, the 
version of events to be found was diametrically opposed to that of the Civil Guard. 
Indeed, characteristic of nearly all reporting of these events is the sense of victimization 
on both sides. Official reports by the Civil Guard always stated that personnel only 
resorted to force in self-defence, often after being pelted with rocks or shot at by an 
uncontrollable mob riled up by degenerate agitators. Conversely, the version of events 
published in the working class press often told a very different story of pacific and 
unarmed workers being beaten and fired upon by brutal Civil Guards in the service of the 
local caciques.
It was in this atmosphere that the events of the small Extremaduran town of Castilblanco 
would eventually erupt on the national consciousness. Like much of the rural south, the 
province of Badajoz had been in a state of considerable tension for several months, if not 
before. On 29 November 1931, a group of striking workers in Almendralejo, frustrated 
after being blacklisted by local landowners, were harassing black-leg labourers that were 
hired from outside the district to get around the stoppage. This had been done illegally, 
and in contravention of the Decree of Municipal Boundaries which prohibited the import 
of labour from outside a locality while there were still workers unemployed there. The 
Civil Guard arrived on the scene, and was greeted with stones, leaving several of them
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lightly wounded. In response, the guardias first fired a warning volley into the air, and 
when this did not prove sufficient to disperse the angry strikers, they fired into the crowd 
itself and then proceeded to arrest a number of people, including the mayor of 
Almendralejo, which only increased the already high state of tension in the locality. The 
continued detention of these men, and the energetic measures of the civil governor and of 
the provincial commander of the Civil Guard, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Pereda Sanz, 
during a series of subsequent incidents led the local Socialists to call a province-wide two 
day strike and demand the dismissal of the two officials.92 Expecting trouble, the civil 
governor, a member of Azana’s Accion Republicana party, successfully requested 
reinforcements. While explaining the reasons for the strike, the provincial Socialist 
press also began to raise temperatures amongst its readers by highlighting aggressions 
committed by the Civil Guard in the province.94
The first day of the strike was not without its confrontations. In La Parra and Barcarrota, 
local Socialists complained of Civil Guards forcing them to abandon the strike and return
92 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 14, Civil Governor [Badajoz] to Interior Minister 
(No. 1361,30 November 1931; No. 95, 3 December 1931; No. 183, 7 December 1931; No. 258,08 
December 1931; No. 379,10 December 1931); Ibid., Las Directivas, Casa del Pueblo, Almendralejo 
[Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 1370,30 November 1931); Comite local Federation obrera, 
Almendralejo [Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 617,17 December 1931); Agrupacion Socialista 
[Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 677,18 December 1931).
93 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 14, Civil Governor [Badajoz] to Interior Minister 
(No. 938, 26 December 1931); Ibid., No. 14, Interior Minister to Civil Governor [Badajoz] (No. 724,28 
December 1931).
94 “Nuestra position”, “Paro general”, “Miserias y dolores de los obreros del campo”, “Atropellos de la 
Guardia Civil en la provincia”, La Verdad Social (25 December 1931); “Paro general popular, justificado y 
planeado reflexivamente”, “Botones de muestra”, La Verdad Social (28 December 1931). The mayor and 
town council of Villagonzalo protested to the Interior Minister about the “unjust Socialist campaign” 
against the governor and Lt. Col. Pereda: AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 14, Sr. 
Mancha, Mayor of Villagonzalo [Badajoz] to Interior Minister (No. 967,27 December 1931).
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to work.95 On the second day of the strike, 31 December 1931, several towns saw clashes 
of various levels of violence between Civil Guards and protesters,96 yet the confrontation 
in the small, isolated village of Castilblanco stood out amongst these. The situation in 
Castilblanco was already volatile even before the strike was called. In the beginning of 
December, Civil Guard Corporal Jose Blanco wrote to one of his instructors soon after 
arriving to his new post. In his letter, Corporal Blanco tells of the hostile attitude of 
certain sectors of the population towards the corps.97 Nonetheless, on the second day of 
the strike, a struggle broke out between the local Civil Guard and the initially peaceful 
demonstrators. The crowd of strikers was fired upon by the Civil Guard. One man was 
killed and two others wounded. Enraged, the crowd fell upon the Civil Guards and all 
four nlen of the local unit were brutally massacred.98
While parliament and the national press debated the exact causes and course of events in 
Castilblanco, such issues were quickly resolved in the minds of many Civil Guards. The 
events of Castilblanco spoke to their deepest fears of being overwhelmed and savagely 
killed by enraged, barbaric crowds. The version of events presented in the Civil Guard 
press was that of the virtuous Civil Guards attempting to reason with the amassed crowd, 
only to be met with anger and violence. In this reading, the confrontation represented the
95 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 14, Casa del Pueblo, La Parra [Badajoz] to 
Interior Minister (No. 1099, 30 December 1931); Ibid., Comite huelga, Bancarrota [Badajoz] to Interior 
Minister (No. 1066, 30 December 1931).
96 AHN, Ministerio del Interior, Serie A, Legajo 39A, No. 14, Civil Governor [Badajoz] to Interior Minister 
(No. 1178,31 December 1931).
97 Part of this letter was reproduced in “Por los martires de Castilblanco”, RTGC, No. 264 (February 1932),
p. 62.
98 A brief description of Castilblanco and the events leading up to it, see Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, 
pp. 74-75; Preston, CSCW, pp. 93-95. For a fuller account of events, including some imaginary 
conversations inserted by the author for dramatic effect, see Jesus Vicente Chamorro, Ano nuevo, ano Viejo 
en Castilblanco (Madrid, 1985).
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struggle between civilization and barbarism that had engulfed Spain since the change of 
regime. Since the common view amongst the corps was that confrontations between 
Civil Guards and workers were almost always the work of agitators, many immediately 
jumped to the conclusion that the murder of the four Civil Guards was the outcome of a 
predetermined plan by the “enemies of order”, which now included the Socialists as well 
as the usual suspects of the CNT and the Communists."
This perception was justified seemingly by events at the regional and national level. 
Between April and December 1931, the government of the Republic had evolved from 
one that contained a broad spectrum of social and political interests to one with a marked 
left-wing character. Indeed, for several months the Radical Republican Party, which had 
come to represent the Centre-Right of the Republican middle classes (as well as many 
former monarchists), had been alleging that Spain was in the grip of constant disorder, 
blaming much of this on the “sectarianism” of the Socialists. In his efforts to force the 
Socialists out of government, and hopefully provoke a new round of elections in which 
his party could increase their representation, the Radicals’ leader Alejandro Lerroux had 
pulled his party out of the government and into the opposition. This move by the largest 
and oldest republican party created a sense of justification amongst those conservative 
sectors that resented the influence of the Socialist Party.100 To add to the growing 
perception amongst Civil Guards that the increasingly partisan nature of the government
99 Lieutenant Vicente Santiago Hodsson, “Vista a Castilblanco”, RTGC, No. 264, pp. 56-58; Candido 
Gallego P6rez, Lucha contra el crimen y  el desorden: Memorias de un teniente de la Guardia Civil 
(Madrid, 1957), p. 171. This view still persists in Civil Guard historiography: Aguado Sanchez, Historia 
de la Guardia Civil, IV, pp. 273-275.
100 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second Republic 
(Brighton, 2000), pp. 88-104.
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worked against the forces of order, in November 1931, Sanjurjo alleged that a group of 
Socialist deputies from the rural south established a commission to collect evidence of 
abuses carried out by the Civil Guard.101
It was these very perceptions amongst the corps that were given voice by Sanjurjo, a 
close friend of Lerroux, in the wake of the events of Castilblanco. At the funeral of the 
four murdered guards, he blamed the Socialists, who, he claimed, had created “an office 
of information against the Civil Guard”, for the tragic events of 31 December. Sanjurjo 
attributed particular responsibility to one of the PSOE deputies for the province and an 
outspoken critic of the Benemerita, Margarita Nelken, implying that she was a foreign 
agent sent to instigate discord and revolution in Spain. Sanjurjo was not the only one 
who felt that Nelken bore special responsibility for the events at Castilblanco. One of 
Nelken’s fellow Socialist deputies for Badajoz, the moderate Manuel Muino, accused her 
of inflaming the passions of the workers, thus making such incidents more likely. In 
an interview a few days later, Sanjuijo ominously stated that “Spain is deliberating 
whether or not it will transform itself into a Soviet regime or into a disciplined Republic, 
civilised and progressive”.103
Tensions continued to rise as a series of confrontations across the country followed in the 
wake of Castilblanco. While the recourse to force by Civil Guards during these days has
101 Paul Preston, Doves o f War: Four Women of Spain (London, 2002), p. 323.
102 “Habla Sanjuijo”, El Debate (5 January 1932); Preston, Doves of War, pp. 324-325. Nelken was later 
called before a military court on charges of incitement against the Civil Guard. It was the reluctance of 
parliament to waive her immunity that ultimately kept her out of prison. Preston, ibid., pp. 328-329.
103 “Declaraciones del general Sanjurjo”, Ejercitoy Armada (7 January 1932).
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been attributed solely to a desire for revenge for Castilblanco,104 and this desire did 
certainly exist amongst sectors of the corps,105 the reality was probably more 
complicated. Taken in the broader context, the actions of Civil Guards during this heady 
period were probably motivated as much by fear as by any sentiment for revenge. The 
increasing tensions amongst both workers and Civil Guards by the end of 1931, and the 
fear amongst the latter that at any moment a demonstration could turn into a violent riot 
were only heightened by the events of Castilblanco. These elements came to a head in 
the bloodiest of those clashes immediately following that of Castilblanco: Amedo. In this 
small industrial town in the province of Logrono, after one guardia was apparently shot 
and believing that they were about to be assaulted, a contingent of Civil Guards opened 
fire on the group of protestors, killing 11 and wounding 30.106
The subsequent outrage at this incident soon overtook that of Castilblanco and caused the 
second national scandal in the space of one week. The Civil Guard itself had felt that 
nothing untoward had occurred in Amedo, and believed that the force had acted in self- 
defence. Instead, they felt that the Socialists were manipulating the facts for their own 
ends. The difference in the perception between what occurred in Castilblanco and 
Amedo is evident in the attention given to the two events in the February issue of the 
Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil. While three pages were dedicated to the events of 
Castilblanco, those of Amedo, despite the publicity they produced, were only briefly 
mentioned amongst other incidents occurring in January. Moreover, a major anarchist
104 Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, 1931-1939 (London, 2005), p. 24; 
Payne, Spain's First Democracy, pp. 75-76; Townson, Crisis o f Democracy, pp. 108-109.
105 Gallego Perez, Lucha contra el crimen, pp. 175-176.
106 The most detailed account of the events in Amedo is provided in Carlos Gil Andres, La Republica en la 
Plaza: Los sucesos de Amedo de 1932 (Amedo, 2002).
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insurrection that lasted several days in some parts of the country, also received little 
notice in this issue.107 Sanjuijo, in a circular published on 7 January 1932, advised his 
men that it was their obligation to “denounce before the proper authorities ... whatever 
attacks are directed against us, most especially those emanating from the sectarian press 
... and those incitements to the working masses to confront us that are made during 
meetings and gatherings”.108 A book was later published under the title La verdad sobre 
la Guardia Civil to counter what was seen as the “flurry of insults and [false] claims” by 
“the employees of sedition” against the Benemerita, which was portrayed as being 
synonymous with civilization itself.109
Despite the defence of the corps made by Prime Minister Azana in parliament, 
many Civil Guards were incensed that once again their own dead were forgotten so 
quickly while attention shifted to those killed at Amedo and criticisms of the corps 
abounded. Indeed, a sense of near paranoia generated by months of unrest and displays 
of public hostility towards the corps was beginning to show. Moreover, the fulsome 
support for the Benemerita in the right-wing and military press made these criticisms 
appear to be the work of extremist elements. Given that the Socialists were amongst 
these critics, and also part of the government, anger over the lack of respect for the 
sacrifices and services of the Benemerita and the frustration at the continual unrest began 
to focus on the government itself. Within certain Civil Guard garrisons, according to one 
officer, the state of opinion was that the current government had lost its legitimacy and
107 “Guardia Civil: La causa por los sucesos de Amedo”, LCM (3 February 1932).
108 “Orden general del Cuerpo del dia 7 de enero 1932”, BOGC (10 January 1932), p. 33.
109 “El Vigia de la Torre” (pseud.), La verdad sobre la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 1932).
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should be overthrown.110 Rumors of conspiracies within the Civil Guard persisted 
through out the month of January.111 Due to Sanjurjo’s inflammatory public statements, 
which in themselves constituted a veiled threat against the administration, it was decided 
that he should be relieved of his command as soon as circumstances permitted. Given 
that such a move would have been interpreted by most Civil Guards as the work of the 
Socialists, great care was taken beforehand in case his removal sparked a rebellion 
amongst the corps.112 When General Miguel Cabanellas replaced Sanjurjo as Director 
General, he repeatedly urged his men to maintain discipline and avoid involving 
themselves in politics.113 As General Cabanellas was a well-known mason and 
Republican, his appointment was seen as politically motivated,114 even though he, like 
Sanjurjo, had close ties to the Radical Party.
While the change of command in the Civil Guard was effected without incident, the 
damage had been done. Sanjurjo, outraged by what he felt was a politically motivated 
demotion to Director-General of the Carabineros (Customs Guard), actively joined the 
ranks of those conspiring against the Left-Republican-Socialist government. Amongst
110 Gallego P6rez, Lucha contra el crimen, pp. 175-178. In his biography of Sanjurjo, Emilio Esteban- 
Infantes, the aide-de-camp and close friend of the General, stated that the entire force was ready to rebel 
against a government that they blamed for the events of Castilblanco: Emilio Esteban-Infantes, General 
Sanjurjo: Un laureado en el penal del Dueso (Barcelona, 1957), p. 177.
111 Azana, Diarios completos, pp. 437-438,440-441,453-454.
112 Azana, Diarios completos, pp. 437-438, 454.
113 “Orden General de la Direction General de la Guardia Civil del dia 4 de febrero de 1932”, BOGC, (10 
February 1932), p. 130; “El general Cabanellas habla de la Guardia Civil”, Ejercito y  Armada (7 March
1932).
114 Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, pp. 285-286. Aguado S&nchez underlines this point 
by noting that Cabanellas was the first general de division to hold the post of Director General of the Civil 
Guard since 1873, as this position was normally awarded to an officer of the rank of lieutenant general.
Yet, as the rank of lieutenant general was abolished by Azana, leaving only four officers with that rank 
amongst the active lists (Sanjurjo being one of them), this act was perhaps less political than it seemed. In 
fact, Cabanellas had requested personally to Azafia back in the beginning of August 1931 that the latter 
reserve for him the command of the Civil Guard whenever Sanjuijo vacated his post, that is, long before the 
events of January 1932: Azana, Diarios completos, p. 206
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his former charges, there was little to endear them to the current government, as disorders 
continued into the summer of 1932. Indeed, despite his political reputation, General 
Cabanellas appeared to have contacts amongst the conspirators. Given the importance 
that was placed on the sympathies of the Civil Guard, this was seen by the plotters as a 
significant gain, despite the fact that Cabanellas was at best lukewarm in his enthusiasm 
for the conspiracy.115 The various plots to topple the Azana government were given an 
air of legitimacy as the leader of the Radicals, Lerroux, gave a series of speeches and 
statements criticising the administration. The most important of these was on 10 July 
1932 in Zaragoza, in which he seemingly recommended that the government resign or 
risk a military rebellion. Given that Lerroux was in contact with Sanjurjo, amongst 
others close to the conspiracy, this appeared to be more than an empty statement.116
One month after Lerroux’s speech in Zaragoza, the expected rebellion broke out. Poorly- 
coordinated, the rebels were quickly defeated in Madrid, with units of the Civil Guard 
participating in its suppression. In Sevilla, the other focal point of the rebellion, Sanjurjo 
managed to mobilize the majority of local security and armed forces behind him, 
including the Civil Guard. Yet, given the failure of the uprising elsewhere, as well as the 
reluctance of his men to engage in battle with loyal troops, Sanjuijo was obliged to leave
117the Andalusian city and was captured on his way towards the Portuguese border. 
Cabanellas, who was suspected of involvement in the conspiracy and had disregarded a
1,5 Joaquin Arraras, Historia de la segunda Republica espanola, Vol. I (Madrid, 1970), p. 479; Townson, 
Crisis of Democracy, p. 131.
116 For a discussion of Lerroux’s role in the build up to the military rebellion of August 1932, see Townson, 
Crisis of Democracy, pp. 102-145.
117 For a description of the military conspiracy and rebellion of 1932, see Payne, Politics and the Military, 
pp. 277-291; Gabriel Cardona, et al., “La sanjuijada”, Historia 16, No. 76 (1982), pp. 43-67. For the events 
in Sevilla, see Arrar&s, Historia de la segunda Republica espanola, I, pp. 505-526.
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direct order from the Interior Minister, Santiago Casares Quiroga, to disarm the Sevillian 
Civil Guard garrison, was dismissed as Director General.118 He was replaced by General 
Ceclio Bedia de la Cavalleria who, like Cabanellas, was an opponent of Primo de Rivera 
and more of a bureaucrat than a man of action. Given the problems that Azana had with 
his more politically-active predecessors, General Bedia seemed the perfect choice at a 
moment when Azana was going to attempt to tame the Civil Guard.119
While the vast majority of the Civil Guard did not participate in the rebellion, Azana took 
advantage of the event to diminsh the autonomy of the corps. Azana suppressed the 
National Directorate of the Civil Guard, located in the Ministry of War, reconstituting it 
as a National Inspectorate (Inspection General) -  with all the reduction of competencies 
inherent in the change of title -  within the Ministry of the Interior.120 The abolition of 
this ‘independent castle of stone’ (‘castillo roquero independiente’) was no small event, 
as Prime Minister and Minister of War Azana noted in his diaiy: ‘The petty despots 
(caciques) and bossy meddlers (mangoneadores) of the Civil Guard are astonished by the 
suppression of the National Directorate. They would never have believed it could 
happen.’121 Furthermore, on 4 September 1932, Civil Governors were given powers of
1 99inspection over those Civil Guard units within their province. In March 1933, 
following upon the incorporation of the command of the Civil Guard into the Interior 
Ministry and further limiting the corps’ autonomy, a Technical Secretariat was set up to
118 Azafia, Diarios completos, pp. 592, 595, 597.
119 Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, p. 320.
120 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, IV, pp. 319-21; Fernando Rivas Gomez, ‘La Guardia 
Civil del siglo XX’ in Jose Sanz Mufloz (ed.), La Guardia Civil Espanola (Madrid, 1994), pp. 219-220.
121 Azana, Diarios Completos., pp. 596-8.
122 Manel Risques and Carles Barrachina, Proces a la Guardia Civil: Barcelona 1939 (Barcelona, 2001), p. 
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better coordinate the services of both the Interior Ministry police and the Civil Guard.123 
Finally, amongst the most important, yet often overlooked, reforms was the granting of 
policing competencies to the Catalan regional government (the Generalitat). Despite the 
strong opposition of the military, the Generalitat was given control of all of those police 
forces located within its jurisdiction, including the very symbol of Spanish centralism: the 
Civil Guard.124
These reforms followed the gradual efforts of the Republicans to reduce the 
independence of the Civil Guard and bring it under greater civilian control, as well as the 
regime’s dependence on the force. In terms of the former objective, it was necessary to 
first dismantle the parallel military administration that evolved under the monarchy. The 
abolition of both the Captainicies-General and the Military Governorships in June 1931 
left the provincial Civil Governors as the maximum authority outside of Madrid. The 
second goal was to reform and strengthen the Interior Ministry police. The most 
important aspect of this policy was the establishment of a well-disciplined and elite unit 
within the Security Corps. From its inception, this force, called the Assault Guard, did 
not enjoy the autonomy of the Civil Guard and was completely under the command of the 
Interior Minister and his subordinates.126 The explicit purpose of the Assault Guard, to 
diminish the Republic’s reliance on the methods and men of the Civil Guard, was clear: 
just as its creation followed the church burnings of 10-11 May 1931, its personnel was
123 Julio de Anton, Historia de la Policia Espanola (Madrid, 2000), p. 281.
124 Armando Oterino Cervelld, ‘La Guardia Civil al servicio de la Generalidad de Catalufia’, Revista de 
Estudios Historicos de la Guardia Civil, No. 19 (1977), pp. 39-122; Risques and Barrachina, Proces a la 
Guardia Civil, pp. 23-32.
125 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London, 1993), p. 78.
126 Alejandro Vargas Gonzalez, ‘La Guardia de Asalto: Policia de la Republica’, Cuadernos Republicanos, 
no. 53 (2003), pp. 41-8; Manuel M. Correa Gamero, Vicente Cabo Meseguer, Miguel A. Camino del Olmo, 
Policia Espanola. Notas e imagenes (Barcelona & Madrid, 1999), pp. 65-66.
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increased by 2500 men in January 1932 after the events of Castilblanco and Amedo,127 
and then again by another 2500 men after the failed military coup of August 1932.128
By the summer of 1933 the government had at its disposal a sufficient number of assault 
guards to be able to abolish the two mobile anti-disturbance units within the Civil Guard 
as part of a general reorganization of the latter force, which included a reduction of 1448 
men in its personnel.129 Indeed, the Assault Guard was continually strengthened 
throughout the Republic, as were the other sections of the Interior Ministry police. On the 
eve of the Republic, the Cuerpo de Seguridad numbered 5603 men, while the Civil Guard 
numbered nearly 28,000.130 By the outbreak of the Civil War, the Security Corps 
numbered 17,660 men (of which nearly 10,000 were assault guards), a growth of over 
300 percent, while the Civil Guard numbered 32,458 men, a growth of just 15 percent.131 
A similar pattern can be seen in the budgets for the two corps. In 1931, the Security 
Corps possessed a budget of just over 64 million pesetas, while the Civil Guard enjoyed a 
budget of 119 million pesetas, nearly twice the size. By 1936 the budgets for the two 
forces reached near parity, with the Security Corps enjoying a budget of 153 million
127 Archivo del Congreso de los Diputados, Comisidn de Gobemacidn (hereafter ACD-CG), leg. 484, exp. 
no. 6.
128 ACD-CG, leg. 484, exp. no. 34.
129 Francisco Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, Vol. V (Madrid, 1984), pp. 45-8. In place of 
the two mobile anti-disturbance divisions, a tercio was created to monitor the national rail network.
130 Gonzalez Calleja, La razon de la fuerza, p. 46; Real decreto-ley de 14 de junio de 1921, establishing the 
number of personnel (plantilla) of the Security and Surveillance Corps. The numbers of personnel 
established in 1921 remained the same until the Republic. My thanks to Martin Turrado Vidal for 
supplying me with this information.
131 Vargas Gonzalez, ‘La Guardia de Asalto’, p. 44; Rivas Gomez, ‘La Guardia Civil del siglo XX’, p. 224. 
It is important to note that most, if not all, of the increase in Civil Guard personnel was effected under the 
period of Center-Right rule.
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pesetas, a 139 percent increase, while the budget for the Civil Guard grew to only 166 
million, a 40 percent increase.132
Despite these reforms, the Azana government offered carrots as well as sticks to the Civil
Guard. In a public ceremony on the 22 July 1933, the government awarded insignias of
the Order of the Republic to the 27th Regiment for their loyalty and actions during the
August 1932 rebellion.133 The issue of loyalty and service to the Republic was a
sensitive one for the Civil Guard, who often felt underappreciated by their new political
masters. Indeed, in the wake of the August 1932 rebellion (and subsequent reforms), an
official committee was set up on 5 September 1932 to distribute the sizeable public
donations made to the widows and orphans of those Civil Guards killed in the line of duty
“since the advent of the Republic”.134 As part of the July 1933 reforms, which saw a
slight reduction of personnel, a small pay raise was awarded to those on the active lists,
whilst those who were displaced by the reform were given a fairly generous
compensation.135 Given the constant comments in the Civil Guard press about how an
increase in pay would improve the “interior satisfaction” of the “workers of order”
1(trabajadores del or den), this was a wise way of taking some of the sting out of the 
less popular aspects of the 1933 reform. As many of these articles noted the pay 
difference between the favoured Interior Ministry police and that of those men “who 
perhaps are not very popular in this moment” but still sacrifice themselves for the good of
132 Budget figures taken from Cardona, El poder militar, p. 270.
133 “Imposition de insignias de la Orden de la Republica”, BOGC (10 August 1933)
134 BOGC (10 December 1932), pp. 1030-1035.
135 BOGC (10 August 1933), pp. 615-617.
136 “Las reformas”, RTGC, No. 276 (February 1933), pp. 55-56; Corporal Eladio Urien, “Trabajadores del 
Orden”, RTGC, No. 277 (March 1933), p. 110; “La equiparacion de haberes”, RTGC, No. 278 (April 1933), 
pp. 132-133; “Las reformas”, RTGC, No. 279 (May 1933), pp. 169-170.
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the nation and regime, a pay raise of some sort was crucial. Moreover, to explain better 
the intentions of the reform, Interior Minister Casares Quiroga granted an interview to the 
Revista Tecnica de la Guaria Civil. In this interview, the Minister stated his admiration 
for the Civil Guard, as well as his recognition of its services to the Republic. He also 
made clear that he had no intention of reforming the moral and disciplinary foundations 
of the corps: “the Cartilla and the Regulations of the Civil Guard are admirable things ... 
It is impossible to change even a comma”.137 This was of great importance to the Civil 
Guard, for while they were amenable to certain organizational reforms, they were 
adamant in their opposition to any changes to the Cartilla, which was linked to the 
military discipline and values that most felt intimately linked to the spirit and efficiency 
of the corps.138
Despite the efforts of the Azana government to fulfil their reformist agenda, they were 
never quite able to win the sympathies of the Civil Guard. The corps chaffed at certain 
aspects of their reforms, and did not believe that these were carried out solely to 
rationalize the structure of the corps. Bitter memories of the lack of confidence and 
appreciation for the Benemerita (which was often mutual) was underlined as the Civil 
Guard was replaced as the primary security force of the Spanish state by the 
“Republican” Assault Guards. This situation was made worse by the on-going social 
conflict. The “holocaust of the social peace” (holocausto de la paz social) brought on by 
anarchist insurrection of January 1933,139 also eventually undermined popular confidence
137 “Cuarenta y cinco minutos de charla, sobre la Guardia Civil, con el Excmo. Sr. D. Santiago Casares 
Quiroga, Ministro de la Gobemacidn”, RTGC, No. 282 (August 1933), pp. 281-284.
138 “^Debe reformarse el Reglamento de la Guardia Civil?”, RTGC, No. 264 (February 1932), pp. 54-55.
139 “Servicios”, RTGC, No. 276 (February 1933), pp. 50-54.
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in the government, particularly in the wake of the Casas Viejas scandal. With the 
government apparently morally bankrupt, and a Centre-Right promising “rectification” 
and greater public order, which included a greater appreciation for the Benemerita and 
willingness to take the “necessary measures”, Civil Guards looked forward to what 
seemed to them a more promising future.
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CHAPTER FIVE
While the Azana government was bolstered by the failure of the sanjurjada, enabling it to 
pass a series of previously log-jammed legislation, within the space of a few months it 
again found itself facing a new crisis, one that would prove terminal. The year 1933, like 
1932, started off with another policing scandal. This one occurred in the midst of the 
suppression of a revolutionary insurrection carried out by elements of the CNT. While 
the insurrection, poorly planned and poorly co-ordinated, was easily repressed by the 
security forces, an incident in the small town of Casas Viejas was converted into a 
national scandal that dominated politics for the next couple of months and undermined 
the government. The Socialists, already under increasing pressure from their rank and 
file to quicken the pace of reforms, found that their endorsement of harsh measures 
against the anarcho-syndicalists did not resonate well with their working-class 
constituencies. Moreover, while the government was criticised from the Left for its 
heavy-handed response to the insurrection, its enemies on the Right were only too happy 
to take advantage of the situation to join the bandwagon in a virtuoso display of 
hypocrisy.1
For the Civil Guard the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection of January 1933, despite its 
somewhat limited impact, was a “holocaust of the social peace” that resulted in six civil 
guards killed and twenty-two wounded. The greatest numbers of incidents reported were 
in Barcelona, Valencia, Murcia and Andalucia. As reported in the Revista Tecnica de la
1 For a description of the insurrection, and its consequences, see Julian Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic 
and Civil War in Spain, 1931-1939 (London, 2005), pp. 68-72; Paul Preston, CSCW, pp. 108-110; Jerome 
R. Mintz, The Anarchists o f Casas Viejas (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994), Chapters 12-16.
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Guardia Civil, in many places the various civil guard posts were confronted and attacked 
by well-armed revolutionaries. Indeed, there were numerous reports of discoveries of 
bomb and weapons caches. Also present was that danger ever present in the minds of 
civil guards: that of being outnumbered by hostile and aggressive crowds. In one such 
incident in Cadiz, a group yelled out “a ellos que son pocos” in coming upon a small 
contingent of civil guards. Conversely, the most infamous incident of the January 1933 
insurrection, that of Casas Viejas in the same province of Cadiz, received relatively little 
attention. In the four-and-a-half pages dedicated to the January 1933 insurrection the 
Civil Guard was reported to have responded with “courage and serenity”, “with neither 
leniency nor cruelty” and “inspired by the humanitarian sentiments of protection and 
philanthropy” in the face of those dangers presented by the failed revolutionary attempt.2 
These purported latter qualities were highlighted in a later article about a Civil Guard, 
Pablo Escudero Lopez, who was wounded in Barcelona during the insurrection. While 
still recuperating in the hospital, an Army officer -  wounded by “criminals” -  was in 
need of a blood transfusion. Despite his own delicate condition, Escudero Lopez offered 
his own blood to the fatally wounded officer.3
In light of the importance given to the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection, and the “heroic” 
deeds of the Civil Guard in its repression, it is somewhat curious that it did not receive 
top billing in the Feburary 1933 issue of the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil. This 
honour was awarded to an article on a public tribute paid to the Civil Guard in 
Barcelona’s massive Teatro Olimpia on 31 December 1932. This event, supposedly the
2 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 276 (February 1933), pp. 50-54.
3 J.O.P., “Virtudes de la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, no. 279 (May 1933), p. 168.
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largest ever homage to the Civil Guard in its history, was seen as "un paso muy marcado 
que el pueblo espanol da hacia [la Guardia Civil]”. This demonstration of gratitude for 
the services and sacrifices of the Civil Guard was deemed more important than the 
suppression of the January 1933 insurrection itself, for the article on the ceremony took 
up the first three pages of the February 1933 issue, while the uprising itself was reported 
in the normal section dedicated to services carried out by the corps.4
Despite this apparent “significant turn”, the energy showed by the Azana government in 
repressing the January 1933 insurrection and the attention given to the economic needs of 
civil guards in the July 1933 reform, confidence in the Left Republican-Socialist coalition 
would experience a steady erosion amongst the corps. This would occur largely due to 
two interrelated factors: the continued, and perhaps increasing levels of disorder,5 and the 
belief that the Azana government had lost its authority and was unable to stop the 
perceived disorder, or perhaps even that elements within the government were 
encouraging it. While the right-wing press had decried persistently the “rampant 
disorder” since very nearly the beginning of the Republic, within the Civil Guard’s own 
professional journal, the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil, it is possible to get a 
glimpse of the rising concern over levels of “social indiscipline”. In the “Servicios” 
section of the March issue, it was reported that in Caceres, always a conflictive province, 
hungry day labourers had carried out widespread invasions of farms, “abusive plowing” 
(roturaciones abusivas) and “other outrages”, with the detention of hundreds of
4 “Homenaje a la Guardia Civil en Barcelona: La razdn y la justicia se abren camino”, RTGC, no. 276 
(February 1933), pp. 41-44.
5 For a discussion of the reasons behind the rise in social unrest in Andalucia during the winter, spring and 
summer of 1933, see Mario Lopez Martinez, Orden publico y  luchas agrarias en Andalucia (Madrid,
1995), pp. 291-308. More generally, see Preston, CSCW, pp. 107-111.
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trespassers (intrusos). Despite this apparently worrying scenario, the majority of the 
other incidents reported that month involved common and gang-related crime. The 
section ended with a tallying of those services carried out in 1932, and upon revising the 
“fabulous action of the Civil Guard”, the author exclaimed: “What would Spain be like 
without the Civil Guard?”.6
Yet, if the final days of winter were relatively quiet, the Civil Guard was increasingly 
nervous about rising social conflict and worker unrest. The April issue of the Revista 
Tecnica de la Guardia Civil reported various incidents of labour disputes and land 
invasions. One such incident, in Luna (Zaragoza) on 18 March 1933, the five civil 
guards who were attempting to control a group of angry workers found themselves 
greeted with stones and then gunshots, resulting in the death of one guard. Returning to 
the conflictive province of Caceres, the Civil Guard captured a radical leader who was 
supposedly involved in the production and storage of bombs and weapons, and in doing 
so struck a major blow to the “terrorist hydra” that existed around the town of 
Navalmoral de la Mata.7 This trend continued in the May 1933 issue, which reported not
o
only several incidents of political conflict, but also an increase of Communist activity. 
The June 1933 issue painted a similar portrait of disorderly elements attempting to spread 
havoc, reporting various incidents involving “extremists”, “anarcho-sydincalists”, 
“communists” and aggressive strikers.9
6 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 277 (March 1933), pp. 92-94.
7 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 288 (April 1933), pp. 133-135.
8 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 289 (May 1933), pp. 171-172.
9 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 280 (June 1933), pp. 208-209.
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Interestingly, in spite of these developments, these elements were still viewed as 
relatively marginal, and a series of articles appeared in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia 
Civil counselling restraint in dealing with disorder and stressing the importance of civil 
guard’s actions in terms of relations with the public. One letter published in the March 
1933 issue noted that respect and prestige were not gained simply through a military 
bearing, but also through one’s conduct.10 Following on the issue of personal conduct, 
another letter, appearing in the May 1933 issue, discussed the need to avoid “disastrous 
abuses” (extralimitaciones funestas) in controlling disorder. In particular, the author of 
this letter advised caution in resorting to the practice of discharging rifles into the air as a 
technique in crowd control. Noting that this could cause innocent victims, the author 
went on to state that civil guards “do not have the right to fire at random, ‘hitting 
whomsoever gets hit’ (pegue a quien pegue)”.n The author of this second letter, Civil 
Guard Sergeant Manuel Martin Rubio, was granted a special section in the following 
month’s issue dedicated precisely to the need to avoid the use of unnecessary force. 
Aware that an increase in social tension also brings with it an increasing temptation 
amongst civil guards to resort to more forceful methods, Martin Rubio set out those 
regulations concerning relations with the public, noting the absence of any official source 
that allows or suggests the practice of firing warning shots into the air. He ends his piece 
reminding the reader that they “should not forget that this Institution is essentially 
charitable and protective”.12
10 Guardia movil Francisco Garcia Hortelano, “Ecos: Buscando el prestigio”, RTGC, no. 277 (March 1933),
p. 111.
11 Civil Guard Sergeant Manuel Martin Rubio, “Ecos: La conservacion del orden publico”, RTGC, no. 279 
(May 1933), pp. 175-176.
12 Civil Guard Sergeant Manuel Martin Rubio, “La conservacion del orden publico”, RTGC, no. 280 (June
1933), pp. 214-215.
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This concept of the Civil Guard al servicio del pueblo, and thus diminishing the conflict 
of interests that often arose between the working classes and the Benemerita, was still 
emphasized in official publications. A letter written to Inspector-General Bedia from the 
Workers’ Section of the town of Pilar de Jarabia (Almeria) praising the generosity of the 
Station Commandant of Pulpi, Corporal Juan Leal Romero, was published in the Boletln 
Oficial de la Guardia Civil in May 1933.13 Moreover, the instances of symbolic 
identification of the Civil Guard with the working class, evident in a series of references 
since the proclamation of the Republic, could still be found. In discussing the widely- 
held desire for a pay raise, one civil guard noted that the Socialist-affiliated UGT referred 
to all public functionaries as “workers”, and that the Civil Guard could rightly be 
considered “trabajadores del orden”. He went on to cite approvingly the phrase 
“uniformed workers” used by a former Civil Governor of Barcelona during the public 
tribute given in the Catalan capital in December 1932.14
If many within the Civil Guard believed that the Left Republican-Socialist government of 
Manuel Azana was overly partisan and increasingly incapable of dealing with Spain’s 
pressing political and social problems, by the summer of 1933 disaffected elements of the 
Benemerita could look to a fairly broad sector of public opinion that shared this view.
The scandal of Casas Viejas had dogged the government throughout the winter and 
spring of 1933. By the summer, a perceived rise in social unrest and disorder had
13 BOGC, VIII, no. 13 (May 1933), pp. 342-343.
14 Civil Guard Corporal Gladio Urien, “Trabajadores del Orden”, RTGC, no. 277 (March 1933), p. 110.
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brought further criticism of the administration.15 While columns on “social indiscipline” 
had been a regular feature of rightist and conservative papers since the summer of 1931, 
in mid-1933 the centrist, liberal and pro-republican daily El Sol also began running 
frequently columns titled “In search of public order” and “The extremists”, largely 
focussing on the activities of the CNT and FAI. Two other important pro-republican 
dailes, El Progreso and Luz, also had withdrawn their support for the administration.16 
Also in July 1933, Miguel Maura, who was highly regarded within the Civil Guard, 
withdrew his small party from the Cortes, blaming the government for the “political and 
social chaos” that was undermining the whole republican project.17 A week later, he gave 
a closing speech at an assembly of the Conservative Republican Party outlining these 
same charges in greater detail.18 By the end of the month, front-page article in El Sol 
talked of political instability and a “vast conspiracy”, and named the “intransigence of the 
Socialists” as being one of the principle causes of the crisis.19 Almost as if on cue, the 
Socialist leader, Francisco Largo Caballero, gave a speech in which alongside stating that 
the Republic needed the Socialists and called for discipline and unity, he also declared 
that if the Socialists were prevented from gaining power through legal mechanisms, they 
were willing to conquer power through other means.20
The month of July also brought other potential sources of disaffection towards the 
government, and the Socialists in particular, amongst the Civil Guard. The trials of
15 Nigel Townson, The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics Under the Second Republic, 1931- 
1936 (Brighton, 2000), pp. 170-173.
16 Townson, Crisis of Democracy in Spain, pp. 171-172.
17 El Sol (16 July 1933).
18 El Sol (25 July 1933). Excerpts from his speech were printed on the front page.
19 El Sol (22 July 1933); El Sol (25 July 1933). This plot was denounced by the government as part of an 
“alarmist campaign”, after a variety of preventative measures were taken: El Sol (25 July 1933).
20 El Sol (25 July 1933). Excerpts from his speech were printed on the front page.
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Sanjurjo for his role in the August 1932 rebellion and those officially charged for the 
massacre of the four civil guards in Castilblanco were held, the latter being defended by 
the Socialists Luis Jimenez de Asua and Juan-Simeon Vidarte. Proceedings also began 
against the Civil Guard sergeant held responsible for the deaths of four workers in 
Palacios Rubios in September 1931. Sargeant Jimenez Cuesta, a corporal at the time of 
the event, was charged with four counts of homicide and another four of wounding 
(lesions). The prosecuting attorney was Jose Andres Manso, president of the Sindicatos 
de Trabajadores de la Tierra and POSE deputy for Salamanca in 1933 and 1936, while his
legal defence was in the hands of the Salamantine lawyer and leader of the authoritarian
0 1Catholic party, the CEDA, Jose Maria Gil Robles. At the same time, articles regularly 
appeared in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil reporting ceremonies whereby 
republican flags were donated to local Civil Guard posts, thus allowing lukewarm and 
pseudo-republican elements to appear to be loyal to the regime -  presented as 
“respectable opinion” and “gente de orden” -  and grateful to the Benemerita for its 
services and sacrifices for the Republic.
Of even greater impact on the attitudes of civil guards was another outburst of unrest that 
erupted at the end of the summer and into the autumn. Reports in the Revista Tecnica de 
la Guardia Civil tell of social conflict, armed robberies, a wave of crop burnings, stealing 
of livestock, and discovery of bomb and weapons caches.22 These incidents appeared to 
intensify in tandem with political developments. With the dismissal of the Left
21 “Por los sucesos de Palaciosrubios: Comienza el Consejo de Guerra contra un sargento de la Guardia 
civil y once paisanos”, El Sol (16 July 1933).
22 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 283 (September 1933), pp. 329-331; “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 283 (October 1933), 
pp. 369-372.
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Republican-Socialist government in the beginning of September and its replacement by 
Radical-led administrations, and the calling of new elections for November 1933, on­
going social and political conflicts rose ever more to the surface as control of the state 
administration went up for grabs. This situation was decried in the “Servicios” section of 
the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil, which stated that during the month of October, 
personnel of the Institute had to “suffocate an infinity of tumultuous demonstrations”.
The majority of these lay within the provinces of Extremadura and Andalucia, 
particularly Jaen. These continued into November and the election day itself.23 Perhaps 
out of frustration and exhaustion after months of increasing social conflict, perhaps out of 
an identification of the Socialists as contributing to this situation, it would seem that civil 
guards in these regions were willing to lend a helping hand to those political parties that 
represented the “forces of order” and promised to impose respect for authority.
According to Socialist sources, civil guards harassed rural workers during the elections, a 
claim that was largely absent in the elections of 1931 24
Alongside the struggle for political, economic and social power existed another important 
conflict that often put civil guards at odds with the civilian population and arguably was 
intrinsic to the “republicanisation” of Spanish society: the competition between “popular” 
and “jurist” concepts of law and justice. As mentioned in Chapter One, in rural villages 
and towns there was a disdain for outside interference in local affairs, and national laws 
and institutions were judged more on pragmatic grounds than on any conversion to liberal 
creeds on what constituted the most just and rational regulation of society. One of the
23 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 285 (December 1933), pp. 460-463.
24 Preston, CSCW, p. 119; L6pez Martinez, Orden publico y  luchas agrarias, pp. 321-329.
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principle tasks of the Republican regime was to change such attitudes towards the state; 
that is, convince the lower classes that they had a stake in a liberal democratic society, 
and demonstrate to the traditional economic and social elites that they were not above the 
law -  as they often were under the monarchy -  but rather subjected to it. The “rule of 
law” (imperio de la ley) was a key social value for the Civil Guard, a liberal institution 
par excellence, as it was the very basis of its personnel’s authority and differentiated it 
from local institutions, making it, in their minds, superior and a force for civilization and 
progress. An example of this is the satirical cartoon of rural life that featured 
occasionally in the Civil Guard’s professional journal. One such cartoon features two 
crafty petty criminals as they outmanoeuvre various other municipal and national 
policing bodies, all the time keeping “an eye out for the ‘ceviles’ [sic]”, who are 
presented as the most effective (and thus feared) force.
Perhaps of greater importance was the Civil Guard’s intervention during episodes of 
“popular justice”. While issues of an economic nature probably featured more 
prominently in the minds of the lower classes when considering such interventions, there 
were other types of incidents that fell outside the conflict between the proprietor and 
labouring classes. Coincidentally or not, during the tense months of the late summer of 
1933, incidents of attempted lynching suddenly gained attention in the Civil Guard press. 
On 31 July 1933, civil guards prevented the lynching of a murderer in Canillas de 
Aceituno (Malaga); in Jabalin (Murcia) on 1 August a well-known delinquent was also 
spared a hanging by angry crowds after murdering a teacher; on 3 August in Talavera de 
la Reina, civil guards intervened to prevent the lynching of a heavy-handed municipal
25 Diego de Gracia, “jOjo a los ceviles!”, RTGC, no. 278 (April 1933), pp. 130-131.
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guard {guardia urbano) who had roughed-up and shot at a local man; in Las Corts 
(Barcelona) the Civil Guard was impeded in the transfer of an armed mugger by the local 
population, who sought to impose “popular justice” on the miscreant -  it was thanks to 
the protection of the Civil Guard that he was not strung up.26 A chauffer in Fuencarral 
(Madrid) was almost lynched on 10 August after causing an accident that resulted in the 
injuring of several people. His life was saved thanks to the protection provided by the 
local contingent of civil guards.27 Perhaps the most extreme example of such an incident, 
demonstrating how important submission to the law was to the ethos of the Civil Guard, 
involved the murder of a civil guard’s sister in early April 1934. As the local population 
gathered to lynch the killer, the report tells us that this particular civil guard swallowed 
his own pain and desire for revenge to protect the murderer of his sibling from the 
angered crowds. His devotion to duty and the due process of law was held up as an 
example to all civil guards.
The Radical-led governments from September 1933 onwards had as their motto the 
imposition of the rule of law and restoration of authority that supposedly had been 
undermined by the previous Left Republican-Socialist administration. They would do 
this through a process of “rectifying” those reforms passed under the Azana government. 
Among these were measures that were supposed to improve the “interior satisfaction” 
within the Civil Guard and Interior Ministry police, building upon the long-standing
26 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 283 (September 1933), pp. 330-331.
27 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 284 (October 1933), p. 369. Three other near-lynching incidents during the 
months of September and October 1933 were mentioned in “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 286 (December 1933), 
pp. 460-463.
28 Comandante Lara, “Notas del mes: Entre el Deber y el Dolor, venci6 el Deber”, RTGC, no. 291 (May 
1934), pp. 205-206.
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campaign by the Radicals and their erstwhile political allies to demonstrate their concern 
for the needs and prestige of the Benemerita. This policy dove-tailed with the desire of 
Lerroux, who believed he was unjustly kept from the reigns of power by upstarts, to 
maintain the Radicals in a dominant position -  through opportunistic alliances or through 
more traditional means of co-opting the coercive forces of the state.
In terms of the political hue of the command structure of the Interior Ministry police, on 
23 September 1933 -  that is, during the short-lived first Lerroux government -  the hard­
line right-wing (though republican) Lieutenant Colonel Agustln Munoz Grandes was 
named commander of the Security Corps (which included the Assault Guard), while Jose 
Valdivia y Garcla-Borron was named Director-General of Security.29 Jose Valdivia was 
a close confidant and Secretary to a previous Director-General of Security, Arturo 
Menendez Lopez, the latter being an Artillery captain and politically linked to Azana, but 
at some point gravitated towards Lerroux.30 While the government of Diego Martinez 
Barrio, Lerroux’s second-in-command, was ostensibly more honest in its intentions to 
hold free and fair elections, within days of its constitution, Martinez Barrio, Valdivia and 
Interior Minister Manuel Rico Avello inspected the Cuatro Caminos Civil Guard garrison 
in Madrid. Whilst there, they distributed Crosses of Military Merit for the officers
'X 1present, and chevrons for the NCOs and ranks. On 19 October 1933, a proposal was
29 Jose Caamafio Boumacell, La policia a traves del tiempo, 1908-1958 (Madrid, 1999), pp. 176-177.
30 Santos Martinez Saura, Memorias del secretario de Azana (Barcelona, 1999), p. 229. Azafia also 
remarks that Valdivia was an “hombre de confianzct’ of Menendez: Obras Completas, p. 755. Valdivia 
reputedly was involved in a supposed assassination plot against Azafia in the autumn of 1933: Santos 
Martinez Saura, ibid., pp. 229 & 247-248
31 El Sol (15 October 1933). Manuel Rico Avello was a politically-independent republican lawyer from 
Asturias who served as a parliamentary deputy as a member of the Al Servicio de la Republica grouping: 
Joaquin Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica Espanola, Vol. II (Madrid, 1970), p. 217; Townson,
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submitted by the government to the Cortes for the establishment of an additional credit to 
the annual budget to cover some of the extra personnel costs of the Civil Guard, a motion 
that was supported by Maura and opposed by the Socialists.32 A month earlier the 
Minister of Justice, Juan Botella Asensi, announced that he was prepared to amnesty all 
of those state functionaries who had seen their careers put on hold (postergados) by the 
Azana governments. On 15 October 1933, it was announced that this was to include 
those Interior Ministry police who saw themselves subjected to any type of investigative 
or disciplinary proceedings for their zealous service under the monarchy (or lack thereof 
under the Republic), potentially returning back into the ranks personnel of dubious 
loyalty to the regime.33 Furthermore, on the same day, the Minister for War, Vicente 
Iranzo Enguita received a delegation of right-leaning and right-wing generals (including 
former Inspector-General of the Civil Guard, Miguel Cabanellas) and announced a 
review of all those military officers who felt “wounded” (lesionados) by the previous 
administration for political reasons.34 That these “rectifications” were done under an all- 
Republican cabinet (though largely without any representatives of the republican Left), 
and echoed the previously stated opinions within the Civil Guard of not punishing 
personnel for their service to the monarchy, made the republican vision of the Azana 
governments seem all the more partisan. Indeed, Lerroux’s oft-stated aim of reconciling 
the non-republican Right with the regime would have resonated amongst the Civil Guard.
Crisis of Democracy, pp. 183-184. Evidently, Lerroux blamed both Martinez Barrio and Rico Avello for 
not providing the Radicals with a majority after the elections: Ibid., p. 196.
32 El Sol (20 October 1933).
33 Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica, II, p. 207; Martin Turrado Vidal, La policia en la historia 
contemporanea de Espaha, 1766-1986 (Madrid, 1995), p. 195. Juan Botella Asensi was a deputy for the 
Radical Socialist Party.
34 El Sol (15 October 1933). Vicente Iranzo Enguita was a doctor from Teruel and politically independent: 
Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica, II, p. 204.
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Despite the contentment probably felt amongst many civil guards with the results of the 
elections and the formation of more friendly Centre-Right governments, there was 
initially not any noticeable praise for the new political leaders of the nation. On 18 
October 1933, Rico Avello announced that he planned to reform the administrative 
structure of the General Inspectorate. In the face of various announcements of the 
Interior Minister to effect new reforms and “rectify” some previous ones, official opinion 
within the Civil Guard, while receptive to reform, was highly sceptical of those proposals 
coming from outside the corps. One lengthy article appearing in the December 1933 
issue of the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil began with a discussion amongst several 
long-serving officers in the force about the series of reforms that had been implemented 
and proposed that year. One such officer responded, “Reorganization you say? The 
better word for it would be ‘deformation’.” The article goes on to state that while the 
Civil Guard accepted the need for reform, it should be done in consultation with technical 
experts from within the corps. Indeed, it criticizes Rico Avello for this lack of 
consultation, exclaiming that as a civilian minister he did not fully understand the 
workings and needs of the Civil Guard, “which, for the perfection of its functioning and 
the esprit de corps imbued in it by its founder, has been admired by Spaniards and served 
as a model for foreign gendarmeries for over eighty years”. The article then goes into 
some detail about those reforms that its author feels are the most necessary. By the 
time Rico Avello was replaced by Martinez Barrio in the end of January 1934, this 
message from the Civil Guard had been noted, and the proposals put forward by the 
Interior Minister on 13 February 1934 were warmly received in the corps’ journal, as
35 El Sol (19 October 1933).
36 “Las reformas”, RTGC, no. 286 (December 1933), pp. 453-456.
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these conformed to those criticisms expressed by the editors of the Revista Tecnica de la 
Guardia Civil “about the efficiency of the absurd administrative organs that were created 
in the celebrated reforms” [of 1933]. The piece then went on to outline further 
recommendations for “rectification”.37
One of the major reforms of the Azana government that was implemented by the Radical- 
led governments was the transfer of competencies to the Catalan Generalitat, including 
those of public order. In the lead up to the transfer, it was announced that those who did 
not wish to serve under the Catalan government could request to transfer outside of
op
Catalonia. Amongst the Interior Ministry police, the offer was taken up by the majority
O Q
of personnel. Amongst the Civil Guard, on the other hand, the response was rather
muted, despite the significance of this change for a force explicitly designed to foster a 
sense of national unity -  a change characterised as “a revolutionary novelty for the corps” 
by one historian.40 In one article discussing the transfer of competencies, the decision of 
many Interior Ministry police to leave Catalonia was mentioned. Noting the potential 
problems that the transfer could create within the Civil Guard, it decided to take a 
positive tone, in that the service of the corps under the Generalitat demonstrated the 
irreplaceable nature of the Benemerita and the apolitical nature of its duty.41 The author 
of this article reported his satisfaction with the attitudes of the Catalan authorities towards 
the Civil Guard when he visited the Catalan capital several months later, and how the
37 “Las reformas”, RTGC, no. 289 (March 1934), pp. 119-120.
38 El Sol (21 October 1933).
39 El Sol (22 October 1933); Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica, II, pp. 249-250.
40 Manel Risques and Carles Barrachina, Proces a la Guardia Civil: Barcelona, 1939 (Barcelona, 2001), p. 
23.
41 Comandante Lara, “Notas del mes: El traspaso de los servicios a la Generalidad”, RTGC, no. 287 
(January 1934), p. 31.
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former had attended to the needs of the corps, particularly that of the construction of new 
and larger garrisons, which would form a ring around Barcelona.42 Despite the 
unpopularity of the corps amongst the general population due to its association with the 
centralized state as well as its repressive functions, it appears that a positive relationship 
did exist between the Catalan authorities and the Civil Guard under its command. Claudi 
Ametlla, a Catalan journalist and parliamentarian who served as Civil Governor of 
Gerona and Barcelona commented in his memoirs on the efficient and obedient nature of 
the institution 43 While the Generalitat could not interfere with the internal structure of 
the corps nor in the selection of the personnel stationed in Catalonia, the Civil Guard was 
required to present itself in dress uniform and fly the senyera during Catalan holidays, 
and its men were recommended to learn the Catalan language 44
In terms of the views within the corps itself, the left-leaning republican Casares Quiroga 
was still praised on equal if not greater terms than his Radical successors. In a ceremony 
held in February 1934 the former Interior Minister was presented with a plaque by the 
corps for his “constant defense of the Civil Guard and for the extraordinary interest he 
placed in improving the economic situation” of its personnel.45 The Galician was praised 
again in an another article published in the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil, which 
commented on the various Ministers and Under-Secretaries of the Interior of the Republic 
up to that point. Alongside Miguel Maura, Casares Quiroga (and his under-secretary,
42 Teniente Colonel Lara, “Notas del mes: La Guardia Civil al servicio de la Generalidad”, RTGC, no. 296 
(October 1934), p. 397.
43 Claudi Ametlla, Memoriespolitiques, 1918-1936 (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 134-135. Ametlla comments are 
quoted in Risques and Borrachina, Proces a la Guardia Civil, pp. 30-32.
44 Risques and Barrachina, Proces a la Guardia Civil, p. 24.
45 Comandante Lara, “Notas del mes: Entrega de una placa”, RTGC, no. 289 (March 1934), p. 117.
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Carlos Espla) received the greatest amount of praise. Their actions and defence of the 
corps in a difficult period for both the Civil Guard and the Republic -  with, again, special 
mention being made for the improvements in pay gained under the 1933 reforms -  were 
applauded, particularly as they were seen as having the courage to support and defend the 
corps when their colleagues apparently pandered to public prejudices for reasons of 
political partisanship and expediency. As the article explained, “they served amongst 
those well-known political elements who dealt with the Civil Guard publicly in a manner 
that was both mistaken and unjust, all the while in private they were the first to 
recognize” the virtues of the discipline of the Benemerita,46
The issue that had brought the Civil Guard closer to the Radicals and their right-wing 
allies was their common interest in “restoring” order and respect for authority. This 
concern was brought to the fore in ever-greater urgency in the year following the 1933 
parliamentary elections. The first major incident that highlighted the advertised threats to 
the political and social harmony of Spain was the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection in 
December 1933, the third of its kind in the past two years. Like previous attempts, it 
lacked the unanimous support of the various sections of the CNT, not to mention that of 
the Socialists, was poorly organised and thus did not constitute a serious threat to the 
regime and was suppressed fairly easily.47 Like with the January 1933 insurrection, it 
received considerable attention in the Civil Guard press despite its limited scale. In total, 
eleven civil guards were killed and forty-five were wounded -  significantly more than 
any previous confrontation, but considerably less than the loss of life the corps would
46 Comandante Lara, “Notas del mes: Ministros y subsecretarios de Gobemacidn”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 
1934), pp. 163-164.
47 Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, pp. 74-78; Preston, CSCW, pp. 130-132.
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experience in later incidents. The revolutionary movement, which “shook all of Spain”, 
was kept in check, as the corps’ press reported, through the efforts of the Benemerita.
Six pages of the “Services” section of the January issue of the Revista Tecnica de la 
Guardia Civil were dedicated to detailing the main events of the insurrection, though this 
account was described by its reporter as being incomplete. There were several notable 
characteristics of this account which mark the increasing disquiet amongst the Civil 
Guard about the perceived revolutionary threat facing Spain (and themselves in 
particular), echoing those concerns voiced after the January 1933 insurrection but in even 
more vivid language, and would serve as indicators to perceptions of future events. 
Amongst these was the familiar image of a relatively small contingent of civil guards 
besieged by well-armed and numerous revolutionaries, and the “heroic resistance” carried 
out by the former in the face of the “unbridled avalanche” of the masses. Reports of 
many discoveries and captures of arms deposits before, during and after the events only 
heightened the sense of physical danger presented by working class radicalism.
Moreover, the feared ubiquitous presence of Bolshevism was apparent, as insurgent 
groups were described as either “communists”, “extremists”, “revolutionaries”. Despite 
the fact that the insurrection was organized by sections of the CNT, the anarcho- 
syndicalist organization was not mentioned by name.48
This image of an assault on civilization was made more implicit in the commentary in the 
article that followed the above account. The Civil Guard was presented as the symbol
48 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 287 (January 1933), pp. 25-30. Furthermore, a detailed two-page account of the 
events in Valderrobles (Teruel) was published two months later: Guardia Segundo Manuel Galvez, “Los 
heroicos Guardias de Valderrobles”, RTGC, no. 289 (March 1934), pp. 140-141. Additional details-about 
the events in Asensio (Logrono) were published in the “Servicios” section of the same issue.
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and bastion of civilization, while the revolutionaries were portrayed as cruel and barbaric. 
The 11 civil guards killed in the insurrection were not just another group of “martyrs” 
who had given their lives in the line of duty, but were described as being “hunted by 
savage hordes, who are unworthy of having been bom in Spain”. It was not just the men 
of the Civil Guard who were at risk in such events, but also their innocent families.
While decrying the poor state of the defences of the average casa-cuartel, the ability to 
resist attack was largely down to the “MEN behind its walls, ready to die for society, 
while their children -  innocents! -  were hidden in those comers less damaged by the 
constant battering” of what constituted their homes.49 While such florid language 
indicated the traditional deep-seated fears of many civil guards, it clearly sets out a 
Manichean clash between anarchic, savage barbarism and the fundamental symbols of 
civilized society: manly virtue, the family and order. Conceived in such terms, this was a 
battle that demanded resolution on the part of the authorities and a harder line against 
those who were seen to apologize for, or provoke disorder and discontent.
As the Civil Guard was seen by certain sectors, and themselves, as one of the principal 
defenders of civilised society, its efforts defending it during the December insurrection 
were praised by both the corps’ supporters and the government. Importantly, the Civil 
Guard was not presented as having protected a Centre-Right government whose 
legitimacy and agenda was under considerable suspicion by the Left, but rather as
49 Comandante Lara, “Notas del Mes: La mas gloriosa, de entre las gloriosas paginas del libro de oro de la 
Guardia Civil, estar£ escrita, de por vida, en las fechas que comprenden del 8 al 15 de diciembre de 1933”, 
RTGC, no. 287 (January 1934), pp. 31-32. For a further depiction by Comandante Lara of the “chasm” that 
separated the indifference and inhumanity of “the political extremists whose passions blind them” to the 
bloody consequences of their actions and the self-sacrificing and humane civil guard, see “Notas del Mes: 
Unas paginas de honor para la historia de la Institution”, RTGC, no. 292 (June 1934), p. 229.
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defending the Republic against its enemies. An article in the February 1934 issue of the 
Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil mentioned the praise given to the corps in various 
newspapers for the actions of its personnel during the December 1933 insurrection, and 
reprinted an article appearing in the El Defensor de Cuenca (23 January 1934) admiring 
the virtues of the Civil Guard. Echoing the language often employed in the Civil Guard 
press, particularly since the advent of the Republic, it noted the humble social origins of 
the average civil guard, and ended by calling them “proletarians of honor” (proletarios 
del honor).50 On 20 March 1934, a special mass was held in Palencia Cathedral at the 
behest of the Bishop in homage to those civil guards who lost their lives during the 
December 1933 insurrection and to pray for their souls.51
Furthermore, for their services to the regime during the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection, 
the Lerroux government awarded the Great Cross of the Order of the Republic to the 
Inspector General of the corps, General Bedia, as well as two other high ranking officials 
(it was noted in the Civil Guard press that the father and grandfather of Vicente Santiago, 
one of those awarded, had both served in the corps). As Bedia noted in a letter published 
in the Boletln Oficial de la Guardia Civil, the government awarded him the highest 
honour of the regime in a gesture of appreciation for the efforts and service of all civil 
guards. This gesture was considered by the Civil Guard to be of such importance that a 
general collection was held to pay for a large banquet for the presentation of the honour. 
Held on 16 June 1934 in the Interior Ministry, the then current Interior Minister, Rafael 
Salazar Alonso, who presided over the event, praised Bedia and all of the corps for their
50 “Leyendo la Prensa”, RTGC, no. 288 (February 1934), p. 56.
51 “Miscelanea: Homenaje a la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 1934), p. 175.
52 Comandante Lara, “Notas del Mes: Homenaje”, RTGC, no. 289 (March 1934), p. 117.
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services to the Republic, stating that “the Republic symbolizes justice, and justice is that 
General Bedia [and by extension, all of the Civil Guard] be rewarded for his services”.53 
A further expression of this gratitude was the quantity of 76,900 pesetas granted by the 
Interior Minister (as the result of public donations) to the dependents of those guards 
killed during the insurrection, as well as to those civil guards who served with distinction 
during the events of December 1933.54 Indeed, a civil guard wrote in a letter published in 
the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil of the Benemerita’s blood sacrifices to the 
defence of order and the Republic, in unprecedented amounts in his view. Echoing the 
barbarism versus civilization rhetoric, the author states how the valiant men of the Civil 
Guard foiled the plans of the revolutionaries to replace the Republic for a social ideal 
“that can find space only in insane minds, frenzied with greed”, and thus, “through a 
thousands vicissitudes” and “in common cause with the people of order (el pueblo del 
ordenf\ struggle towards the goal of gaining justice for all (lograr [...] el imperio de la 
Justicia).55
If the Interior Minister Salazar Alonso had expressed his recognition of the importance of 
the Civil Guard and his appreciation for its services, the corps certainly had high hopes 
for their new ministerial commander. Unlike his moderate predecessors since September 
1933, Diego Martinez Barrio and Manuel Rico Avello, who had sought to maintain a 
measured response to public order, Salazar Alonso was a hard-liner who pursued a 
strategy of confrontation and conquest. Although a member of the Radical Party, Salazar
53 Comandante Lara, “Notas del Mes: La Guardia Civil y su Inspector General”, RTGC, no. 293 (July
1934), pp. 269-270.
54 The full text of the General Order, complete with the individual quantities distributed, can be found in 
Francisco Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, Vol. V (Madrid, 1984), pp. 363-364.
55 J. Perez Castillo (rank not given), “Ecos: Saldo del Deber”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 1934), p. 168.
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Alonso felt a great deal of sympathy for the positions of the CEDA, whose leader was 
instrumental in engineering his nomination as Interior Minister.56 Salazar Alonso’s 
tenure of the Interior Ministry on 3 March 1934 was greeted warmly by the Civil Guard, 
who, unlike the Spanish Left, did not view Salazar Alonso as a tactical ally to the 
enemies of the regime, but rather a “prominent republican” who quickly demonstrated his 
“talents as a liberal, democratic, understanding, energetic and virile statesman”.57 The 
first interview Salazar Alonso held upon assuming his post was with Inspector General 
Bedia. According to the former, Bedia informed him that morale was low amongst his 
men. The reason for this was the “friction” between civil guards “and many local 
authorities”, and “the forced inactivity in the face of certain events”. Salazar Alonso 
requested a detailed list of such tensions and incidents, and assured Bedia that he would 
respect the traditions and concerns of the Civil Guard.
Salazar Alonso was true to his word and within days of assuming his post he presented a 
motion to parliament on 7 March 1934 to increase the personnel of the Civil Guard by 
1200 men, effectively undoing the reduction instituted in the reform of July 1933, as well 
as requesting an increase in the budget to cover the greater costs. While making his 
argument, he mounted a stubborn defence of the Civil Guard and noted that the Republic 
owed a debt of gratitude towards the corps.59 Some of the autonomy of the Civil Guard 
was also restored on 10 March 1934 with the abolition of the Technical Secretariat
56 Preston, CSCW, p. 142; Townson, Crisis o f Democracy, pp. 221-223.
57 Comandante Lara, “Notas del Mes: Ministros y subsecretarios de Gobemacion”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 
1934), p. 163, “Notas del Mes: El Ministro de la Goibemaci6n en los cuarteles del Instituto, en Madrid”, 
RTGC, no. 291 (May 1934), p. 205.
58 Rafael Salazar Alonso, Bajo el signo de la Revolucion (Madrid, 1935), pp. 34-35.
59 Diario de la Sesiones de Cortes (DSC hereafter), 07 March 1934; “El Cuadro Organico”, RTGC, no. 290 
(April 1934), p. 86.
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created a year earlier, which had coordinated services between the corps and the Interior 
Ministry police.60 Salazar Alonso also began to undo other aspects of the reforms of the 
Centre-Left governments, and incorporate some of the suggestions proposed in the 
Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil. This “counter-reform” was warmly welcomed in 
the Civil Guard press, which criticized the 1933 reforms as “revealing the most absolute 
ignorance of the real needs of the corps”.61 Given the concerns voiced about the small 
number of personnel in isolated and vulnerable rural stations in the wake of the 
December 1933 insurrection,62 Salazar Alonso announced a proposal in May 1934 to 
increase personnel by another 2000 men, alongside other “counter-reforms” and 
improvements.63 When finally set before parliament on 3 July 1934, in the wake of the 
peasants’ strike the month before, he requested an even larger increase of 4037 new 
personnel, alongside other reforms 64
The “counter-reforms” of the Radical-led governments, as well as their much-publicized 
efforts to broaden the definition of republicanism and reach out to those sectors either 
alienated by the previous leftist character of the regime or yet still to be won over to 
republicanism, were applauded by most civil guards (most of whom fit into these two 
categories). Moreover, the continued exclusivist conception of the Republic by the Left 
Republicans and the Socialists only drove deeper the wedge between these two groups
60 “Negociado de ‘Intervention de Armas y Explosivos y de Coordination y Enlace con los Servicios de 
Orden Publico’”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 1934), p. 192.
61 “Las Reformas”, RTGC, no. 293 (July 1934), p. 280; “La contrareforma”, RTGC, no. 291 (May 1934), p. 
209; Comandante Lara, “Notas del Mes: ^Reformas?”, RTGC, no. 292 (June 1934), pp. 229-230; 
Comandante Lara, “Notas del Mes: Las reformas”, RTGC, no. 293 (July 1934), p. 271.
62 Ram6n V&zquez Diaz, “Ecos: Tema de actualidad”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 1934), p. 167.
63 “Proyecto de aumento de 2000 hombres para reforzar los Puestos, y otras mejoras”, RTGC, no. 292 (June 
1934), pp. 240.
64 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 57.
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and the corps.65 After the December 1933 insurrection, alongside the growing conflict 
and tension that began earlier in that year, the revolutionary threat seemed all-to-real for 
many civil guards, who felt that confrontation, not reconciliation -  or, as they saw it, 
“flattering violent minorities” -  was the strategy needed to impose order and respect for 
authority.
In particular, the hardening of attitudes within the Civil Guard was bringing into greater 
conflict with the Socialists, whose own attitudes were experiencing a hardening of sorts. 
Over the course of the Republic up to this point, in the eyes of the Civil Guard, the 
Socialists had gone from being a “disciplined force supporting the regime” to a menace to 
the regime. The apparent shift (often more apparent than real) on the part of the 
Socialists from a movement counselling moderation to a more belligerent stance was the 
product of a number of factors. The Socialists’ position was characterised by both their 
struggle to balance their generally reformist traditions with the high expectations of their 
constituencies, as well as their fears over the possibility of the emergence of fascism in 
Spain. Nevertheless, given that the Civil Guard was on constant lookout for the 
“Bolshevik menace”, the “bolshevisation” of the Socialists (however rhetorical) would 
have been seen as a dangerous development, particularly given the characterization of the 
Socialists as such by the right-wing and Catholic press. Moreover, Interior Minister 
Salazar Alonso had singled the Socialists out as the most important revolutionary threat 
to the Republic, a threat that had to be eradicated.
65 It should be noted that certain sectors of the Centre and Centre-Right were also wary of the Radical 
Party’s tactical alliance, and increasing reliance, on the non-republican Right.
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The Socialists’ position towards the Civil Guard had hardened since the beginning of 
1931 as a result of the corps’ role in undermining reformist initiatives in the countryside. 
At the PSOE Congress of October 1932, a motion to propose a law to dissolve the Civil 
Guard in parliament was approved overwhelmingly with 20,048 votes in favour and only 
2217 votes against.66 Thus, after a brief interlude, they had reverted back to their 
previous position of wanting to abolish the Civil Guard. Beginning in December 1933, a 
series of executive meetings were held to discuss the movement’s plan of action 
regarding the new political situation, and a series of programmes were presented, in 
which the dissolution of the Civil Guard figured alongside what constituted the 
organisation of the security forces on a blatant political basis 67 While this policy, if it 
was ever implemented, would have created many more problems than it would have 
resolved, it reflected a long history of latent and open confrontation with the Civil Guard, 
both before and during the Republic, as well as the Socialists’ exasperation at the residual 
strength of the traditional elites after the fall of the monarchy. Moreover, in the wake of 
the elections and December 1933 insurrection, civil guards were increasingly resorting to 
heavy-handed measures in their dealings with workers.68 While this increase in 
“preventative brutality” was symptomatic of the Civil Guard’s own anxieties about the 
levels of social and political conflict, it could only increase the Socialists’ own sense of 
persecution by the Radical-led governments. The history of antagonism with the 
Radicals meant that the Socialists even accused moderates such as Martinez Barrio and 
Rico Avello (the latter not even being a member of the Radicals) of a deliberate policy of
66 Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 7-8.
67 Preston, CSCW, pp. 131-138. For the various proposals, see Juan-Simeon Vidarte, El bienio negroy la 
insurrection de Asturias (Barcelona, 1978), pp. 88-97.
68 Preston, CSCW, pp. 134-136.
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persecuting the Socialist movement.69 This exaggeration soon became a reality when 
Salazar Alonso assumed the post of Interior Minister.70
Adopting a clear attitude of hostility towards the Civil Guard, the Socialists resisted all 
efforts to strengthen a force they saw antagonistic to them and that generally was hated 
by their constituencies. Moreover, after the scandal provoked by the massacre at Casas 
Viejas in January 1933, the Socialists sought to distance themselves with heavy-handed 
methods towards extremist actions, even if this was carried out against their rivals in the 
CNT. This was evident in their criticism of the repression of the December 1933 
insurrection in parliament, in which allusions to Casas Viejas were made in an effort to 
give the Radicals a taste of their own medicine and also score points with those workers 
angered by their sectarian attitudes towards labour disputes. In terms of the Civil Guard 
specifically, they opposed (unsuccessfully) both of Salazar Alonso’s attempts to increase 
the personnel and budget,71 a position that would have done little to endear the 
Benemerita towards them.
Indeed, according to the Socialist-affiliated press, the Civil Guard continued to 
demonstrate its antipathy for its members, particularly in those areas of high social 
tension. In February of 1934, the Socialist mayor of Puebla de Don Fadrique (Granada) 
was replaced by a retired army officer who had decided that he was going to make an 
example of the local Socialist “agitators”. He had the local Casa del Pueblo emptied of
69 See, for example, DSC, 16 & 17 January 1934.
70 Gabriel Jackson notes that Salazar Alonso was actually on friendly terms with much of the Spanish Left 
in the 1920s, a situation that had suffered a radical reverse in the 1930s: The Spanish Republic and the Civil 
War, 1931-1939 (Princeton, NJ, 1965), pp. 135-136.
71 DSC, 7 March 1934; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 57.
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its members, who were then beaten by civil guards and the hired thugs of the local 
proprietors. In April a hunger march in Fuente del Maestre was confronted with violence 
by the Civil Guard, resulting in four workers killed, several wounded and dozens of 
arrests.72
Contrary to the complaints of the Socialists about the partisanship and brutality of the 
Civil Guard, the corps described a volatile situation in which the members of the 
Benemerita acted with great humanity and discipline. On 7 February 1934 in La Almeda 
(Ciudad Real), the Civil Guard contained a “subversive movement” of “extremist 
character”, acting “with skill and conscientiousness”. The following day, in Colmenar 
Viejo (Madrid), during a food/subsistence riot in which various persons were assaulted, 
the Civil Guard “worked with such great prudence and tact” that they gained the 
obedience of the crowd and re-established the public peace. In Sestao (Bilbao), an 
“imposing mass of men and women” gathered in what converted into bread riot. Local 
civil guards were able to calm the situation through “patience, vigilance and danger 
(presumably to themselves)”. The Benemerita also had to confront “massive and 
tumultuous demonstrations” in Canillas (Logrono) on 14 February and faced off against 
the “mobs of strikers” threatening stores in Torrelvega (Santander) five days later. As to 
be expected, the more ominous developments came from the conflictive lands of the 
latifundista south. In the areas surrounding Bujulance (Cordoba), the scene of a violent 
confrontation between civil guards and revolutionaries during the December 1933
72 Preston, CSCW, pp. 148-150. The Civil Governor for Granada, Manuel Asensi Mestre (Radicals), denied 
that the beatings in Puebla de Don Fadrique occurred, but admitted that the Casa del Pueblo was subjected 
certainly to constant vigilance and its members were often stopped and searched by civil guards: Lopez 
Martinez, Orden publicoy luchas agrarias, p. 352n7.
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insurrection, massive deposits of arms and explosives were found after a series of 
determined searches throughout the month of January. In the province of Jaen, another 
burst of activity resulted in the capture of “the most dangerous delinquents against 
property”, who were reportedly causing terror in the area.73
While the growing mood of confrontation in the wake of the November 1933 elections 
and the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection the following month undoubtedly provoked a 
move towards more heavy-handed methods amongst the Civil Guard, it appears that the 
humanitarian self-image evident in the accounts given above did have some actual 
resonance amongst the corps. As in other articles appearing in previous years, a debate 
of sorts was initiated about the correct manner to deal with peasant unrest. While such 
concerns were voiced by what was probably a minority, the fact that they were published 
in the semi-official professional journal of the Civil Guard indicates, at the least, a 
nominal concern in reducing the near-constant tension between personnel and the 
working classes. In one such article, a corporal of the corps queries the proper response 
to peaceful land occupations when the invading landless labourers ignore the “benevolent 
invitation” of civil guards to desist and respect the right of private property. While a 
small group can be easily removed without much force, the author of this article, who 
portrays these pacific trespassers in a fairly positive light, notes that the problem becomes 
difficult with large groups. The quandary appears to be absolute: the civil guards must 
fulfil their duty to protect private property, and while their regulations allow the recourse 
to force if their instructions are not obeyed, in the absence of any aggression it would 
seem cruel to resort to lethal force to evict the much more numerous invaders. The
73 “Servcios”, RTGC, no. 289 (March 1934), pp. 121-123.
normal recourse in such a situation, though not sanctioned by the corps’ regulations, 
would be the firing of a warning volley into the air, which also was ignored by the 
obstinate, yet still peaceful, peasants.74
Although the author promised to answer the riddle in a future article which never 
appeared, the first instalment clearly shows the central dilemma of the public relations of 
the Civil Guard, often mistakenly believed by scholars to be its military bearing. Instead, 
it is the unenviable position of being caught in the middle of a three-way struggle 
between the liberal state, the proprietor classes and the working classes, all of whom are 
determined to impose their own vision onto society. The advent of the Republic raised 
the stakes in this tension, and events were making the situation all the more acute. 
Nonetheless, given that the principle physical threat to civil guards came from the 
working classes, this reinforced the need, from their perspective, to bolster the authority 
of the state, an objective shared by the proprietor classes -  though, of course, with the 
caveat that state power revert back to protecting their economic interests -  and thus 
making them, once again, the natural allies of the Benemerita.
Further complicating the issue of public order was intra-class violence. While much of 
the hostility of the working class organisations was directed at their “class enemies”, a 
good portion of their animus was reserved for their competitors. The history of 
confrontation, only periodically broken by short periods of cooperation, between the two 
largest workers’ movements -  those of the Socialists and the anarcho-syndicalists -  had
74 Francisco Carmona, “Ecos: Intervention de la Fuerza en delitos sociales incruentos”, RTGC, no. 288 
(Feburary 1934), pp. 57-58.
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hardened as their approaches to the advancement of working-class interests came into 
open conflict. The Socialists’ willingness to collaborate (though, not always with great 
enthusiasm and at times with mixed emotions) with the constituted authority, which often 
targeted the CNT, created considerable bad blood between the two groupings. Indeed, 
first under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and then during the first two years of the 
Republic, the Socialists had little compunction in colluding, if not encouraging, the 
governments of the day to take a hard line against their anarcho-syndicalist rivals. In 
turn, the majority of the anarcho-syndicalists saw little to gain from co-operating with the 
Republican state, despite the presence of working-class representatives in the 
government. After two years of increasing confrontation, the political situation caused 
some violence to erupt at the local level during the November 1933 elections.75 While 
the increasing radicalization of working class opinion did little to soften the position of 
the CNT -  though the strategy of “revolutionary gymnastics” had been largely discredited 
by 1934 -  it did cause a certain shift in that of their Socialists rivals, who demonstrated 
greater concern, at least publicly, about the repression of the December 1933 
insurrection. Nonetheless, this at times bloody rivalry (not to mention other, smaller 
working class organisation also competing fiercely for members) added another layer to 
the issue of public order and “republicanising” social and labour relations, and in its own 
way, served further to harden attitudes of civil guards towards the working class 
movement as a whole. Indeed, almost paradoxically, while the working class movement
75 The attempts by the right-wing Popular Action to gain recruits for its own trade union, Workers’ Action, 
only added to intra-class friction. For a description of the conflictive situation in western Andalucia during 
the 1933 parliamentary elections, see Francisco J. Carmona Obrero, Violencia politico y  ordenpublico en 
Andalucia occidental, 1933-1934 (Madrid, 2002), pp. 43-67.
76 Preston, CSCW, pp. 15-27; 74-119; Helen Graham, The Spanish Republic at War, 1936-1939 
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was becoming ever more fragmented, the tendency amongst the Civil Guard was 
increasingly to group them all together as part of a single enemy.
If anything, despite the change in government and the sporadic efforts of the various 
administrations to curb the power of the trades unions, these seemed only to grow 
stronger, thus making the dire warnings of Interior Minister Salazar Alonso and his like- 
minded allies in the CEDA seem all the more true. Indeed, despite the repressive 
measures against the CNT in the wake of the December 1933 insurrection, the anarcho- 
syndicalists managed to hold a six-week strike in Zaragoza in the spring of 1934, which 
ended with a victory for the union. Notably, despite the rather fumbling efforts of the 
civil governor of the province to exacerbate the divisions between the CNT and the UGT 
in order to break the strike, the two rival unions resolved to join forces in the face of the 
“obstinacy of the bourgeoisie”.77 This successful action by the unions was portrayed by 
the Civil Guard press as little more than a dangerous nuisance by unruly workers: 
“During the days of the Zaragoza general strike, the Civil Guard rendered numerous 
services with no time to rest, carrying out arrests of the rebels (revoltosos) and collecting
«7 Q
constantly bombs and arms.” At the same time as the general strike in Zaragoza, three 
major strikes broke out in the nation’s capital: one by printers of the right-wing press, 
another by construction workers, and a metallurgy strike that last until 1 June. The 
government declared a state of alarm, and closed down the centres of the Socialist Youth, 
the Communists and the CNT. While the printers’ strike was broken -  thanks largely to
77 Casanova, Anarchism, the Republic and Civil War in Spain, pp. 86-88;
78 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 292 (June 1934), p. 255.
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the efforts of the youth organization of the CEDA, the Juventudes de Action Popular -
7 Q
the latter two strikes ended on terms favourable to the workers.
Alongside these larger strikes, the Civil Guard press related a series of alarming 
developments involving “extremists” and communists. In Cadiz, on 20 March 1934, 
three “dangerous Communists” who were planning a “vast revolutionary plot” were 
arrested. On 5 April, a clandestine Communist meeting in Hospitalet (Barcelona) was 
discovered and dispersed by civil guards, though only after some exchange of fire. In 
Crevillente (Alicante) an unauthorized Communist demonstration was broken up, also 
after a firefight. While reports of common and organized crime still dominated those 
sections dedicated to detailing the services carried out by civil guards, even these were 
fraught with danger as these criminals were almost always reported as being armed and 
violently resisting arrest. Indeed, during the months of March and April, large arms and 
bombs caches were reported to have been discovered in Belmez (Cordoba), Mieres 
(Oviedo), Riotinto (Huelva), Vallecas (Madrid), Espinosa de los Monteros (Burgos) and 
Vigo.80 The working class demonstrations commemorating the First of May only 
underlined how the apparent lack of arms control and social unrest could often spell 
danger for civil guards. In Tauste (Zaragoza), Villafranca de los Barros and Fuente del 
Maestre (both in Badajoz), the Civil Guard reported violent confrontations in which 
members of the corps were fired upon. In Alfaro (Logrono), “a great brawl” broke out 
between enemy political factions, in which the Civil Guard and the police suffered some
79 Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, p. 194; Preston, CSCW, pp. 143-144.
80 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 290 (April 1934), pp. 171-174; “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 291 (May 1934), pp. 
213-216.
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wounded whilst re-establishing order.81 Give the long-standing concerns voiced by the 
Civil Guard in its press about the proliferation of arms, and the threat this represented to 
its personnel, these were worrying developments.
Yet, the biggest confrontation was still yet to come. In the wake of the increasing 
undermining of the legislation passed during the first bienio to safeguard workers’ rights, 
in particular, the repealing of the Law of Municipal Boundaries, the Socialist-affiliated 
rural workers’ union, the FNTT, decided to call a general strike in protest. The Socialist 
leadership tried to discourage this action, and the Prime Minister, the Ministers of 
Agriculture and Labour attempted a series of conciliatory gestures of to avert the strike. 
Nonetheless, the provocative actions of Interior Minister Salazar Alonso, who had been 
planning for such a showdown with the Socialists with Inspector-General Bedia and 
Director-General of Security Valdivia, overrode the legal petitions of the rural unions to 
strike and declared the harvest a “national service”. Moreover, the incendiary rhetoric 
and nai've revolutionary dreams of the caballerista elements of the FNTT (who had just 
formed an alliance with the CNT in Andalucia), meant that the proposed strike went 
ahead despite its lack of legal authorization. Despite an apparently disadvantageous 
position, the FNTT strike was the largest rural strike in Spanish history, and yet still a 
devastating failure as the government undermined and then clamped down on the 
strikers.82
81 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 292 (June 1934), pp. 254-256.
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This massive show of force by the FNTT was, in the minds of civil guards, the first major 
manifestation of the growing threat posed by the Socialists. Alongside the increasingly 
belligerent rhetoric of the Socialist press, reports of incidents explicitly involving 
Socialists began to seep into the Civil Guard press alongside the regular suspects of 
“extremists” and Communists. On 2 April 1934, the Civil Guard of Corrales (Santander) 
went to inspect {registrar) the local Casa del Pueblo. Upon their appearance, the 
Secretary of the Casa del Pueblo attempted to flee and was stopped by the guards, who 
inquired about a suspicious package he was carrying. He refused and attempted to hide 
the package, which was discovered later and contained six pistols and “many cartridges”. 
Afterwards, the civil guards returned to the Casa del Pueblo, where they found more 
weapons and carried out several arrests. Another such incident was described in a 
lengthy account of events in Arroyo de San Servan, in the ever-conflictive province of 
Badajoz, in the month of May. During a routine patrol, three guards walked into an trap 
reportedly organized by the Socialist ex-Mayor and Socialist Ex-Municipal Judge. One 
of the guards was fatally wounded, and the town was plunged into darkness as the 
ambushers had cut all the electricity and telephone wires. Upon the arrival of 
reinforcements, a search party set out to find the “aggressors”, seven of whom were 
captured alongside a small cache of weapons. Further activity resulted in the arrest of 
other suspects and “an infinite amount of arms, a formula for making explosives and 
flammable liquids”.84 Perhaps more spectacular was the discovery of weapons in the
83 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 291 (May 1934), p. 214.
84 “Servicios”, RTGC, no. 293 (July 1934), pp. 277-278.
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house of the Socialist parliamentarian Juan Lozano in Madrid, and an even larger
Of
collection of arms destined for storage in Lozano’s residence.
As to be expected, the events of the peasants strike dominated the Civil Guard press, as 
did reports of other incidents involving confrontations with workers. In the province of 
Badajoz, after a violent clash with the “rebels” (revoltosos), in which one Civil Guard 
corporal was “stabbed in a cowardly fashion” the Benemerita restored peace “with tact 
and valour” to the town of Alconchel. In the neighbouring province of Caceres, “an 
enormous mass of Socialists” in the town of Santiago del Campo rioted during a protest 
of five individuals arrested for holding a clandestine meeting, during which they attacked 
the Civil Guard barracks with a “hail of stones”. Civil Guards in the town of Pedro 
Munoz (Ciudad Real) were also stoned by peasants, as was another patrol in Toro 
(Zamora). Various incidents were reported in the province of Jaen: in Santo Tome the 
local casa-cuartel was fired upon, while in Sabiote the Civil Guard had to intervene to 
prevent the burning of crops. The untiring efforts of the Civil Guard in the provinces of 
Sevilla and Malaga were also praised.86 In the following two months of the Revista 
Tecnica de la Guardia Civil, while common crime began to occupy greater space in the 
“Services” sections, reminders of social conflict and the revolutionary threat were still to 
be found, with reports of deposits of arms and explosives, subversive pamphlets and acts 
of arson, in which the province of Jaen figured prominently.87
85 Jackson, Spanish Republic and Civil War, p. 138; Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, p. 209.
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If all of these events, alongside the demagogic rhetoric of the Largo Caballero and his 
followers in the Socialist media, were not enough to convince civil guards that a 
revolutionary plot to seize power was in the making, the efforts of the Socialists to gamer 
support amongst the corps during their piecemeal preparations for a potential showdown 
with what they saw as the Fascist threat did much to reinforce this perception. The 
director of the committee to make these preparations was Amaro del Rosal, whose most 
significant contact was with a Socialist lieutenant in the automobile depot (Parque Movil) 
of the Civil Guard, Fernando Condes Romero. Lt. Condes had an illustrious tour of duty 
in the Army of Africa in Spanish Morocco, during which he became a member of the 
Socialist Party. Upon returning to Spain in 1928, he joined the Civil Guard, though this 
did not signify a change in his ideology. He was remembered to have frequently 
remarked that “I may make mistakes in my position as a Captain of the Civil Guard, but
o o
never as a Socialist for, in my opinion, the workers are always right.” After being 
transferred to Madrid in 1933, Lt. Condes made the acquaintance of the Socialist deputy 
Margarita Nelken, and the two became close friends.89 In the summer of 1934 Nelken 
put him in contact with Del Rosal. Condes and his small coterie of sympathetic civil 
guards were meant to lead a more numerous group of Socialist militiamen dressed in 
Civil Guard uniforms and occupy the Interior Ministry and a radio station located in its 
vicinity. They evidently were also meant to take control of the Parque Movil, where 
Condes was stationed, and thus obtain the vehicles and weapons stored within.90
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To foment indiscipline amongst the ranks of the Civil Guard, Condes and his fellow- 
travellers were to distribute a series of pamphlets in favour the “people’s cause” (i.e. that 
of the Socialists). The text of one such pamphlet read:
The orders are given. First patience. In the event of the declaration of the 
revolutionary strike, we shall remain in our barracks and our stations! We will 
not be the fodder for cannon nor for dynamite. The red flag about our barracks 
will be the definitive signal. On the 14th of April we were the guards of the 
Republic. The next 14th of April we will be the guard of the revolution. Down 
with the black dictatorship! Long live the Civil Guard at the service of the 
people’s liberties!91
The commander of the Madrid Civil Guard garrisons, Colonel Pedro Pereda Sanz, and 
Inspector-General Bedia attempted to stamp out such propaganda activity. Alarmed by 
the proliferation of the seditious material, Bedia circulated a General Order in which he 
stated his confidence in the discipline of the personnel of the corps, their rejection of the 
efforts of “extremist elements of these or other ideas” that are preparing “revolutions for 
partisan ends”, and that they all be aware that “the true Spanish people are on their 
side”.92 Despite these concerns by the hierarchy of the Civil Guard, the actual success of 
the Socialists to gain adherents amongst the corps unsurprisingly was limited. This was
Octubre (Madrid, 1983), pp. 216-228; Margarita Nelken, Por que hicimos la revolution (Barcelona, 1936), 
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not only because of the on-going conflicts that routinely put the Socialists and the Civil 
Guard on opposing sides, but also the contradictory nature of the Socialist propaganda, 
which promised to attend to the material and professional interests of the corps, yet at the 
same time fiercely criticized the “enemies of the people” and proposing the dissolution of 
the Benemerita.
Indeed, Socialist propaganda very likely had the opposite consequence than desired in 
that it made the feared Bolshevik menace all the more real. Given the numerous 
commentaries made by Civil Guard in its press since the advent of the Republic about 
revolutionaries attempting to weaken the Benemerita in order to leave the state 
defenceless against their deviant plans, Socialist efforts laigely had the effect of 
increasing their association with Communism in the minds of many civil guards. Indeed, 
as much as the Socialists were ever-wary about the (occasionally exaggerated) fascist 
threat from conservative and right-wing sectors, civil guards had been vigilant about the 
(often exaggerated) communist threat since 1917. For both groups, the danger these two 
movements represented to the material and physical well-being of their men explains 
their heightened concerns.
By September, the situation was one of crisis and looming confrontation, a perception 
encouraged by the political situation as the collapse of the Samper government -  the 
fourth in less than a year -  was only a matter of time. A rally of agrarian associations 
was held in Madrid on 8 September. A joint action by the Communists, CNT and the 
Socialists to disrupt the meeting resulted in violent clashes with the police. The next day
93 Souto Kustrin, "Y iMadrid? ”, p. 217.
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the JAP held a belligerent mass rally at Covadonga, a place replete with symbolism as it 
was traditionally held to be the starting point for the 700 year reconquista of the 
peninsula from the Moors. Members of the UGT and the CNT attempted to disrupt the 
rally. Less than a week later, the Socialist Youth held their own rally, in conjunction 
with the Communists, itself full of aggressive language.94
September also saw increased activity on the part of the Civil Guard and the police in 
searching for hidden arms deposits. The spark for this particular burst of activity was the 
interception of the ship La Twrquesa off the Asturian coast on 10 September 1934, which 
contained a significant cargo of arms which was to be collected by four Socialist 
deputies, amongst these Prieto and the future prime minister Juan Negrin. In the 
following days, a large depot of arms was discovered in the Casa del Pueblo in Madrid, 
another arms delivery was intercepted in the University City in Madrid, and the Socialist 
ex-deputy Gabriel Moron was arrested after “a real arsenal of acid and dynamite for the 
construction of bombs” was discovered in his house.95 Indicative of the fears amongst 
the security forces of an armed insurrection by the “Bolshevized” Socialists, fuelled by 
these widespread discoveries of weapons caches, were rumours that Trotsky and even 
Lenin (despite his death some 10 years previously) were in Spain in order to help prepare 
the revolution.96
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Rumours of coups and insurrections had been fairly constant since the advent of the 
Republic, and these intensified by the late summer of 1934, giving a sensation of a 
political order that was under constant threat. With another governmental crisis on the 
horizon and the supposed forces of revolution appearing to be in possession of massive 
quantities of arms, parallels with Russia in the autumn of 1917 must have crossed the 
minds of many civil guards. Had they not come to such a conclusion themselves, 
declarations in the Socialist press (meant more to threaten than predict) would have led 
them there. As El Socialista declared on 27 September 1934: “Next month could be our 
October”. Nine days later, the Socialists’ bluff and bluster was put to the test as the 
CEDA, whom the Socialists had always regarded as a Trojan Horse for fascism in Spain, 
was allowed to occupy three ministerial posts in a new government. The events that 
followed not only changed the course of politics in pre- Civil War Spain, but also had a 
profound effect on the mentalities of the Civil Guard.
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CHAPTER SIX
On the morning of 4 October 1934 the entry of three members of the CEDA party into the 
government was announced. While initially it was hoped by President Alcala Zamora to 
limit their presence to one ministerial portfolio and thus diffuse the likely backlash from 
the Socialists, Gil Robles insisted on three, precisely to provoke that backlash. 
Nonetheless, the CEDA were kept out of the most sensitive ministries -  those of the 
Interior and War -  and the combative Salazar Alonso was compelled to leave the Interior 
Ministry as part of the deal. Regardless of the Ministries selected or of the identities of 
the specific CEDA members chosen to head them or these efforts to minimize the 
looming political confrontation, the Socialists felt obliged to honour their long- and oft- 
stated threats to call a revolutionary general strike if the authoritarian-leaning Catholic 
party joined the government. The threat had been made in the hope of persuading the 
President to call new elections. While most members of the national executive, most 
notably Largo Caballero, balked at this calling of their bluff, at the more local level 
Socialists launched their futile attempts to “save” the Republic from the perceived fascist 
threat. This lack of proper organization and central coordination meant that the 
insurrection was bound for failure, as it probably would have anyhow as it meant 
confronting a government in full control of the coercive apparatus of state.1
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The areas where the Socialists enjoyed their greatest success were in Vizcaya, La Rioja, 
Palencia, Leon and Asturias -  perhaps because these areas had been largely untouched by 
the repression that followed the peasants’ strike four months earlier. It was in this last 
province that the revolutionaries saw their greatest success, largely due to the relative 
unity of the working-class organizations and the fact that they had previously devised a 
plan of action. The first phase of this plan was the neutralizing, if not elimination of the 
Civil Guard stations in the coalfields, which was then to be followed by an attack on the 
capital city of the province, Oviedo.2 The assault on the Civil Guard in the mining 
districts gave rise to the most violent episodes of the revolution, and the capture of each 
post -  as well as of other establishments housing weapons deposits -  allowed the 
revolutionaries to add further arms to their arsenal. The bloodiest of the confrontations 
occurred in the towns of Campomanes and Sama de Langreo. In the latter clash, Civil 
Guard Captain Jose Alonso Nart had a contingent of seventy men under his command, 
alongside a small group of Interior Ministry police under the orders of Lieutenant Cesar 
Garcia Iglesias. As the neighbouring posts fell, the revolutionary forces began to 
converge on Sama. Refusing the invitations of the revolutionaries to surrender, but 
facing certain annihilation with the increasing loss of men and ammunition, Nart 
eventually ordered his remaining forces to stage a strategic retreat, in which those who 
could escape were to head for the mountains and wait for the expected reinforcements 
from Oviedo. While some civil guards did manage to survive the encounter, described as 
the “scene of one of the cruellest battles” by the Socialist Juan-Simeon Vidarte, thirty- 
eight lost their lives, including Nart himself. In Campomanes, twelve civil guards were
2 Adrian Shubert, The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners o f Asturias, 1860-1934 (Urbana & 
Chicago, 1987), p. 3.
3 Juan-Simeon Vidarte, El bienio negro y la insurrection de Asturias (Barcelona, 1978), pp. 268-269.
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killed and seven wounded after another vicious confrontation that symbolized the aura of 
hostility which permeated the region. After occupying a pastry factory where some of the 
civil guards had attempted to take refuge, the revolutionaries mutilated the corpse of one 
of the dead officers, exploding a stick of dynamite in his mouth. In Asturias as a whole, 
the Civil Guard suffered eighty-six dead and seventy-three wounded.4 This total reflected 
more than just those civil guards normally stationed in the region, but also those sent 
there in the wake of the repression. One such man was Julian Diosdado Rodriguez, who 
belonged to the small post of Rascafrfa in the province of Madrid. Civil Guard Diosdado 
was killed during his emergency posting to Asturias.5 Accordingly, the physical effects 
of the events in the Principality reached far beyond its borders.
Indeed, while Asturias was the scene of the heaviest fighting, and consequently the focus 
of most subsequent attention, the events of October 1934 touched nearly every province 
of Spain. In the relatively peaceful province of Albacete (and thus one with relatively 
few civil guards), the towns of Villarrobledo and Tarazona de la Mancha were scenes of 
revolutionary violence. In the former, revolutionaries set fire to the town hall, and when 
the local contingent of five civil guards arrived they were fired upon and forced to retreat 
to their barracks where they put up a determined defence of their post and of their 
families within, surviving three attempts to overrun them. In Tarazona, one civil guard 
was killed during the defence of the town hall, and another in the town of Caudete.6 
Violent confrontations could and did break out in areas with a limited Socialist presence,
4 Francisco Aguado Sanchez, La Guardia Civil en la revolution roja de Octubre de 1934 (Madrid, 1972), 
pp. 135-155, 431.
5 El Debate (30 December 1934), weekly supplement.
6 Jos6 Aparicio Albinana, Para que sirve un gobernador (Valencia, 1936), pp. 95,104-114.
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such as in the province of Zaragoza, one of the strongholds of the anarcho-syndicalist 
movement. In the town of Uncastillo the Socialist mayor, Antonio Planta, led the call for 
a revolutionary general strike. As elsewhere, the local post of civil guards was requested 
to surrender their arms and their post. The station commandant, Sergeant Victorino 
Quinones, refused and a fire fight begun in which three out of the seven guards were 
killed and another two seriously wounded at the outset. The two remaining guards 
defended the post and their families within for ten hours until reinforcements arrived and 
lifted the siege.7
The Socialists’ rebellion was echoed in Barcelona by the forces of the Catalan Esquerra 
within the Generalitat. Bereft of widespread support amongst the general population and 
security forces, the Catalan rebels were forced to surrender after declaring a “Catalan 
State within the Spanish Federal Republic”.8 The local garrisons of Civil Guard had little 
sympathy for this regionalist revolt against the central state whose sovereignty it was 
their primary duty to defend. As the rebellion was suppressed, civil guards and soldiers 
embraced in celebration, with cries of “Long Live United Spain” (Viva Espana unica), in 
response to earlier shouts of “Long Live Catalonia” by regional nationalists.9 In total, the 
events of October 1934 cost the Civil Guard 111 dead and 182 wounded across Spain.10 
This constituted the single greatest loss of life by the corps in peninsular Spain in all of its 
history prior to the Civil War of 1936-1939.
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8 Payne, Collapse of the Spanish Republic, pp. 86-88; Federico Escofet, De una derrota a una Victoria: 6 
de octubre de 1934 -  19 de Julio de 1936 (Barcelona, 1984), pp. 69-88.
9 El Debate (7 October 1934); Hilari Raguer, El general Batet. Franco contra Batet: cronica de una 
vengaza (Barcelona, 1996), p. 173.
10 For a provincial breakdown of casualties, including the names of all those killed and wounded, see 
Aguado Sanchez, La Guardia Civil en la revolution roja, pp. 425-432.
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This considerable casualty rate left in its wake a profound psychological impact amongst 
the corps. The leading article in the November 1934 issue of the Revista Tecnica de la 
Guardia Civil presented the corps’ view of the events of the previous month. These 
included some of the familiar characterizations used during previous working-class 
insurrections. Yet, newer, more novel phrases began to become common currency, 
reflecting the importance attached to the October 1934 insurrection. It was seen as 
Spain’s own October 1917, but unlike its Russian counterpart, the government -  with the 
staunch support of the Civil Guard and the Army -  was able to prevent the feared 
Bolshevik revolution from taking hold. Indeed, the Benemerita adopted some of the 
Left’s own terminology about the CEDA and, to a lesser extent, the Radicals -  neither of 
whom were seen as a threat by Civil Guards -  and applied it against the Socialists and 
their allies. These latter groups were now seen as “[t]he enemies of the Republic and of 
legality”. Noting the revolutionaries’ strategy of targeting the various Civil Guard posts 
and how the corps’ personnel became the principal obstacles to the spread of the 
insurrection, it highlighted the human cost of the October insurrection amongst the 
Benemerita. “Heroic” civil guards faced off against “the cowardly ferocity of the blood­
thirsty hordes”, the latter being well-armed and civil guards forced to hold them off from 
behind the walls of the weak fortifications of their casa-cuarteles. The article closes by 
stating that the “Civil Guard, as the vanguard of the Army, vigorously resisted the first 
attacks in those places of greatest danger, in those most bitter hours of the insurrection, its 
men offering generously their lives in this holocaust for the Fatherland”.11 The next 
several pages were dedicated to those killed “in the holocaust of the Fatherland” as well
11 “Loor a ‘La Benemerita’”, RTGC, no. 297 (November 1934), p. 425.
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as those men wounded, breaking down 
this latter group down by province, 
demonstrating the broad nature of the 
revolutionary threat as well as the 
great personal sacrifices made in 
service to the regime and the nation.12 
Sacrifices were also made by the 
wives and children of civil guards, 
trapped inside besieged casa-cuarteles 
and helping in whatever way they 
could in the defence of their homes. 
This image was graphically
Illustration I: Front cover o f  November 1934 issue o f  represented in a drawing by a Civil
Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil.
Guard Major, which was used as the 
cover illustration of the November 
1934 issue of Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil.13 [see Illustration 1]
Various episodes that occurred during the events of October 1934 insurrection were 
recounted every month for the next year, reflecting a more general obsession with its 
significance amongst all sectors of Spanish society and the outpouring of monographs, 
eyewitness accounts and commentaries on the topic.14 In these accounts, the
12 “jGloria a los heroes!” & “Heridos”, RTGC, no. 297 (November 1934), pp. 426-428.
13 Lt. Col. Lara, “Notas del Mes”, RTGC, no. 297 (November 1934), p. 429.
14 J.O.P., “Hechos gloriosos de la Guardia Civil: Asi fue la epopeya de Uncastillo”, RTGC, no. 300 
(February 1935), pp. 53-55. See also the “Notas del Mes” sections from December 1934 to December 1935
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characterization of the revolutionaries -  and by extension, the Socialists, Catalan 
nationalists and their leftist allies -  as the “enemy” begins to appear for the first time, 
reflecting the use of this term by those very same groups when referring to the “enemies 
of the people” (i.e. the Civil Guard) or the “enemies of the Republic” (i.e. the forces of 
reaction, most notably the CEDA, and by implication, the Civil Guard). In one letter 
submitted to and published by the Revita Tecnica de la Guardia Civil, the term 
“facciosos” (rebels) was repeatedly used to describe the revolutionaries.15
The theme of a handful of heroic civil guards facing off against hundreds, if not 
thousands of barbarians was repeated over and again. The frequent accompaniment of 
pictures of those guards who were killed or wounded in battle, those who displayed acts 
of courage, as well as the frequent mention of their families were meant to show the 
deeply human side to the sacrifices made by the men of the Benemerita. Moreover, not 
unlike the dehumanizing representations of the Civil Guard that were traditional amongst 
leftist artists and commentators, the supposedly deviant revolutionaries, “sin 
comtemplaciones humanas”, now were compared in the Civil Guard press to such things 
as “reptiles”.16 This terminology can also be found in a monograph titled Espisodios de 
la revolution, written by former Civil Guard and erstwhile columnist Jenaro Geijo. In 
this work, the revolutionaries are referred to as “hyenas” and their calls as “the howl of 
the revolutionary pack of hounds”. Moreover, he employs rhetoric common amongst 
civil guards in describing outburst of working-class discontent: a mad wave of savage
issues of the RTGC. For a treatment of the extensive contemporary literature on the Asturian Revolution, 
see Sarah Sanchez, Fact and Fiction: Representations of the Asturian Revolution, 1934-1938 (Leeds & 
London, 2003).
15 “Notas del Mes: En Infiesto”, RTGC, no. 300 (February 1935), pp. 57-62.
16 Corporal Juan Lara G6mez, “Miscel&nea: Guardias civiles”, RTGC, no. 302 (April 1935), pp. 162-163.
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destruction instigated by agitators that threatened to engulf all of society and convert 
Spain into “a Soviet paradise a usanza rusd\ In this, he attributes blame principally to 
the Socialists, and to the seditious propaganda of Largo Caballero and Prieto.17
October 1934 reinforced the perception amongst the Civil Guard that the Socialist Party 
was now the principal source of social agitation and a Trojan Horse for Bolshevism. 
Despite the somewhat positive image of the Socialists presented in the Civil Guard press 
back in 1931, events such as Castilblanco and Amedo had elevated local frictions 
between civil guards and Socialists up to the national consciousness. This marked the 
point whereby the growing hostility between the Civil Guard and the Socialists became 
markedly more open, and alongside a series of issues in which the two groups were on 
opposing sides, the year of 1934 had served only to worsen an already tense relationship. 
From the perspective of the Civil Guard, it had seemed that the Socialists were no longer 
a “party of common sense and sound judgement” that “rejected violence” but now were 
the handmaidens to Communist revolution. However erroneous this perception was, it 
was not difficult for the Civil Guard to find examples to vindicate this view. The PSOE’s 
refusal to issue an absolute condemnation of the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection of 
December 1933, the “illegal” landworkers’ strike of June 1934 and the revolution of 
October 1934, not to mention a series of high-profile weapons seizures between the latter 
two events, erased whatever positive image of the Socialists gained by their collaboration 
with the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and their moderation during the initial stages of the 
Republic. The fact that the principal leader of the Socialist movement would soon be 
referred to as the “Spanish Lenin”, regardless of the inappropriateness of such a moniker,
17 Sanchez, Fact and Fiction, pp. 138-142.
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and the publication of the inflammatory pamphlet Octobre -  segunda etapa by the 
bolshevising wing of the party did little to dispel the image of the Socialists as working 
towards the creation of a Soviet Spain. Indeed, it could be argued that Largo Caballero’s 
refusal to counter the Spanish Communist Party’s (PCE) claim to have played the 
principal role in the October Revolution, which was the product of Socialist policy, 
would only have reinforced this notion.18
The spectre of the Communist phantom was prevalent in Civil Guard’s view of the source 
and possible trajectory of the social conflict that characterized Spain periodically since 
1917 and fairly consistently since 1931, much in the same way the Left -  particularly 
amongst the working-class organizations -  was vigilant for any possible manifestation of 
fascism. The best bulwark against the supposed Bolshevik threat, it was believed, was 
the imposition of social discipline whilst the political situation was still in a state of 
fluidity.
The opening article of the December 1934 issue of the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia 
Civil set out the argument for this position. Authored by Baltasar Rull, a jurist who 
frequently contributed articles about issues of jurisprudence to the journal, it noted the 
dangers of “pathological influence of strong currents of destabilizing forces” (influencia 
patologica de grandes corrientes de fuerzas disolventes) during the current period of 
political experimentation in the form of the State. “Spain”, he diagnosed, “is extremely 
gravely sick with indiscipline”. The basis of social and political organization, the family,
18 For a discussion of the internal debate within the Socialist movement over the events and significance of 
October 1934, see Preston, CSCW, pp. 211-238; Helen Graham, Socialism and War: The Spanish Socialist 
Party in power and crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 15-33.
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was being undermined by “poorly digested and malicious ideas’ (ideas mal digeridasy 
peor intencionadas). The consequence of this was a weakening of the rule of law, the 
rigorous application of which would constitute, in the opinion of Rull, “the greatest 
revolution that Spain could make, the only and authentic revolution”. The Civil Guard, 
as the symbol of the law and its efficacy has, in consequence, has been the primary target 
of these “destabilizing forces”.19 This theme of the links between the Civil Guard, the 
rule of law and legality was picked up again in a later article on public order. The 
“prestige” and “moral force” of the Civil Guard is meant to be an inspiration for the 
general population, and as such it serves as “the cement of society, the bastion of the law 
and the fear of those who live on the margins of it”. The lack of respect for the law in 
Spain obliges the Civil Guard to have to defend it with the force of arms, in contrast to 
other countries -  such as England, Germany, France and the United States -  where this 
“fundamental principle” for the law and those charged with its enforcement has been 
successfully inculcated.20
The events of October 1934 were seen as the height of both this lack of respect for the 
law as well as the Communist threat. The almost inevitable result was recourse to 
“preventative brutality” by civil guards enraged and frightened by the casualties inflicted 
upon them by the revolutionaries. The very symbol of this backlash was Major Lisardo 
Doval, who was in charge of the repression in Asturias in the wake of the revolution and 
to who, according to the Socialist Vidarte, was responsible for “mass murders and pre­
emptive executions”. Indeed, Vidarte stated that the military commander of the region,
19 Baltasar Rull, “Valor de slmbolo: En elogio a la Guardia Civil”, RTGC, no. 298 (December 1934), pp. 
521-522.
20 Corporal Enrique Luque, “Sobre Orden Publico”, RTGC, no. 303 (May 1935), pp. 190-191.
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General Lopez Ochoa, claimed that even he had difficulty keeping Doval and his men in
2| t 
check. Doval had had considerable previous experience in counter-insurgency and
interrogation, as well as an intimate familiarity with the area, as he served in Gijon from 
1917 to 1922, and in Sama de Langreo from 1926 to 1931. At the time of the October 
Revolution he was stationed in Morocco -  only having been recently returned to active 
service thanks to the amnesty of those involved in the attempted military coup of August 
1932 -  and was sent to Asturias under the expressed wishes of General Franco, who 
himself was made a special advisor to the Minister of War during the insurrection. Doval 
was returned to his prior mission in Morocco, where he was participating in re­
organization of the mehaznias soon after the capture of the revolutionary leader Ramon 
Gonzalez Pena on 3 December 1934. Despite the brevity of Doval’s stay in Asturias, his 
notoriously heavy-handed techniques provoked a public uproar and he and his 
lieutenants, Manuel Bravo Montero and Nilo Telia y Cantos, gained a sort of infamy 
amongst the Spanish Left.22
Given the passions raised by the events of October 1934, perhaps a pause is necessary to 
consider several issues. While the harshness of Doval’s methods are beyond doubt, a 
certain care must be taken when characterizing these as typical of all civil guards. As 
mentioned before, Doval was specifically nominated by Franco as a special governmental 
delegate in charge of post-revolutionary operations in Asturias and Leon. As Doval, and 
his reputation, was already well-known to Franco -  both were natives of El Ferrol, they 
studied together at the Infantry Academy in Toledo and had served together on several
21 Vidarte, El bienio negro, pp. 284, 342-343, 361.
22 Jesus Mendoza, “Las andanzas del coronel Lisardo Doval”, Historia 16, no. 261 (1998), 26-29; Aguado 
Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 116-119.
occasions -  the latter knew what to expect from the Civil Guard Major. Franco was 
himself a hard-liner who was frustrated by the more moderate and humane attitudes of 
Generals Lopez Ochoa and Batet towards the insurgents in their respective commands of 
Asturias and Catalonia.23 As such, his nomination of Doval was not only deliberate in its 
intentions, but also implied that he did not believe those local Civil Guard commanders 
stationed in Asturias would be as “thorough” in carrying out this task. Moreover, as 
Vidarte noted, Doval was considered extreme even by his own colleagues in the Civil 
Guard, who gave him the nickname “the Jackal”.24 That being said, undoubtedly few of 
them would have raised any qualms about his tactics in the wake of the revolutionary 
violence perpetuated against them during the insurrection. Indeed, the semi-official 
history of the corps, published nearly fifty years after the event, still takes a benign view 
of Major Doval, claiming that he -  and the Civil Guard as a whole -  was the victim of a 
smear campaign by the Spanish Left and their foreign sympathizers.
The cruelties perpetuated by Doval and his subordinates have led, perhaps, to a certain 
exaggeration of the repression and a corresponding downplaying of the culpability of the 
revolutionaries. While sectors of the Right had a certain appetite for harsh measures 
against the revolutionaries, the Socialists and, by extension, the whole of the Spanish 
Left, the Lerroux government itself and a significant group of the Radical Party did not 
display such a hunger. Moreover, the government, embarrassed by the harshness of 
Doval’s actions, sent a police inspector to investigate the claims made against the Civil
23 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London, 1993), pp. 103-106; Raguer, El general Batet, pp. 142, 146, 
155-156, passim.
24 Vidarte, El bienio negro, pp. 342-343.
25 Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 118-121.
26 Townson, Crisis o f Democracy, pp. 271-279.
Guard Major. Doval unceremoniously despatched the inspector back to Madrid but the 
government transferred “the Jackal” at the earliest possibly opportunity.27 Indeed, instead 
of protecting him from public clamour, investigative proceedings were brought against 
Doval and in July 1935 he was left without command (after being given the command of 
the Civil Guard and the police in Spanish Morocco only three months earlier), attached to 
the Salamanca Civil Guard garrison 28
The number of 40,000 prisoners purported by Socialist sources may be an overestimate. 
Official Civil Guard bulletins register a total of 22,367 detentions for the months of 
October and November. The Civil Guard historian Francisco Aguado Sanchez claims 
that 12,000 of these were for common crime, leaving about 10,000 persons detained for 
“political or revolutionary reasons”. By December 1934 the number of persons detained 
fell to 4354. While this figure is considerably higher than those detained in the following 
the FNTT strike of June 1934, it is only slightly more than those arrested in the wake of 
the anarcho-syndicalist insurrection of December 1933, which was much smaller in scale 
and cost significantly less loss of life.29 Even if we can question the official figures, it is 
unlikely that the number of unregistered detentions would have been two or three times 
the official total during peacetime conditions.
Nor should it simply be assumed that the government, and the Civil Guard, had 
exaggerated the revolutionary threat into a phantom menace. According to the data
27 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 118; Townson, Crisis of Democracy, pp. 277, 278.
28 Though, to sweeten the pill somewhat, Doval was recompensed for pay lost during his expulsion from 
the Civil Guard due to his activities during the August 1932 coup: Mendoza, “Las andanzas del coronel 
Lisardo Doval”, p. 29.
29 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 127.
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released by the Interior Ministry in early 1935, the Civil Guard recovered 3158 muskets, 
6756 long rifles (fusiles), 836 carbines, 73 rifles (rifles), 1913 shotguns, 63 automatic 
rifles (fusiles ametralladores), 811 revolvers, 593 pistols, 5934 various arms, 4056 
cartridges of dynamite, 16,561 rifle cartridges and 943 hand grenades.30 Even Socialists 
such as Vidarte admit that in places such as Vizcaya “the workers possessed a 
considerable amount of arms”, and these figures are in addition to those seized in the 
months prior to the October Revolution. Given the Civil Guard’s concerns over the 
proliferation of weapons -  the dangers of which had just been amply demonstrated -  and 
the reluctance of the workers to surrender all of their arms, it was inevitable that its 
personnel would be active in the recovery of all weaponry and would remain anxious to 
stamp out all the embers of the revolutionary fire.
Experience had taught the Civil Guard that the revolutionary threat was difficult to 
eliminate, and that there was no room for complacency. Indeed, despite all of the 
precautionary actions taken, as well as repressive actions taken after the fact, each major 
working-class uprising was larger than the next, with October 1934 being the largest and 
most violent of them all. This deep concern over such future threats, and also the desire 
to learn the lessons of past revolutionary insurrections, was reflected in the almost 
immediate prescriptions for how best to deal with them. In the December 1934 issue of 
the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil two measures that had been previously suggested 
received renewed attention. One was the installation of radio transmitters in all Civil 
Guard posts and vehicles, which would not only help coordinate efforts when dealing
30 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 119. The Times (5 February 1935) reported roughly 
the same figures.
31 Vidarte, El bienio negro, pp. 264-265.
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with common criminals, but also would be crucial in “moments of national danger” as the 
instant communication it would provide would allow for a more efficient collective 
response to attacks on individual posts.
This particular issue inspired a second article on the numbers of personnel assigned to a 
given station. “The recent storming of various casa-cuarteles by revolutionary mobs” 
had highlighted the dangers -  “greater every day” -  and the inadequacies of the defensive 
position of small posts and the lack of mobility amongst their personnel to react quickly 
to snuff out any revolutionary movement before it could gain momentum. Most casa- 
cuarteles were not custom-designed and built for their purpose -  many being buildings 
constructed for other uses and then ceded to the Civil Guard by a municipality or private 
institution -  and their defense made all the more untenable by the small number of 
personnel in any given post. As such, besides the need for more automotive 
transportation, the article recommends purpose-built accommodations (including one, or 
several machine guns) and a minimum of fifteen or twenty men at every station to ensure 
that absence of personnel carrying out their normal duties does not weaken the overall 
defensibility of their garrison. Also linked to the matter of the defense of their casa- 
cuarteles was another article suggesting the installation of a warning bell in each post, a 
useful tool “above all in turbulent times”.33
Perhaps most indicative of the footprint left by the events of October 1934 were two 
articles dealing with Asturias titled “El problema de su seguridad”, based on the
32 “Miscelanea”, RTGC, no. 298 (December 1934), p. 537.
33 Civil Guard Luis Paz Arroyo, “El timbre de alarma en las casas-cuarteles”, RTGC, no. 300 (February 
1935), p. 72.
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experiences of a Civil Guard officer stationed in the area for three years alongside the 
lessons learned from Major Doval whilst he was stationed there. The “problem” of 
public order in Asturias was seen as endemic, as certain conditions made the province of 
Oviedo “more favorable for disorder” (mas propicia al disorderi). Geography was one 
such factor, but perhaps more important were the nature of work in the area and the local 
working-class organizations. “Work in the mines”, the author informs us, “has attracted a 
flood of people full of ideas adverse to the austere and tranquil life of the peasant”.
These “people”, that is, working class militants, were seen as implacable and as 
constantly inciting the general population. The strength of the working-class 
organizations facilitated the mobilization of the miners, and the reverses they suffered 
only served to stiffen their resolve and imbue them with the hope of greater success for 
the next confrontation. As such, it was the task of the local Civil Guard to “maintain 
permanently the necessary defensive precautions”. The author suggests not only better 
fortified garrisons in strategic locations stationed with anywhere from 25 to 100 men, but 
also heavily-armed “vanguard units” that could be sent out quickly to smash any future 
revolutionary movement before it has a chance to spread. These vanguard units, very 
likely based on the special units set up by Doval to “clean up” the province in the wake of 
the October Revolution, received the most attention in these two articles, which also 
suggested the formation of similar units to be based in Madrid, Sevilla and Barcelona, as 
well as in Oviedo.34 These articles, and the attitudes expressed in them, reflected a siege 
mentality amongst those civil guards stationed in areas of high tension, now heightened
34 Major J. Espafla, “Asturias: El problema de su seguridad”, RTGC, nos. 300 & 301 (February and March 
1935), pp. 70-72 (part I) and 104 (part II).
214
even further by the events of October 1934, which in turn hardened attitudes towards the 
related issues of labour conflict and public order.
This evolution echoed attitudes in Spanish society in general, as both leftist and 
conservative forces continued preparing themselves for the political and social battles 
ahead. Furthermore, neither side saw October 1934 as conclusive. There was little in the 
public discourse that would have moderated in any way those attitudes being formed in 
the Civil Guard. Indeed, events served to further ally the Benemerita with the “forces of 
order”, and consequently deepen the canyon that separated the Civil Guard from those on 
the Left, whose own view of the corps as being nothing more than the armed force of 
reaction became ever more entrenched. The Civil Guard’s view of itself as the defender 
of civilization and the Republic was not just the product of self-aggrandizement, but an 
image encouraged and reinforced by both the governments and parties of the Centre- 
Right in their press and in a host of public ceremonies. Such praise was, as to be 
expected, dutifully reported in the Civil Guard press: “With the rapid pacification of the 
country, an explosion of enthusiasm and admiration towards the defensive forces of the
o r
legitimate authority could be seen in all towns of importance”. This gratitude would 
continue to be demonstrated over the next year, in which the Civil Guard’s defense of the 
“legitimate authority” was frequently emphasized.36 The image of the corps as the 
defender of the regime, as opposed to a threat to it, was the theme of the anniversary
35 “Homenaje a la fiierza publica”, RTGC, no. 297 (November 1934), p. 428.
36 “Notas del mes: Doble homenaje simpatiquisimo”, RTGC, no. 301 (March 1935), pp. 96-100; 
“Miscelanea: La bandera del Puesto de Villanueva de San Juan (Sevilla)”, RTGC, no. 302 (April 1935), pp. 
161-162; “Uncastillo reacciona: Homenaje a unos heroes”, RTGC, no. 303 (May 1935), pp. 180-183; 
“Homenaje a la Guardia Civil de Ventas y La Concepcion (Madrid)”, RTGC, no. 306 (August 1935), p. 
317. For a detailed account of one such ceremony, in the province of Albacete, see Aparicio Albinana, 
Para que sirve un gobernador, pp. 164-178.
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celebrations of the proclamation of the Republic on 14 April 1935. Phrases such as the 
“explosion of enthusiasm” and “delirious ovations” were used in describing the reception 
civil guards received “in all of the provinces of Spain” when they marched passed during 
celebratory parades. This sense of gratitude was not presented as limited to those 
conservative elements traditionally linked to the Benemerita, but rather as the expression 
of “the people”, of “all social classes”, further contesting the Left’s conception of the 
insurrection October 1934 and the Civil Guard’s role in it.37 Such descriptions were also 
given in the conservative press, which noted the special attention and affection the corps 
received in many parades.
While the Civil Guard portrayed their admirers as coming from all social sectors, it was 
those of the Right that were most vocal in drumming up support and expressing interest 
in the trials and tribulations of the corps. The Catholic daily, El Debate, served as one of 
the leading voices. In a front page editorial it echoed an interpretation frequently 
expressed by the Civil Guard itself: that there were times when the use of force by the 
corps was an unfortunate necessity, not the actions of killers. The declaration of martial 
law protected them as they protect Spain, sometimes at the cost of their own lives, from
' i Q
the revolutionary danger. In recognition of the sacrifices and services of the 
Benemerita, the newspaper announced that it would run a series of articles as part of a 
campaign on behalf of the Civil Guard both to educate the general public about the corps
37 Lt. Col. Lara, “Notas del mes: Nuestros desfiles en el pasado 14 de Abril”, RTGC, no. 303 (May 1935), 
p. 184.
38 El Debate (16 April 1935).
39 El Debate (25 November 1934).
216
-  and hence enhance its prestige -  and also to lobby the government about its needs and 
grievances.
The first of these articles was dedicated to the need for motorized transportation to 
improve the efficacy of the force, particularly in mobilizing its units in times of 
emergency.40 Another discussed the need for central heating (colefaccion) in Civil Guard 
barracks.41 A lengthy piece was dedicated to the “best gendarmerie in the world” as part 
of a Sunday supplement. Echoing earlier efforts it and other conservative newspapers to 
put a human face to those described by Lorca as “having souls of leather”, it was titled 
“The Daily Life of the Civil Guard” (“Como vive la Guardia CiviF). It served as an 
expose of the hardships of a post in the province of Madrid, discussing the cramped and 
somewhat inhospitable living conditions, the lack of proper modes of communication and 
transport. It even mentioned how during the heavy snowfalls the men of the post of 
Robregordo had to climb up their chimney in order to exit their casa-cuartel and carry 
out their normal duties. References were made to the events of October 1934 and their 
personal impact on the guards. The relationship between these two issues was made in 
the leading article in which it stated that to invest the necessary funds in the men of the 
Benemerita “is to save money”, noting the ruinous costs of any revolutionary attempt if it 
was not suffocated in time by the Civil Guard and the police.42
In an attempt to alleviate the penury and hardships of the corps’ personnel and their 
families, El Debate not only announced public donations for the Civil Guard and Interior
40 El Debate (15 December 1934).
41 El Debate (16 December 1934)
42 El Debate (30 December 1934).
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Ministry police, but also served as a channel for such monetary gifts.43 One such charity 
effort was carried out during la Fiesta de los Reyes on behalf of the orphans of those 
heroic civil guards “who gave their lives for society and for the Fatherland”. The 
relevance of this act was clear: “The recent tragic and bloody events of the attempted 
revolution had increase, sadly and considerably, the number of orphans of those martyrs 
to their duty.”44 Within in a few days some 340 toys were donated for those orphans 
housed in the Young Guards College and orphanages in Valdemoro (Madrid), which 
were presented to the children by the “Three Wise Kings” with much fanfare on 5 
January 193 5.45
Perhaps even more significant than the moral and financial backing received from 
conservative sectors of society was the official governmental sanction of the Civil 
Guard’s views of the events of October 1934, the threat from the Left, and the corps’ role 
in defense of the Republic and legality. During the summer of 1935, several of the local 
tributes paid to the Civil Guard were attended by high ranking government officials, 
particularly, though not exclusively, by those belonging to, or linked to the Right.
Perhaps the most high-profile of these was the homage paid to the Benemerita in 
Salamanca on 24 June 1935. As it coincided (perhaps intentionally) with a ceremony in 
honor of two prominent members of the CEDA, Gil Robles and Candido Casanueva, 
Ministers of War and Justice respectively, this particular event was attended by the two 
ministers, Lerroux (Prime Minister), Portela Valladares (Interior Minister), Rafael 
Aizpun (Industry and Commerce), Manuel Marraco (Public Works), and General Miguel
43 El Debate (16 December 1934).
44 El Debate (27 December 1934).
45 El Debate (30 December 1934, 6 December 1935).
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Cabanellas, who was now, for the second time, Inspector-General of the Civil Guard.46 
The restitution of Cabanellas, a Radical parliamentary deputy since November 1933, was 
deeply significant. He had been dismissed as Director-General of the corps by the Left 
Republican-Socialist government for his ambiguous attitude during the failed rightist 
military coup of August 1932. His rehabilitation in itself can be seen as part of the 
Radicals’ strategy to reach out to the critics of the Centre-Left governments of 1931-
1933. As such, it was welcomed by the Civil Guard, who nonetheless subtly reminded 
their new commander of their distaste for the reforms of 1933 and all discussion of 
altering the Regulations and Cartilla of the corps 47
During the banquets held in connection with the two events, both Lerroux and Gil Robles 
made a series of speeches. After a series of warnings against any future revolutionary 
threat, the former drew a distinction between his “patriotic” position and those of the 
Left-Republican and Socialist opposition:
I was a revolutionary. I have not ceased to be so, but I am not a fanatic, overcome 
by a destructive rage. Upon the establishment of the Republic ... the rule of law 
for all was established. Since then, with the rule of law established, he who 
resorts to violence to install their ideals is a criminal.
Indeed, in contrast to the “partisan” agenda of the Left, the Radical leader affirmed his 
own pragmatism, which was not compromised by his own leftist ideals:
46 “Homenaje a la Guardia Civil en Salamanca”, RTGC, no. 306 (August 1935), pp. 230-232; El Debate (16 
June 1935).
47 “El Excmo. Sr. D. Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer”, RTGC, no. 301 (March 1935), p. 90. Cabanellas was 
returned to the command of the Civil Guard during a reshuffle of the upper military commands on 15 
February 1935: Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 122.
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I am not incompatible with anyone, not with those on the Right nor with those on 
the Left. I am incompatible with those who resort to violence when they find 
themselves outside of government, in order to install a left-wing or right-wing 
dictatorship.
If the audience was confused by what must have seemed an implied criticism of the party 
of its two guests of honor, Lerroux clarified that the real danger to the public peace came 
from the opposition: “It was to my enormous surprise that I encountered greater 
intransigence in the fanaticism of the Left than in that of the Right.”48 Such remarks, 
while partly reflecting Lerroux’s efforts to paper over the tense relationship with his 
CEDA allies, echoed themes touched upon in previous speeches, and would be repeated 
again in later statements.49 These views of the causes of the October insurrections were 
also reflected in the official account, La revolution de octubre en Espana, published 
almost immediately after the events themselves.50 Given Lerroux’s unquestionable 
republicanism, as well as his authority as Prime Minister, his words arguably held 
particular importance for those civil guards who were trying to find a place for 
themselves within the Republic, particularly after the events of the previous October.
The primary consequence of the insurrection of the insurrection of October 1934 was to 
solidify two opposing visions of the Republic, which made impossible any effort to 
“republicanise” the corps and, consequently, made the centrist position of the Radicals
48 See El Debate (25 June 1935) for the full text of the speeches given by both Lerroux and Gil Robles.
49 See, for instance, his earlier speeches of 17 and 29 December 1934, both reprinted in El Debate (18 & 30 
December 1934). Extracts of his later speech in Pontevedra on 4 August 1935, was reprinted in the 
September issue of the Revista Tenica de la Guardia Civil: “Notas del Mes”, RTGC, no. 307 (September 
1935), p. 364. For a discussion of the post-October 1934 tensions between the Radicals and their erstwhile 
CEDA allies, see Townson, Crisis of Democracy, Chapters 10 & 11.
50 Sanchez, Fact and Fiction, pp. 121 -123.
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increasing untenable. Yet, given the smoldering hostility between the Civil Guard and 
the Left in the wake of October Revolution, the efforts of the republican and non­
republican Right to attract the sympathies of the Benemerita were greatly boosted.
Indeed, the contrast between the corps’ vilification for its defense of a “disfigured 
Republic” by the Left and its celebration for the defense of the “legitimate authority” by 
the governments of October 1934 -  February 1936 only blurred the idea of what 
constituted the Republic all the more and only increased the Civil Guard’s identification 
with the Right. This had been sanctioned officially on 11 February 1935 when the corps 
was collectively awarded the sash of the Order of the Republic in recognition of “the 
innumerable heroic acts” carried out by its personnel and “the humanitarian and civic 
services that it has rendered Spain and the Republic in compliance with its duties”. Upon 
receiving the honor, General Bedia, still Inspector-General, had stated: “The detractors of 
our Institute continue with their campaign against us. Nonetheless, the Civil Guard, 
which is a politically neutral corps, answers them with silence, honoring its principles of 
‘faith in Spain and in the Republic’.”51 Moreover, on the fourth anniversary of the 
proclamation of the Republic, President Alcala Zamora, whose own identification with 
the regime was without question, awarded the Laurelled Cross of San Fernando, Spain’s 
highest military honor, to Generals Ochoa Lopez and Batet, amongst others, for their 
“heroic and virile comportment in the face of the enemy”.52 As these two officers were in 
charge of the suppression of the Asturian and Catalan revolts, the identification of the 
Socialists (and their allies on the Left) and Catalans (or, at least those of the Esquerra) as 
the “enemies” of Spain and the Republic was unmistakable.
51 El Debate (12 February 1935); Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 121. The full text of 
the official statement can be found in Aguado Sanchez, ibid., p. 367.
52 El Debate (16 April 1935).
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Alongside these public eulogies of the Civil Guard, the governments of the Centre-Right 
enacted a series of reforms and material improvements that demonstrated the confidence 
that they placed in the corps. These had a contrary purpose to those reforms enacted by 
the Centre-Left governments of 1931-1933, which sought gradually to minimize the 
presence of the Civil Guard in the state administration. The first of these was an increase 
of personnel by some 3700 men, passed in the immediate aftermath of the October 
Revolution.53 A decree on 30 January 1935 militarized the Republican Forest Guard 
{Guarderia Forestal Republicana) and linked it institutionally to the Civil Guard, naming 
one of the latter’s officers as its commander.54 In June 1935, another decree allowed for 
personnel of the Civil Guard to carry out their duties in plain clothes, in special 
circumstances.55 While these “special circumstances” were left ambiguous, the probable 
intention was for civil guards to be able to carry out undercover work in rooting out 
criminals and political subversives. Many of the structural and material improvements 
were precisely those requested by the Civil Guard itself, several of these gaining an 
increased importance in the wake of October 1934. The personnel increase, for example, 
was carried out in order to raise the minimum number of men assigned to a post from 
four to seven. Moreover, in terms of radio transmitters, at the end of 1934, only 16 
provincial capitals had this crucial means of communication. In the first days of 1935 the 
government sent out technicians to ensure that all 56 provincial and regimental 
commands possessed radio transmitters.56
53 “Aumento de fuerza”, RTGC, no. 297 (November 1934), p. 429.
54 “Militarization de la Guarderia Forestal”, RTGC, no. 301 (March 1935), pp. 132-133.
55 El Debate (18 June 1935).
56 El Debate (16 January 1935).
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Another reform that proved popular amongst the Civil Guard, particularly given the loss 
of lives in October, was the awarding of a pension for the widows and orphans of the 
corps. This measure was seen as being of “extraordinary importance”, despite the 
apparently modest amounts that would be granted. Noting the poor remuneration of civil 
guards in relation to other state personnel, as well as the blood sacrifices of the 
Benemerita in mining districts Asturias and Leon in October 1934, this effort by Interior 
Minister Vaquero and Deputy Secretary of the Interior Benzo, “great admirers of the 
Institute” (amantes del Institute>), was warmly received by the corps.57 Taken as a whole, 
the Civil Guard saw these reforms as indicative of a sense of appreciation by the 
governments of the Centre-Right, which was contrasted positively with their treatment by 
those of the Centre-Left. As the leading article of the January 1935 Revista Tecnica de la 
Guardia Civil announced, “with the dawn of the Year 1935, a wave of optimism 
permeates the collective soul” of the corps. “The more than a hundred lives that the Civil 
Guard sacrificed for sake of duty have not been in vain”, it continued, “and the torrents of 
blood, spilt by the heroic defenders of the social peace and of the Republican State, 
testify the steadfastness of the posts of the courageous civil guards, that constitute the 
impregnable dike against which crash the crazed revolutionary masses, eager for death 
and desolation.”58
Conversely, those civil guards that were considered cracks in this impregnable dike 
against barbarity received little leniency. Strangely, the existence of this handful of civil
57 “Notas del Mes”, RTGC, no. 298 (December 1934), p. 523.
58 “A Nuestros Lectores”, RTGC, no. 299 (January 1935), pp. 1-2.
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guards whose actions were deemed as unbecoming of the honor of the corps was only 
mentioned briefly in the Civil Guard press. In contrast to those who gave their lives in 
defense of their duty, these blotches in the “golden book of the Civil Guard” remained 
nameless and worthy of pity, and whatever punishment the military courts deemed they 
deserved.59 These faltering civil guards came in two types: those charged with negligent 
or dishonorable conduct, and those charged with military rebellion for their collusion 
with the revolutionaries. Often these were cases whereby personnel acted in self- 
preservation in light of the circumstances they found themselves. A Civil Guard sergeant 
was court-martialed and imprisoned for three years for failing to do his duty during an 
attack in Cadiz.60 The two highest-ranking Civil Guard officers court-martialed for 
negligence were Colonel Juan Diaz Carmena, Commander of the 10th Regiment (Oviedo) 
and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Moreno Molina, Provincial Commander of Oviedo. Their 
lack of initiative in heading off the insurrection was deemed to have contributed to its 
spread. The aged Diaz Carmena was sentenced to life imprisonment while Moreno 
Molina was sentenced to four years in a reformatory prison (prision correcionat).61 The 
relative ease with which the post of Olloniego (Oviedo), which contained fifteen men at 
the time of its attack, fell to the revolutionaries meant that several of its personnel were 
court-martialed. The commanding officer was found guilty of negligence and sentenced 
to a month and a day of arrest. Two of the guards stationed there were charged with 
military rebellion and sentenced to life imprisonment. The two guards claimed to have
59 “Notas del Mes”, RTGC, no. 301 (March 1935), pp. 95-96.
60 The Times (17 November 1935).
61 Joaquin Arraras, Historia de la Segunda Republica Espahola, Vol. II (Madrid, 1970), pp. 575-576, 
576nl, 605; The Times (16 February 1935); Aguado Sanchez, La Guardia Civil en la Revolucion Roja, pp. 
110-111. Aguado Sanchez attributes Moreno Molina’s actions to his supposed sympathies for the 
Socialists.
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cooperated with the revolutionaries only after the fall of their post, and even then only in 
order to await the right moment to escape. A third guard who made the same claim, but 
did manage to escape, was sentenced to six months imprisonment for negligence.62
A similar defense was employed by Lieutenant Gabriel Torrens Llompart, who was 
commander of the post in Ujo (Oviedo) and charged with passing over to the 
revolutionaries with the surrender of his post. Lt. Torrens maintained that he acted under 
duress, and that he had no links whatsoever with the Socialists. He surrendered his post 
only because his men were running out of munitions and he feared for the lives of the 
women and children sheltered inside. After convincing his men to surrender, Torrens 
stated that he was taken prisoner by the revolutionaries, who used the threat of murdering 
their prisoners -  including the lieutenant himself -  if he did not cooperate. Torrens was 
instrumental in gaining the surrender of the post of Carbonera, and acted as interlocutor 
of the revolutionaries in the attacks on the posts of Santa Cruz de Mieres and Boo, and 
his actions were considered to have caused the subsequent fall of Civil Guard positions in 
Cabanaquinta and Turon. Torrens also served as an emissary for the revolutionaries 
when the latter decided to seek terms of surrender from General Lopez Ochoa. The 
prosecuting attorney maintained that Torrens surrendered when his position was still 
defensible, and that he was, in fact, treated well by the revolutionaries. As a result, he 
sought the death penalty for the lieutenant. Torrens was sentenced to death, but this was 
later commuted to life imprisonment.63 In a sense the hardening of attitudes caused by
62 El Debate (14 February 1935); Aguado Sanchez, La Guardia Civil en la Revolucion Roja, pp. 165-166.
63 El Debate (24 & 25 November 1934); Vidarte, El bienio negro, pp. 280-283; Arrar&s, Historia de la 
Segunda Republica, II, pp. 535-536; Aguado S&nchez, La Guardia Civil en la Revolucion Roja, pp. 126- 
134. Aguado Sanchez, in agreement with the findings of the military court, maintains that Torrens was
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the ferocity of battle and loss of life in Asturias, which left little place for those who were 
seen to be less committed to the fight against the revolutionary danger, presaged those 
attitudes seen later in the Civil War and under the Franco dictatorship.
There were cases that were more clear-cut. Lieutenant Fernando Condes Romero, who 
was a committed Socialist, a friend of Margarita Nelken and had participated in the 
preparations for the insurrection, was charged with military rebellion. All of Condes 
Romero’s colleagues attested that he had “advanced ideas”, engaged in “suspicious 
conversations” and activities. Perhaps most unforgivable for his colleagues, he was 
suspected “of having provided details to El Socialista for its damaging campaigns against 
the Civil Guard”. Inspector-General Bedia also testified against the lieutenant and 
presented evidence against him. In the end, Condes was sentenced to life imprisonment 
and expulsion from the corps.64
Ironically, and certainly unintentionally, the whole counter-revolutionary structure that 
was erected in anticipation of and reaction to October 1934 was undermined by the very 
party that benefited most from the reigning atmosphere: the authoritarian CEDA. Its 
leader, Gil Robles, took advantage of the situation to undermine further the centrist 
position of the Radicals and gradually accumulate more power for his party and its
won over to the Socialists. General L6pez Ochoa stated that Torrens was a prisoner of the Mieres 
Committee (as opposed to a willing accomplice), whom the latter used to negotiate surrender with the 
General: Eduardo Lopez de Ochoa, Campaha militar de Asturias en Octubre de 1934 (Madrid, 1936), 
pp. 159-163. Torrens was interviewed in 1992 by Jose Luis Cervero, a leftist officer and amateur historian 
within the Civil Guard, in which he admitted that he had made common cause with the miners. He later 
joined the Spanish Communist Party. Josd Luis Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 2006), p. 
324.
64 El Debate (30 December 1934); Ramon Salas Larrdzabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular de la Republica, 
Vol. I (Madrid, 1973), pp. 61-62; Ian Gibson, La noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona, 1982), 
p. 104.
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fellow-travelers, with the goal of ultimately securing the prime ministry for himself. The 
first step was to secure a firm base of support amongst the military and security forces, 
which up to this point were largely in the hands of those sympathetic to the Radicals. 
Indeed, he personally attempted to prevent the transfer of Major Doval out of Asturias, 
going against the expressed sentiments of the majority of conservative opinion in the 
Principality, including that of several members of his party.65 Probably due to pressure 
by the CEDA boss, the fifth Lerroux government named Doval the commander of the 
Civil Guard and security forces in Spanish Morocco, though once again continued public 
outrage over his actions in Asturias would mean that Doval would hold this post for only 
three months before being left without command.66 Nonetheless, throughout his tenure as 
War Minister, Gil Robles routinely appointed officers of known right-wing sympathies to 
key commands in the military.67
Gil Robles wanted to take things one step further, and attempted fully to militarize the 
police and transfer control of all the security forces -  that is, the Civil Guard and the 
Security and Assault Guards -  from the Ministry of the Interior to that of War, i.e. to 
himself, a move that was met with the determined opposition of President Alcala 
Zamora.68 It was an exasperated Alcala Zamora who, suspicious of the CEDA leader’s 
motives and anxious to expand his own presence within the political scene with the 
virtual collapse of the Radicals (which he helped to engineer), dismissed the government, 
promoting the formation of a new one under his ally Portela Valladares. This
65 Jose Maria Gil Robles, No fue posible la paz (Barcelona, 1998), p. 647n3.
66 Mendoza, “Las andanzas del coronel Lisardo Doval”, p. 29.
67 Preston, Franco, pp. 109-110. Predictably, Gil Robles himself denies that his policies on promotions and 
placements were influenced in any way by political considerations: No fue posible, pp. 231-233.
68 Alcala Zamora, Memorias, pp. 378-379.
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government would dissolve the Cortes and oversee new elections. Gil Robles was not 
only blocked from his ultimate goal, but was also not invited to continue as War Minister. 
As a result, he explored the possibility of a military coup to prevent the dissolution of 
parliament. Yet, his principal allies in the military, Generals Franco, Fanjul, Varela and 
Goded were reluctant to act given the likelihood that the Civil Guard and the police 
would oppose any military intervention.69 As proof of the likely opposition of the Civil 
Guard to any attempt by Gil Robles to resist being dislodged from his post, contingents of 
the corps was sent to surround the War Ministry and the Madrid military garrisons and 
aerodromes.70
If these would-be military conspirators were doubtful of the support of the Civil Guard, 
Alcala Zamora and Portela Valladares were not complacent about the corps’ loyalty. 
Perhaps for this reason, General Cabanellas was dismissed for a second time on 7 January 
1936 and replaced as Inspector-General of the Civil Guard by General Sebastian Pozas 
Perea. General Pozas was considered a close friend of Alcala Zamora, and also served as 
the investigating magistrate during the military proceedings against Azana that cleared 
the Left Republican leader for his supposed participation in the Catalan revolt of October
1934. A week after taking possession of his new post, Pozas issued a circular reminding 
his men that the corps’ regulations stipulated that they should not accept any gifts from 
members of the public, as “these often come with strings attached”, threatening severe
71punishment for any such infractions. Moreover, in an effort to halt the growing
69 Preston, Franco, pp. 111-113; Gil Robles, No fue posible, pp. 355-359.
70 Gil Robles, No fue posible, pp. 352-353.
71 The text of the circular is reprinted in Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 369
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politicization of the corps, all political and social commentary disappeared from the pages 
of the Revista Tecnica de la Guardia Civil.
Counteracting these efforts to maintain the discipline of the corps was the programme and 
composition of the Popular Front coalition. One of the key planks of the Popular Front’s 
campaign was the amnesty of all those imprisoned for the October Revolution of 1934. 
This would literally undo all the efforts made by the Civil Guard since then to capture 
those it considered enemies of the state and of society, as well as dishonor the memory of 
all those who were killed or wounded during the insurrection itself. Yet, given the 
immense popularity of such a move amongst their constituencies, the members of the 
Popular Front coalition could not have dropped this policy from their platform even if 
they had been disposed to do so.72 Given the scale of hostility directed at the Civil Guard 
for its role in the repression, and the stated desire of the Socialists to abolish the corps, 
the sensation pervaded the corps that there would be no place for the Benemerita in the 
Republic of the Left, or that its members would be targets for revenge in the event of the 
victory of the Popular Front.
Perhaps even more ominous in the eyes of many civil guards was the inclusion of the 
Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in the coalition. Despite the friction that this caused 
within the coalition itself, the adoption of the Comintern-inspired name of Popular Front 
and the Communist press’ endorsement of Left-Republican and Socialist candidates 
(which was, of course, the logical product of their electoral alliance) would have only
72 Helen Graham, “The Spanish Popular Front and the Civil War”, in Helen Graham and Paul Preston 
(eds.), The Popular Front in Europe (Basingstoke, Hamps., 1987), pp. 108-109.
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served to convince suspicious minds that the Popular Front was a Trojan Horse for 
Bolshevism.73 The Republicans’ and Socialists’ alliance with a party whose opposition to 
the Republican regime was a matter of public record would have made their criticism of 
the Radicals’ collusion with the CEDA seem somewhat inconsistent, if not blatant 
hypocrisy, to critical eyes.
The position of the much more significant Socialist Party did little to alleviate concerns 
over the presumed Communist threat. Not only were the Socialists tainted by their 
association with the October Revolution, the irresponsible rhetoric of the “Spanish 
Lenin” did little to dispel notions that the party had been “bolshevized”. During one of 
his campaign speeches, published in Claridad, Largo Caballero stated that the left-wing 
of the Socialist Party and the PCE were not separated by “any great difference. What am 
I saying?! [Not] by any difference at all!”74 Even the more moderate El Socialista felt at 
times to voice alarming statements. On 9 February 1936, the same day that the moderate 
republican Martinez Barrio was attempting to present the Popular Front coalition as 
something rather less revolutionary, the Socialist organ stated: “We are determined to do 
in Spain what has been done in Russia. The plans of Spanish socialism and of Russian 
communism are the same. Certain details may change, but not the fundamental 
decrees.”75
73 This was the conclusion that military officers such as General Franco arrived at: Preston, Franco, pp. 
I l l ,  114.
74 Stanley G. Payne, Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936 (Madison, WI, 1993), p. 
294.
75 Quoted in Payne, The Collapse o f the Second Republic, p. 167.
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Even if such statements did not reflect the actual reality of the Popular Front coalition, for 
those looking for evidence that the coalition would usher in a Soviet regime, these 
constituted convincing proof of such a plot, an impression that the opposing right-wing 
coalition did everything it could to encourage in its own election propaganda. In this 
climate, it probably should come as little surprise that civil guards would collude with 
rightists at the local level to prevent the victory of the Popular Front. In the province of 
Granada, civil guards helped to prevent the distribution of left-wing propaganda and 
turned a blind eye to all sorts of abuses committed by local rightists. Similar activity was 
seen in the province of Badajoz, where Socialist Casas del Pueblo were kept closed 
illegally, and in various towns in the centre and south of Spain.76
Despite these efforts, the Popular Front managed to win the 16 February 1936 general 
election. As the election results became known, crowds gathered in the streets to 
celebrate while Gil Robles and various right-wing military officers, namely General 
Franco, worked behind the scenes to prevent the imminent change in government.
During the course of his efforts, Gil Robles and Franco ran into the obstinate refusal of 
the Inspector-General of the Civil Guard to collaborate with any such plans. Franco, 
Chief of the General Staff at the time, approached Pozas after Prime Minister Portela 
Valladares (who was also Interior Minister) proved unwilling to declare martial law as 
requested by Gil Robles and Franco. When Pozas also proved unwilling to involve his 
men in what effectively was an attempt to overturn the results of the elections, Franco 
and a clique of fellow officers again attempted to pressure Portela Valladares to override 
his subordinate Pozas and order the Civil Guard out into the street. Uppermost in
76 Preston, CSCW, pp. 208-209.
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Franco’s mind was that the Civil Guard must act in concert with any military 
intervention, and not against it. While Franco and his collaborators had managed to get a 
state of alarm declared, and a decree of martial law to be held in reserve, the General felt 
immediate action was needed to stave off what he saw as a revolutionary threat. 
Accordingly, he exceeded his own authority and attempted to convince local commanders 
to declare martial law. While achieving his objective in a handful of provinces, most 
military commanders were unwilling to bring their men out into the streets if the 
compliance of the Civil Guard was not assured. As for this latter force, when several 
provincial commanders contacted Madrid to ascertain whether or not martial law had in 
fact been declared, they were curtly informed by Pozas that it had not. Indeed, 
increasingly aware of what was afoot, Pozas surrounded suspect military garrisons with 
Civil Guard units, and informed the Prime Minister that his men “will oppose any coup 
attempt”. This effectively put paid on any attempt to cancel the election results through 
military fiat.77 The course of events had also demonstrated that no matter how much 
most civil guards might have approved Franco’s intentions, the chain of command had 
not broken down. Nonetheless, events over the next few months would undermine 
discipline within the corps.
Indeed, despite the attitude of their Inspector-General, many civil guards greeted the 
news of the Popular Front’s victory with a sense of distaste, if not disgust. In Moreda 
(Oviedo), for example, a Socialist mayor who had been incarcerated for his activities 
during October 1934 was set free and organized a triumphant gathering of leftists in order 
to celebrate the election results. Upon receiving news of this, the local Civil Guard
77 Preston, Franco, pp. 113-119.
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commander called the men under his orders to the central plaza of their station and asked 
for volunteers to dissolve the celebration. All thirty of his men stepped forward. The 
Lieutenant took seventeen of his men to confront the revelers, leaving thirteen behind to 
guard their casa-cuartel in case the situation escalated and they had to make a strategic 
retreat. On their way, they passed the makeshift Socialist club at the edge of the town, 
the old Casa del Pueblo now serving as the barracks for these same civil guards. Two of 
the guards entered the building and pulled down the red flag which the Socialists had 
raised, and ripped it to shreds. Upon reaching the outskirts of town, the Civil Guard 
commander ordered his men to fall into formation and prepare their rifles. The 
Lieutenant then informed the crowd that their gathering was illegal and that they must 
disperse. The Socialist mayor approached the officer and told the latter that he, as mayor, 
had authorized the meeting, and thus it was fully legal. Unmoved, the Lieutenant replied 
that either the gathering disperse or he would order his men to open fire. Fearing a 
bloodbath, the mayor managed to persuade those gathered to disperse. While the civil 
guards would have followed the orders of their commanding officer, despite their 
hostility towards the Socialists, few of them believed the drastic action conceived by the 
Lieutenant was called for, and felt a sense of relief that the situation was resolved 
peacefully.78
The newly established government under Azana was not unaware of the series of clashes 
between their followers and civil guards during the days following the election, and on 19 
February 1936 decreed the transfer of the provincial commanders of Oviedo, Valencia, 
Soria, Murcia, Badajoz, Ciudad Real, Tarragona, Orense, Huesca, Lerida, Cuenca,
78 Gabriel Ferreras Estrada, Memorias del sargento Ferreras (Le6n, 2002), pp. 61-62.
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Valladolid, Avila, Palencia, Cadiz, Leon and Guipuzcoa. These transfers were carried 
out not only to diffuse a situation due to confrontations between personnel of the 
Benemerita and members of the parties of the Popular Front. They were also used to 
disrupt the various military conspiracy cells. This policy was continued throughout the 
period, with the month of March alone seeing the transfer of eighteen provincial Civil 
Guard commanders, and by outbreak of the military rebellion in July, sixty-eight changes 
of command had been carried out (some provinces, like Avila, had their Jefe de 
Comandancia changed several times) at what was probably the most important post in the 
chain of command within the corps. To put this in context, the average number of 
transfers in any given year was between fifteen and twenty. Moreover, some of these 
transfers went against established rules, such as the posting of officers to commands 
above that which their rank allowed -  such as the handful of cases where majors were 
named as provincial commanders, a post reserved for lieutenant colonels. The lieutenant 
colonels of the corps were not the only rank to be forced to participate in this “dance”. In 
total, all of the colonels suffered the same fate, as did 99 out of 124 majors, 206 captains 
out of 318 and numerous lieutenants.79
The changes made in the commands of the police, Civil Guard and the military were seen 
by many civil guards as the politicizing of the public order apparatus, particularly 
because those officers of right-wing sympathies appointed under the previous 
administration would not have been seen as been politically-motivated nominations. One 
such change was the dismissal the Director-General of Security, Vicente Hodsson, a Civil
79 Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 143, 148, 151.
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Guard Captain who was linked to the Radicals.80 The amnesty and reinstatement of all 
leftist officers expelled from the army and security forces for their collusion in the events 
of October 1934 definitely would have been seen, correctly, as such. The infamous Lt. 
Condes Romero and Lt. Torrens Llompart were among those amnestied. Lt. Condes was 
raised to the rank of Captain and reintegrated into the Civil Guard. His return, and that of 
Lt. Torrens, was resented deeply by his colleagues, who would cold-shoulder him and 
refuse to recognize his promotion.81
Perhaps even more infuriating and insulting to the Civil Guard was the amnesty of all 
“political and social prisoners” by the Popular Front government. This was by no means 
the first amnesty -  the second Lerroux government pardoned those involved in the 
August 1932 attempted coup -  and despite the left-wing coalition’s well-publicized 
pledge to carry it out, the actual freeing of those seen as responsible for the deaths and 
injuries of so many civil guards would have been difficult to stomach. Adding salt to the 
collective wound of the corps was the amnestying of those imprisoned for the events of 
Castilblanco back in 1931, another sensitive and highly emotive topic within the Civil 
Guard. The fact that the Castilblanco prisoners committed their crime under the first 
biennium and were judged and imprisoned whilst the Centre-Left were in power, made 
nonsense of the idea that the amnesty was simply about the undoing the repressive
o n
policies carried out under the governments of the Centre-Right. Indeed, the Socialists,
80 Fernando Rivas, El Frente Popular: Antecedentes de un alzamiento (Madrid, 1976), p. 103. General 
Pozas, nonetheless, was left in charge of the Civil Guard.
81 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 135,173.
82 Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 101-102.
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who led the call for their amnesty, treated them as heroes upon their release.83 In 
contrast, the Popular Front government put on trial those military and Civil Guard 
officers who were in charge of the repression in Asturias and previously honored for their 
defense of the Republic. This included Civil Guard Captain Telia y Cantos, one of 
Doval’s subordinates. If the contrast between the amnesty of Condes Romero and the 
prosecution of Telia y Cantos was not stark enough, one of the witnesses at the latter’s 
trial was none other than recently-amnestied Lieutenant Torrens Llompart. In fact, 
Torrens Llompart’s participation in the trial of Telia y Cantos was not for political 
reasons, but rather because, having been imprisoned in Oviedo alongside those miners 
arrested for their part in the insurrection, he was a material witness to Telia’s
a  a
interrogation techniques. Another civil guard, Sergeant Francisco Serna, who had 
killed a Socialist mayor was convicted and sentenced to twelve years in prison and a 
15,000 peseta fine, apparently the first time this ever happened in the Civil Guard’s 
history.85
Alongside these developments was an increase of social and political violence in the 
wake of the February elections. While strike activity did not start to take off until April, 
the numbers of those killed for political reasons were greatest in the first four months of 
the Popular Front, peaking in March 1936 with ninety-three deaths. Leaving aside those 
killed during the events of October 1934, more people were killed in acts of political 
violence during the February-July 1936 period than any entire year of the pre-Civil War
83 El Socialista (6 & 26 February 1936).
84 Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 137; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 
323-324.
85 Juan-Simeon Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables (Mexico City, 1973), p. 103.
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Republic, and there was no major insurrection during the Popular Front period.86 As one 
study notes, over half of the victims were leftists, and the authors of the most killings 
were personnel in the security forces, with the Civil Guard causing more deaths than any 
other single group. These figures, apart from the significance assigned to them by the 
author of this particular study, arguably demonstrate that the Civil Guard was more 
involved in the social and political conflict than any other single group. When compared 
to the (enforced) relative peace of the previous year, the contrast was noticeable. As one 
civil guard recorded in his memoirs:
Up to February 1936, in which the Left more or less legally won the elections, the 
public order was well maintained and the principle of authority was respected. 
Nonetheless, after [the Left’s] victory, things changed direction and thus began 
the strikes, the social agitation, the lack of mutual respect... In sum, civil
O Q
coexistence began to crack.
The traditional Civil Guard perception of the Left as agitators fed into the contemporary 
situation to create a potentially dangerous situation for the government. Azana noted that 
the outburst of disorder that followed the elections served only to discredit the Popular 
Front’s cause. “It is deplorable”, he was recorded as saying in El Sol: “They are
86 For strike figures, see Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, p. 338. For deaths, see Payne, ibid., pp. 360 & 
362; Rafael Cruz, En el nombre del pueblo: Republica, rebellion y  Guerra en la Espana de 1936 (Madrid, 
2006), p. 167.
87 Cruz, En el nombre del pueblo, pp. 166-168. A number of qualifications must be made, though, about 
these figures. The most important of these is the fact that, unlike civilian militants, the Civil Guard, the 
Interior Ministry police and the Army caused their killings in confrontations in which they were 
involuntary participants. Indeed, civilian-authored killings made up 57 percent of the total, and of those 
that are identified, leftists were the worst offenders. The authors of forty-one of the deaths recorded by 
Cruz are unidentified, though it is reasonable to assume that the perpetrators of these were civilians.
88 Ferreras Estrada, Memorias del sargento Ferreras, p. 61.
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behaving just as though they had been paid by our enemies.”89 At the beginning of the 
Republic, the primary troublemakers for the Civil Guard were the Communists and 
anarcho-syndicalists, whose extreme views and rejection of the Republic led to most of 
the confrontations with the apparatuses of the State. By October 1934 the Socialists had 
been seen to have joined this group. The Popular Front government not only justified 
these groups’ positions with the amnesty -  which symbolized something of an about-face 
regarding the Republicans and Socialists’ attitudes towards extralegal activities -  but also 
reintroduced back into society all of those “dangerous elements” that Civil Guard and 
police had managed to capture and incarcerate. The rhetoric of the working-class 
organizations did little to assuage concerns amongst the corps that all of this would drag 
Spain ever-closer to Bolshevik revolution.
If the PCE and the Socialists were in reality moderating their demands so as not to 
undermine the Popular Front, there was little evidence of this in the speeches of their 
members and the editorial lines followed in much of their press. On 25 February 1936 
the Communist newspaper Mundo Obrero published the PCE’s demands, which included 
the abolition of the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard, and the arming of the workers. 
The massive change in commands was also seen by civil guards as being the consequence 
of Communist pressure, as Mundo Obrero had called for such measures.90 In what could 
be interpreted as incitement, Dolores Ibarruri, one of the PCE’s leading spokespersons, 
declared in a speech to the International Red Aid on the day of the elections that the 
“people” had “called for the execution of their murderers”. She disparaged a legalistic
89 Quoted in Payne, Collapse of the Spanish Republic, p. 186.
90 Mundo Obrero (25 February 1936).
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approach to obtaining her party’s goals and repeated these statements before a 
parliamentary body two weeks later.91 Similar statements could be found in Mundo 
Obrero. Moreover, the PCE were amongst the most vocal in pressuring the government 
to prosecute all those involved in the repression of the Asturian Revolution, which gave 
the impression that the arrest of Lopez Ochoa, Telia y Cantos and several other officers 
was carried out at the behest of the Communists. More threatening was the boldfaced 
statement on the front page of the 28 February 1936 edition of Mundo Obrero: “Those 
guilty for the mass murders of the Asturian miners have not been arrested yet? Their 
names are well-known.”
The rhetoric of the Socialists was little better. For a party that desired to conquer the 
State, the Socialists pursued a losing strategy in terms of winning over its personnel to 
their cause. By following a (rhetorical) strategy of confrontation with the coercive 
instruments of the State, Socialists such as Largo Caballero demonstrated that they had 
learned none of the lessons that they should have in the preceding years, particularly 
those leading up to the disastrous showdown in October 1934. Given the internal conflict 
within the movement over the proper course of action, their position could at times 
appear schizophrenic. For example, while insisting that the workers should not cede an 
inch of ground in terms of what had been gained, the Socialist paper for rural 
landworkers advised its readers to “avoid confrontations with the security forces”. Yet 
such confrontations were clearly expected as the very same edition of El Obrero de la 
Tierra also counseled its readers to form “People’s Militias” in order to protect those
91 Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union and Communism (New Haven & London, 
2004), pp. 87-89.
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“conquests” gained in the wake of the February elections. The Civil Guard in particular 
was characterized as being aligned with the enemies of the workers, as its personnel had 
been “disarming us for two years while leaving intact the arsenals of fascist elements”. 
Typically ignoring the reasons for their “disarmament”, the Socialists lumped the Civil 
Guard together with those groups identified as being the enemies of the rural workers, the 
former being “armed to the teeth”.92 Equally alarming for civil guards were those 
prophecies of the imminent collapse of the current liberal democratic Republic. Luis 
Araquistain, the editor of Claridad, made a series of analyses in which he compared the 
situation in Spain to that of Russia in 1917, talking of a weak bourgeois state and an 
imminent showdown between fascism and socialism, in which socialism would 
triumph. Around the same time, from the beginning of April, leaflets began to appear, 
presumably authored and distributed by right-wing provocateurs but claiming to be issued 
by the Socialist UGT and contained plans for a coming revolution, with lists of rightists 
to be eliminated.94
Indeed, the rhetoric of the working-class organizations, within the environment of 
tension, hostility and conflict, was playing into the hands of those who sought to 
overthrow the Popular Front government by force.95 Anti-militarism and anti-police 
attitudes on behalf of the Left were antagonising Army and Civil Guard officers. Anti­
militarism was not reserved exclusively for those officers publicly associated with the 
repression in Asturias, which, alongside the attempted prosecution of the moderate and
92 El Obrero de la Tierra (28 February 1936). These statements were repeated in the caballerista 
newspaper Claridad (2 April 1936).
93 Payne, SCW, the Soviet Union and Communism, pp. 89-90.
94 Preston, CSCW, p. 248; Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, pp. 295-296.
95 Preston, CSCW, p. 269, 271-272.
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republican Lopez Ochoa, created a sense of persecution amongst even the less right-wing 
officers. After an incident on 13 March in which a leftist officer was assaulted in the 
street by a group of leftist militants, War Minister Carlos Masquelet felt obliged to issue 
an internal note stating his “indignation over the unjust attacks” and urged his fellow 
officers not to let themselves be provoked by such acts. Masquelet also issued a public 
statement denying the existence of any military conspiracies against the government and 
declared that the military, “the firmest support of the Republic”, deserved more respectful 
treatment.96 Nonetheless, knowledge about plotting amongst military circles and the 
disquiet felt amongst the armed and security forces were cause for enough concern 
amongst the government that more energetic measures were believed to be needed. 
Besides the continuous transfers of commands, a decree was issued on 21 March 1936 
granting the Interior Minister the right to place on indefinite leave (<disponible forzoso) 
any member of the police suspected of anti-Republican activities. Amongst the Civil 
Guard alone, this ministerial prerogative was employed against one colonel, one 
lieutenant colonel, four majors, six captains and three lieutenants.97
These disciplinary measures enacted by the government would be of limited effect as 
long as the general situation continued to sour relations between the Popular Front 
government and the Civil Guard. The government’s apparent refusal to take action 
against leftist groups was a source of great consternation amongst civil guards. In 
Toledo, the Civil Governor ordered local civil guards to retire from the scene of an 
incident after they restored order when a rightist was attacked. In Consuegra (Toledo) a
96 Stanley G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Stanford, CA, 1967), pp. 316-317; Payne, 
Spain’s First Democracy, pp. 290-291.
9 Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 149-150.
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group of some 200 leftist hotheads took effective control of the town, carrying out 
searches of locals’ homes. When the Civil Guard intervened and detained several of the 
ringleaders, they were obliged to release them “por orden gubernativa”. In Cieza 
(Murcia), various workers’ organizations (anarchists, communists and socialists) took 
over the town and searched the houses of local right-wingers. The Civil Guard was 
ordered to not to interfere. In Albacete, while local leftists burned and sacked local 
casinos and churches, the Civil Guard was ordered not to interfere, for their presence 
would “provoke the masses”.98 When civil guards did intervene and violence ensued, the 
usual result would be the reassignment of the commanding officer.99 This also included 
when a civil guard was the object of violence. In Gijon on 25 March 1936, Civil Guard 
Manuel Vela Rodriguez was gunned down by a group of leftists in a drive-by shooting. 
There was a bit of a discrepancy over the route the funeral procession should take, as the 
authorities wanted to minimize the potential for confrontations while emotions were still 
running high, and in the end the route taken deviated from that dictated by the Civil 
Governor. The event degenerated into a confrontation between local right-wing and left- 
wing elements. As a result, the commanding officers of the local Civil Guard were 
dismissed from their posts. Three Falangists were arrested, yet no leftists were held 
accountable for outbreak of violence.100
Public instances of insubordination by the Civil Guard grew in reaction to what seemed 
to them to be alarming developments. When a Civil Guard officer, Second Lieutenant
98 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 137-138. For a detailed account of a host of 
incidents during the end of March and beginning of April, see Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 166-170.
99 Payne, Spain’s First Democracy, pp. 289 & 307; Payne, Politics and the Military, p. 316.
100 Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 170-171.
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Anastasio de los Reyes, was killed during a public parade celebrating the anniversary of 
the Republic in Madrid, the government tried to diffuse the situation by ordering that 
Reyes be given a discreet, private burial. His indignant colleagues disobeyed a direct 
order by the government and took the corpse of their killed comrade back to their 
barracks for a full military burial. When Inspector-General Pozas arrived at the scene and 
asked the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Florentino Gonzalez Valles, under 
whose authority he was acting, the latter answered:
with the authority of the whole Army and Civil Guard. We have determined to 
render a passionate tribute to our companero, who was assassinated in a cowardly 
fashion. Seeing that the authorities, far from facilitating this pious wish, will not 
allow us to do so, we have decided to do it ourselves, in our own manner.
As such, Reyes’ interment turned into a public display of defiance against the Popular 
Front and constituted a fracture in the internal discipline of the corps.101
To protect parliament in case the funeral procession -  which was attended by cedistas, 
monarchists and Falangists, as well as by a slightly embarrassed Pozas -  turned into a 
coup, Assault Guards were put on alert. Two groups of these were situated strategically 
near the Cortes, and were under the command of two captains, Faruado and Castillo, both 
known left-wing militants. Another 500 Assault Guards were on standby in the Pontejos 
barracks (also known for its left-wing sympathies) under the command of Major Burillo. 
When Vidarte snipped that all will be fine as long as the Civil Guard does not decide to
101 Quotation from Candido Gallego Perez, Lucha contra el crimen y  el desorden. Memorias de un teniente 
de la Guardia Civil (Madrid, 1957), pp. 200-201. Reprinted in Ian Gibson, La noche en que mataron a 
Calvo Sotelo (Barcelona, 1982), pp. 33-35; and Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 178-179, though Rivas takes 
the actual wording with a pinch of salt. A detailed narrative of the killing and burial of Reyes can be found 
in Rivas, ibid., pp. 173-184; Gibson, ibid., pp. 29-53.
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intervene, Azana assured his skeptical Socialist friend that the corps was loyal to the 
regime. If their loyalty was wavering, the Prime Minister added, it was because “you 
[Socialists] with your hooting and hissing, such as during the parades on 14 April, are 
turning them against the Republic”.102 Almost predictably, the event converted into a 
violent confrontation between leftist and right-wing supporters, resulting in six persons 
killed and many more wounded. Consequently, an alarmed government placed Lt. Col. 
Gonzalez Valles, four Majors, five Captains and ten lieutenants on indefinite leave as a 
result of their breach of discipline.103
The event played into the hands of the conspiratorial Right. Their visible support for the 
Civil Guard was in stark contrast to the apparent insensitivity of the government and the 
hostility of the Left. Moreover, the Right also shared the Civil Guard’s concerns over 
what they saw as rampant disorder and the revolutionary threat. Indeed, in the wake of 
the killing of Lieutenant de los Reyes, Calvo Sotelo and Gil Robles, the two key leaders 
of the Right (and both involved in the various plots against the government), read out in 
parliament a series of somewhat exaggerated statistics about the levels of disorder since 
the February election, ignoring the Right’s own role in this. The heated atmosphere in 
the streets was echoed in the parliamentary debates of 15-16 April in which threats and
102 Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables, pp. 90-91;
103 Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 189-190, 189nl6; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p.
152. A number of right-leaning Assault Guard officers were also placed on indefinite leave. The British 
journalist Henry Buckley claimed that Anatasio de los Reyes was a fascist who held “some position of 
importance in the counter-revolutionary movement of the Right”. Buckley also asserts that all of the Civil 
Guard officers punished for the events surrounding Reyes’ burial were all fascists as well: Life and Death 
of the Spanish Republic (London, 1940), pp. 200-201. This seems to be pure conjecture based on the fact 
that the funeral was attended by Falangists and several leaders of the Right.
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talk of civil war abounded. Gil Robles warned the government that “A considerable mass 
of Spanish opinion which is at least half the nation will not resign itself to die.”104
Notwithstanding, the preparations of the principal military conspirators and their civilian 
allies were not going very smoothly. Besides numerous issues related to political 
posturing, the military conspirators found that opinion in the army was not yet at the 
point of supporting a major rebellion. As such, the initial date of April 20th went by 
without any action despite the atmosphere created by the killing of De los Reyes. Indeed, 
as Franco -  considered the “traffic light of military politics” -  noted a month later to a 
less temperate colleague,
You are really mistaken. It is going to be immensely difficult and very bloody. 
We have not got much of an army, the intervention of the Civil Guard is looking 
doubtful and many officers will side with the constituted power, some because it 
is easier, others because of their convictions. Nobody should forget that the 
soldier who rebels against the constituted power can never turn back, never 
surrender, for he will be shot without a second thought.105 
The support of the Civil Guard was deemed crucial for the success of any military coup. 
Given the corps’ strategic presence across the whole of the country, it would be an 
important component of any attempted coup. As such, it was agreed in the first meeting 
of the principal military conspirators in March that if, as feared, the Popular Front 
government abolished the Civil Guard, they would rebel immediately.106
104 Preston, CSCW, pp. 253-254; Payne, Spain's First Democracy, pp. 313-316.
105 Quoted in Preston, Franco, pp. 129-130.
106 Preston, Franco, p. 122.
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As Franco surmised, the boiling point had not yet been reached for the conspirators to be 
able to count on the backing of the Civil Guard. In part this was because of the reasons 
that Franco outlined, and also the constant shifting of Civil Guard commands certainly 
made any efforts to establish secure links between garrisons problematic. Moreover, the 
change in government probably also had an effect on the willingness to rebel. After the 
impeachment of Alcala Zamora and the ascension of Azana to the Presidency, Casares 
Quiroga became Prime Minister on 13 May 1936. While Casares Quiroga’s nomination 
as Prime Minister was felt to be less than optimal by those on the Left -  and was met with 
hostility by the CNT, who considered him the “Casas Viejas Minister” -  it would have 
been welcomed to a certain degree by the Civil Guard, as he was generally well-regarded 
amongst the corps.
If this was the case, events would have made this second honeymoon a short one, as 
confrontations continued and tensions grew ever deeper. Besides the infamous clash in 
Yeste (Albacete) on 29 May 1936,107 one civil guard recounts a lesser-known incident in 
which one of his colleagues came across a large group of Socialists returning from 
hearing a speech given by Largo Caballero in Oviedo. This colleague was returning from 
visiting his girlfriend in another town and ran into the group coincidentally at the train 
station. The unfortunate guard was greeted with a series of insults, and when he 
attempted to react, the crown fell upon him, lynching him then firing two shots into his 
lifeless body. His fellow civil guards, upon realizing his absence and coming across his 
corpse, were overcome with anger and desired revenge. As the streets were empty -  the
107 For an account of the incident at Yeste, see Manuel Requena Gallego, Los Sucesos de Yeste, Mayo 1936 
(Albacete, 1983); Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 275-286.
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populace probably figuring a reckoning was coming and sought safety in their homes -  
the enraged civil guards went to the local Socialist Casa del Pueblo and began to pour 
gasoline around it with the intention of burning it to the ground. The arrival of the 
Regimental and Provincial Commanders prevented them from consummating the act. 
Nonetheless, when the principal authors of the crime were arrested, they were later 
released by the special magistrate sent to deal with the matter. A few days later men 
from this same post came across a group of young Socialist militiamen training in the 
countryside. After dispersing the youths, they were later fired upon whilst patrolling the 
area. As it was dark, they were unable to apprehend nor identify their attempted 
assailants. In contrast to this judicial leniency towards the Socialists, during one 
confrontation between civil guards and workers in Oviedo that same month, five guards 
were arrested and prosecuted.109 Given such incidents, and the political atmosphere, one 
historian computed that some fifty percent of the officer class was against the Popular 
Front by the end of May.110
The Right was not the only group mobilizing within the military and security forces. 
Indeed, one of the primary casualties of the period was the professionalism of the security 
forces, as they became increasing politicized in tandem with the rest of society. Left- 
wing Civil Guard officers felt that reshuffling around personnel was not enough and they 
were dismayed by what they saw as the government’s lack of will to tackle the military 
threat seriously. Some officers, especially Captain Condes and Captain (retired)
108 Ferreras Estrada, Memorias del sargento Ferreras, pp. 64-65. For other incidents occuring during the 
month of May 1936, see Rivas, El Frente Popular, pp. 241-246.
109 Payne, Spain's First Democracy, p. 342.
110 The calculation is by Federico Bravo Morata, quoted in Rivas, El Frente Popular, p. 246.
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Francisco Galan began providing training for the Socialist and Communist militias.111 
Captain Condes, and his friend Captain Manuel Uribarri Barutell, joined the Union 
Militar Republicana Antifascista (UMRA), a group that attempted to band together all the 
loyal elements within the armed forces to counteract the efforts of the rightist Union 
Militar Espahola, as well as keep the government informed of the conspirators’ plans.112 
Officers like Captain Uribarri were exasperated by what they felt was the Popular Front 
government’s unwillingness to take energetic measure to counter the impending 
fascist/military threat.113 Mirroring the attitude of their right-wing counterparts within 
the corps, they felt the situation was getting out of control and thus they had to take 
matters into their own hands.
In the afternoon of 12 July 1936, Lieutenant Jose del Castillo of the Assault Guards, a 
fellow member of the UMRA also active in the training of Socialist militias and a close 
friend of Captain Condes, was killed by right-wing youths. Lt. Del Castillo was the 
second UMRA officer to have been assassinated: Captain Carlos Faraudo having been 
murdered by Falangists on 8 May. In an act of pure revenge, and tired of being “hunted
i L
like rabbits”, during the early hours of the 13 an enraged Captain Condes led a group of 
Assault Guards to the house of right-wing politician Jose Calvo Sotelo -  believed 
(correctly) to be implicated in the military conspiracy -  illegally arrested the
111 Ramon Salas Larr&zabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular de la Republica, Vol. I (Madrid, 1973), pp. 68, 
218-19; Luis Romero, Caray Cruz de la Republica, 1931-1936 (Barcelona, 1980), p. 274; Gibson, La 
noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo, pp. 104-105.
112 UMRA created in 1935 by fusion of Union Militar Republicana (created in Morocco the preceding year) 
and the small clandestine Communist-led Union Militar Antifascista. The UMRA had no more than a few 
hundred members, and Masons were prominent amongst them. Payne, Politics and the Military, pp. 321, 
293 passim.', Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables, pp. 50-51.
1,3 Manuel Uribarri, La quinta columna espahola (La Habana, 1943), p. 59.
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parliamentary deputy and then murdered him.114 The historian Joan Villaroya notes the 
curious significance of this: “If we abide by the more simplistic perceptions of our recent 
history, nothing could be more paradoxical than the fact that the person responsible for 
the death of a right-wing leader was a captain of the Civil Guard.”115 Beyond this 
apparent paradox, the greater significance of this act was the fact that a leading politician 
could be targeted and murdered not by civilian vigilantes, but by the regime’s own police 
forces. It symbolized the breakdown of professionalism and the blatant politicization of 
Spain’s security forces, a dangerous situation for a government facing an incipient 
rebellion and for those civil guards seeking to remain outside of the political fray. Four 
days after the assassination of Calvo Sotelo, the position of these latter two groups would 
become virtually untenable.
114 Uribarri, La quinta columna, pp. 172-180; Vidarte, Todos fuimos culpables, pp. 211-216; Gibson, La 
noche en que mataron a Calvo Sotelo, pp. 208-214.
115 Joan Villanova i Font, ‘La Guardia Civil: La Crisis del Estado, 1923-1939’, Historia 16, No. 218 (1994), 
p. 42.
CHAPTER SEVEN
By July 1936, the concept that democratic, consensual solutions could be found to the 
social and political problems facing Spain had almost completely ceded ground to those 
proposing more radical approaches. Alongside the rhetoric of the Socialist Left and the 
Communists about the weakness of “bourgeois democracy” and the inevitability of a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat”, the Right made corresponding warnings about the 
debility of the Popular Front government. These not only voiced the concerns of its 
social constituencies, but also were meant as veiled calls to the military to intervene. In 
the parliamentary debate of 16 June 1936, Calvo Sotelo charged the Casares Quiroga 
government with allowing the unravelling of the social fabric and the principle of 
authority. Echoing the presumed Communist threat, of which fake documents purporting 
to be the secret plans of the Socialists and PCE to establish a Soviet regime had been 
circulating for several months, Calvo Sotelo compared the Prime Minister with both 
Kerensky and Karolyi, the Russian and Hungarian leaders prior to the eruption of 
Communist revolution in their respective countries.
Yet, calls for more energetic government was not the monopoly of those outside the 
political centre, and moderates from within the ranks of republican movement began to 
call for extraordinary measures to deal with the apparently chaotic situation. The 
distinguished historian Claudio Sanchez-Albomoz, Ambassador to Lisbon at the time, 
wrote in his memoirs of anxiously awaiting for the phone call from Madrid announcing a
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“Republican dictatorship of salvation” (la salvadora dictadura republicana)} On 25 May 
1936, the National Republican Party (PNR) -  whose leader, Felipe Sanchez Roman, had 
been approached by now-President Azana to form a new government -  agreed on a 
declaration, that was never published publicly, that talked of forming a government with 
or without the support of the Socialists, and possibly ruling by decree if need be.2 More 
publicly, Miguel Maura called for a “national Republican dictatorship” in a series of 
articles from 18 to 27 June in the republican daily El Sol.3 While some of the wording 
used was perhaps an exaggeration of sorts, and hence was denounced in the left-wing 
press, that such ideas came from one of the founding fathers of the Republic could have 
only had a deep resonance amongst the majority of the Civil Guard, who shared his 
sentiments and also held the former minister in the highest respect. The policies 
expressed in the articles did have some resonance. They led to a friendly exchange of 
letters between himself and the imprisoned leader of the Falange, Jose Antonio Primo de 
Rivera.4 Maura’s proposals were accepted by the majority of the Republican leaders, 
despite their earlier public rejection of these, including the Socialists Prieto and Besteiro, 
in the immediate wake of the military uprising. The opposition of Largo Caballero, who 
threatened to call a revolutionary general strike if they were implemented, meant that 
they were not adopted.5
1 Claudio Sanchez-Albomoz, Anecdotario politico (Barcelona, 1976), pp. 196-197.
2 The full declaration can be found in Stanley G. Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936: 
Origins of the Civil War (New Haven, 2006), pp. 294-296.
3 The full text of Maura’s six articles can be found in the new edition of Maura’s memoirs, edited by his 
grandson, Joaquin Romero Maura: Miguel Maura, Asi cayo Alfonso XIII. De una dictadura a otra (Madrid, 
2007), pp. 513-546.
4 Maura, Asi cayo, pp. 547-552
5 See testimony of Maura in Asi cayo, pp. 552-553. For other moderate republicans voicing similar 
concerns about the state of affairs, see Payne, Collapse of the Spanish Republic, pp. 300-302.
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The sensation that the day of reckoning was coming pervaded Spanish society. The 
murder of Calvo Sotelo was seen by many as the spark that would set off a civil war, 
even if the military conspiracy was already months in the planning. The lack of direct 
responsibility for the killing of the right-wing deputy on the part of the government did 
not blind it to the level of politicisation amongst its security forces. This was now 
recognized as a dangerous fact. A coded telegram was sent to all provincial governors 
calling for the search and capture of the responsible Assault Guard officers and Civil 
Guard Captain Condes. It warned to keep a tight reign on the Assault Guard, admitting 
that while the personnel of the Interior Ministry police and the Civil Guard were 
suspected of right-wing leanings, “including fascist sympathies”. There now existed a 
suspicion of “left-wing extremists” within the same security forces that were capable of 
carrying out “reprisals and actions incompatible with their status as agents of 
governmental authority”.6 The murder of Calvo Sotelo naturally had its repercussions 
within the Civil Guard, many of whom were also in a mood of expectation. As one wrote 
in his memoirs, after learning of the news “we anxiously awaited the assignment to 
impose order and justice as it should be”.7
They did not have to wait very long. The rising, which was planned to start on the 
morning of 18 July, started precipitously on the afternoon of the 17th in Melilla. A mole 
within the Falange betrayed the conspirators’ plans to the Socialists, who in turn told the 
military commander of the city, General Manuel Romales. During a meeting in which 
the final preparations were being made, and which three representatives of Civil Guard
6 Jose Maria Varela Rendueles, Rebelion en Sevilla: Memorias de su Gobernador rebelde (Sevilla, 1982), p. 
87.
7 Gabriel Ferreras Estrada, Memorias del sargento Ferreras (Leon, 2002), p. 65.
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garrison were present, a group of Assault Guards surrounded the meeting demanding 
entry to search for weapons. A confrontation ensued, and the arrival of a group of 
Legionnaires convinced the commander of the Assault Guard unit to surrender. Soon 
thereafter, General Romales was arrested by the rebels, who then telephoned the other 
African garrisons, informing them of the premature commencement of the rebellion. By 
the morning of the 18th, with the active assistance of the Civil Guard, most of the 
Spanish Moroccan Protectorate was in rebel hands.8
As the military rebels began transmitting reports of their success to peninsular garrisons, 
often through the radio transmitters of the Civil Guard, the government attempted to 
control any such news, fearing correctly that events in Morocco would encourage further 
rebellions across the country, as well as provoke a broader explosion within society itself. 
The Inspector-General of the Civil Guard, loyal to the government, made similar attempts 
to restrict the flow of information amongst his men. In the afternoon of the 18th he 
issued the following clear and direct orders:
A few rebel units in Africa have gained control of the radio station in Tetuan. I 
hereby communicate to the commanding officers of my corps, by order of the 
Interior Minister, that they consider as sedition all proclamations made from this 
station, which is spreading false information. All communications and orders 
emanating from the legitimate government and from this Inspectorate will be 
dispatched from the central station. I exhort all of you that you comply with
8 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (London, 2003), pp. 204-208; Juan Blazquez Miguel, Historia 
Militar de la Guerra Civil Espahola (henceforth HMGCE), Vol. I (Madrid, 2003), pp. 44-55.
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absolute loyalty the statutory rule to remain always faithful to your duty, for the 
honour of the Institute.9 
The line had been drawn in the sand. Now it was to be seen whether anyone would cross 
it.
Pozas was not the only officer who made appeals to the core values of the Civil Guard. 
On 22 July, soon after taking command of the Army of Africa, Franco gave a speech, 
emitted from the Civil Guard radio transmitter in Tetuan, in which he dedicated the last 
part to the men of the Benemerita, “because you are the most precious in the hearts of all 
Spaniards”. Echoing the frustrations and fears of the corps’ personnel, and understanding 
their mentality, Franco continued:
You, the self-sacrificing civil guard! Veteran soldiers who embrace voluntarily 
the teachings of the Duque de Ahumada! How much you must have suffered to 
see how justice is dishonored, how disorder and violence reigns in the countryside 
and the villages, caused by those delinquents who you arrested only the day 
before!”
Further flattering the institutional pride of the Civil Guard, Franco ended by stating that 
“your efforts and those of this heroic Army that we have raised, united with the impulses 
of so many honorable citizens, will crown our determination, and we will create a Spain 
that is great and worthy of having sons such as yourselves.”10 Given the actions of many
9 Quoted in Francisco Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, Vol. 5 (Madrid, 1984), pp. 179-180. 
Slightly different wording, with an explict reference to the rebellion being against the Government of the 
Republic, can be found in Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Munoz, Politicay guerra civil en Almeria (Almeria, 
1986), pp. 109-110.
10 Quoted in Miguel Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid durante la Guerra”, in Fernando Martinez 
de Banos Carrillo (ed.), Guerra Civil: Madrid (Zaragoza, 2006), p. 258.
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civil guards in the intervening days between the two messages, it would seem that Franco 
and the military rebels made the more compelling argument.
Part of this success was the vague political character of uprising. The rebels argued that 
their actions were not against the Republic, but rather the government of the Popular 
Front that was destroying the Patria. This allowed for those in the military and the Civil 
Guard who were alienated from the government, yet hesitant about breaking discipline 
and without strong political convictions, to feel justified in joining the revolt. This 
strategy, a necessity given the variety of political loyalties within the military and 
security forces, was not a new one. The principle organizer of the rebellion, General 
Emilio Mola, had stipulated in his memorandum of 5 June 1936 that the forthcoming 
military uprising would install a “republican dictatorship”, which looked for inspiration 
not only from the previous dictatorship of Primo de Rivera but also from the (republican) 
military dictatorship of Pilsudski in Poland, and not explicitly from Italian fascism. The 
memorandum concluded that the newly-established military directory “will guarantee no 
change in the republican regime during its administration”, its principle goal being the 
establishment of “a strong and disciplined state”.11 This rhetorical continuity with the 
existing regime was also found in the public statements of various rebel officers as they 
declared martial law, including General Franco.12 As civilian politicians seemed unable 
to take the necessary measures to deal with the disorder and the presumed revolutionary 
threat, it was left to the Army, and by extension, the Civil Guard, to “save” the Republic.
11 Quotations from Payne, Collapse of the Spanish Republic, p. 313.
12 Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography (London, 1993), p. 150.
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Indeed, a significant sector of civilian public opinion clamoured for the military to take 
exactly this step.
As such, in those places were the Right was strongest, the rebels appeared to be reflecting 
the “national will”. It has been noted that the initial wave of rebel victories roughly 
corresponded to the electoral successes of the Right in the previous elections.13 In such 
places, it was a relatively easy step for civil guards to join the rebellion, even when this 
meant disobeying the direct orders of their commanding officers. Perhaps the most 
extreme example of this was in Navarra, a redoubt of radical right-wing sentiment. The 
military commander of Pamplona was none other that General Emilio Mola, the 
“Director” of the military conspiracy. Moreover, Pamplona was located in the heartlands 
of the Carlists, a reactionary group that had dominated Navarra for a century and since 
1931 had been training thousands of its supporters for a military conflict with the 
“atheistic” Republic. The command of the Navarrese Civil Guard garrison had been left 
vacant since the end of April after its previous commander was suspected to be colluding 
with the military conspirators and then transferred to the command of the less significant 
garrison of Soria. After a visit of the Director-General of Security, Alonso Mallol, to 
Pamplona in May, the authorities in Madrid felt that something had to be done to halt the 
flurry of conspiratorial activity there. Major Jose Rodriguez-Medel Briones was put in 
charge of the Pamplona garrison on 6 June 1936, despite not being of sufficient rank to 
hold such a post. Rodriguez-Medel, of no known political affiliation, knew he was 
fighting an uphill battle as his own men were enthusiastic supporters of the conspiracy,
13 Preston, Franco, p. 147.
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yet he believed that in the last instance their duty to defend the legally-constituted 
government would override their personal sentiments.
Events would prove his optimism to be misplaced. On 18 July, General Mola summoned 
Rodriguez-Medel to his office. Mola told him of his intention to join the rebellion, and 
requested that the Major do the same. Rodriguez-Medel declined, and retorted that he 
could count on the Civil Guard under his command to obey his orders to resist the rebels: 
“The Civil Guard will stand by the Government. Now and always I will defend the 
Republican Government as the constitutional power. That is my position.” Upon leaving 
Mola’s office, Major Rodriguez-Medel went to the Civil Guard barracks and gathered his 
men. He told them of his intention to stage a strategic retreat to the nearby city of 
Tafalla, from where they would confront the rebel column on its way to Madrid. Upon 
hearing their commander’s plans, the Civil Guard garrison mutinied, killing Major 
Rodriguez-Medel in the ensuing struggle, and then put themselves at the orders of 
General Mola. Shortly thereafter, Major Martinez Friera, Rodriguez-Medel’s second-in- 
command, and Captain Ricardo Fresno Urzaiz, both loyal to the government were 
arrested. They were executed on the 26 August 1936.14 The rest of the province soon 
followed Pamplona’s lead, almost in a state of exaltation, with shouts of “Long Live 
Christ the King!”, and formed columns for a march on Madrid.15 This included the 
Commandant of the Civil Guard company stationed in Tafalla, Captain Jesus Miranda
14 The most detailed account of the events in Navarra can be found in Gonzalo Jar Couselo, ‘La Guardia 
Civil en Navarra (18-07-1936)’, Principe de Viana, No. 192 (1991), 281-323. The Rodriguez-Medel 
quotation is on page 305. For more information about Captain Fresno Urzaiz, a decorated veteran of the 
Moroccan wars with no apparent political loyalties, see Jose Luis Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil 
(Madrid, 2006), pp. 40-41.
15 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 228-229; Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and 
Revenge (London, 2006), p. 102.
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Guerra. He demonstrated initially a disposition to follow the lead of his commanding 
officer and defend the government, but after learning of the fate of Rodriguez-Medel 
decided to join the rebels lest he suffer a similar fate.16
Events in Pamplona graphically illustrated the fate of those who attempted to hold back 
the tide of hatred which was given full expression once the military rebellion began.
There were those that attempted to pull Spain back from the brink, to attempt belatedly to 
avoid a national disaster through compromise. Diego Martinez Barrio was one such 
person. While workers gathered in the Puerta del Sol demanding weapons, Martinez 
Barrio -  who had replaced Casares Quiroga as Prime Minister in the early hours of the 
19th -  telephoned Mola directly to offer the latter the post of War Minister in a new 
government. The rebel general replied, “You have your followers and I have mine. If we 
were to seal a bargain, we should be betraying our ideals and our men. We should both 
deserve to be lynched.” Perhaps thinking of Rodriguez Medel, Mola explained that given 
the state of excitement in Pamplona, “If I tell these men now that I have made an 
arrangement with you, the first head to roll would be mine. The same would happen to 
you in Madrid. Neither of us can control our masses.”17
With Navarra in the hands of the rebels, some of the neighbouring provinces followed 
suit. In Alava, the commander of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Mario Torres Rigal declared 
rather misleadingly that “he and his men were willing to defend to the death the 
Government of the Republic”. When the Provincial Governor called upon him to honour
16 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, p. 362.
17 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 217-218.
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his word, he responded that he had already placed himself and his men at the orders of 
the military commander of the province, General Garcia Benitez. Indeed, Lt. Col. Torres 
Rigal and most of his officers were involved in the conspiracy, led in Alava by a close 
friend of General Franco: Lt. Col. Alonso Vega.18 The Civil Guard in Soria was under 
the command of Lt. Col. Ignacio Muga Diaz, who had been transferred there from 
Pamplona back in April due to concerns about his loyalties. Lt. Col. Muga proved these 
concerns to be well-founded. After a disobeying and countermanding a series of orders 
by the provincial governor, Muga finally declared for the rebellion as Mola’s columns 
approached Soria. Nonetheless, lack of initiative shown by Muga and his subordinates 
angered Colonel Garcia Escamez, who was leading the rebel force, and he soon dismissed 
Muga from his command once a replacement officer was available.19 In Logrono, the 
Provincial Commander (Jefe de Comandancia) of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Manuel 
Fernandez Valdes, was also loyal to the Popular Front government, and like Rodriguez- 
Medel, was out of synch with the attitudes amongst his men. On the morning of the 19th 
he went to interview the military commander General Victor Carrasco. Carrasco had 
already made arrangements with other officers, including some of Fernandez Valdes’ 
own subordinates, to join the rebellion and declare martial law. When the Civil Guard 
officer arrived at his office, Carrasco relieved him of his command and replaced 
Fernandez Valdes with his second in command, Civil Guard Major Pedro Parellada
18 Santiago de Pablo Contreras, La segunda Republica en Alava: eleciones, partidos y  vida politico (Lejona, 
1989), pp. 277-278; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, pp. 436-437, 439nl7.
19 Bl&zquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 404-406; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 312- 
313.
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Garcia, who was active in the conspiracy. Fernandez Valdes was arrested and imprisoned 
in Pamplona.20
The loyalty and fate of Fernandez Valdes in Logrono was shared by the commanding 
officers of other large cities of the conservative north: Burgos, Valladolid and Leon. The 
old ecclesiastical city of Burgos was considered by President Manuel Azana to be “the 
most dangerous city for [the government]”,21 and was also the seat of the 12th Regiment 
of the Civil Guard. Both the Regimental Commander (Jefe del Tercio), Colonel Luis 
Villena Ramos, and the Provincial Commander for Burgos, Lt. Col. Eduardo Dasca 
Garcia, were reputed to have contacts with the conspiratorial cell in the city 22 
Nonetheless, neither of them joined the rebellion, perhaps out of discipline to the 
Commander of the Sixth Military Division, General Domingo Batet. The efforts of the 
Provincial Governor to arm the workers in defense of the government were blocked by 
the wives of the Civil Guard garrison, who exclaimed (not without reason) that doing.so 
would be a death sentence for their husbands.23 These same wives, and their children, 
chided publicly the hapless Dasca back at the casa-cuartel when he attempted to prevent 
his men from joining the rebellion by reminding them of “the loyalty dutifully owed to 
the constituent power”. His pleas went ignored. Indeed, his subordinates, foreseeing the 
likely attitude of their commanding officer, had secretly moved and hidden the arms
20 Maria Cristina Rivero Noval, Politico y  sociedad en La Rioja durante el primer franquismo, 1936-1945 
(Logrono, 2001), pp. 85-90; Joaquin Arraras Iribarren, Historia de la Cruzada Espahola, Vol. Ill (Madrid, 
1940), pp. 500-502; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 462-464.
21 The Conde de Vallellano was said to have remarked to Dr. Marcel Junod of the Red Cross that “The very 
stones here are Nationalist”: Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 227.
22 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, p. 21.
23 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 227.
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deposit kept in the garrison.24 Abandoned by his men, and the rebels in control of the city, 
Dasca, Villena and another loyalist officer, Captain Enrique Marin Valenzuela, were all 
relieved of their commands and arrested. Dasca and Marin Valenzuela shared the fate of 
their loyalist colleagues in equally conservative Pamplona and were murdered on 9 
August 1936 and buried in unmarked graves in the Burgos cemetery. Colonel Villena, 
who had taken no active part in the resistance to the rebellion, was sentenced to six years 
imprisonment.25
In Valladolid, subsequently awarded the title of “Capital of the Uprising”26 and the 
wartime location of the Inspectorate-General of the Civil Guard for the Nationalist Zone, 
the Provincial Commander of the Civil Guard was Lieutenant Colonel Eusebio Ruiz 
Guerra, who was loyal to the government. Ruiz Guerra was an isolated figure amongst 
his garrison, as most of his subordinates were in favour of the rebellion. Worst still for Lt. 
Col. Ruiz Guerra was the fact that his superior officers, Commander of the 8th Civil 
Guard Regiment Colonel Francisco Lopez Zapata, and the Commander of the Third 
Division of the Civil Guard, General Federico de la Cruz Boullosa, were also in favour of 
the rebel cause. General De la Cruz Boullosa was the only general within the corps to
onopenly support the uprising. While General de la Cruz Boullosa initially took a rather
24 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 187-188; Joaquin Arraras Iribarren, Historia de la 
Cruzada, III, p. 407.
25 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 21-23. Salas Larrazabal claimed that Villena was also “taken 
for a ride” (paseado): Ramon Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular de la Republica, Vol. I 
(Madrid, 1973), p. 121. In fact, Villena died at the age of 72 of natural causes in 1947.
26 Jesus Maria Palomares Ibafiez, La Guerra Civil en la Ciudad de Valladolid (Valladolid, 2001), pp. 7 & 
11.
27 There seems to be some confusion about the exact role of De la Cruz Boullosa in the uprising. Arraras 
claims that the General attempted to prevent his troops from joining the rebellion: Arraras Iribarren, 
Historia de la Cruzada, III, p. 318. Aguado Sanchez sidesteps this by shifting the focus to the more active 
role played by the junior officers of the Burgos Civil Guard garrison: Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, 191-
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aloof position as the rebellion unfolded, the same could not be said for Lt. Col. Ruiz’s 
second-in command, Major Mariano Salinas Bellver, who was the uncle of the Artillery 
Captain Luis Salinas Garcia -  one of the officers who participated in the failed rebellion 
in Jaca in December 1930. After his commanding officer demonstrated himself 
unwilling to join the rebellion and helped the provincial governor escape capture, Salinas 
arrested Lt. Col. Ruiz Guerra and took command of the Valladolid Civil Guard. This 
open act of insubordination went unquestioned by the city’s garrison, the vast majority of 
which supported the rebel cause. Lt. Col. Ruiz Guerra was later court marshalled for 
military rebellion, alongside a small handful of other loyal civil guards in Valladolid.29 
Indeed, perhaps with an eye for further promotion, Major Salinas denounced his former 
immediate superior to Colonel Lopez Zapata, claiming that the lieutenant colonel was in 
active contact with left-wing militants.30 It appears that venal motives worked alongside 
ideological ones when dealing with the fluid situation within the Nationalist Zone. 
Nonetheless, despite the relatively smooth capture of key buildings in the city, it took the 
rebels twenty-four hours to bring the Socialists to heel.31
In Leon, another of the great cathedral cities of north-central Spain, Lt. Col. Santiago 
Alonso Munoz found himself as isolated as his fellow provincial commanders in 
Valladolid and Burgos. Alonso Munoz was reputed to have links with the Left
192. Blazquez Miguel reports that De la Cruz Boullosa quickly adhered to the rebellion once martial law 
was declared in Burgos: HMGCE, I, p. 183. It would seem that De la Cruz Boullosa’s sympathies lay with 
the rebels, despite his relative inaction, as he was subsequently rewarded with the post of Director General 
of the Civil Guard within the Nationalist zone: Francisco Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, 
Vol. VI (Madrid, 1985), p. 110.
28 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, p. 365.
29 Ignacio Martin Jimenez, La Guerra Civil en Valladolid, 1936-1939 (Valladolid, 2000), pp. 75-77 & 134- 
135.
30 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 363-364.
31 Preston, Spanish Civil War, p. 102, Hugh Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 229.
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Republicans and enjoyed good relations with the local Socialists, perhaps a necessity 
given the strong union organizations in the mining areas. This apparent friendliness with 
the representatives of the Popular Front ran against the grain of his officers and men, who 
found a counter-balance in Alonso Munoz’s newly appointed second-in-command, Major 
Luis Medina Montoro. Major Medina was transferred from Jaen over suspicions of his 
loyalty to the government, yet far from diminishing the damage Medina could do, his 
presence in the Leon galvanized those men disaffected with their commanding officer. 
Thus, when Lt. Col. Alonso Munoz first directed his men to attack the military rebels 
holed up in the Infantry garrison, and then attempted to comply with the government’s 
orders to arm the workers, insubordination broke out amongst his men and they forthwith 
joined the rebels en masse.32 Meanwhile, in neighbouring Palencia, the rebels were aided 
by the absence of the Provincial Commander of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Ramon Franch 
Alisedo. Paradoxically, Franch was called to Madrid over concerns about the loyalty of 
his men. This left his second-in-command, Major Fernando Marti Alvaro, who was one 
of the principal conspirators in Palencia, in charge of the province when the rebellion 
broke out. As a result, Palencia was easily won for the insurgents.33 Despite their rapid 
victory, the rebel civil guards and soldiers remained on alert as they expected militias of 
miners from the north of the province and also from Asturias to converge and overwhelm 
their positions. Fortunately for the insurgents, events in Oviedo -  to be described below 
-  saved them from this scenario.34
32 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 268-269; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 529.
33 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 189-190.
34 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 229-230.
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With the larger garrisons and principal commands of Valladolid, Leon and Burgos in the 
hands of the rebels, it was natural that other provinces in conservative Castilla would fall 
in line, particularly as their commanders were all supporters of the Alzamiento Nacionol. 
Once the rebels were in control of Valladolid, they contacted their colleagues in the 
neighbouring provinces, such as Zamora and Salamanca, which quickly declared for the 
rebellion, and with the full support of the Civil Guard took control with ease.35 In 
Segovia, the insurgents, led by Civil Guard Major Joaquin Espana Cantos, received the 
support of the Mayor and were then applauded by pro-rebel crowds.36 In Avila, the 
Provincial Commander was Lt. Colonel Romualdo Almoguera Martinez, and he was the 
third person to hold that position since February 1936. Although sent to the province by 
Inspector-General Pozas explicitly to purge disloyal elements from both within his own 
men and the military garrison, Almoguera felt that his hands were tied given that he had 
only occupied his post a day or two beforehand. As such, he deferred all decision making 
to one of his assistants, Captain Chicote, who was one of die leaders of the conspiracy in 
the province. Soon thereafter, martial law was declared and a contingent of Civil Guards, 
led by Captain Julio Perez Perez -  who participated in the sanjurjada and was a member
_ ' i n
of the UME -  captured the provincial government building.
This domino effect was also evident in Galicia. La Coruna had the most important 
garrison, as well as some of the larger cities and towns of the region. The primary go-
35 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 192-193 & 198-199 respectively. For Salamanca, see also Santiago 
L6pez Garcia and Severiano Delgado Cruz, “Que no se olvide el castigo: la represion en Salamanca durante 
la guerra civil”, in Ricardo Robledo (ed.), Esta salvaje pesadilla: Salamanca en la guerra civil espahola 
(Barcelona, 2007), pp. 103-107.
36 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 192-193; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 210- 
211 .
37 Arraras Iribarren, Historia de la Cruzada, III, pp. 382-386; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia 
Civil, V, pp. 240-242.
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between in the province was Civil Guard Captain Jose Ranal Lorenzo, and the majority of 
middle-ranking officers were sympathetic to the conspiracy, even if they did not count 
amongst the ringleaders. Their ranks were bolstered by the presence of Lt. Col. Gonzalez 
Valles and Lt. Col. Benito de Haro Lumbreras, both on indefinite leave by government 
decree after the events of 14-16 April. Gonzalez Valles, it should be remembered, was 
the officer who directly disobeyed government orders regulating the burial of the slain 
Civil Guard lieutenant, Anastasio De los Reyes. De Haro was previously Provincial 
Commander of La Coruna, but was dismissed and briefly imprisoned after the 
government discovered his involvement in a planned coup.38 Against this significant 
group of rebel sympathizers were the three highest-ranking commanders of the province: 
the Commander of the 6th Civil Guard Regiment, Colonel Ramon Perez Tello, the 
Provincial Commander Lt. Col. Jose Clares Cruz and his second-in-command, Major 
Jose Alvarez Rios. As occurred in many other places, these commanding officers found 
themselves isolated once the insurgents took action -  though Clares Cruz did manage to 
help the provincial governor escape the clutches of the rebels — were relieved of their 
commands and then court marshalled. Lt. Col. Gonzalez Valles was then named Chief of 
the Delegation of Public Order, whilst Clares Cruz and Alvarez Rios were sentenced to 
twelve years imprisonment.39
In Pontevedra the Civil Guard played a prominent role not only in the preparations for the 
rebellion, but also in neutralizing the groups of workers arriving in the provincial capital
38 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 259.
39 Carlos Fernandez Santander, Alzamiento y  guerra civil en Galicia, 1936-1939, Vol. I (La Coruna, 2000), 
pp. 80-85; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 366-367; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 490-494.
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to frustrate their plans.40 Curiously, even though the Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. 
Ricardo Macarron Piudo was sympathetic to the rebellion, and was made Chief of Public 
Order in its wake, his lack of initiative during the preparations for the Alzamiento, as well 
as some apparently dubious actions afterwards, led to an official investigation by the 
Nationalist authorities. The product of these was Macarron’s explusion from the corps 
for “desafecto al Regimen”.41 Conspirators in Orense, amongst whose numbers were 
members of the Civil Guard, declared martial law upon receiving news of events in La 
Coruna and orders to do so from Valladolid. Prior to this, the Civil Guard refused 
outright the order from the Provincial Governor to hand over their weapons deposits to 
the workers, as happened in many other provinces.42 In Lugo, martial law was declared 
via the radio transmitter of the Civil Guard once news arrived that La Coruna had just 
done so. The Provincial Commander, Major Fernando Alavarez Holguin then led his 
men out to secure the province for the rebel cause 43
Outside these areas of right-wing strength, the situation facing Civil Guard, military and 
civilian conspirators was more complicated, and thus produced a greater variety of 
reactions and results. In Madrid, arguably the most important city for rebels and loyalists 
alike, the situation remained somewhat confused at first. Not waiting on events, 
Inspector-General Pozas, who was soon to be made Interior Minister, swung into action. 
Upon receiving news of the rebellion in Morocco, he reinforced the Presidential Guard
40 Fernandez Santander, Alzamiento y guerra civil en Galicia, I, pp. 278-279; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, 
pp. 520-521.
41 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 368-369.
42 Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 263-264; Fernandez Santander, Alzamiento y  
guerra civil en Galicia, I, pp. 260-261; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 514-515.
43 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 262; Fernandez Santander, Alzamientoy guerra 
civil en Galicia, I, pp. 234-235; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 508.
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and, to bolster the nearly 2300 civil guards normally stationed there, ordered the 
concentration of 3000 men from those provinces bordering that of Madrid in an effort to 
“save the Republic”. Though, given that some of these provinces declared for the rebels, 
only a part of this number arrived in the national capital.44 Nonetheless, all of Pozas 
immediate subordinates, the two Regimental Commanders (Colonel Fernando Nunez 
Llanos and Colonel Eduardo Agustfn Sierra) and the two Provincial Commanders (one 
each for the city and province of Madrid: Lt. Col. Sebastian Royo Salsamendi and Lt. Col. 
Luis Andres Mann) were loyal, as was Pozas’ replacement as Inspector when he 
occupied the Interior Ministiy, General Jose Sanjurjo y Rodriguez Arias 45
The plans of the military conspirators in Madrid were that units of the Civil Guard would 
control loyalist crowds whilst the rebels took control of key buildings and awaited 
reinforcements. Yet, in the Civil Guard garrison of Bellas Artes (mobile regiment), only 
one of its four officers demonstrated any willingness to fulfill this role. Many were 
hesitant to breach discipline with Pozas, and they also had some reservations about the 
viability of the rebel plan for the conquest of Madrid. Their reluctance was justified 
given the strength and organization of pro-government elements and the contrasting 
ramshackle structure of the conspiracy in the nation’s capital.46 In the afternoon of the 
19th, General Fanjul and two Falangist leaders failed to convince the officers of the 
Parque Movil and the garrisons of Bellas Artes and Garcia de Paredes to bring their men 
out into the streets to reinforce the rebel Army units of Campamento as these attempted to
44 Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid durante la Guerra”, pp. 261-262.
45 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 308. Apparently General Sanjurjo y Rodriguez Arias was the first ever 
General of the Civil Guard to occupy the post of Inspector-General; previously this honor had been 
bestowed exclusively to generals from the Army.
46 Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 232-233.
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join up with those in the Montana barracks. This refusal significantly weakened the 
chances of success of the rebellion in Madrid.47
A company of Civil Guards were sent by Pozas to distribute to the militias the 5000 rifles 
stored in the Artillery Park. Yet, most of the bolts for these rifles were deposited in the 
Montana barracks, whose commander, Colonel Serra, refused to hand over. Serra 
believed that the rebel cause in Madrid was not lost, as several Civil Guard officers who 
sympathized with the rebellion gave him the impression that the arrival of the 3000 civil 
guards ordered by Pozas to concentrate in the capital could actually work in the 
insurgents’ favor as many of these would probably join forces with the military rebels. 
Given the masses of loyalist militias that were converging on the Montana barracks 
seeking the release of the bolts for their rifles, Minister of War General Castello ordered 
two Infantry companies and one Calvary squadron of Civil Guard to the scene to 
maintain order. Of the two officers put in command of this force, Major Jose Bretano 
Ramos dutifully fulfilled his orders, while Captain Antonio Bermudez de Castro Blanco -  
the commander of the Calvary squadron -  was less enthusiastic and held friendly 
conversations with the rebel officers inside the Montana barracks. While Bermudez did 
not join them on that day, he did cross over to the Nationalists in January 1938. On the 
morning of the 20th, the government decided to act and ordered the attack of the barracks. 
The role of the Civil Guard units there was to protect those soldiers captured as prisoners. 
Yet, the resistance and treachery of those inside the barracks resulted in the massacre of
47 L6pez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid durante la Guerra”, pp. 262-263.
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its inhabitants by the angered militias.48 Fearing that they would suffer a similar fate, 
those rebels holed up in the Conde Duque barracks surrendered peacefully to those civil 
guards, commanded by Major Alfredo Semprun Ramos, sent to take them prisoner 49
The situation in Madrid had rippling effect on the course of events in several of its 
neighbouring provinces. In Guadalajara the Provincial Commander was Lt. Col. Ricardo 
Ferrari Ayora, who was ostensibly loyal to the government, as was his assistant, Captain 
Jose Rubio Garcia. Nonetheless, his second-in-command, Major Enrique Pastor 
Rodriguez and the majority of the officers and men did not share their position. Despite 
knowing of the failure of the rebellion in Madrid and in nearby Alcala de Henares, Major 
Pastor and the other officers refused to countenance the arming of the workers, 
particularly as they expected that fortunes would soon change with the anticipated arrival 
of Mola’s columns descending from the north. Thus, when Lt. Col. Ferrari attempted to 
comply with the government’s orders to arm the workers, he faced the determined 
resistance of Major Pastor and the rest of the officers, who threatened to remove him 
from command if he tried to distribute the weapons. Faced with this daring display of 
insubordination, Ferrari hesitated and eventually switched sides once his subordinates 
began to occupy the city. Captain Rubio Garcia proved more resolute in his defense of 
the government. When called upon by the provincial governor to defend the Gobiemo 
Civil, Rubio Garcia organized a contingent of civil guards to reinforce those Security 
Guards already stationed in the building. Nonetheless, his men deserted him with the 
approach of the rebels, and Rubio was arrested. Yet, the rebels’ victory was ephemeral as
48 Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid durante la Guerra”, pp. 263-266; Preston, Spanish Civil War, 
pp. 111-112; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 233-234.
49 Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid durante la Guerra”, p. 266
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Guadalajara was soon recaptured by government forces proceeding from Madrid that 
considerably outnumbered the insurgents, with Captain Rubio playing the role of 
intermediary between the two groups as the rebels took refuge in the casa-cuartel of the 
Civil Guard. After several hours of resistance, Major Pastor and his men surrendered.50
The rebels in Toledo had better luck, relatively speaking. The Provincial Commander of 
the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Pedro Romero Basart, and his second-in-command, Major 
Rafael Diaz Gomez, were both involved in the military conspiracy. The military garrison 
of Toledo only numbered some 250 men, which made the Civil Guard, composed of 
nearly 700 men, of supreme importance to the potential success of any attempted 
rebellion in the province. Colonel Jose Moscardo, being the highest-ranking official 
present in Toledo at the time, took charge of the situation, attempting to buy time whilst 
the forces of the Civil Guard converged on the provincial capital. Once these had arrived, 
and the necessary preparations made, Moscardo openly declared for the rebellion on 21 
July and the rebels took up defensive positions in the Alcazar, which served as a Military 
academy, and adjacent Provincial Government building. Of the 1300 people holed-up in 
the Alcazar, including women and children, the majority of the combatants were civil 
guards. As loyalist and militia forces flooded into the city, the rebels’ position looked 
bleak as any potential relief columns were still considerably far away, and thus in no 
position to offer assistance any time soon. Nonetheless, by taking the precaution of 
concentrating the Civil Guard in the city of Toledo itself, as well as the formidable 
defense afforded by the Alcazar, the rebels were able to withstand a long and difficult
50 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 182-186; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 363- 
366.
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siege until columns of Franco’s Army of Africa were able to relieve them in the end of 
September. The successful defense of Toledo entered into the legends of the Nationalist 
cause, much to the benefit of Franco himself, as well as being an embarrassment of sorts 
for the Popular Front government.51
Similar to the situation in Toledo, rebels in the province of Cuenca, which lacked a 
proper military presence, were dependent on the loyalties of the Civil Guard, which 
numbered nearly 500 men. Yet, the key difference was the attitude of the provincial 
commanders of the corps, who in the case of Cuenca was Lt. Col. Francisco Garcia de 
Angela San Roman. Garcia de Angela was apparently sympathetic to conspiracy, yet 
maintained ambiguous attitude when rebellion actually broke out, despite the enthusiasm 
of many of his subordinates for the insurgents. This was dictated by events in Madrid, as 
well as the fact that two of Garcia de Angela’s closest subordinates, Second Lieutenant 
Julio Fernandez Gomez and Captain Alfredo Mari Clerigues, were convinced republicans. 
Garcia de Angela’s caution translated into relative inaction on the part of his men, which 
was enough to assure that Cuenca remained in the government’s sphere of influence. In 
the last week of July, all the forces of the province were ordered to concentrate in the 
capital, yet the purpose of this -  other than potentially to reduce friction with local 
militias in the various towns and villages -  was not clear. Nonetheless, Cuenca remained 
in the government’s hand until the very end of the Civil War. Lt. Col. Garcia de Angela
51 Gabriel Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton, NJ, 1967), pp. 271-273; 
Preston, Spanish Civil War, pp. 128-133; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 342-346. The importance of 
this event to the Civil Guard, and particularly the corps’ sometimes overlooked role in it, can be seen by the 
fact that a whole chapter is dedicated to the event in the semi-official history of Aguado Sanchez: Historia 
de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 215-238. A detailed, though somewhat fictionalized, account can be found in 
Cecil Eby, The Siege o f the Alcazar (London, 1966).
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was called to Madrid on 2 August, being replaced by Lt. Fernandez Gomez as provincial 
commander, and was imprisoned due to the ambiguity in his loyalty to the Popular Front 
government and the defection of a large number of his men on their way to Teruel. 
Another GC officer, Captain Carmelo Martinez, who was active behind the scenes in 
trying to initiate the rebellion in Cuenca, was also arrested.
The Provincial Commander of nearby Ciudad Real, Lt. Col. Rafael Lopez Montijano, 
wanted nothing to do with the military rebellion, though many of his officers, particularly 
his second-in-command Major Valero Perez Ondategui, were sympathizers. In the 
company command station at Damiel, Captain Antonio Torres Garcia wanted to join the 
rebellion at the first opportunity, but the right moment never materialized. Lt. Felix Prats 
y Prats, Line Commandant in Manzananes, concentrated the 30 men under his command, 
yet in the end felt the situation militated against joining the rebellion. His colleague Lt. 
Elias Fernandez Utrilla in Tomelloso had more initiative, yet his pluck ended up costing 
him his life. At any rate, given the position of Lt. Col. Lopez Montijano and the timidity 
of those officers stationed in provincial command, no assistance was afforded to potential 
rebels. When a group of Carlists went to the Civil Guard garrison on the 18th looking 
for arms, their request was denied “resolutely” by the officers within. Later, when local 
Falangists made a similar request to supply them with weapons (as opposed to giving 
them to the Popular Front militias), they were not only rebuffed, but arrested by the Civil 
Guard.53
52 Ana Belen Rodriguez Patino, La guerra civil en Cuenca, 1936-1939 (Madrid, 2003), pp. 64-76; Aguado 
Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, pp. 186-187.
53 Francisco Alia Miranda, La guerra civil en retaguardia: Conjlictoy revolucion en la provincial de 
Ciudad Real, 1936-1939 (Ciudad Real, 1994), pp. 65-71; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 353-354.
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Albacete, like Ciudad Real and Cuenca, did not possess a proper military presence within 
its provincial borders and thus any rebel initiative would necessarily need to be supported 
by the Civil Guard. The events of Yeste in May 1936 had engendered a mood of 
indignation against the Popular Front Government and Inspector-General Pozas. The 
Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. Fernando Chapuli Anso, went to Madrid to protest 
against the proceedings being brought against his men over the incident, but reportedly 
was rebuffed by Pozas, who allegedly would not meet with Chapuli.54
The leading conspirator in Ciudad Real was Chapuli’s second-in-command, Major Angel 
Molina Galano, whose efforts were consented to by his superior officer. In the wake of 
the murder of Calvo Sotelo, Molina began to order the concentration of the provincial 
forces to the city of Albacete. This precipitous move awakened the suspicion of the 
provincial governor, who asked Chapuli to provide an explanation for this move by his 
subordinate. Lacking any orders from conspirators elsewhere, Chapuli had to reverse the 
order. Once news arrived of the rebellion in Melilla, Chapuli himself issued the order for 
the concentration of forces in the capital as well as in the key command posts throughout 
the province. Events then began to force his hand: as Chapuli was mobilizing his men for 
the capture of the province, Pozas telegrammed an order for him to sent 150 guards and 
three officers to Madrid. Chapuli was unsure how to act, and when he consulted the 
commanders of the neighbouring provinces, they counselled “prudence and tact” in 
handling the situation. Yet, his space for manoeuvre was quickly disappearing as the 
provincial governor issued an order in the morning of the 19th to arm the workers, groups
54 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, VI, p. 2.
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of which were arriving in the city. Sensing that the time had come for action, the military 
commander of Albacete, General Martinez Moreno, installed himself in the casa-cuartel 
of the Civil Guard, and that afternoon, he declared martial law. Chapuli and Molina then 
instructed their men to occupy Albacete and the rest of the province, which they did with 
the aid of the small force of Assault Guards stationed there.
While this was being done, Chapuli contacted the commander of the Civil Guard in 
Ciudad Real, which not only possessed a larger contingent of men, but also was the 
location of the headquarters of the 23rd Regiment, under whose jurisdiction Albacete fell. 
As mentioned above, its commanding officer was loyal to the government, which was a 
blow to the insurgent in Albacete, who were finding themselves increasingly 
geographically isolated. Indeed, they were obliged to surrender less than a week later 
when loyalist forces converged on the province to re-establish governmental control.
Once the failure of the rebellion was evident, Chapuli committed suicide. Molina Galano 
and nine of his fellow rebel officers were later executed without trial on 14 August.55
The failure of the rebellion in Albacete was foreseeable as the insurgents dithered all 
along the more important neighbouring provinces of the Levante, thus ensuring that these 
all remained in loyalist hands. The key to the region was Valencia, the Headquarters of 
the 3rd Military Division and the 1st Civil Guard Zone, the commander of which was 
General Luis Grijalvo Celaya, who had promised previously to collaborate with the rebels 
The consignment of Civil Guard in the province of Valencia alone was around 800 men,
55 Manuel Ortiz Heras, Violencia politico en la II Republicay el primer franquismo: Albacete, 1936-1950 
(Madrid, 1996), pp. 64-67; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, VI, pp. 5-20; Blazquez Miguel, 
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potentially a crucial asset for the insurgents. Surprisingly, the local representatives of the 
UME made little effort to include key officers of the Civil Guard during the 
conspiratorial phase of the preparations. The only officer actively involved in these was 
relatively low-ranking Captain Luis Tio Ripoll. While many of the middle and low- 
ranking officers were in favour of the conspiracy, most of their higher-ranking colleagues 
were not willing to carelessly put their careers, and possibly their lives, on the line. The 
commander of the 5th Regiment (also located in Valencia), Colonel Juan Moreno Molina 
was loyal to the government, while the head of the two provincial commands, Lt. Col. 
Marcelino Gomez Plata Mateu and Lt. Col. Ricardo Agromariz Ponce de Leon (one each 
for the city and province of Valencia, respectively), were not men prone to taking risks, 
an attitude shared by their immediate subordinates, Major Adolfo Valcarcel Sampol and 
Captain Adolfo Carretero Parreno. General Salamero Ortiz, Commander of the Second 
Civil Guard Zone (Cordoba), who coincidentally was in Valencia, agreed with the 
general mood of the upper hierarchy. Moreover, amongst their ranks was Captain 
Manuel Uribarri Barutell, a leading member of the UMRA who was sent by Pozas kept a 
close eye on their activities.56
All of this did not bode well for the success of the rebels’ plans. Once news of the 
rebellion in Africa reached Valencia, loyalist forces, with Uribarri at their head, began to 
prepare for the defense of the government whilst the military rebels prevaricated. 
Furthermore, the leader of the influential DRV, Luis Lucia Lucfa, declared that he and his 
party would remain within the bounds of republican legality, thus sowing further
56 Eladi Mainar Cabanes, L ’Algament militar de juliol de 1936 a Valencia (Benifair6 de la Valldigna, 1996), 
pp. 72-75; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 540-543; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, p. 290.
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confusion and pessimism amongst rebel sympathizers amongst the military and security 
forces. The caution of the nominated leader of the rebellion in Valencia, General 
Gonzalez Carrasco, only hampered the chances of its success there. When Gonzalez 
Carrasco wanted to change the plans to include a company of Civil Guards in the 
occupation of the Military Division headquarters, Grijalvo proved unenthusiastic, stating 
that the military must take the first steps. Once this occurred, he promised that “la 
Guardia Civil, a su requerimiento, obedecerla sin vacilar”. The only officer willing to 
take action was Captain Tio Ripoll. As Gonzalez Carrasco drug his feet upon learning of 
events in Barcelona, the conspirators then turned to Grijalvo, who again refused to take 
the initiative, replying that his men “would second the rebellion, but never initiate it”. 
Disappointed, yet undaunted, they then approached General Salamero Ortiz, who also 
declined to take command of the rebellion in Valencia. After several days, the 
momentum was lost and the advantage passed to loyalist elements. After a clash with 
loyalist authorities, General Grijalva was deemed to be insufficiently loyal, and was 
replaced by the commander of the 5th Regiment, Colonel Moreno Molina, and twenty- 
eight Civil Guard officers were then arrested and investigated for their roles in the 
conspiracy. Grijalvo and his son were later murdered on 6 November 1936.57
Events along the Mediterranean littoral followed a somewhat similar pattern. In Murcia, 
the Commander of the 15th Regiment, Colonel Carlos Ochotorena Laborda, and the 
Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. Antonio Borges Fe, were both sympathetic to the 
conspiracy, but unwilling to take the initiative, preferring to second any action by the
57 Mainar Cabanes, L ’Algament militar de juliol de 1936 a Valencia, pp. 75-119; Blazquez Miguel, 
HMGCE, I, pp. 543-548; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, 339-343; Thomas, Spanish 
Civil War, pp. 230-231, 240.
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province’s military garrison. Nonetheless, Major Perfecto Malo Munillo, Borges’ 
second-in-command, and several of the officers were active in the preparations for the 
rebellion. When news of the coup in Melilla was known, Malo Munillo attempted to 
raise the garrison, but failed and was arrested, only to be executed later. Several other 
units attempted to join the rebellion, such as in Lorca, or displayed an “actitud 
expectante”, such as in Cartagena.58 In Alicante, which lacked a well-organized 
conspiratorial cell as well as possessing a number of loyal military officers, Provincial 
Commander Lt. Col. Jose Estany Herrero proved to be another rebel sympathizer who 
decided in the end to remain loyal to the government.59 In Castellon, Lt. Col. Jose 
Estaras Ferro also abandoned his previous inclination towards the conspiracy once the 
rebellion failed to materialize in Valencia. He resisted pressure from local Carlists to 
take action, and when his second-in-command confronted him about his back-peddling, 
Estaras arrested him. Despite his superficial loyalty to the regime, suspicions about him 
remained and he was later executed by militiamen.60
The rebels had better luck in Aragon. As with many other areas, once the status of the 
key city was established, Zaragoza in this case, the surrounding provinces tended to 
follow the same course. Despite the historically strong presence of the CNT in the region, 
the insurgents were bolstered by the fact that almost all of the provinces to their north and 
west were largely under the control of the Nationalists. In this sense, Aragon was a
58 Carmen Gonzalez Martinez, Guerra Civil en Murcia: Un analisis sobre el podery los comportamientos 
colectivos (Murcia, 1999), pp.57-60; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 573-574, 582n38; Aguado Sanchez, 
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frontier region between the conservative north and centre and the more liberal 
Mediterrean east and south. This meant that the rebel cause would have had enough 
social support to encourage disloyalty amongst those civil guards stationed there, whilst 
the presence of a combative CNT only served to push them further down the road to 
rebellion. Indeed, as will be seen elsewhere, the active presence of the CNT more often 
than not would translate into Civil Guard support for the insurgency.
The Commander of the 5th Military Division was the former Inspector-General of the 
Civil Guard, General Miguel Cabanellas, who was also the only Army divisional 
commander to openly join the rebellion. Zaragoza was also the seat of the 7th Regiment 
of the Civil Guard, which covered the provinces of Zaragoza and Huesca, and the 
Regimental and Provincial commanders of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Eulogio Perez Martin 
and Major Julian Lasierra Luis, respectively, were both sympathizers of the conspiracy, 
the latter being a member of the Military Junta. Upon hearing the news of the uprising in 
Morocco and groups of leftists began gathering in the streets, the commander of the Civil 
Guard, Julian Lasierra withdrew his men into their barracks and allowed for some 
Falangists to take refuge in them. The Civil Governor, Angel Vera Coronel, refused the 
requests of local workers’ leaders to distribute arms. His reasoning was threefold: the 
Government expressly prohibited such an action (at least for the moment); Vera feared 
that in doing so would only allow the workers -  led principally by the CNT -  to initiate 
their long-stated goal of social revolution, and thus push definitively the military into 
revolt; and, finally, he trusted that General Cabanellas would remain loyal to the 
government and restrain the rebellious tendencies of his fellow officers.
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As things worsened in Madrid, and permission to distribute arms came through on the 
evening of the 18th, Cabanellas and his fellow officers were making their preparations. 
Evidently there was some concern amongst the principal conspirators that Cabanellas 
would not go through with it, and certainly some of his officers were hesitant to act until 
they were sure of events in Madrid. Yet, Cabanellas had already set himself on a 
collision course with Madrid and set the rebellion in motion. On the night of the 18th a 
group of civil guards, soldiers and assault guards occupied the provincial government 
building, detained Vera Coronel, and Lt. Col. Lasierra assumed the post of Provincial 
Governor. Having the full support of the Civil Guard (which numbered some 120 men in 
the city of Zaragoza, significantly less than the military garrison) and Assault Guard, 
Cabanellas signed and promulgated a decree of martial law and the rebels were able to 
gain control of the city with few problems, despite the strong presence of the CNT in the 
city. Once Zaragoza itself was in rebel hands, most of the province soon fell under their 
control, save the town of Caspe, which offered not only strong resistance, but also was 
vulnerable as columns proceeding from Catalonia towards Zaragoza approached. As 
such, it was abandoned and its civil guards obliged to retreat, though not before their 
commander, Captain Juan Negrete Rabella, was fatally wounded.61
Once martial law was declared in Zaragoza, Huesca followed suit. The Provincial 
Commander, Lt. Col. Manuel Diez Ticio, and his second-in-command, Major Rafael
61 Francisco Escribano Bernal, “Una primavera de conspiraciones”, in Fernando Martinez de Banos Carrillo 
(ed.), Guerra Civil: Aragdn (Zaragoza, 2004), pp. 31-33; Julia Cifiientes Cheuca & Pilar Malvenda Pons, 
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Fernandez de Vega Soto, were both supporters of the conspiracy, the latter being the 
more active and acting as the liaison with the chief military conspirator in the province, 
General Gregorio de Benito. Once the decree of martial law was promulgated, Diez 
Ticio sent his men, under the command of Captain Vicente Garcia Esteban and Captain 
Jesus Bercial Esteban (another officer who was active in the conspiracy), out into the 
streets in support of the military rebels. As in the city of Huesca itself, civil guards were 
the principal protagonists in securing control of the various towns through out the 
province, except in Barbastro, where the military commander managed to keep the local 
units of Civil Guard and Carabineros loyal whilst facing off against a group of rebels. 
Nonetheless, as Huesca was a province with a long border between loyalist and insurgent 
zones, a series of skirmishes and battles ensued between the two opposing sides.
Teruel was a conservative stronghold, yet with a small military garrison of only 12 men 
in the provincial capital. As such, the attitude of the Civil Guard, and somewhat less so 
given their less numbers, the Assault Guard and the Carabineros were of crucial 
importance to deciding the situation in the province. On the 18th of July, Lt. Col. 
Simarro Roig and the commander of the Assault Guard, Lt. Antonio Navarro Gomez, 
were called to the Provincial government building to secure their loyalty to the 
government. Both officers stated that they were “at his disposition to guarantee the 
public order, as was their duty”. The position of the Civil Guard in Teruel remained 
ambiguous at first, given that it belonged to the 7th Regiment of the Civil Guard, whose 
command was in Guadalajara. As such, orders emanating from Guadalajara, which fell
62 Escribano Bemal, “Una primavera de conspiraciones”, pp. 37-40; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la 
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outside the jurisdiction of the 5th Military Division in Zaragoza, contradicted those 
coming from the Aragonese capital. With the declaration of martial law in Zaragoza on 
the 19th, Infantry Major Virgilio Aguado Martinez, with the passive compliance of his 
commanding officer, Lt. Col. Mariano Garcia Brisolara, declared martial law in Teruel. 
As Lt. Col. Simarro was in Alcaniz at that moment, the definitive position of the Civil 
Guard was uncertain. Aguado met with the acting commander, Major Jose Perez del 
Hoyo, who opted to join the rebellion with his men, as did the forces of the Interior 
Ministry police. This decision was not countermanded by Lt. Col. Simarro when he 
returned to the city the next day, and Teruel joined Huesca on the frontier of the 
contending sides.63
If there was a place in Spain where it could be expected that the Civil Guard would be 
anxious to join a movement for “national salvation”, Barcelona certainly would come to 
mind. The mixture of Catalan nationalism and the active presence of the CNT would 
seem like a recipe for fostering disaffection amongst the Civil Guard stationed there. In 
terms of the presence of the corps in the city, Barcelona was the seat of the 5th Civil 
Guard Division, as well as the 3rd and 19th Regiments (one each for the province and 
city of Barcelona, respectively), with a total of around 3000 personnel in the province. 
The Commander of the 5th Division was General Jose Aranguren Roldan, and that of the 
19th Regiment was Colonel Antonio Escobar Huertas. Both men were of conservative
63 Valentin Solano Sanmiguel, Guerra civil: Aragon. Tomo III: Teruel (Zaragoza, 2006), pp. 19-21; Angela 
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temperament and devout Catholics; one of Escobar Huertas’ sons was a member of the 
Falange. Nonetheless, they inspired a certain confidence in Inspector-General Pozas, 
who assigned them to Barcelona in April 1936, transferring their predecessors due to 
suspicions of sedition.64 Colonel Escobar had demonstrated a degree of sympathy for the 
military conspiracy. When asked during an interview with the Director of Public Order 
for the Generalitat, Federico Escofet, as to what his position would be in the event of a 
military coup, Escobar replied
If a military insurrection occurs [...] and has a national character to it, and the 
totality of the Barcelona garrison is out in the streets, this would represent a state 
of opinion. It is natural that in this case it will not be me personally who decides 
what to do, but rather my superiors within the Institute, which whom I will have 
to consult and who will decide the position that we are to take.
Unnerved by this response, Escofet reminded the Colonel that his primary duty was to 
defend the law, and that any military rebellion would be necessarily outside the bounds of 
legality, no matter how many soldiers supported it. While Escobar appeared to have been 
moved by this argument, Escofet maintained a certain level of doubt about Escobar, and 
felt more confident about the loyalty of his colleague, Colonel Francisco Brotons Gomez, 
the commander of the 3rd Regiment.65 Nonetheless, there was little room for 
complacency amongst the authorities in the Generalitat and in Madrid as a significant
64 Manuel Risques Corbella, “Disciplinados en 1936, ejecutados en 1939. Proceso sumarfsimo a la Guardia 
Civil de Barcelona”, Ayer, no. 43 (2001), p. 153.
65 Federico Escofet, De una derrota a una victoria: 6 de octubre de 1934 a 19 de julio de 1936 (Barcelona, 
1984), pp. 196-198.
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number, if not the majority of the Civil Guard officers stationed in Barcelona were 
favourably disposed towards the ideals of the military conspiracy.66
On 19 July 1936 several of the local military garrisons rebelled and were resisted in the 
streets by anarchist militiamen and loyal Assault Guards. As the battle seemed to 
stalemate, members of the Generalitat fretted over what position the Civil Guard would 
take, especially as many of its officers were known right-wingers. It was feared that if 
they joined the rebels, Barcelona could fall to the insurgents. In the midst of these 
doubts, Colonel Escobar arrived in the city center with a large contingent of his men.
One eyewitness described the scene:
‘What’s going to happen now?’ I thought. All morning I’d been fearing a 
trap. The guardia -  the people’s historic enemy! If they came out against 
us [all would be lost]...
At this moment, Colonel Escobar made his position known, saluting 
the Catalan President Luis Companys and shouting “At your orders, seiior 
presidente!”67
In fact, it seems that the Civil Guard acted with considerable reluctance, or at least many
/ I Q  •
of its officers did, with the exception of Aranguren, Escobar and Brotons. While the 
majority of the these officers were soon imprisoned and investigated by the revolutionary
66 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 245; Risques Corbella, “Disciplinados en 1936”, pp. 152-155.
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68 Risques Corbella, “Disciplinados en 1936”, pp. 154-158; Bldzquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 247-263.
The most detailed treatment of the Civil Guard’s role in the military rebellion in Barcelona is Manel 
Risques & Carles Barrachina, Proces a la Guardia Civil (Barcelona, 2001). Risques gives little to no credit 
for the defeat of the rebellion in Barcelona, noting that by the time the Civil Guard arrived at the scene of 
the various skirmishes, the outcome had already been decided. Yet, even if this was the case, and various 
members of the Generalitat argued otherwise, the passive loyalty of the Civil Guard certainly contributed to 
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authorities, Colonel Escobar (General Escobar after 29 May 1937) went on to loyally 
serve the Republic for the rest of the war in various posts, including commander of the 
Army of Extremadura. He was later executed by the Franco regime after the war.69
The failure of the rebellion in Barcelona had its repercussions in the rest of Catalonia. 
Hesitation was the order of the day in Tarragona. Whilst military officers debated 
amongst themselves as to whether or not to act, they were aware of the fact that they 
could not count on the commander of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Arsenio Cabanas 
Fernandez de Castro, who was waiting on events. The Assault Guards were of the same 
mind, and the Carabineros leaning towards supporting the government. With the capture 
of General Goded and his announcement of the failure of the rebellion in Barcelona, 
Cabanas declared for the government. The main posts in the rest of the province also
nc\took a cautious course, waiting on events in Tarragona city, and especially, Barcelona.
The provisional Provincial Commander of Gerona, Major Felipe Moragriega Carvaja, 
was a key member of the conspiratorial nucleus in Gerona. Moragriega knew of the 
rebellion in Morocco through transmission received at the command’s radio, but was 
waiting for the declaration of martial law in Barcelona, which was planned for the 
morning of the 19th. The leading military conspirator, Lt. Col. Antonio Alcubilla Perez 
began dismissing and naming new authorities that morning, but upon receiving news of
71events in Barcelona, the rebels desisted in their efforts, and Moragriega fled to France.
69 ‘Vida y muerte del general Escobar: toda la verdad’, Historia 16, no. 92 (1983), pp. 23-36.
70 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 281-283; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 337.
71 Carlos Rojas, La Guerra en Catalunya (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 56-57; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la 
Guardia Civil, V, pp. 334-336.
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Like his counterpart in Tarragona, Lt. Col. Acacio Sandoval Asensio, the Provincial 
Commander of the Civil Guard in Lerida, hesitated to take any action before being sure 
of the probable success of the rebellion. While Sandoval dithered, Civil Guard 
Lieutenant Jose Sanchez Zamora, who was one of the main conspirators in the province, 
convinced his colleagues to join the insurgents, whilst Civil Guard Major Vicente 
Garchitorena Rigan, usurped command and sent his men out into the streets to aid in the 
securing of the city. Nonetheless, the news of the rebellion’s failure in Barcelona and the 
imminent arrival of a loyalist column to retake the city changed the atmosphere in Lerida. 
Loyalist elements went on the offensive while the rebels lost heart, and the Civil Guard 
was returned to their barracks. Many of rebel officers then were murdered once the city 
was back in loyalist hands.72
While Alava easily fell into rebel hands, the situation in the two northern Basque 
Provinces, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa was more complicated. Despite a strong Socialist 
presence, particularly in Vizcaya, the Basque Country was a deeply Catholic and 
conservative area. Yet, the Spanish Right’s hostility towards anything deemed to 
threaten national unity, which was equally felt by the military insurgents, had pushed the 
Basque Nationalists -  who were more prominent in these two provinces than in Alava, in 
which the Carlists still had a significant following -  into a somewhat uncomfortable 
alliance with a secularizing, liberal Republic. The Provincial Commander of the Civil 
Guard for Vizcaya was Lt. Col. Juan Colinas Guerra. Although Lt. Col. Colinas was
72 Rojas, La Guerra en Catalunya, pp. 54-56; Aguado S&nchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 335- 
336; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 274-276.
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ambiguous in his loyalties, some of his officers were more committed to the Popular 
Front government, such as his second-in-command Major Pedro Cortaire Elizagaray.
Once the military rebellion broke out, Colinas Guerra and his officers put themselves at 
the orders of the provincial governor, and Captain Juan Ibairola Ometa aided with the 
distribution of arms to the workers.73 Captain Ibarrola, like Colonel Escobar, was one of 
the few devout Catholics that loyally served the Popular Front Government throughout 
the war. He went on to command militia units in the Somosierra, fighting alongside 
Valetin Gonzalez, “El Campesino”, as well as Enrique Lister. Ibarrola, who would 
regularly go out in the field dressed in Extremaduran corduroy, was later put in charge of 
the 22nd Corps of the Army of the Levante, but was dismissed in the wake of the coup of 
Colonel Casado in March 1939.74 Nonetheless, not all of Vizcaya’s civil guards were 
stalwarts of the Popular Front. The Line Commandant in Durango passed over to the 
Nationalists when the opportunity presented itself.75 More damaging was the defection of 
Lieutenant Fernando Ledesma Navarro in February 1937, who delivered the defensive 
plans for Bilbao to the Nationalists just as they were about to begin their offensive on the 
city.76 Lt. Col. Colinas, for his part, had the unfortunate distinction of being subjected to 
an investigative inquiry by both the Popular Front and Francoist governments, the latter 
sentencing him to death by firing squad.
73 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 429-431; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 314.
74 Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular, I, p. 238; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 768, 883; 
Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 341-342.
75 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 431.
76 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, p. 202.
77 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, p. 303.
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The split in loyalties in Guipuzcoa would put civil guard against civil guard. The 
Commander of the 13th Regiment, located in San Sebastian, was Colonel Ignacio Lopez 
de Ogallar, who was one of the ringleaders of the conspiracy. On the other hand, the 
Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. Satumino Bengoa Murizabal, and his second-in- 
command, Major Mauricio Garcia Ezcurra, were both loyalists. Colonel Ogallar was 
arrested on the night of the 18th when he, along with the military commander of the 
province, Colonel Leon Carrasco, and a lieutenant colonel of the Carabineros were 
detained when they entered the provincial government building. As a result, Carrasco’s 
second-in-command, Lt. Col. Jose Vallespin Cobian, was named military commander by 
a frustrated Mola, and Vallespin set up several cannons in front of the provincial 
government and demanded its surrender. At this point L t Col. Bengoa sprung into action, 
and mobilized the Civil Guard to defend the government. Meanwhile, a mixed force of 
soldiers, civil guards, assault guards, carabineros numbering around 200 men began to 
secure the strategic points around San Sebastian. The besieged Colonel Ogallar issued 
orders that Bengoa’s commands were not to be followed. This proved fruitless as the 
force led by Bengoa and the Provincial Governor soon regained control of the city, with 
only a small group of rebel civil guards under the command of Captain Julio Ayuso 
Sanchez-Molero holding out in the Gran Casino. The besieging force was led by Major 
Garcia Ezcurra, who managed to gain entry to the Casino and secure the rebels’
<70
surrender.
78 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 315-317; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 442- 
444; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 226-227.
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The matter did not end there. Loyal Civil Guard units under the command of Captain 
Alejo Benaran Garin then proceeded southwards to meet insurgent columns (containing 
civil guards amongst them) marching northwards from Pamplona and Burgos under the 
command of Colonel Beorlegui. Captain Benaran and his men, supported by civilian 
militiamen, put up a dogged resistance in the town of Beasain, but were eventually 
overwhelmed by the rebels. Infuriated that men of the Civil Guard were defending the 
government, and thus retarding his advance, Beorlegui had Benaran and fourteen of his 
men summarily executed. Three days later Ogallar and his fellow rebel officers were 
murdered when the prison in which they were being held was overrun by angry crowds. 
Fifty-two prisoners were killed and buried in unmarked graves alongside another thirty
79persons.
The adjacent province of Santander was another situation in which the loyalty of the 
commander of the Civil Guard, alongside the strength of loyalist forces, spelt the defeat 
for the rebels. While a number of the commanding officers of the Civil Guard had 
pledged themselves to the join the rebellion, their superior officer, Lt. Col. Roman 
Morales Martinez refused the exhortations of the principal military conspirator and 
commander of the province, Colonel Jose Perez Garcia-Argiielles. Morales Martinez’s 
men followed his lead, probably also influenced by the loyalty of the local Assault Guard 
and Carabineros, who already had begun to take defensive positions to prevent the 
insurgents from gaining a foothold in Santander. The rebellion was aborted and Perez
79 Miguel Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en la Guerra, 1936-1939”, Cuadernos de la Guardia Civil, No. 
10 (1994), p. 149; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 343-346.
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Garci'a-Argiielles was arrested, as were several Civil Guard officers implicated in the 
conspiracy.80
Given the hostility, if  not hatred caused in Asturias by the events of October 1934 and
afterwards, it should come as little surprise that the Civil Guard of the province of Oviedo
were ready and willing to join the rebellion. Indeed, the military conspirators were
confident that they would receive the support of the numerous Civil Guard stationed in
Asturias under the command of Lt. Col. Carlos Lapresta Rodriguez, who was also acting
Commander of the 10th Regiment pending the arrival of Colonel Mario Juanes
Clemente.81 Nonetheless, given the proven strength and resilience of the working-class
organizations in the region -  a preoccupation particularly within the Civil Guard since
October 1934 -  meant that the conspirators had to conceive of a more creative strategy if
they hoped to gain control of the region. Indeed, upon receiving news of the military
rebellion in Morocco, the miners had begun already to mobilize. Colonel Antonio
Aranda, the military commander, convinced both the provincial governor and the union
leaders that he was on the side of the government. The fact that no one was quite sure of
Aranda’s political loyalties meant that his professions of loyalty were believed. Indeed,
•  • 82even the men of the Civil Guard were unsure as to what was his real position.
Moreover, he even convinced the miners’ leaders that, with Oviedo secure for the 
government, they should sent their men to Madrid where the greater danger lay for the 
Republic. As columns of miners began to leave for the nation’s capital, orders were
80 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, p. 314; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 452-453; 
Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular, I, p. 101. Some accounts state that Perez Garcia-Arguelles 
refused to rebel: Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 225-226, 226nl.
81 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 474.
82 Ferreras Estrada, Memorias, p. 66.
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given on the 19th to concentrate the various units of the Civil Guard in Oviedo. To 
further confuse the miners, civil guards were ordered to give the clenched fist salute as 
they left for the provincial capital.83 Nonetheless, this move did arouse some suspicion, 
and miners in Sama de Langreo sabotaged the railway line. After a brief skirmish, the 
miners managed to detain a company of civil guards on their way towards Oviedo, who 
were then transferred and murdered in Puerto de San Isidro.84
Just as in Toledo, once the nearly 1200 men of the Civil Guard had arrived in Oviedo, 
they began to occupy the strategic points of the city and Colonel Aranda declared martial 
law. The majority of the Assault Guard, the loyalties of whose personnel was unknown, 
then joined the rebellion. Upon hearing of Aranda’s treachery, enraged miners converged 
on Oviedo, beginning a siege that would last even longer than that of Toledo.85 In Gijon, 
civil guards made common cause with military rebels, suffering long sieges in both the 
Simancas barracks and the casa-cuartel of the Civil Guard. The defenders of the casa- 
cuartel were obliged eventually to surrender after a sustained attack, only to be executed 
thereafter -  another product of the violence and seething hatred engendered by the 
military rebellion. Those civil guards who joined the rebel soldiers in the Simancas 
barracks fared somewhat better in that they were able to hold out until relieved by
o r
Nationalist forces, though not without first suffering many casualties.
83 Jackson, Spanish Republic and Civil War, p. 241.
84 Ibid.; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 476-477.
85 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 474-477; Jackson, Spanish Republic and Civil War, pp. 240-241; 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 225; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 281-304. For a 
personal account by a Civil Guard who participated in the defense of Oviedo, see Ferreras Estrada, 
Memorias, pp. 66-73.
86 Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 272-280; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 477- 
480.
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In the provinces of Extremadura and Andalucia we see the highest proportion of 
insubordination within the corps, as the majority of provincial commanders remained 
loyal, only to be overruled by their subordinates. Given that these two regions also 
constituted amongst the most conflictive areas in Spain, the sense of desperation and 
exasperation amongst civil guards was acute enough to foster this breakdown of the 
much-vaunted internal discipline of the Civil Guard.
At 8 o’clock on the morning of 19 July the military command of Caceres received a 
telegram from Franco instructing them to declare martial law and join the rebellion. The 
Provincial Commander of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. Angel Hernandez Martin, refused to 
second the movement, a position not welcomed by his men. His second-in-command, 
Major Fernando Vazquez Ramos, with the support of Captain Luis Marzal Albarran, 
confronted his superior officer and arrested him. This act of indiscipline was received 
enthusiastically by the rest of the men, and upon the occupation of the provincial
• ,  07government building, Major Vazquez Ramos assumed the post of Provincial Governor.
Upon gaining control of Caceres, Vazquez Ramos began to pressure the Provincial 
Commander in neighbouring Badajoz, Major Jose Vega Cornejo, to declare for the 
rebellion, threatening him with execution if he failed to do so. Like Lt. Col. Hernandez 
Martin, Major Vega Cornejo refused, yet initially he had more luck in controlling his men 
and keeping the capital in government hands. Nonetheless, once the leash was loosened, 
his men began to defect: on 30 July, two detachments of civil guards that Vega Cornejo
87 Julian Chaves Palacios, Violenciapoliticay conflictividad social en Extremadura: Caceres en 1936 
(Badajoz, 2000), p. 136; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, p. 215.
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had sent to Madrid decided to join the rebels as they gathered in Medellin. Realizing the 
tenuous nature of the discipline of his personnel, Vega Cornejo and the authorities 
reduced the armament of the Civil Guard and kept the garrisons under watch.
Determined to stamp out insubordination wherever it flamed up, Vega Cornejo led a 
mixed column of civil guards and militiamen on 3 August to force the surrender of a 
rebel Civil Guard garrison in Frenegal.
Nonetheless, geography was working against Vega Cornejo. As news of the approaching 
insurgent columns reached Badajoz, rebellious elements within the Army and Civil 
Guard units leapt into action, taking as a hostage the military commander of the province, 
Colonel Ildefonso Puigdengolas. Yet, the rebels discovered that they had acted 
prematurely, and were forced to surrender to local loyalist forces. Their fortunes 
improved with the arrival of columns of the Army of Africa under Colonel Yague, who 
then captured the city definitively for the Nationalists. In the savage repression that 
followed, Major Vega Cornejo and his son, Jose Vega Rodriguez (who was a lieutenant
O Q
in the Civil Guard and Line Commandant in Badajoz city), were executed.
The key to controlling western Andalucia was Sevilla. The city was not only one of the 
strongholds of the CNT, but also possessed amongst the most important conspiratorial 
cells. Sevilla’s turbulent history since the proclamation of the Republic made it fertile 
ground for military plots, as the experience of 1932 had shown. Thus, while the 
Commander of the 17th Civil Guard Regiment, Colonel Arturo Blanco Horrillo was loyal,
88 Francisco Espinosa, La columna de la muerte: El avance del ejercito franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz 
(Barcelona, 2003), pp. 24-29,452n81; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 85-86.
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virtually all of his subordinate officers were ready to join the insurgency, including the 
two Provincial Commanders, Lt. Col. Genaro Conde Bujons (Sevilla-city) and Lt. Col. 
Manuel Pereita Vela (Sevilla-province). The fact that Colonel Blanco Horrillo had only 
recently occupied his post only diminished whatever moral authority he could have had 
over his officers and men. According to the Provincial Governor, Jose Maria Varela, 
who did not enjoy good relations with either provincial commander, Lt. Col. Conde 
Bujons played a double game to alleviate any suspicion of his true loyalties. He 
presented himself as a Socialist and fervent supporter of the government -  often 
appearing in the Gobiemo Civil in modest civilian clothes to reinforce this impression -  
but in fact he was a rebel sympathizer. Conde Bunjons even attempted to convince the 
governor of an imminent Communist plot: it was the supposed existence of which was 
used by the conspirators to justify the need to rebel against the government.89 Given that 
both provincial commanders were themselves relatively recent arrivals, the primary links 
with the military conspiracy were Major Santiago Garrigos Bemabeu and Major Ramon 
Rodriguez Diaz, the second-in-commands of the two provincial Civil Guard 
comandancias.
The role of the Civil Guard, as in many places, was to occupy the key buildings and 
neutralize the Assault Guards. As General Quiepo de Llano was arriving in Sevilla to 
initiate the rebellion on 18 July, Pereita and Conde Bujons repeatedly telephoned 
Governor Varela to assure him of their loyalty and that of their men, and even sent a 
token force to the Gobiemo Civil to further obscure their true intentions, employing this
89 Jose Maria Varela Rendueles, Rebelion en Sevilla. Memorias de su gobemador rebelde (Sevilla, 1982), 
p. 77, 113-114.
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deception in order to gain time for the conspirators’ plans to be put in place. In fact, 
when Colonel Blanco Horrillo, who was convalescing in hospital after receiving some 
minor surgery, attempted to resist the rebels and issued orders to his men to protect the 
provincial government building, Lt. Col. Pereita intercepted these and ensured that they 
remained without effect while Major Garrigos rallied the men to the rebel cause. In a 
similar fashion as their colleagues in Asturias, as these forces set out to secure their 
specific objectives, they shouted “Long Live the Republic” and gave the clenched-fist 
salute of the Left in order to confuse Assault Guard units of their intentions. They then 
joined a not insignificant number of rebel soldiers in securing the city for the insurgents.90
A mixed column of civil guards and miners was sent against rebel-held Sevilla from 
neighbouring Huelva, led by the second-in-command of that province’s forces, Major 
Gregorio Haro Lumbreras. The Provincial Commander of Huelva, Lt. Col. Julio Orts 
Flor had given his word to the conspirators that he would join the rebellion, but like some 
of his fellow officers, balked at actually taking this step when the insurgency broke out. 
Instead, he kept his men quartered in their barracks whilst loyalist forces took control of 
the city, a move that angered his subordinates. As such, those that were sent out to 
recapture Sevilla for the government passed over to the rebels as soon as they entered the 
latter city -  though not without disguising their intentions as they passed through those 
sectors still not under the control of the insurgents.
90 Francisco Espinosa Maestre, “Sevilla, 1936: Sublevacion y represion”, in Alfonso Braojos Garrido, 
Leandro Alvarez Rey and Francisco Espinosa Maestre, Sevilla 36: Sublevacion fascistay represion (Sevilla, 
1990), pp. 179-203; Varela Rendueles, Rebelion en Sevilla, pp. 113-115; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la 
Guardia Civil, V, 198-199; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 82-84; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE,
I, pp. 88-97.
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Once Sevilla was comfortably in the hands of the rebels, Quiepo de Llano sent his own 
force out against Huelva. The defense of the latter city was entrusted to the Lieutenant 
Colonel of the Carabineros, Alfonso Lopez Vicencio, who attempted to mobilize those 
forces remaining in Huelva for its defense. The captains and lieutenants of the Civil 
Guard present in the city refused their assistance and passed over to the rebels, declaring 
martial law. Lt. Col. Orts Flor attempted to flee, but was captured and sentenced to death 
at his court martial soon thereafter. In reward for his services, Major Haro was named 
joint Civil and Military Governor of Huelva by Quiepo de Llano and commenced to carry 
out a bloody purge of loyalist elements. This repression was deemed to be so harsh that 
even Francoist authorities in the province would say that Haro “carried out his noble 
mission with excessive zeal”. In one of history’s ironies, in February 1941, after rising to 
the rank of lieutenant colonel and being named Provincial Commander of the Civil Guard 
in Leon, Haro was shot and killed by one of his subordinates.91
The rebels had mixed success in many provinces. In Cadiz, there was little to no civilian 
support for the military rebels. While the Civil Guard, under the command of Lt. Col. 
Vicente Gonzalez Garcia, rallied to their cause, the Assault Guard and Carabineros did 
not. As such, their position was tenuous until the arrival of reinforcements from Africa
09allowed them to gain control of the city. In Almeria, despite Pozas’ orders to only 
receive transmissions coming from government sources in Madrid, the Civil Guard kept 
close tabs on the progress of the uprising, learning of its success in several cities on the
91 Arrar&s Iribarren, Historia de la Cruzada, HI, pp.292-298; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, 
V, Madrid, 1984, pp. 199-202; Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, 51-56; Espinosa Maestre, “Sevilla, 
1936”, pp. 206-208. The quotation is from Espinosa Maestre, La columna de la muerte, p. 255.
92 Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 124-127; Aguado Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 350- 
353.
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mainland. On the morning of 19 July Franco’s orders to declare martial law and submit 
to his command came through the transmitter. Lt. Col. Huerta Topete, the senior military 
officer in the province, then gathered the various officers of the Army, Civil Guard and 
Carabineros to ascertain their positions. He found that the majority of these desired to 
join the rebel’s cause. Nonetheless, Huerta Topete was cautious, and did not declare 
martial law until the 20th. The Jefe de Comandancia of the Civil Guard, Lt. Col. 
Gregorio Vazquez Moscardi, who, like Gonzalez Garcia in Cadiz, was one of the few 
provincial commanders in Andalucia that joined the rebellion, put his forces at the 
disposition of the rebels, and ordered that his men from across the province converge on 
the city of Almeria. The rebels appeared to have the upper hand, but with the appearance 
of loyalist forces and the arrival of the destroyer Lepanto the next day, a cautious Huerta 
Topete decided that his position was untenable and surrendered. Undaunted, a handful of 
officers and civil guards took refuge in the provincial command with the determination to 
resist. During the siege of the casa-cuartel, the Civil Guard received another telegram 
from Franco, who ordered Vazquez Moscardi to take command of the province, and to 
execute Huerta Topete if he resisted. Nonetheless, the besieged Civil Guard garrison
Q O
surrendered at six o’clock that evening.
In Granada, the seat of the 8th Civil Guard Regiment, there was a division of attitudes. 
The Regimental Commander, Colonel Ramon Gonzalez Lopez, along with most of the 
middle-ranking officers, sympathized with the rebels, whilst the Provincial Commander, 
Lt. Col. Fernando Vidal Pagan maintained an uneasy loyalty to the government that was
93 Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Munoz, Politico y  guerra civil en Almeria, pp. 109-120; Blazquez Miguel, 
HMGCE, I, pp. 170-174.
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dictated more out of a sense of duty rather than conviction.. The Civil Governor, Cesar 
Torres, ordered Vidal to distribute the rifles stored in the Artillery garrison to the workers. 
Vidal sent Lieutenant Mariano Pelayo Navarro to the Artillery garrison to collect the 
arms. When the officers there refused, he joined their cause. The issue of handing over 
arms was the key point of contention between civil and military authorities, particularly 
as the latter were biding their time, waiting for the right moment to join the rebellion.
Two days went by without action, and General Pozas, now Interior Minister, sent a direct 
order to Vidal to distribute arms to the workers. Under pressure, Vidal issued the order to 
his subordinates, who refused to carry it out. As tensions rose amongst the military and 
civil guard forces, General Campms declared martial law. Lt. Col. Vidal, now almost 
completely isolated, was arrested by the insurgents when they occupied the Gobiemo 
Civil. When asked by one of the rebel officers to explain his actions, Vidal responded “I 
was doing my duty”. Nonetheless, the insurgents were only able to gain control of the 
city of Granada, unable to exert their influence across the province. As such, they 
concentrated their forces in the provincial capital until they could be relieved by rebel 
columns proceeding from Sevilla.94
A similar situation occurred in Cordoba. The Commander of the 18th Civil Guard 
Regiment, Colonel Francisco Marin Garrido, and the Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. 
Mariano Rivero Lopez, remained loyal to the government, though they both had 
displayed some sympathy for the conspiracy previously. Like Vidal in Granada, the two 
officers’ sense of discipline overcame their distaste for the Popular Front Government.
94 Arraras Iribarren, Historia de la Cruzada, III, p. 285; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 114-118; Aguado 
Sanchez, Historia de la Guardia Civil, V, pp. 346-348.
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When the news of the rebellion broke out, Colonel Marin presented himself to the 
Provincial Governor, stating “I have come here out of duty. The Civil Guard and I 
personally are at the side of the legitimate government of the Republic. We await your 
orders to act.” Shortly thereafter, Civil Guard Captain Amador Martin arrived in the 
provincial capital with the mayor of Penarroyo, and offered to send several truckloads of 
miners and dynamite to defend Cordoba from any attempted uprising. Unfortunately for 
both officers, the governor, Rodriguez de Leon, was in league with the rebels and 
disregarded their offers of assistance. Nonetheless, neither officers made any further 
gestures to prevent the success of the rebellion in Cordoba, in which the provincial 
second-in-command Major Luis Zurdo Martin and Civil Guard Lt. Col. Bruno Ibanez 
Galvez were willing accomplices.
When Colonel Marin went to meet with Army Colonel Ciriaco Cascajo Ruiz, the leading 
military officer and conspirator in Cordoba, the Civil Guard commander refused to join 
the rebels. Colonel Cascajo then relieved him of his command, replacing him with Major 
Zurdo. Insulted by this affront to his authority, Marin barked at his subordinate, “Major, 
you are not compelled to follow any other orders than mine. This is indiscipline, and 
there is no reason for it.” Unmoved, Major Zurdo replied in a manner which reflected 
many Civil Guard officers when confronted with commanders -  including Pozas himself 
-  that refused to see, in their minds, the call of the times: “Colonel, here there is no other 
discipline than that which our uniforms demands. This is above any political 
considerations.” Zurdo then gave Marin ten minutes to surrender the Gobiemo Civil 
before it would be shelled by artillery. In control of the government, Zurdo was named
298
Chief of Public Order in the city, but was later replaced by his much more brutal co­
conspirator, Lt. Col. Ibanez Galvez, or “Don Bruno” as he infamously came to be known. 
Nonetheless, the rebels were only secure in their control of the provincial capital and 
some of its hinterland, and thus were obliged to take defensive positions until 
reinforcements arrived from Sevilla.95
The rebellion in Malaga displayed some similarities to that of Almeria. Martial law was 
declared on the 18th once news arrived of the uprising in Morocco. The rebellion 
enjoyed widespread support amongst the Civil Guard, with the exception of the 
Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. Aqiulino Porras Rodriguez. Nonetheless, the rebels, 
with the aid of two Civil Guard units, failed to capture the Gobiemo Civil, and with the 
mobilization of loyalist forces and the threat of naval bombardment, the rebels 
surrendered. While the timidity of General Paxtot, who was in charge of the rebellion in 
Malaga, was a factor for its failure, poor planning and implementation also played their 
parts. As one rebel Civil Guard officer explained in his trial, martial law was declared 
and the rebellion initiated before the concentration of Civil Guard forces was carried out, 
a necessary move given the loyalty of the Assault Guards.96 The role of the Commander 
of the 16th Civil Guard Regiment, Colonel Fulgencio Gomez Carrion, was ambiguous. 
Recognizing the validity of the declaration of martial law, Carrion ordered his men out to 
support the rebels. Yet, upon receiving Pozas’ circular about opposing the military rebels, 
he sent a telegram to Madrid to ask for clarification, explaining that he had placed
95 Francisco Moreno Gomez, La Guerra Civil en Cordoba, 1936-1939 (Madrid, 1986), pp. 16-27; Jose 
Tom&s Valverde, Memorias de un alcalde (Madrid, 1961), pp. 180, 185; Arraras Iribarren, Historia de la 
Cruzada, hi, pp. 240-265; Blazquez Miguel, HMGCE, I, pp. 140-143.
96 The declaration of Captain Roman Duran is quoted in Juan A. Ramos Hitos, Guerra Civil en Malaga, 
1936-1937 (Malaga, 2003), p. 62.
299
himself at the orders of the military authorities, as the decree of martial law was issued 
prior to him receiving orders from Madrid. As the rebellion faltered in Malaga, his 
professions of loyalty became more profuse after he received a terse response from Pozas. 
Carrion then returned his men back to their barracks.97
This ambiguity spared Colonel Carrion from being immediately dismissed and arrested 
by the official authorities, but the weakening of Madrid’s control over affairs in the 
immediate wake of the rebellion meant that this was only a temporary respite for the 
Colonel. Indeed, as anarchist militias exerted their control over Malaga and its province, 
they murdered a considerable number of Civil Guard officers, Carrion being amongst 
them. Yet, this example of “red terror” was indiscriminate when it came to dealing with 
an institution that was long seen as the “enemies of the people” and many of whose 
members were complicit in the rebellion. As a result, despite his loyalty to the Popular 
Front government, Lt. Col. Porras Rodriguez, the Provincial Commander of the corps, 
also fell victim to revolutionary justice. It should be mentioned, though, that 
counterrevolutionary justice was even more sanguinary, as loyal civil guards suffered 
even more at the hands of the Nationalists once they captured Malaga in February 1937. 
According to a list sent later that same month by the newly appointed Jefe de 
Comandancia, Lt. Col. Jose Enriquez Ramirez, to the Inspector-General of the Civil 
Guard in the Nationalist Zone, 56 loyalist civil guards were executed, 37 sentenced to life
97 Ramos Hitos, pp. 59-62, 79-123; Antonio Nadal, Guerra Civil en Malaga (Malaga, 1984), pp. 28-38; 
Thomas, Spanish Civil War, pp. 212-213.
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imprisonment, two to a prison sentence of 12 years and a day, and another received six
98years.
The province of Jaen lacked a proper military presence, and as such, the hopes of the 
conspirators lay in the support of the Civil Guard for the planned rebellion. The 
Provincial Commander was Lt. Col. Pablo Iglesias Sanchez Martinez, a practicing 
Catholic with conservative views. His immediate subordinates were Major Eduardo 
Nofuentes Montero and Major Ismael Serrano. All three officers were involved in the 
failed military coup of 1932, and consequently were hesitant about getting their fingers 
burned a second time. Thus, when pro-rebel civilian groups converged on the Provincial 
Command looking for arms, despite the considerable sympathy for the insurgency 
amongst the middle-ranking officers, Lt. Col. Iglesias refused to distribute any weapons, 
claiming that the rebellion was premature, and hence doomed to fail. Iglesias’ decision 
hampered all preparations for a rebellion, while at the same time the considerable 
working class organizations began to mobilize for the defense of the government. This 
situation did not sit well with the majority of the officers and men of the provincial 
garrison. Friction between the Popular Front committees and civil guards was frequent, 
only increasing disaffection. As elsewhere, as men were sent to fight the advancing 
rebels or to recapture towns under their control, they took advantage of the first 
opportunity to cross over to the insurgents. One such group in Andujar, under the 
command of Captain Santiago Cortes, after coming under continued pressure to distribute
98 Cervero, Los rojos de la Guardia Civil, pp. 392-393. It should be noted that these men would no longer 
have been officially civil guards as the corps had been abolished six months beforehand, though this has 
little bearing on the sheer numbers of those former civil guards punished for their service to the Popular 
Front government.
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arms to the workers, gathered provisions and arms and installed themselves in the 
Santuario de Nuestra Seiiora de la Cabeza, where they soon found themselves besieged 
by militiamen and loyalist forces. This siege was the longest of all those suffered by 
insurgent forces, lasting nine months, but ended in surrender after Condes was mortally 
wounded."
While defections amongst the Civil Guard were frequent, they should have come to little 
surprise. News of yet another contingent of civil guards passing over to the rebels often 
provoked anger amongst the militias, anti-fascist committees and the authorities in 
Madrid. Yet it would be somewhat ingenuous to interpret the suspicion directed towards 
the Benemerita was due simply to their occurrence. Indeed, civil guards had been seen 
even before July 1936 and an anachronism within the Republic by many leftist sectors; in 
the revolutionary atmosphere that followed the military rebellion, this was even more the 
case.
Nonetheless, in the common struggle against the insurgents, differences needed to be set 
aside. The breakdown of the state apparatus in the wake of the military rebellion brought 
loyal civil guards and militiamen together into makeshift coalitions in order to achieve 
their common objective of defending the Republic. The journalist Ramon J. Sender -  a
99 For a personal, though exaggerated, account of the events surrounding the siege by one of the Civil 
Guard officers, see Captain Reparaz and Antonio Tresgallo de Sousa, Antonio, Desde el Cuartel General 
de Miaja al Santuario de la Virgen de la Cabeza: 30 dlas dlas con los rojo-separatistas, sierviendo a 
Espana. Relato de un protagonista (Valladolid, 1937). Francisco Cobo Romero, La Guerra Civily la 
repression franquista en laprovincia de Jaen, 1936-1950 (Jaen, 1993), pp. 9-55; Luis Miguel Sanchez 
Tostado, La Guerra Civil en Jaen (Jaen, 2006), pp. 59-78, 108-112; Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito 
Popular, I, pp. 96, 283, 1070-1071. The importance of this event for the Civil Guard can be seen in the 
extraordinary amount of space given to it in the semioficial Historia de la Guardia Civil. More pages are 
dedicated to the siege of the Santuario than any other single incident in the corps’ history: Aguado Sdnchez, 
Historia de la Guardia Civil, VI, pp. 26-108.
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fierce critic of the Civil Guard himself -  noted one incident he witnessed alongside the 
militias in the Guadarrama: “A youth, a newspaper seller, said to me, pointing to a 
sergeant of the Civil Guard.
‘That man broke my father’s arm when he was beating him in October, 
1934.’
‘And now you are going to fight by his side?’
“He looked at me in astonishment:
‘If we all think of liquidating our personal wrongs at a time like this, we are 
done for.’100
The sight of Civil Guards fighting alongside loyalist elements in defense of the regime 
was also seen as a sign of imminent victory, if not the righteousness of the government’s 
cause. As Manuel Cruells, a university student in Barcelona and a Catalan nationalist, 
exclaimed when he saw Colonel Escobar salute Companys and put his men under the 
orders of the Generalitat,
It was unforgettable. Anyone who hasn’t lived that moment can’t imagine what it 
was like. The apotheosis of 19 July: the guardia civil on the people’s side! We 
knew we must win now...101
The revolutionary atmosphere in places such as Barcelona could, at times, have its effect 
even on the men of the Civil Guard. As one mill-owner’s wife describes a scene that 
symbolized the very essence of this process:
100 Ramon J. Sender, The War in Spain: A Personal Narrative (London, 1937), p. 38
101 Quoted in Fraser, Blood o f Spain, p. 68
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When I saw a guardia sitting in a car in the Plaza de Catalunya, his tunic 
unbuttoned, his tricorn pushed to the back of his head and smoking a cigar, I knew 
there was no law and order any more, knew that the guardia civil had become 
infected by the populace.102
Loyalist Civil Guard units often played as crucial a role in the defense of the government 
as their disloyal colleagues did in the success of the insurgents. While many Civil 
Guards crossed over to the rebels once reaching the front line, there were those who 
continued to loyally serve the Popular Front government and played important roles as 
military instructors for the largely untrained militiamen. Captains Fernando Condes 
Romero, Francisco Galan, Juan Ibarrola Orueta and Lieutenant Colonel Royo Salsamendi 
all led mixed units of civil guards, soldiers and militiamen in the sierras surrounding 
Madrid, halting the advance of Mola’s Army of the North. The Civil Guard’s presence in 
the front lines translated into high casualty rates. In the first three months of fighting on 
the Madrid front, official sources report 3125 civil guards were killed in action.103 The 
Francoist military historian, Ramon Salas Larrazabal gives a total figure of 6579 
casualties on the Madrid front alone, the highest rate amongst the regular forces fighting 
in this zone after the Infantry.104
The formation of mixed columns of civil guards and workers was indeed an exceptional 
occurrence. This was especially true when the militiamen were anarcho-syndicalists. On 
the Aragon front, the anarchist militia leader Satumino Carod dubbed his unit the Carod-
102 Quoted in Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 110.
103 Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid”, p. 268, 269nl0.
104 Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular, I, pp. 560-562n50.
Ferrer column in recognition of the services of Lieutenant Jose Ferrer Bonet, who served 
as his military adviser. The presence of Lt. Ferrer and his 80 civil guards was not 
digested easily by Carod’s fellow anarchists, particularly once he began to militarize the 
unit in an effort to increase its efficiency. This produced a flood of desertions, but Carod 
stood firm. He explained:
It was understandable. For many years I had spoken to the peasants of Aragon 
not only about their problems ... but of ideas. Opposition to capitalism, the state, 
the church, the military. They drank in these ideas; and now, when the revolution 
was happening, they couldn’t understand when I spoke of the need for 
militarization, of the need to respect republican institutions and political parties, 
the need to organize new town councils, new organs of authority. They simply 
left the column. But in their home villages great pressure was put on them to 
return. Many came back. I addressed them :4 You can rejoin the column, but first 
you will have to do a fortnight’s training. And your instructors will be the 
guardia civil' Imagine telling a CNT militant he had to accept orders from a 
guardia\ But I wasn’t going to back down. ‘In accepting, you will be 
demonstrating your willingness to become good combatants.’ They accepted the 
training.. .105
Yet differences in ideologies and mutual suspicions that had been engrained over the 
years were sometimes insuperable. Militia committees pressured the government to 
purge the ranks of those civil guards serving on the front, one of these being Royo
105 Quoted in Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 133. Captain Ferrer Bonet was previously stationed in Tarragona 
before being sent northwards towards Zaragoza: Salas Larrazabal, Historia del Ejercito Popular, I, p. 997.
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Salsamendi. Lt. Col. Royo Salsamendi fell foul of his erstwhile militia allies when he 
attempted to impose discipline in those units under his command. When civil guards in 
his unit began to defect en masse to the advancing rebel columns, militia leaders 
attributed this to a lack of loyalty on the part of Royo Salsamendi. As such, he was 
imprisoned and his reward for loyal service to the Popular Front government was to be 
murdered by anarchist militiamen.106 Loyalty to the Popular Front was no guarantee of 
safety, for in the turbulent and uncertain atmosphere in the Republican Zone during the 
first phase of the Civil War, suspicion and blame found easy targets in the supposed 
“enemies of the people”. This could take a particularly sinister form, as with the murder 
of fifty-one civil guards imprisoned in the “cheka” of the Spartacus anarchist column in
107November 1936. Incidents such as these only provoked more defections. Julian 
Zugazagoitia, a Socialist and Interior Minister from May 1937 to April 1938, tells the 
story of a loyal Civil Guard sergeant who eventually passed over to the Nationalists. 
Before doing so, this sergeant prepared a letter to his commanding officer to explain his 
actions. In this he wrote that, despite his loyal service to the government and his own 
republicanism, he found the disdain and distrust to which he was constantly subjected too 
much to bear. Zugazagoitia noted that this was not an isolated case.108
The situation provoked by the military rebellion and subsequent civil war ultimately 
brought the end of the Civil Guard in the Republican Zone. The abolition of the corps, 
desired by many on the Left back in 1931, was now not only possible, but a necessity
106 Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid”, pp. 267-268.
107 Cervero, Los rojas de la Guardia Civil, Chapter 5; Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid”, pp. 
279-283.
108 Julian Zugazagoitia, Guerra y  vicisitudes de los espanoles (Barcelona, 2001), 131.
306
giving the reigning atmosphere and the need for the government to adjust to it in order to 
re-establish the authority of the central state. Thus, on 30 August 1936, the Civil Guard 
was dissolved and renamed as the National Republican Guard {Guardia Nacional 
Republicana, GNR), and thus started a process of politicization not unlike that carried out 
by the Nationalists (and later under the Franco dictatorship).109 While a reduced core of 
civil guards went on to serve in the GNR, for all intensive purposes, the force established 
by the Duque de Ahumada had disappeared in Loyalist-controlled Spain, thus bringing to 
an end the tense relationship between the Republicans and the Civil Guard.
109 For a discussion of the GNR, and its heavy politization, see Lopez Corral, “La Guardia Civil en Madrid”, 
pp. 270-279,283-286; Cervero, Los rojas de la Guardia Civil, Chapter 8.
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